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FOREWORD
In the fall of 2008, the Naval War College Press published Milan Vego’s Major Naval 
Operations as Newport Paper 32. The present work represents a sequel of sorts to 
that study, or perhaps more precisely, an elaboration on it in the form of detailed 
studies of three major naval operations of World War II. These three, initiated by 
imperial Japan, took place in the Pacific and resulted in the battles of the Coral Sea, 
Midway/Aleutians, and the Philippine Sea. All the cases provide ample background 
on the geographic and strategic context of the operations, as well as an account 
of the unfolding of the action utilizing much primary source material in, espe-
cially, American and Japanese archives. Finally, and most valuably, Vego in each 
case identifies lessons learned from it for a proper appreciation of naval operational 
art. As Vego will argue, these lessons are of more than merely historical interest for 
today’s U.S. Navy.
Dr. Milan Vego is a professor in the Joint Military Operations Department of 
the Naval War College. He is the author of Operational Art (2001) and Joint Op-
erational Warfare (2008), an authoritative textbook currently in use as part of the 
department’s teaching curriculum, as well as numerous articles for military publi-
cations in this country and abroad.
Carnes Lord
Director, Naval War College Press

PREFACE
The idea for this book came from Dr. Carnes Lord, director of the Naval War Col-
lege Press, in the spring of 2012. He suggested that it would be a good thing to have 
a historical monograph on selected major naval operations. I agreed, because the 
new book would be a sequel to my Major Naval Operations, published as Newport 
Paper 32 in 2008. The book would provide an analysis from the operational-art 
perspective of selected major naval operations conducted in World War II. The 
plan was to include one of my articles (on the Port Moresby–Solomons operation) 
that have appeared in the Naval War College Review, plus two new case studies: the 
Midway-Aleutians and A-Go operations. 
The main purpose is to stimulate interest in the study of the theory and practice 
of major naval operations. This is an area that the U.S. Navy and other Western na-
vies have given short shrift. Too much focus is given to “strike operations”—that is, 
tactics—while operational art is either ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. Yet major 
naval operations should form the very heart of a doctrine for operational war at sea. 
Another purpose of this monograph is to provide a source for studying major naval 
operations as part of the curriculum of the Joint Military Operations Department 
here at the Naval War College. 
The main body of this work comprises two parts. The first part deals with ma-
jor fleet-versus-fleet operations conducted during the Pacific War, 1941–45. These 
clashes resulted from imminent amphibious landings on defended shores—the Port 
Moresby and Midway-Aleutians operations. The second part (chapters 3 through 
6) describes an operation fought in defense (by one side, in each case) of ground 
forces that had already landed on an enemy-held shore (the A-Go operation). 
The internal organization of each chapter (and of part 2, taken together) is 
roughly identical. Any major operation is planned and executed within a much 
broader and more important framework determined by policy and strategy. Hence, 
the strategic setting for each major naval operation is described in some detail. 
For each case study there is a section on the physical features and weather/climate 
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in the theater of operation. Another section analyzes the various elements of the 
theater’s geography (positions, distances, naval/air bases, lines of operation, lines of 
communications, etc.). Command structures are then addressed; a sound theater 
command structure or organization is a key prerequisite of command and control. 
Further, decisions on and the subsequent planning and execution of major naval 
operations are largely based in the accuracy, timeliness, and relevance of informa-
tion available to the commanders. One of the greatest advantages the Allies pos-
sessed in both the European and the Pacific theaters was their ability to intercept 
and then decode and then read most of the enemy’s radio messages. Hence, each 
case study contains a detailed description and analysis of what the opposing opera-
tional commanders knew at the time they made decisions. The bulk of each case 
study (chapter or part) is devoted to analysis of the opposing plans and their execu-
tion. Each ends with an extensive conclusion and outline of operational lessons. 
No study of any major operation or campaign is of practical use unless its possible 
operational lessons are identified and studied. Finally, each case study is accompa-
nied by several detailed maps of the respective theater and phases of the operation. 
In writing this monograph, emphasis was given to the use of primary sources 
held at the Military Branch, National Archives and Records Administration, in 
College Park, Maryland. 
This work would not have been possible without the cooperation and help of 
many people. My heartfelt thanks are to Dr. Lord for his staunch and consistent 
support for the project. I am also very grateful to Capt. Alan Abramson, USN, 
chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department, and his executive officer, 
Professor (and Capt., USN [Ret.]) Fred Horne. Thanks to them I was released from 
various administrative duties and departmental meetings to have more time for 
this project. 
I am also greatly indebted for a superb job and great patience to Pelham Boyer 
of the Naval War College Press, for copyediting and preparing the manuscript and 
previous articles for proofs; to Mr. John Lanzieri, for typesetting; to Ms. Shannon 
Cole and Mr. Albert F. Fassbender III, for careful proofreading; and to Mr. Art 
Lamoureux, who prepared all the maps and figures. Finally, and not the least, I 
am grateful for consistent support provided by Ms. Elizabeth Davis, the Visual 
Communications Department head, and Mr. Jeremiah Lenihan, lead specialist in 
the Desktop Publishing Division. 
Milan Vego
Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 
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INTRODUCTION
The term “major operation” is used in the U.S. military to make a clear distinction 
between an operation aimed at an operational objective and one involving almost 
any scale and type of employment of combat forces, including logistics and train-
ing. In contrast, the term “operation” as used in most European militaries, notably 
the German and the Soviet/Russian, is essentially identical in its meaning to the 
term “major operation” as used by the United States. 
In generic terms, a major naval operation consists of a series of related major 
and minor naval tactical actions conducted by diverse combat arms and meant to 
accomplish an operational (sometimes partly strategic) objective in a given mari-
time theater. A major naval operation is planned and conducted by a single com-
mander in accordance with an operational idea (scheme) and a common plan. Ma-
jor naval operations are normally integral parts of maritime or land campaigns, 
but they can sometimes be conducted outside the framework of a campaign. In the 
littorals, major naval operations are planned and conducted with the participation 
of combat arms of other services, air forces in particular. 
By accomplishing an operational objective, a major naval operation drastically 
changes the operational situation in that part of the maritime theater. However, if 
it is only partially successful, the operational situation is most likely to remain as 
it was. A major naval operation can also have a strategic effect, although its main 
objective is operational in scale.
The best and most proven way of avoiding attrition at the operational or strategic 
level is by planning and executing major operations or campaigns, respectively. By 
conducting a major naval operation, the stronger side at sea can defeat the weaker 
side in an ocean/sea area and within a time frame of its own choosing. Major naval 
operations are normally planned and conducted when decisive results must be ac-
complished in the shortest possible time and with the least loss.1 Successful major 
naval/joint operations can contribute considerably to shortening a war at sea. 
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“Tactical actions” in a major naval operation can be fought on the surface, un-
derwater, in the air, and, in some cases, on the coast. Their results are not just a 
simple arithmetic sum; tactical actions are all related and conducted within a given 
operational framework. A tactical action fought outside the framework of a major 
naval operation would generally not contribute to the accomplishment of the as-
signed operational objective and therefore would represent a waste of resources 
and sorely needed time. 
Naval tactical actions can range from actions without use of weapons, such as 
patrolling and surveillance, to attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and finally naval 
battles. As the term implies, they are aimed at accomplishing tactical objectives in 
a given part of a maritime theater. In some cases, a series of diverse tactical actions 
conducted over time can lead to the accomplishment of an operational objective. 
A major naval operation is not an artificial construct but a result of long evolu-
tion in the methods of combat employment of naval forces. In the era of sail and 
until the late nineteenth century, the principal method of combat employment of 
the fleet to attain operational and sometimes strategic objectives was “decisive na-
val battle.” Some “decisive battles”—for example, Trafalgar in October 1805—led to 
drastic changes in the operational and sometimes even strategic situations. 
The methods of combat employment of naval forces gradually changed in the 
middle and late nineteenth century because of the effects of new technological ad-
vances. Great improvements in steam propulsion and the invention of the internal 
combustion engine made it possible to fit powerful plants on even small ships. 
The introduction of torpedoes and mines led to the design of new, small platforms 
capable of posing serious threats to larger ships. This, in turn, led to a proliferation 
of small warships of all types and classes. The numerical strength of the major na-
vies steadily increased. In addition to battleships and cruisers, these fleets included 
a large number of smaller surface combatants, such as destroyers, torpedo craft, 
gunboats, and auxiliaries.2 
The importance of a decisive battle became steadily less with the increase in 
size and corresponding changes in the composition of the major navies. Instead of 
comprising a single decisive battle to accomplish an operational and even strategic 
objective, war at sea between two strong opponents was fought over a large area 
and almost continuously. Numerous tactical actions were conducted by both large 
and smaller surface combatants. The deployment of forces became an integral part 
of a major clash between fleets. 
As early as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, war at sea was conducted 
almost continuously. It consisted of a series of major and minor naval actions all 
related in terms of purpose, place, and time. These actions took place over large 
parts of the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and even the Pacific Ocean.3 In retrospect, 
the battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was the last “decisive” naval battle in history. 
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This was not recognized by the theoreticians and practitioners of the day. Up to the 
beginning of World War I, all major navies planned to fight a “decisive battle” (also 
called “general fleet action”) aimed at obtaining command of the sea in a single 
clash of battle fleets. 
During World War I several large-scale fleet-versus-fleet actions took place in 
the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. Of 
these, the battle of Jutland, fought on 31 May–1 June 1916, came closest to what 
is known as a major naval operation. It comprised a series of small engagements 
and attacks aimed at an operational objective. The Germans’ plan was to bring the 
strength of the British Grand Fleet down to parity with their own High Seas Fleet.4 
The British operational objective was the destruction of the High Seas Fleet. Both 
sides also conducted a series of actions aimed to provide combat support to their 
battle fleets.5 
The first major naval operation in that war against an enemy coast was conduct-
ed by the Austro-Hungarian fleet, shortly after Italy’s decision to enter the war on 
the side of the Entente powers in May 1915. The main objective of that operation 
was to disrupt and significantly delay the movement and transport of mobilized 
Italian troops by rail along the Adriatic’s western coast. Another objective was to 
create fear and possibly panic among the Italians in the coastal area.6
During World War I, the first major joint naval operations emerged; the En-
tente’s amphibious landing at Gallipoli in April 1915 and the German landing on 
the Latvian coast in October 1917 (Operation ALBION) are the best-known exam-
ples. The principal objectives of the Gallipoli landing were to take Turkey out of the 
war, open a direct link with the Entente’s embattled Russian ally, force the Germans 
to shift troops from the Russian front, and influence Greece to side openly with 
the Entente powers.7 ALBION, conducted by the German navy and the army, was 
more successful. Its operational objective was to open the Gulf of Riga and thereby 
threaten the rear of the Russian 12th Army, defending the Baltic coast.8 
World War I at sea proved that the fleets of the major opponents were too large 
and deployed too widely to be destroyed during a single battle or even a couple of 
them. It signaled the final demise of the decisive battle and the general fleet action 
and demonstrated that operational objectives in the theater could be accomplished 
only by a series of related naval battles and engagements, sequenced and synchro-
nized in time and place—a major naval operation, in modern terms. Deployment, 
contact between opposing forces, pursuit, and withdrawal/redeployment were 
meshed to constitute a seamless whole. The entire naval operation was planned, 
prepared, and conducted by a single commander. It was based on a certain idea and 
a common plan.
In World War II, all the major navies conducted, independently and in coopera-
tion with other armed services, a large number of major naval operations in all the 
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maritime theaters. Among many major naval operations, a few stand out because of 
their importance to the course of the war. Major clashes of opposing carrier forces 
in the Pacific—notably the Japanese Port Moresby–Solomons operation (the battle 
of the Coral Sea, for the United States) in May 1942, the Midway-Aleutians opera-
tion (the battle of Midway), the A-Go operation (the battle of the Philippine Sea) in 
June 1942, and the Leyte operation in October 1944—were not truly “battles” but 
major naval operations. Several major naval operations were also conducted in the 
Atlantic during the long German struggle to cut off Allied maritime traffic and the 
Allied struggle to protect it. Examples are the German attempt cut off the Allied 
traffic in the northern Atlantic by employing the battleship Bismarck and a heavy 
cruiser in May 1941 (Operation RHEINUEBUNG, or Rhine Exercise) and the escape 
of the two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) through the English 
Channel in February 1942 (Operation CERBERUS). The British carrier attack on the 
Italian naval base at Taranto in November 1940 (JUDGEMENT) and the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (HAWAII) were examples of major naval 
operations aimed to destroy a major part of an enemy fleet at its base. Also, several 
major naval operations were conducted by German U-boats against large Allied 
convoys in the northern Atlantic in the spring of 1943. The Allies conducted many 
major operations in the Mediterranean to defend their maritime traffic there; the 
best known are a major dual-convoy operation to Malta in June 1942 (Operation 
HARPOON/VIGOROUS) and a major convoy operation to Malta in August 1942 (PED-
ESTAL). At the same time, attacks on major Allied convoys were offensive major 
naval operations for the Axis forces. Major amphibious operations were conducted 
by all belligerents in several maritime theaters. For example, the Allied landings on 
Guadalcanal in August 1942 (WATCHTOWER), in the Gilberts in November 1943 
(GALVANIC), Sicily in July 1943 (HUSKY), and Salerno in September 1943 (AVA-
LANCHE) were examples of such major naval/joint operations.
Since the end of World War II only a few major naval operations have been 
conducted. One reason is that most regional wars have not involved major navies 
on both sides. The amphibious landing by United Nations forces at Inchon in Sep-
tember 1950 (Operation CHROMITE), the blockade of North Korea’s coast during 
the Korean War (1950–53), and the British recapture of the Falklands in April–June 
1982 (CORPORATE) are examples of major naval operations in the postwar era.
In terms of its principal purpose, a major naval operation can be offensive or 
defensive. An offensive major naval operation is normally planned by the stronger 
side at sea, but one can be planned by the side on the defensive. Normally, the 
stronger side at sea would mount a single major naval operation or several in suc-
cession to obtain and then maintain sea control in a specific part of a maritime 
theater. Such operations can also be designed to reduce greatly or eliminate the 
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threat posed by a numerically larger force, to facilitate operations in another part 
of the maritime theater. An offensive major naval operation can also be planned as 
part of a defensive campaign.
On the basis of the degree of participation of naval forces and other services, it 
is possible to differentiate major naval operations as naval, joint (multiservice), or 
combined (multinational). A major naval operation is conducted predominantly 
by the navy, although the air force or even ground forces can take part as well. A 
major naval/joint operation is planned and conducted by forces of the navy but 
with more substantial participation by one or more of the other services. In a mari-
time theater encompassing a large ocean or sea area, major naval operations would 
be conducted with the significant participation of the air force; ground forces may 
be involved as well. In contrast, major naval operations in littoral waters are likely 
to be conducted with the participation of all three services. All major amphibious 
landing operations are inherently joint, as are major operations against the ene-
my’s maritime trade, as well as the defense and protection of maritime trade in the 
littorals. 
In generic terms, the main purpose of a major naval/joint operation today in the 
case of a high-intensity conventional war at sea can be 
• Fleet versus fleet (aimed to destroy the enemy fleet at sea and/or in its 
bases) 
• Fleet versus shore (amphibious landing on the opposed shore or to destroy 
the enemy’s coastal installations/facilities) 
• Attack on the enemy’s maritime trade (including military shipping) 
• Defense and protection of friendly maritime trade (including military  
shipping) 
• Destruction of an enemy’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces or protection 
of one’s own, and support of friendly ground forces in offensive/defensive 
operations on the coast.
Major naval operations represent an area of study of operational art that West-
ern naval theoreticians and planners have generally neglected. Too much emphasis 
is given instead to advanced technologies and tactics of weapons, at the expense 
of combined-arms tactics. The absence of an immediate and serious threat at sea 
today should not be allowed to prevent the development of sound naval theory and 
doctrine and the training of naval forces to prepare, plan, and execute major naval/
joint operations as part of land campaigns in the littorals or a maritime campaign. 
A major regional war with a strong opponent at sea may seem improbable, but in 
fact it is not unlikely. Experience shows that the major threats to national interests 
can emerge quickly and with little warning. Navies primarily exist, and are main-
tained, not to conduct operations short of war but to fight and win high-intensity, 
conventional wars at sea. 
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I The Port Moresby–Solomons Operation and  
Allied Reaction, 27 April–11 May 1942
The ultimately unsuccessful Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby in May 1942 is commonly referred to as the “battle of the Coral Sea.” Almost all at-tention is usually focused on the decisive tactical engagement between the 
opposing carrier forces. However, the Japanese effort—formally code-named Op-
eration MORESBY (MO) and often called the “Port Moresby–Solomons operation” 
—was in formal terms a major offensive and joint operation, planned and executed 
to accomplish an operational objective, the capture of Port Moresby, on the Austra-
lian territory of New Guinea (now Papua New Guinea). For the Allies, in contrast, 
“the battle of the Coral Sea” was a major defensive and joint operation aimed at pre-
venting an enemy landing at Port Moresby. Both U.S. and Australian naval forces 
and land-based aircraft took part. 
The Japanese inflicted larger losses on the Allies than they suffered and hence 
won a clear tactical victory; however, the Japanese failed to accomplish the ultimate 
objective of their operation, and hence the Allies won an operational victory. The 
operation was the first major setback for the Japanese in their drive, which had 
started with their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, to expand 
their control in the Pacific. It is a powerful example of the value and importance of 
the human factor in warfare. More generally, and despite the passage of time, the 
Port Moresby–Solomons operation provides a number of operational lessons of 
great importance to current and future naval leaders.
The Strategic Setting
By the beginning of 1942, the strategic situation in the southwestern and South 
Pacific had become extremely serious for the Allies. The Japanese were on the verge 
of victory in the Philippines. They were making rapid progress in their invasion 
of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and thereby threatened northern Australia. 
The Japanese had included the invasion of the Bismarck Archipelago in their plan, 
developed in November 1941, for the “First Operational Stage” of the war in the 
Pacific. In their view, their major base at Truk, in the central Carolines, would not 
be secure as long as Rabaul, the capital of the Australian mandated territory, on 
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New Britain, was in enemy hands.1 Accordingly, Japanese troops captured Rabaul 
on 23 January 1942. Its fall alarmed greatly the Australian government and people; 
Australia’s Northeast Area was now virtually unprotected. The Japanese next occu-
pied the rest of New Britain, as well as the Admiralties, New Ireland, and Bougain-
ville, in the upper Solomons. The vulnerability of Australia was shown also on 19 
February 1942 when four Japanese fleet carriers conducted a massive raid on the 
port of Darwin.2
By February 1942, the Japanese had accomplished all their initial strategic ob-
jectives, at far less cost than expected. However, instead of consolidating gains, the 
Japanese leaders made the fatal mistake of deciding to expand their defense perim-
eter. Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo had initiated staff 
studies for the Second Operational Stage of the war in January 1942.3 The Plans Di-
vision of the First (Operational) Section of the Navy Section (i.e., the Naval General 
Staff) of IGHQ was a strong advocate of invading Australia. As early as December 
1941, the Naval General Staff had insisted on an invasion of strategically impor-
tant points in northern and northeastern Australia; this could be accomplished, it 
was believed, with very little expenditure in men and materiel.4 The Naval General 
Staff argued that Australia represented the greatest threat to Japanese control in 
the South Pacific, because it could serve as a base for a counteroffensive. Australia 
also possessed economic resources of great potential importance to Japan’s war in-
dustry.5 The Naval General Staff argued that only three divisions, some forty-five 
to sixty thousand troops, would be sufficient to secure the flanks and center of 
Australia’s northeastern and northern coastline.6
In contrast, the Army General Staff was opposed to any invasion of Austra-
lia. The Army had in September 1941 only fifty-one divisions (twenty-eight divi-
sions were deployed in China, thirteen in Manchukuo, and ten divisions, including 
five not fully trained, on the home islands). For the First Operational Stage, the 
army committed only eleven divisions (five from China and six from Japan) and 
achieved an enormous success in a very short period of time.7 In contrast to the 
Naval General Staff, the army estimated that it would require at least ten, possibly 
twelve divisions, or 150,000 to 200,000 men, to invade Australia. To supply and 
sustain such a force would require 1.5 to two million tons of shipping. Such a huge 
requirement would in fact destroy the national economy.8 
Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, chief of IGHQ’s Army Section (Army General Staff), 
was opposed to invasion of Australia.* He said, “If we take only part of Australia, it 
could lead to a war of attrition and escalate into total war.”9 The Army General Staff 
intended instead to strengthen the defensive perimeter against the growing enemy 
force in Australia by capturing Port Moresby and important positions in the South 
* Throughout the book Japanese surnames are given last, in the Western fashion.
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Pacific. The Japanese did not include Port Moresby as an objective in their plans 
for the First Operational Stage of war. In their view, to secure Rabaul, Port Moresby 
had to be seized; after the capture of Port Moresby, the enemy’s air strength in 
northeastern Australia would have to be neutralized.10 The army also considered 
the Solomons Archipelago to be a stepping-stone for an eventual enemy advance 
toward Japanese-held Rabaul—hence, the southernmost island of the Solomons, 
Guadalcanal, and the islands of Nauru and Ocean (modern Banaba) in the Gilberts 
had to be captured.11 The army requested the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to sup-
port the Port Moresby–Solomons operation, and the commander in chief (CINC) 
of the Combined Fleet, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, reluctantly agreed. At the same 
time, Yamamoto believed that the Port Moresby operation would not present great 
difficulties.12
The Combined Fleet started planning for the Second Operational Stage of the 
war in January 1942. Yamamoto and his chief of staff, Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki, 
had views different from those of the Naval General Staff. Yamamoto insisted 
that the IJN had to retain the initiative, and he cautioned against complacency.13 
He argued that the IJN should capture Midway and the islands of Johnston and 
Palmyra as advanced bases for an eventual landing on the Hawaiian Islands.14 He 
considered the idea of capturing New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa to be “folly.” 
Yamamoto believed that it would be difficult to hold them, some four thousand 
miles from the Japanese home islands. Moreover, the operation would not be effec-
tive, because as long as the U.S. Pacific Fleet was afloat, it could always reach Aus-
tralia by another route. Yamamoto was willing to provide ships only for the capture 
of Port Moresby and Tulagi, in the Solomons, not for other objectives in the South 
Pacific.15 The Combined Fleet plan was to destroy the British Eastern Fleet and cap-
ture Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka), thereby extending Japanese power over the central 
Indian Ocean, protecting the western flank of the NEI, and allowing the Combined 
Fleet to deal with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
On 29 January 1942, the Naval General Staff issued “Great Navy Instruction No. 
47”; the Army General Staff issued “Great Army Instruction No. 596” on 2 Febru-
ary. The Army-Navy Central Agreement stated that the “operational objectives” 
were to “invade key area in eastern British New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in 
order to blockade the communications lines between the Australian mainland and 
the region and in order to control the seas.”16 The “operational policy” to be pursued 
was that the army and the navy “will cooperate to invade the areas around Lae and 
Salamaua as soon as possible.” The navy “will seek an opportunity to independently 
invade Tulagi and establish a seaplane base on the island. The Army and the Navy 
will cooperate after the completion of the invasion of Lae and Salamaua to invade 
Port Moresby.” The navy would provide for the defense of the Lae, Salamaua, and 
Tulagi area, while the army’s responsibility would be defense of Port Moresby.17
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The original idea of invading Australia was slowly abandoned by the Naval 
General Staff. Both general staffs agreed that the best way of isolating Australia was 
by capturing Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. Sugiyama urged on Adm. Osami 
Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staff, the need for both services to study 
such an operation, dubbed FS. This option received a more favorable view in late 
February and the beginning of March 1942. On 28 February, a liaison conference 
concluded that total isolation of Australia was the key to Japan’s mastery of the 
southwestern Pacific.18 
The Combined Fleet presented this plan to the Naval General Staff, which 
brought it to the attention of the army. The army supported eliminating the Brit-
ish fleet from the Indian Ocean and cooperating with the Germans in the Mid-
dle East but protested strongly the capture of Ceylon as premature. Army leaders 
were concerned that if they agreed that troops were available, the navy might 
divert their scarce resources for Pacific operations. Because of the army’s objec-
tions and the lack of response from Germany, IGHQ decided to limit operations 
in the Indian Ocean to massive raids by the First Air Fleet (the carrier striking 
force) against Ceylon and enemy shipping in the Bay of Bengal in early April. 
This operation would tie up five of the navy’s six large carriers until the end of 
the month. Then at least three carriers (Akagi, Sōryū, and Hiryū) would have to 
return to the homeland for upkeep and refitting; the First Air Fleet would not be 
ready to conduct another major operation until the end of May.19 
The differences between the navy and the army regarding the objectives in 
the Second Operational Stage of the war were heatedly discussed during late 
January and February 1942. On 7 March, the services tried to resolve the dispute 
at the Imperial Liaison Conference in Tokyo. On 13 March an agreement was 
finally reached in a document entitled “Fundamental Outline of Recommen-
dations for Future War Leadership.” In it the option of invading Australia was 
dropped.20
On this basis, in mid-March the Combined Fleet formulated a strategic plan 
for the Second Operational Stage of the war. The plan contemplated the capture 
of Midway Island in order to lure the U.S. Pacific Fleet into a “decisive battle.” 
From Yamamoto’s perspective, a great advantage of this plan was that it would 
require minimal participation by the army and so would not risk an army veto 
in IGHQ. The Combined Fleet plan was the subject of the discussion at a con-
ference held at IGHQ on 2–3 April. At the conference the Naval General Staff 
insisted that the Midway operation include simultaneous capture of the western 
part of the Aleutian chain, and the Combined Fleet acquiesced. Naval General 
Staff also argued that the entire Midway operation should be delayed until late 
June, because it was unwilling to divert forces from the operation to secure Ra-
baul in support of operations in the Central and North Pacific. Yet on 5 April 
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the Naval General Staff, faced with a threat by Yamamoto to resign, reluctantly 
agreed to his timetable for a Midway-Aleutians operation.21 
In late April, IGHQ’s Army and Naval General Staffs agreed to a compromise 
plan that envisaged the occupation of strategic points in New Caledonia, the Fiji 
Islands, and Samoa, to be carried out sometime after the Port Moresby–Solomons 
operation.22 For its part, the Combined Fleet’s staff argued that any South Pacific 
project should be delayed until after the Midway-Aleutians operation.23 The Na-
val General Staff replied that preparations for operations in the “South Seas” had 
already started. It also maintained that Midway was beyond the effective range of 
Japanese land-based aircraft, that it would be very difficult to garrison and supply 
even if captured, and that its loss would not significantly affect American morale. 
In the Naval General Staff ’s view, cutting the supply lines to Australia would greatly 
affect morale; it would be more likely than a threat to Midway to draw the Pacific 
Fleet into a decisive battle and thereby shorten the war.24
The differences between the Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff over 
the objectives and timetable of the Second Operational Stage of war were not re-
solved until after the Allied carrier raid on Tokyo—“the Doolittle Raid”—on 18 
April. This raid had (as its planners intended) a great and negative psychological 
effect on the Japanese strategic leadership. Both the navy and the army had failed 
in their duty to safeguard the homeland and the emperor from attack. Yamamoto 
regarded it as a “mortifying personal defeat.” The Japanese admirals and generals, 
suffering great loss of face, now overreacted and made several strategic decisions 
that proved fatal for Japan.25 Specifically, they adopted Yamamoto’s argument to 
extend the defense perimeter into the eastern part of the Central Pacific.26 A plan 
for the Second Operational Stage of war was approved by IJN Directive No. 86, 
which set the occupation of Port Moresby for early May 1942 (following raids in the 
Indian Ocean in April), that of Midway and the Aleutians for early June, and those 
of Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia for July.27 
On the American side, strategy in the Pacific was largely driven by Adm. Ernest 
J. King, appointed as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) on 
20 December 1941. On 16 March, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relieved Adm. 
Harold R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); ten days later, King assumed 
the duties of CNO in addition to those of COMINCH. Stark had been very pessi-
mistic about the Allies’ ability to stem the tide of Japanese conquests. He had been 
willing to abandon all positions west of the international date line (longitude 180° 
east), including the Philippines and Australia. In contrast, King was determined 
to oppose any further Japanese advance in the Pacific and eventually to mount 
a counteroffensive. Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, who had replaced Adm. Husband 
Kimmel as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPac) on 31 December 1941, 
was directed by King to halt the Japanese advance, keep the line of communications 
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with Australia open, and mount raids with carrier forces against the enemy’s strong-
points in the Pacific.28 
Because of the growing Japanese threat to Australia, the British had suggested 
that the U.S. Pacific Fleet assume responsibility for defending the northeastern ap-
proaches to Australia and for securing Australia’s lines of communications with the 
United States. At first, the U.S. Navy had been reluctant to assume such responsi-
bilities, the Pacific Fleet having been greatly weakened by the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. Yet King agreed on 1 January 1942 to study the problem. On 27 Janu-
ary 1942, the ANZAC (Australia–New Zealand Army Corps) Area was established. 
It encompassed eastern Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, New Caledonia, the 
New Hebrides (modern Vanuatu), the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and 
Fiji. Australia and New Zealand would provide forces and would be supported by 
the United States. The combined force would be under command of an American 
flag officer and directly subordinate to the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.29 
King appointed Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary as the ANZAC Area commander. 
Leary’s task was to cover the northeastern and eastern approaches to Australia and 
New Zealand, protect friendly shipping in the area, support the defense of island 
positions, and destroy enemy forces in the area.30 
At the end of February of 1942, the Australian chiefs of staff assessed the coun-
try’s defense in light of the fall of Singapore, the raid on Darwin, and the impend-
ing Allied collapse in the NEI. They believed that if the Japanese advanced into the 
Coral Sea to cut off Australia’s communications with North America they might 
attack Port Moresby and then the Australian mainland. In their view, Port Moresby 
was too vulnerable to be reinforced but too important to be abandoned. Another 
option for the Japanese was to advance to the Solomon Islands and then capture the 
New Hebrides and New Caledonia.31 
In the spring of 1942, the only troops available for defense of Australia were 
about 265,000 militiamen, poorly trained and equipped. The best Australian troops 
were deployed abroad—three divisions in the Middle East and elements of one 
division in Singapore, Timor, Ambon, and Rabaul.32 By mid-April, the Australian 
army at home had two first-line divisions, an armored division, and eight second-
line militia divisions. The 41st Division was then the only major force of the U.S. 
Army in Australia.33 
The key for the successful defense of Australia and New Zealand was the secu-
rity of their sea routes to the U.S. west coast and Hawaii. If these lines were cut off, 
the defense of Australia and New Zealand would become almost impossible. This 
fact was also well understood by the Japanese planners.34 The United States had in 
October 1941 started construction of airfields in the South Pacific to provide an 
alternate air-ferry route to the Philippines. However, that work had not progressed 
far enough, and none of the islands was garrisoned. The responsibility for guarding 
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the lines of communications in the South Pacific was in the hands of the U.S. Pa-
cific Fleet and the Royal Navy. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was responsible for the defense 
of this line of communications east of longitude 180° east, on the basis of “ABC-1,” 
secret American, British, and Canadian military staff conversations (against the 
event of U.S. entry into war), and the U.S. Rainbow plans. The Royal Navy had the 
responsibility to defend the area to the west as far as longitude 155° east. The Pacif-
ic Fleet had additional responsibility to support the British in their area of respon-
sibility, which included the east coast of Australia and the southeastern part of the 
Papuan Peninsula. This agreement became moot after the attack on Pearl Harbor.35 
In the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff—the main arena for discussing strategic issues 
facing the United States—the Navy and Army had fundamentally different views 
on strategy in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy realized by February that the Philippines 
were lost. Hence, it believed, the defense of Australia and of communications to 
that country was of vital interest to the Allied cause. In contrast, the Army’s chief 
of staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, was adamant that the principal effort must be a 
cross-channel invasion of Europe. The main proponent of that view was Brig. Gen. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, appointed as the War Department’s chief of War Plans Divi-
sion on 16 February 1942. For Eisenhower the main conditions for winning the war 
were defense of the United Kingdom, continued participation of the Soviet Union in 
the war, and preservation of Allied positions in the Middle East and India to prevent 
the junction of German and Japanese forces.36 In Eisenhower’s view, the Japanese 
conquest of the NEI removed one of the major reasons for making a stand in the 
southwest Pacific. Because the Japanese now controlled the region’s oil and tin and 
practically the world’s entire rubber resources, the reasons for committing more 
forces in the theater had become “less compelling than they were three months 
ago.”37
King was persistent in his efforts to establish island bases with Army troops 
and land-based aircraft. He secured a small Army force to garrison Bora Bora in 
the French Society group. By early January 1942, the Army had promised to send 
troops to Canton and Christmas Islands in the Gilberts, thereby providing addi-
tional security to Samoa. It also promised to garrison New Caledonia. On 5 Feb-
ruary, King recommended that Funafuti Atoll in the Ellice Islands (Tuvalu today) 
be made an advance base to cover Fiji and Samoa. He was concerned about the 
Japanese activity in the Gilberts and was convinced that the Allies had to interpose 
bases between them and southern Pacific islands.38 
King fought battles with Marshall and Henry H. Arnold, commanding general 
of the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF), in February and March 1942 over the alloca-
tion of scarce resources to the South Pacific. He selected Suva in Fiji and Tongatabu 
in the Tonga Islands as advance bases. Efate in the New Hebrides would be the 
first stepping-stone of a projected advance to the New Hebrides and the Solomons 
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and on to Rabaul itself.39 On 15 February, he presented these ideas to Marshall. 
However, Marshall was not enthused, suspecting (correctly) that King was plan-
ning to mount a major offensive in the South Pacific, and that ran counter to his 
own Europe-first strategy.40 
On 2 March, King sent a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining his strategy 
for the southern Pacific. He argued for measures to secure the lines of communica-
tions between the United States and Australia and to establish a series of strong-
points for a gradual advance to the Bismarck Archipelago. This would divert Japa-
nese forces from India and Australia. For the time being, he was willing to settle for 
garrisons only on Efate and Tongatabu. Yet he would not be content with the Allies’ 
remaining on the defensive in the Pacific for long.41 
On 5 March, at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with President Roosevelt, 
the main topic was Pacific strategy. Roosevelt seemed to agree with King’s views on 
the strategy to be followed in the Pacific. This in turn led King to direct Rear Adm. 
Richmond K. Turner, chief of the Navy’s War Plans Division, to develop a com-
prehensive plan for the war in the Pacific.42 On 16 March, King suffered a major 
setback: the Joint Chiefs decided to implement a War Department plan for rapid 
buildup in Europe, restricting reinforcements in the Pacific to “current commit-
ments.” Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs approved King’s request for bases at Efate 
and Tongatabu. The Army believed that three divisions in the southwestern Pa-
cific were sufficient; the Joint Chiefs approved a single AAF pursuit squadron for 
Christmas Island, Canton, Tongatabu, and Efate. Fiji and New Caledonia would 
have two squadrons each of medium bombers, about sixty in all.43 
Marshall and the Army realized the importance of keeping communications 
with Australia open but refused to allocate a significant number of aircraft or the 
best troops for the South Pacific. However, King decided to send one brigade of 
U.S. Marines to Samoa. This prompted the Army to provide small garrisons for 
Palmyra, Canton, and Christmas Island. The U.S. Navy established a fueling depot 
at Bora Bora. The importance of New Caledonia, which was also rich in minerals 
(nickel and chrome), finally convinced the Army to send what became known as 
the Americal Division (about fifteen thousand men) plus one AAF pursuit squad-
ron to the island. The majority of these troops were drawn from poorly trained 
reservists, National Guardsmen, and fresh draftees.44 
On 16 April, Turner presented his “Pacific War Campaign Plan” to King. The 
basic idea was that the Allies had to prevent the Japanese from occupying further 
territories; otherwise, the Allies would have much greater difficulty in mounting a 
counteroffensive and dislodging the Japanese from their more fortified positions. 
Turner’s plan contemplated a Pacific campaign of four phases. In the first phase, 
the United States would hold its current positions, including Port Moresby, and 
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build up forces in the southern and southwestern Pacific. In the second phase, 
U.S.-Australian forces would mount a counteroffensive aimed at recapturing the 
Solomons, eastern New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago. The third phase 
envisaged the capture of the Marshall and Caroline Archipelagoes, as well as the 
Marianas. In the final and fourth phase, the Allies would advance through the NEI 
or the Philippines, depending on which would provide greater strategic advantages. 
King approved Turner’s plan. It became the basic war strategy in the Pacific.45
King’s view on strategy in the Pacific proved to be the right response to the situ-
ation in spring 1942. Without a successful defense of Australia and of lines of com-
munications in the South Pacific, an Allied counteroffensive would have been very 
difficult, if not impossible, to start in 1942, as was done. Marshall’s insistence on 
assigning the majority of forces and resources to preparation for the cross-channel 
invasion was the right strategy. Yet Marshall went too far in his refusal to assign 
larger and better trained and equipped troops to guard the remaining Allied out-
posts in the South Pacific. 
Operating Area 
The Port Moresby–Solomons operation was conducted over a large part of the 
southwestern Pacific (see map 1). The 1,850,000-square-mile Coral Sea is very 
deep (average depth about 7,850 feet); it is bounded in the west by northeastern 
Australia and the Great Barrier Reef, off the coast of Queensland; in the north 
by southeast New Guinea, the Louisiade Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and 
the Santa Cruz Islands; and in the east by the New Hebrides and Loyalty island 
groups and New Caledonia. Its southern boundary runs along latitude 25° south. 
The distance from Cooktown to Espiritu Santo Island is about 1,300 miles, while 
Guadalcanal is about 950 miles away from latitude 25° south. Hence, the Coral Sea 
provided ample room for carrier operations. 
The Coral Sea is generally free of navigational hazards, except for numerous is-
lands and reefs on the western, northern, and eastern fringes, and the Great Barrier 
Reef to the west. The Great Barrier Reef is composed of about 2,900 individual reefs 
and nine hundred islands. It stretches for over 1,600 miles from the Torres Strait 
and the Gulf of Papua in the north to an unnamed passage between Elliot Island 
and Fraser Island in the south. 
The Louisiade Archipelago is a barrier between the Solomon Sea in the north 
and the Coral Sea in the south. The Louisiades encompass an area of about 620 
square miles—10,040 square miles, if all outliers are included. It extends from west 
to east about 260 miles and sixty-five from north to south. The largest islands in 
the Archipelago are Rossel, Misima, Pana Tinani, and Vanatinai (Tagula). Other 
important islands are Deboyne, Renard, and Conflict. The only routes through the 
Louisiades to the Solomon Sea in the north are the (poorly charted in 1942) Jomard 
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Operating area
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Passage, 4.9 nautical miles wide, and the four-mile-wide China Strait off the south-
eastern tip of New Guinea. 
In the northeast, the Coral Sea borders on the six-hundred-mile double and 
parallel chain of the Solomon Islands, stretching from the Bismarck Archipelago to 
the New Hebrides. The Solomons Archipelago consists of seven major islands hav-
ing a total land area of about 14,600 square miles. In the eastern part of the Coral 
Sea, the largest group of islands is the New Hebrides. The largest reef is the Ches-
terfield Group, some 370 miles west of the northern tip of New Caledonia. Other 
reefs in the area are the Bellona Reefs and Observatory Cay. 
The most important current in the Coral Sea is the East Australian Current, 
sixty-two miles wide and 1,640 feet deep. It runs along the east coast of Australia 
to the cold waters of the Tasman Sea. It is strongest in February and weakest in Au-
gust. The South Equatorial Current enters north of Espiritu Santo and divides into 
two branches; the Rossel Current passes northwest along the northern boundary of 
the Coral Sea, slows southwestward through the central part of the Coral Sea, and 
then runs southward along the coast of Australia.46 
The weather in the Coral Sea is dominated by the semipermanent high-pressure 
area of the Southern Hemisphere. It generates southeast trade winds that dominate 
in all seasons between latitudes 20° and 25° south and west of longitude 155° east. 
The Coral Sea is occasionally subject to fronts moving off Australia, bringing tow-
ering cumulus clouds, showers, and squalls. The fronts gradually slow down and 
reach their northernmost limit near latitudes 8° and 12° south. The resulting bad 
weather may encompass an area fifty to 150 miles wide.47 In the Coral Sea, tropical 
cyclones are frequent occurrences, especially between January and April. 
Between September and December, the wind changes to northerly and north-
westerly. Southwesterly winds prevail in May–August west of longitude 155° east. 
Gales are frequent between January and August. In January, a northwest monsoon 
may occur between latitudes 15° and 20° south and west of longitude 155° east. 
In those areas gales are rare except in June and August, when strong southeasterly 
winds occur for a few days per month. Southeasterly trade winds are strong north 
of latitude 15° south between March and November. Southeasterly trade winds 
would be advantageous to carriers moving southward, because such winds would 
facilitate the launching of aircraft. Hence, during the battle of Coral Sea the Japa-
nese carriers—moving southward, into the prevailing wind—were able to launch 
their aircraft much faster than the Allied carriers, which had to turn away from the 
enemy carriers into the wind to launch and recover. On the other hand, the south-
easterly wind gave the Allied carriers an advantage during their withdrawal from 
the operating area.48 
The Japanese controlled a large number of positions in the central and south-
western Pacific prior to the Port Moresby–Solomons operation. The most important 
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naval and air base in the central Carolines was the Truk (Chuuk today) Lagoon, 
forty-nine by thirty miles. Likewise, the newly acquired base at Rabaul, about 640 
miles south of Truk, was centrally located in the southwest Pacific. It had a first-
class anchorage. A 620-mile land-based-aviation patrol arc encompassed the Solo-
mons to the east, most of eastern New Guinea to the west, and half of the Solomon 
Sea to the south.49 
Other important positions captured by the Japanese in early 1942 were Manus 
Island, in the Admiralties; Gasmata, on New Britain; Kavieng, on New Ireland; 
Buka Island; Kieta and Buin, on Bougainville; Faisi Island; and Salamaua and Lae 
on New Guinea.50 The majority of these bases included airfields or seaplane facili-
ties. Rabaul had two operational airfields (Lakunai and Vunakanau), used by both 
fighters and bombers; a third was under construction. Both Kavieng and Gasmata 
had airfields. Kieta had a landing strip, but it was not suitable for military aircraft. 
Faisi Island could serve as a seaplane base. Salamaua and Lae had airfields used 
by fighters and bombers.51 The anchorage at Shortland Island (seized by the Japa-
nese on 13 March 1942), southeast of Bougainville, could shelter a large number 
of ships; an inlet at the eastern side of Shortland was suitable for a seaplane base.52 
The area south of Rabaul contained many sheltered anchorages and numerous la-
goons suitable for seaplane bases.
From the Allied perspective, the largest and the most important position was 
Port Moresby, on New Guinea. Port Moresby is separated from northeastern Aus-
tralia by the 310-mile-wide Gulf of Papua and the ninety-mile-wide Torres Strait. 
It was excellently located to support air attacks against the eastern and southeast-
ern coast of New Guinea and the Admiralties. Port Moresby was vulnerable to an 
assault landing. The 13,360-foot Owen Stanley Range provided a degree of secu-
rity from attack over land.53 Control of Port Moresby would allow the Japanese to 
blockade the eastern sea approaches to Darwin and deny the Allies a forward base 
in New Guinea. It would also pose a threat of invasion against eastern Australia.54 
Port Moresby lacked the good port facilities needed to serve as base when the 
Australian troops arrived in early 1941. However, within a year new facilities were 
built. Port Moresby remained virtually useless for Allied heavy bombers. The near-
est supporting airfields were at Townsville, some seven hundred miles away in 
Australia.55 In the spring of 1942, Port Moresby was defended by several thousand 
poorly trained and equipped troops. The rest of New Guinea was defended by a lo-
cal militia called the New Guinea Volunteer Reserve.56 
Naval/Air Bases
In spring 1942, the South Pacific lacked suitable bases, anchorages, and repair fa-
cilities for aircraft carriers and major surface combatants. The principal bases for 
the Allied ships were Tongatabu, in the Friendly Islands (Tonga); Nouméa, on New 
Caledonia; Efate, in the New Hebrides; Suva and Nandi, in Fiji; and Tutuila, in the 
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American protectorate of Samoa. However, none was suitable for basing aircraft 
carriers.57 The nearest place usable for dry-docking aircraft carriers was Pearl Har-
bor, and for cruisers and destroyers, Sydney, Australia. Nouméa’s harbor could ac-
commodate ships of any size. Its entrances were protected by mines, except for the 
Bulari Passage.58 Limited harbor facilities existed at Port Moresby; St. James Bay, on 
Espiritu Santo Island, in the New Hebrides; and Nouméa.59 
Allied air forces used fields at Townsville, Charters Towers, Cloncurry, and Dar-
win in northeastern Australia. Horn Island, off Cape York in northern Australia, 
was an intermediate field for aircraft flying to and from Port Moresby. The airfields 
at Port Moresby were small, and they were used only for fighter aircraft and as stag-
ing points for bombers en route to the New Hebrides and the Solomons. They also 
lacked dispersal areas and hence were vulnerable to attack by the enemy fighters 
and bombers. Tulagi was a valuable base for searches by flying boats but was poorly 
defended and highly vulnerable.60 The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operated 
a few PBY-5 Catalina flying boats from Gavutu Harbor on Tulagi until 2 May, when 
these aircraft were withdrawn. The Allies also started construction of an airfield at 
Le Tontouta, New Caledonia; another at Efate (Vanuatu today), a defended base for 
fighters and dive-bombers, was nearing completion.61 The anchorage at Nouméa 
was not suitable as a seaplane base, because it lacked antiaircraft defenses. Catali-
nas were also able to use anchorages at White Sand Point and Meli Bay, the New 
Hebrides.62 
Theater Geometry
The Japanese base of operations anchored at Rabaul greatly facilitated the of-
fensive employment of naval forces and land-based aircraft toward the Solo-
mons, the Louisiades, and southeastern New Guinea. 
In spring 1942, the Allied base of operations in the South Pacific stretched 
in a generally westerly direction. It flanked the lines of communications 
from the U.S. west coast, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal to New Zealand 
and Australia but was unfavorable for preventing the Japanese from gaining 
control of additional strongpoints in the South Pacific. The distances sepa-
rating the Allied bases from each other and enemy bases were overly long. 
For example, the sea distance from Nouméa to Tongatabu, Tonga, is about a 
thousand miles. New Caledonia and the New Hebrides are a similar distance 
from Australia’s coast. The distances from Samoa and Fiji to Rabaul are 2,230 
and 3,540 miles, respectively. Nouméa and Rabaul are separated by about 
1,385 miles of water. 
The base of operations for the Allied land-based aircraft in northeastern 
Australia was far from the newly acquired Japanese bases in the Bismarck Ar-
chipelago and the Solomons. For example, the air distances from Townsville 
and Cairns to Rabaul are 1,100 and 980 miles, respectively. Allied aircraft 
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based in northeastern Australia operated along lengthy and converging lines 
of operation against targets off the eastern coast of Papua New Guinea. 
The Japanese naval forces and aircraft based at Rabaul operated along short 
and diverging lines of operation. For example, the sea distance from Rabaul to Lae 
is about 450 miles. Tulagi is about 550 miles by the sea southeast of Rabaul, while 
Deboyne Island is about 560 miles westward of Tulagi. Munda Point, New Georgia, 
is about 170 miles west-northwest of Tulagi and some four hundred miles southeast 
of Rabaul. The flying distance from Rabaul to Port Moresby is about five hundred 
miles. The sea distances from Rabaul to Brisbane and Nouméa are 1,435 and 1,385 
nautical miles, respectively. The sea distance from Rabaul to Port Moresby via the 
China Strait is 676 miles, 772 miles via the Jomard Passage, or 430 via the Grafton 
Passage (off the northeast coast of Queensland). The distance from Lae to Port 
Moresby via the China Strait is about 685 nautical miles. 
Allied carrier forces operating in the central part of the Coral Sea or south of the 
Solomons occupied a central position with respect to any Japanese force coming 
south from Rabaul or entering the Coral Sea from the east or west. They were able 
to use short and diverging lines of operation. 
The Japanese lines of communications within the Bismarck Archipelago and 
toward southeastern and eastern New Guinea were almost identical to their lines of 
operation. Their hub was Rabaul, and they were short and relatively easy to protect 
by land-based aircraft and ships. The route between the Bismarcks and the lower 
Solomons runs through deep water and is partially sheltered. 
In contrast, the Allied lines of communications to Australia and New Zealand 
were very long and highly vulnerable to the attacks by submarines. For example, 
the distances from the Panama Canal to Brisbane and Auckland are 7,765 and 
6,540 nautical miles, respectively. The distances from Honolulu to Papeete, Tahiti, 
and Suva, Fiji, are about 2,380 and 2,780 miles, respectively. Suva and Sydney are 
separated by 1,740 miles of water. From Cape Horn to Sydney the distance is 5,890 
miles. The sea distances from Nouméa to Brisbane and Auckland are 808 and 998 
miles, respectively. Melbourne is some 1,600 nautical miles, and Sydney about 
1,070, from Nouméa. The sea distance from San Francisco to Sydney is about 6,450 
miles. From the Panama Canal to Sydney the distance is about 7,680 miles.
Operational Command Structures 
The Japanese in the southern and southwestern Pacific lacked a single theater 
commander exercising command and control of all naval and ground forces. The 
Fourth Fleet was responsible for all operations in the South Pacific, the Caroline 
Islands, the Marshalls, the Marianas, and Palau.63 Its operational designation was 
“South Seas Fleet” (sometimes erroneously referred to as “South Seas Force”). Its 
commander was Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue, with headquarters in Truk; its sec-
ondary base was at Kwajalein, in the Marshalls.64 Inoue moved his headquarters 
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temporarily to Rabaul for the pending Port Moresby–Solomons operation.65 On 5 
November 1941, the Fourth Fleet had become responsible for defense of islands in 
the South Pacific area and for patrolling and protecting shipping routes in the area. 
When war came, it was responsible for capturing Wake Island, and with the coop-
eration of the army, Guam; it was then, when opportunity occurred, to attack “stra-
tegic locations” in the Bismarck Archipelago.66 The organic forces of the Fourth 
Fleet consisted of the light cruiser Kashima (the flagship) and two cruiser divisions 
(CruDiv 18, with Tenryu and Tatsuta; and CruDiv 19, Okinoshima, Tokiwa, and 
Tsugaru); Torpedo Squadron 6, with one light cruiser (Yubari) and three destroyer 
squadrons (DesRons 23, 29, 30); and submarine squadron (SubRon) 7, with one 
submarine tender (Jingei) and three submarine groups (SubGrus 21, 26, and 33).67 
All Japanese naval land-based aircraft in the southwest and the South Pacific 
were subordinate to the Eleventh Air Fleet, under Vice Adm. Nishizō Tsukahara 
at Tinian, in the Marianas.68 The Eleventh Air Fleet consisted of the 21st, 24th, 
25th, and 26th Air Flotillas. It was responsible for securing eastern New Guinea, 
the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshalls, Wake Island, the eastern Carolines, and 
the area around the Japanese homeland. It was also to cooperate with the Fourth 
and Fifth Fleets.69 The 24th and the 25th Air Flotillas were attached to the South 
Seas Fleet until control returned to the Eleventh Air Fleet on 17 April. The 24th 
Air Flotilla was redeployed out of the area, leaving only the 25th Air Flotilla to 
support the Fourth Fleet. The 25th Air Flotilla’s headquarters, under Rear Adm. 
Sadoyashi Yamada, was moved to Rabaul on 29 March and was activated on 1 
April. The 25th Air Flotilla was designated the 5th Air Attack Force (5th AAF) for 
operational purposes.70 
In the spring of 1942, the Allied theater organization in the southern and the 
southwestern Pacific was divided between two theater-strategic commands (see 
map 2). The entire Pacific had been designated as an area of U.S. strategic respon-
sibility. On 9 March 1942, the Allies formally divided the Pacific theater into three 
large “areas” (or in modern terms, theaters of war): the Southwest Pacific Area 
(SWPA), the Southeast Pacific Area, and the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA).71 Gen. 
Douglas MacArthur was appointed as the Commander, SWPA (COMSWPA); he 
formally assumed this responsibility on 18 April 1942. The ANZAC Area was for-
mally abolished on 22 April, and to replace it Admiral Leary was appointed Com-
mander, Allied Naval Forces. 
MacArthur was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish the following 
objectives: 
 a. Hold island positions between the United States and Southwest Pacific 
Area necessary for the security of lines of communications and for sup-
porting naval, air, and amphibious operations against the Japanese. Hold 
key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against 
Japan, and strive to check Japanese aggression in the SWPA.
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Structure of the POA
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 b. Support the operations of forces in the SWPA. Check the enemy advance 
across Australia and its essential lines of communications by the destruc-
tion of enemy combatant, troop, and supply ships, aircraft, and bases in 
eastern Malaysia and the New Guinea–Bismarck–Solomon Islands region.
 c. Contain the Japanese forces within the Pacific theater. Exert economic 
pressure on the enemy by destroying vessels transporting raw materials 
from recently conquered territories to Japan.
 d. Support the defense of the continent of North America. Maintain the Al-
lied position in the Philippine Islands.
 e. Protect the essential sea and air communications. Protect land, sea, and air 
communications within the SWPA and its close approaches.
 f. Prepare for the execution of major amphibious operations against posi-
tions held by Japan, the initial offensives to be launched from the South 
Pacific Area and SWPA. Route shipping in the SWPA.
 g. Support operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean Area and in the 
Indian theater.
 h. Prepare to take the offensive.72
On 3 April, the POA was subdivided into three (in modern terms) theaters of 
operations: the North Pacific Area (above latitude 42° north), the Central Pacific 
Area (from north latitude 42° to the equator), and the South Pacific Area (south 
of the equator and between the eastern boundary of the SWPA and longitude 110° 
west).73
Nimitz took officially the post of Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas 
(CINCPOA) in addition to that of CINCPac at 1100 on 8 May 1942, when the 
battle of the Coral Sea was almost over. Nimitz’s responsibilities as CINCPOA were 
as follows:
• Hold the island positions between the United States and the Southwest Pa-
cific Area necessary for the security of the lines of communications between 
these regions; support naval, air, and amphibious operations against the 
Japanese forces
• Support the operations of the forces in the SWPA
• Contain the Japanese forces within the Pacific theater
• Support the defense of the continent of North America
• Protect the essential sea and air communications
• Prepare for execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held 
by Japan, the initial offensives to be launched from the South Pacific Area 
and SWPA.74
Nimitz was directed to appoint a commander for the South Pacific (SOPAC) 
Area, who, “acting under his authority and general direction, would exercise com-
mand of the combined armed forces, which at any time might be assigned that 
area.”75 However, that post was not filled until 19 June 1942, when Vice Adm. Robert 
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L. Ghormley assumed command of SOPAC. He initially established his headquar-
ters at Auckland, New Zealand. 
Nimitz exercised command over all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific theater, in-
cluding those in the Coral Sea, by virtue of his authority as CINCPac, but the Coral 
Sea itself was formally part of MacArthur’s SWPA. Nimitz and Rear Adm. Frank 
Jack Fletcher, Commander, Task Force 17 (CTF 17), had no control over supporting 
forces, such as Army Air Forces elements, which were provided by MacArthur. The 
resolution of this problem was that when American carriers and British or Aus-
tralian forces operated in the same general area, the carrier task force commander 
would be in overall command. In all other cases, the senior commander, of any of 
the three nations, would be in command.76 The part of the SWPA in which combat 
actions took place during the battle of the Coral Sea was bounded by a line from 
longitude 130° east at the equator running eastward along the equator to longitude 
165° east, thence southward to latitude 10° south, and southwesterly to latitude 17° 
south, longitude 160° east, and thence south.77 The SOPAC was bounded on the 
west by the SWPA and on the north by the equator. It encompassed New Zealand, 
New Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands, the New Hebrides and the Santa Cruz Islands, 
and the Solomons Archipelago.78 The separation line between SWPA and SOPAC 
caused problems during the battle of the Coral Sea because the Allied naval forces 
were subordinate to CINCPac but operated almost entirely within COMSWPA’s 
area of responsibility.
The Preliminaries
After the capture of Rabaul and other points in the Bismarck Archipelago, the Jap-
anese moved quickly to expand their control in the southwest Pacific. On 29 Janu-
ary, IGHQ issued a directive to the CINC of the Combined Fleet that “the Army 
and Navy working together will occupy the Lae and Salamua sectors as quickly as 
possible. At the proper time the Navy will independently occupy Tulagi and secure 
a civilian seaplane base. If possible the Army and Navy will work jointly and oc-
cupy Port Moresby after the occupation of Lae and Salamua.”79 It also directed the 
Fourth Fleet on 2 February to attack and capture “strategic areas” in British New 
Guinea and the Solomons as soon as possible.80 The first operational objective was 
to seize the ports of Lae and Salamaua in the Huon Gulf, on the southeastern coast 
of New Guinea (the SR operation). On 13 February the Japanese navy and army 
signed an Army-Navy Local Agreement setting execution of the SR operation for 
25 February.81 On 16 February, Inoue and Maj. Gen. Tomitarō Horii, commander 
of the South Seas Force (or Detachment) agreed that the 2nd Battalion of the 144th 
Infantry Regiment, reinforced by one mountain artillery battery and other units, 
would attack Salamaua, while one battalion would capture Lae.82 
In mid-February, Admiral King transferred temporarily Task Force (TF) 11, 
based on the carrier USS Lexington, to the ANZAC Area. Admiral Leary, together 
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with CTF 11, Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, was planning to attack Rabaul. B-17 heavy 
bombers based at Townsville would strike Rabaul at the same time.83 On 20 Febru-
ary, TF 11 reached a point about 350 miles south of Rabaul, where Japanese land-
based aircraft detected it. In the ensuing encounters the Japanese lost eighteen air-
craft and the Americans only two;84 however, the element of surprise had been lost, 
and hence the carrier attack on Rabaul was abandoned.85 A major effect of this 
aborted raid was that Inoue decided to delay the SR operation until 8 March.86 
On 4 March, the 24th Air Flotilla started raids on Port Moresby, Lae, and Bulolo 
(some thirty-seven miles southwest of Lae). The next day the Japanese convoy, es-
corted by the 6th Destroyer Squadron and the 6th and the 18th Cruiser Divisions, 
sortied from Rabaul bound for the Huon Gulf.87 
Two days later, the convoy split into two groups, one to Lae and the other to 
Salamaua. On the night of 7–8 March, the Japanese landed, quickly captured both 
without opposition, and immediately started to build bases.88 By seizing control of 
the Huon Gulf the Japanese obtained control of the straits between northeast New 
Guinea and New Britain, as well as positions from which they could support fur-
ther advances to the south.89 
In early March, the Allies had TF 11 (with Lexington) and TF 17 (with Yorktown 
and a screen of eight cruisers and fourteen destroyers) operating in the Coral Sea. 
The original plan was to conduct a moonlight air attack on Rabaul and Gasmata 
about three hours before sunrise. However, this plan was abandoned, because the 
majority of the Yorktown pilots were not qualified in night landings. The decision 
was then made to launch an attack at dawn on the enemy shipping and shore instal-
lations at Rabaul and Gasmata by cruisers and destroyers. If the enemy was alerted, 
the cruisers and destroyers would rejoin the task force without attacking.90 On 7 
March, Nimitz received information from Admiral Leary that an enemy convoy 
of one cruiser and several destroyers and transports had been sighted off Buna. 
The next day, Leary informed Nimitz that an enemy force of eleven warships, in-
cluding four cruisers or destroyers, had started shelling Salamaua and Lae in the 
early morning and that a landing had followed. Searches conducted by the RAAF 
revealed that only three transports were at Rabaul and no shipping was at Gasmata. 
Yet on the previous day twenty-eight ships had been sighted at Rabaul.91 
Nimitz reacted strongly and quickly to these reports and to reported move-
ments of enemy forces toward the eastern coast of New Guinea. He directed both 
carrier groups to concentrate in the Gulf of Papua, from where they were to carry 
out attacks on the ships at Salamaua and Lae. The main reason for this decision 
was to surprise the enemy. A position eastward of Salamaua and Lae would not 
have ensured surprise, because these waters were patrolled by enemy ships; the 
Gulf of Papua offered more security from repeated attacks by aircraft at Rabaul and 
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Gasmata. It also would allow a lower speed of approach and withdrawal, thereby 
preserving fuel. A major disadvantage of the attack from the Gulf of Papua, how-
ever, was that the carrier aircraft had to fly about a hundred miles over wild and 
poorly charted terrain and high mountain ranges often obscured by clouds.92 
The plan also envisaged that a special group of four heavy cruisers and four 
destroyers under Rear Adm. John C. Crace, Royal Navy, would remain in the vi-
cinity of Rossel Island (the easternmost island of the Louisiades) to cover carrier 
operations in the Gulf of Papua, intercept any enemy surface force striking at Port 
Moresby, and cover the arrival of Allied troops at New Caledonia.93 
On 10 March, 104 Allied aircraft attacked Japanese shipping in the Huon Gulf 
from a position about fifty miles southwest of Port Moresby.94 The aircraft achieved 
complete surprise, approaching through the 7,500-foot pass over the Owen Stan-
ley Range.95 Japanese sources cited their own losses as four transports sunk, three 
ships damaged moderately and three lightly, eleven fighter aircraft lost, and 130 
men killed and 245 wounded. Among the damaged ships were one seaplane tender, 
two light cruisers, and one destroyer.96 Allied postwar sources claimed much larger 
Japanese losses: thirteen out of eighteen transports sunk or damaged, of which sev-
eral had to return to Japan for repairs.97 About four hundred Japanese were killed 
in the attack.98 The losses in shipping could not be replaced quickly. That was one 
reason that Inoue decided to postpone the Port Moresby–Solomons operation for 
one month; another reason was increased Allied air strength over New Guinea.99
On 16 March, Admiral Brown advised King, Nimitz, Leary, and Fletcher that 
in his view the Japanese air-early-warning system would not allow further surprise 
carrier raids like the one conducted against Rabaul on 20 February. Because of the 
350-mile gap between the Louisiades and Solomons, the cost of access to Rabaul 
from the south was increasingly more prohibitive.100 
Allied and Japanese land-based aircraft conducted sporadic attacks on each 
other’s airfields starting in late January. The Allies raided Rabaul with small num-
bers of aircraft every other night from 24 January to 3 February. On 22 February, 
B-17s made their first attack on Rabaul. Allied attacks on Rabaul intensified in 
April. B-26 medium bombers struck on 9, 11, 12, 18, and 19 April. On the 11th and 
13th, an attack on Lae by a small number of medium bombers and fighters caused 
extensive damage, forcing the Japanese to move aircraft to Rabaul. After further 
raids on Rabaul on 22 and 23 April, Allied attacks there used only two to three 
medium bombers, leading the Japanese to believe erroneously that the enemy’s air 
strength at Port Moresby was greatly reduced. In fact, however, the Allies had rein-
forced Port Moresby, deploying additional P-39 fighters and basing B-25 bombers 
on Horn Island, off the York Peninsula.101 
Japanese aircraft from Rabaul attacked Port Moresby for the first time on 3 Feb-
ruary. On 14 March, nine Japanese land-based attack aircraft attacked Port Moresby. 
 THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942 21 20 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
The same day the Japanese attacked Australia’s mainland for the first time, raiding 
Horn Island.102 The Japanese conducted extensive enemy air reconnaissance of Port 
Moresby, and on 18 March twin-engine planes bombed Tulagi and Gavutu. Port 
Moresby was attacked on 19 March by eight Japanese heavy bombers and on the 
next day by one heavy bomber and four fighters.103 On 21 March, the Japanese also 
conducted reconnaissance of the Allied bases at Townsville and Cooktown.104 
On 11 April, the commander of the 25th Air Flotilla directed that the “opera-
tional policy,” of the 5th AAF, was to destroy enemy forces in northeast Australia, 
New Caledonia, and the Fiji area to prevent buildups in enemy air strength; to 
patrol the southern area of British New Guinea and the seas to the east, destroying 
mobile forces and disrupting supply lines; to cooperate with invasion operations; 
and to seek out and destroy the enemy fleet.105 The 25th Air Flotilla intensified its 
attacks on Port Moresby in early April, using bases at Rabaul and Lae. On 5–6 April 
the Japanese mounted large attacks on Port Moresby from Rabaul and Lae. Another 
raid was conducted on 7 April, and another on 10 April. The Japanese raids gener-
ally used only about half a dozen land-based attack aircraft and several fighters;106 
for this reason, these attacks were not decisive.107 
The Japanese attacks on Port Moresby were delayed by a week after 10 April 
because of the need to repair damaged aircraft. On 14 April, the number of service-
able aircraft in the entire 25th Air Flotilla did not exceed three fighters and three 
attack aircraft. The flotilla resumed full-scale raids on Port Moresby on 17 April, 
with fifteen fighters and seven attack aircraft, striking thereafter almost daily until 
the beginning of May.108 On 30 April, fourteen Japanese aircraft attacked the Allied 
airfield on Horn Island. Tulagi was bombed on 25 and 30 April.109 
Japanese Information on the Enemy
The Japanese plans for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation were based on gen-
erally poor knowledge of the whereabouts and movements of enemy naval forces, 
the carriers in particular. This was a major reason for several decisions that were to 
cause major problems and setbacks for the Japanese in the course of the operation. 
Their main sources of information were visual observation by land-based search 
aircraft and submarines, interrogations of captured airmen, analysis of combat 
experience, and intercepts of plaintext messages. The Japanese, unable to decode 
Allied radio traffic, lacked direct knowledge of enemy plans and intentions, but 
their analysis of open sources, such as the Allied broadcasts and printed media, was 
generally good. 
The Japanese relied on land-based medium bombers, flying boats, floatplanes, 
and ship-based aircraft for sea reconnaissance. They rarely used carrier aircraft for 
scouting. The Japanese had fairly accurate information on the strength of enemy 
garrisons and air elements. For example, on 23 April the Fourth Fleet estimated 
correctly that Tulagi had a small garrison but that Port Moresby was defended by 
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about five thousand troops. The Japanese assessed (again correctly) that Allied air 
strength in Australia had been increased, to probably two hundred first-line air-
craft. They knew that the Allies had concentrated air strength in the Port Moresby, 
Port Darwin, and Townsville areas and that air activity in those areas was intense.110 
However, the Japanese had very poor knowledge of the overall strength of en-
emy forces in the southern and southwestern Pacific. Their single greatest mistake 
was to assume, in the absence of information to the contrary, that “there [was] little 
probability of the existence of a powerful force in the area after the withdrawal 
of US task force.”111 Yet they also believed that it was “not unlikely that the enemy 
might conduct their own operations against our South Seas Fleet operational area 
east or south. The only U.S. carrier believed to be in the area is the Saratoga.”112 
These estimates were based on information from a Japanese picketboat that the 
Americans had employed three carriers in their raid on Tokyo on 18 April. How-
ever, from interrogations of captured pilots the Japanese learned that only two 
carriers (Enterprise and Hornet) had taken part. This meant, they assessed, that 
two others, Yorktown and Saratoga, were available. They erroneously believed that 
Lexington had been sunk by a Japanese submarine in January 1942. The Japanese 
did not know that Saratoga had sustained damage and was under repair. In any 
case, having observed no enemy carriers in the southern area since 10 March, the 
Japanese assumed that only one large carrier (Saratoga) would be operating there. 
They believed that the Royal Navy might have in Australian waters a battleship, two 
or three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and several destroyers. They also assumed 
that “even if enemy submarines are not particularly active, there is a strong chance 
that at least two or three” would operate in the area.113
Japanese Plans and Preparations
Operational planning in the Japanese army and navy was conducted by the re-
spective general staffs and major field commands. The Army and Navy Sections 
were organized along similar lines. Operational plans were developed separately 
in the First Bureaus of the respective general staffs.114 However, there was a writ-
ten law that the army had primary responsibility for strategic planning on Asia’s 
mainland and the navy in the Pacific; they shared these responsibilities in the 
southwest Pacific.115 Often, army-navy disagreement over specific joint operations 
led to delay or even cancellation. Even when an agreement was reached, the opera-
tion would normally be executed not by a joint commander but by respective ser-
vice commanders. Unity of effort would be ensured by the terms of the pertinent 
Army-Navy Central Agreement.116 For joint operations planned by the numbered 
fleets, Army-Navy Local Agreements had to be signed to ensure unity of effort by 
both services. 
Inoue, of the Fourth Fleet, and his staff were primarily responsible for planning 
the employment of naval forces and Base Air Forces (i.e., naval land-based aircraft) 
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in the southwest and South Pacific. Maj. Gen. Tomitaro Horii of his South Seas 
Force (or Detachment, a brigade-sized force) and his staff planned the employment 
of the army troops. The Fourth Fleet received on 29 January 1942 IGHQ’s great 
Naval Directive No. 47 directing the army and navy to cooperate in seizing Lae and 
Salamaua. Afterward, the navy, alone, would seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Both 
services would cooperate in seizing Port Moresby in early March. Afterward, New 
Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa would be captured, thereby cutting off communications 
between the United States and Australia.117 
IGHQ stipulated that Port Moresby and Tulagi should be seized immediately af-
ter Lae and Salamaua. That is, the Port Moresby–Solomons operation would be ex-
ecuted in March 1942, supported by land-based aircraft from Rabaul and seaplanes 
from bases to be constructed at Lae, Salamaua, and Finschafen.118 The original as-
sumption that the enemy would have no carriers in the area became invalid in the 
light of the raids of February and March 1942. Also, enemy air strength in Australia 
was growing. In Inoue’s view the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi would entail 
much more risk than initially envisaged and would need strong support by the 
large carriers. However, Yamamoto needed all five large carriers (Kaga had been 
damaged in a grounding in February 1942) and four battleships for raids against 
Ceylon and in the Bay of Bengal in early April (Operation C).119 
Inoue sent a message to the Combined Fleet on 20 March arguing that consider-
ing the experience of the Lae-Salamaua operation, especially the appearance of the 
enemy carrier force, “it would be very difficult to assign protection for the trans-
port convoy by land-based air units, and to protect the airbase establishment and 
the landing point after disembarkation.” He continued, “I would like to see discus-
sion during a central agreement to doubly ensure the strengthening of land-based 
air units and the cooperation of a fully equipped aircraft carrier for the coming 
operation.”120 
Final plans for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation were developed by the 
Fourth Fleet and its subordinate commanders during April 1942. The plans were 
considerably affected by Yamamoto’s decisions regarding the timeline of the Midway- 
Aleutians operation and the availability of carriers. The Fourth Fleet also depended 
on the Combined Fleet for additional cruisers, destroyers, and land-based naval 
aircraft.
On 5 April Admiral Ugaki, Yamamoto’s chief of staff, circulated an outline of 
organizational changes based on IJN Directive No. 86. Among other things, the 
Port Moresby operation, to be code-named MO Operation, would take place in 
early May, prior to the Midway-Aleutians operation. From 20 April to 10 May the 
Combined Fleet would attach to the South Seas Fleet the large carrier Kaga, one 
seaplane tender, CruDiv 5 (Haguro and Myoko), CruDiv 6 (Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, 
and Furutaka), and Destroyer Divisions 7 and 27.121 Inoue also learned that 24th 
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and 25th Air Flotillas would return to the direct control of the Eleventh Air Fleet 
commander, Admiral Tsukahara.122 In addition, the Combined Fleet attached the 
light carrier Shōhō from the 4th Air Flotilla to the Fourth Fleet; until then it had 
been used only for ferrying aircraft. Initially scheduled to take effect on 10 May, the 
command changes were later advanced to 20 April.123
On 5 April, Yamamoto directed Inoue that all plans for the Fourth Fleet had to 
be completed by 10 May. It was this change, combined with the advancement of 
the date for the execution of the Midway-Aleutians operation to early June, that 
had made it impossible to provide the frontline, large-carrier division Inoue had 
been promised in March. If the MO Operation had taken place in late May, Inoue 
would have been able to get two or more large carriers. Inoue had been a strong 
opponent of the Midway operation, because the Fourth Fleet would have to gar-
rison and supply the island after its capture.124 He was now even more distressed 
that only one large carrier would be assigned to the MO Operation, and he asked 
the Combined Fleet to reconsider. Only three weeks earlier, he had been promised 
a carrier division of two large carriers. Inoue specifically requested that Carrier 
Division (CarDiv) 2 (Sōryū and Hiryū) be assigned to the operation, in addition 
to Kaga; CarDiv 2 was considered one of the most effective formations in the en-
tire navy. Another problem with the schedule was that the 25th Air Flotilla would 
not have sufficient time to neutralize air opposition in the area prior to the start 
of the operation; its major components would not be ready for combat until 20 
April.125
The Combined Fleet’s staff duly reconsidered the question of carrier support 
for the MO Operation. Yamamoto, however, was reluctant to assign CarDiv 2 to 
the Fourth Fleet. That division, together with CarDiv 1, would be part of the pend-
ing Midway-Aleutians operation. Also, both carrier divisions needed refitting and 
training upon their return from the Indian Ocean. Yamamoto therefore decided 
on 10 April to allocate to the South Seas Fleet CarDiv 5, composed of the new car-
riers Shōkaku and Zuikaku, and two destroyer divisions. CarDiv 5 was the least 
experienced carrier unit in the Combined Fleet. This order became effective on 18 
April.126
On 17 April, Inoue directed CarDiv 5 to sail for Truk after a brief stay at Formosa. 
At that time, CruDiv 5 and six submarines of SubRon 8 assigned to the operation 
were in home waters. Inoue hoped to assemble at Truk and Rabaul the major part 
of the forces assigned to the operation in the third week of April.127 
Not until 18 April did the Army General Staff provide specific instructions or 
exercise leadership concerning the pending operation. On that day, when the chief 
of the staff of the South Seas Force asked for instructions, IGHQ responded that 
the “Port Moresby offensive is essential for later operations, and should be carried 
out according to the commander’s judgment. This campaign is an opportunity to 
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test army and navy cooperation for later operations, and should be executed by 10 
May at the latest.”128 
Landing Options 
The Fourth Fleet’s planners considered three options for seizing Port Moresby: a 
land approach over the Owen Stanley Range, a barge “mobilization,” and a standard 
landing operation. Capturing Port Moresby by advancing over land was feasible if 
a road were built over difficult mountainous terrain. Some army commanders pre-
ferred this option to the risks of embarking troops on ships, which could be sunk.129 
“Barge mobilization” meant landing troops in the southeastern part of New 
Guinea and transporting them on by self-propelled barges to successive points along 
the coast in the vicinity of Port Moresby. These landings would be conducted dur-
ing the night to reduce the threat of air attack. The Japanese estimated that moving 
in darkness an average of sixty-eight miles each night, the barges would need about 
five days to reach Port Moresby. The problem was that the sea approaches to Port 
Moresby were navigationally very difficult, due to reefs and other obstacles; the 
barges would have to sail far from the shore. Barge mobilization would thus have 
been extremely difficult, but Inoue believed it feasible and in early April directed 
studies for transportation of food and munitions, embarkation rosters, cooking ar-
rangements, etc.130 But in the end a standard landing was adopted, despite high 
risks for the convoy and covering forces; the strengthening of the Fourth Fleet had 
given its planners increased confidence in that option.131
The Japanese conducted extensive reconnaissance of the area of Port Moresby 
and the sea routes from Rabaul westward and southward. The army commander 
had asked the navy to obtain photographs of the landing area at Port Moresby and 
of the sea area between there and the island of Samarai, in the China Strait. Army 
officers accompanied reconnaissance flights over the landing area after 10 April.132 
Yet after numerous reconnaissance and photographic flights, the Japanese acknowl-
edged that they still lacked accurate information on facilities and enemy strength.133 
As the Japanese usually did in preparing for amphibious landings, the 24th Air 
Flotilla in March conducted reconnaissance flights over the projected route to de-
termine the best sites for seaplane bases; the 25th Air Flotilla did the same in mid-
April. Japanese search aircraft reconnoitered the islands of Gizo, Tetepare (in the 
central Solomons), Kiriwina, Normanby, Deboyne, Rossel, Samarai, and Abau, as 
well as Egum Atoll, Paria Reef, the Louisiades, Eagle Point, and Keppel Point for 
suitable places for seaplane bases. The Japanese surveyed waterways east of Aus-
tralia, confirmed the accuracy of charts, reconnoitered the airfield on Horn Island, 
and photographed both landing sites at Port Moresby and potential barge routes 
from Samarai to Keppel Point.134 For some of these purposes the Japanese used 
short-range, single-float, reconnaissance biplanes that operated from shore bases 
established by tenders or from the tenders themselves. Submarine Division 33 at 
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Truk was directed to conduct extensive reconnaissance of the area to check the ac-
curacy of charts.
On 16 April, Inoue convened a two-day staff meeting to discuss the plan and ar-
range final orders. Many subordinate commanders voiced strong misgivings. One 
major problem was the vulnerability of the MO Invasion Force along the southern 
coast of Papua New Guinea; enemy air bases were only about three hundred miles 
away. Within a circle of 275 miles from that area was a chain of numerous islands 
surrounded by reefs, severely restricting passage by ships.135
Sea Routes
The MO Invasion Force had three main routes available: the 670-mile-long west-
ward route via the China Strait, a 950-mile route eastward around the Louisiades, 
and an 840-mile route southward through the Louisiades via the Jomard Passage 
and then across the Coral Sea to Port Moresby. The route through the China Strait 
was the shortest and ran mostly over deep water; it was also least exposed to air 
attacks. However, ships would have to sail in a single column. The eastward route 
was free of navigational obstacles but 110 miles longer than the southward route; 
it was also more exposed to attack by submarines. The southward route was less 
navigationally difficult than going westward and more secure than the eastward 
route; planners adopted it as a compromise.136 
The plan was to organize a convoy of five ships from the army and six from 
the navy. The convoy, after departing from Rabaul, would run through St. George’s 
Channel and then south-southwest to west of Bougainville, turn southwest, and 
when eastward of Woodlark Island (Muyua today) head toward Deboyne Island 
and then enter the Coral Sea through the Jomard Passage, some 420 nautical miles 
south of Rabaul. Thereafter, and for the remainder of its advance to the objective, 
the convoy would be open to attack from enemy bases at Townsville and Cooktown. 
The planners calculated that if the Jomard Passage was navigated during the evening 
and a constant speed of eleven knots was maintained, the convoy would be exposed 
to attack in the Coral Sea for the next twelve hours.137 Hence, it was critical that the 
MO Carrier Force obtain local sea control in the Coral Sea. The basic idea for doing 
so was to send the MO Carrier Force sweeping around to the east of the Solomons 
(to avoid air searches), entering the Coral Sea from the southeast as the MO Main 
Force passed to the westward (see sidebar, “Japanese Order of Battle, May 1942”).138
Another problem was inadequate protection for the convoy from air attack. The 
navy believed that powerful carrier forces would compensate for the low speed of 
the convoy. However, General Horii was not convinced and expressed his fears on 
24 April to Rear Adm. Masao Kanazawa, commander of the Rabaul base detach-
ment. In turn, Kanazawa contacted Inoue and suggested that a representative be 
sent to Rabaul to meet with Horii. On 25–26 April Horii and his staff met with 
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Japanese Order of Battle, May 1942
CINC, Combined Fleet: Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto
Commander, Fourth Fleet (South Seas Fleet): Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue (Flagship CL 
Kashima, Rabaul)
Moresby (MO) Main Force
(Rear Adm. Aritomo Gotō, Commander, CruDiv 6)
CruDiv 6 (4 CAs—Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka)
DesDiv 7 (1 DD—Sazanami)
1 Light Carrier (Shōhō—12 A6M Zero fighters and 9 B5N Type 97 [Kate] torpedo bombers)
Tulagi Invasion Force
(Rear Adm. Kiyohide Shima, Commander, CruDiv 19)
CruDiv 19 (1 CM—Okinoshima, minus Tsugaru and Tokiwa)
DesDiv 23 (2 DDs—Kikuzuki, Yūzuki)
2 Transports (Azumasan Maru, Kōei Maru)
Minesweeper Flotilla 14 (Hagoromo Maru, Noshiro Maru No. 2)
2 Special Minesweepers (Wa No. 1, Wa No. 2)
SC Squadron 56 (Toshi Maru No. 3, Tama Maru No. 8)
Base Units (400 men of Kure 3rd Special Unit, part of the 7th Construction Bn., two 80 mm AA guns of 3rd 
Base Unit, one 130 mm MG of 3rd Base Unit, two 80 mm AA guns of 8th Base Unit)
Moresby (MO) Invasion Force
(Rear Adm. Sadamichi Kajioka, Commander, Torpedo Squadron 6)
Torpedo Squadron 6 (1 CL—Yubari)
DesDiv 29 (2 DDs—Oite, Asanagi) 
DesDiv 30 (3 DDs—Mutsuki, Mochizuki, Yayoi) 
DesDiv 23 (1 DD—Uzuki, minus Yūnagi, Kikuzuki, and Yūzuki)
1 Repair Ship (Ojima)
1 Special Minesweeper (Wa No. 20)
Transport Unit 
(Rear Adm. Kōsō Abe) 
1 CM (Tsugaru)
11 Transports: 5 navy (Mogamigawa Maru, Akihasan Maru, Chōwa Maru, Goyō Maru, Shōkai Maru), 6 army 
(China Maru, Daifuku Maru, Asakayama Maru, Matsue Maru, Mito Maru, Nichibi Maru)
South Seas Force (5,000 men) 
Base Units (embarked; some 500 men of 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, 10th Construction Section, 
four 120 mm AA guns and two 80 mm AA guns of 8th Base Unit, two 80 mm of 4th Base Unit, 
part of the Base Unit–Communication Personnel, Transportation Section)
Moresby (MO) Support Force (Covering Force)
(Rear Adm. Kuninori Marumo, Commander, CruDiv 18)
CruDiv 18 (2 CLs—Tenryu, Tatsuta)
2 AVs (Kiyokawa Maru, Kamikawa Maru)
Gunboat Division 5 (2 XAVPs—Nikkai Maru, Keijō Maru) 
1 Transport (Shōei Maru)
Minesweeper Flotilla 14 (Hagoromo Maru, Noshiro Maru No. 2)
Base Units (part of Kure 3rd Special Unit, part of the Communication Personnel of 8th Unit)
Moresby (MO) Carrier Force
(Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi, Commander, CruDiv 5)
CruDiv 5 (2 CAs—Myōkō, Haguro, minus Nachi)
CarDiv 5 (5th Air Flotilla), Rear Adm. Chūichi Hara, Commander (2 CVs—Zuikaku, Shōkaku)
 (Shōkaku—21 A6M Zero fighters, 20 D3A Type 99 [Val] dive-bombers, 19 B5N Type 97 [Kate] 
torpedo bombers)
 (Zuikaku—21 A6M Zero fighters, 21 D3A Type 99 [Val] dive-bombers, 20 B5N Type 97 [Kate] 
torpedo bombers)
DesDiv 27 (4 DDs—Shigure, Yūgure, Ariake, Shiratsuyu)
DesDiv 7 (1 DD—Shioakebono, minus Sazanami)
1 Fleet Tanker (Tōhō Maru)
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Capt. Iwao Kawai of the Fourth Fleet to discuss air protection of the convoy. Horii’s 
chief of staff suggested that the light carrier Shōhō from the Port Moresby Invasion 
Force be attached to CarDiv 5, thereby adding twenty aircraft to the force. Captain 
Kawai disagreed. The decision was made to keep Shōhō in direct escort of the con-
voy at all times. In the end, Horii and his staff were satisfied with that arrangement.
The Japanese planners also grappled with the problem of the barrier reef front-
ing Port Moresby. The reef is a natural fortress, running along the coast from the 
eastern tip of New Guinea to Port Moresby at a distance of from two to ten miles. 
Passage by landing craft was impeded at both low and high tides. Outside Port 
Moresby the large Sinavi and Nateara Reefs had to be penetrated, by one of three 
possible routes: the Liljeblad Passage, the Basilisk Passage, and the Padana Nafua. 
Vice Adm. Teruhisa Komatsu, Commander, Sixth Fleet
Advance Expeditionary Force
(Capt. Mitsunage Iwagama)
Eastern Detachment, SubRon 8 (Patrol/Scouting Group) (I-21, I-22, I-24, I-28, I-29, plus one) 
SubGru 21 (Raiding Force) (RO-33, RO-34) 
Supply Force
2 Fleet Tankers (Ishirō, Hōyō Maru)
Bismarck Area (R) Defense Force
(Rear Adm. Masao Kanazawa, Commander, 8th Base Unit)
8th Signalss Unit
8th Submarine Base Force
81st Garrison Rabaul Unit
Gunboat Div 5 (Seikai Maru)
SC Div 56 (Kotobuki Maru No. 5)
MO Invasion Army Units
(Maj. Gen. Tomitarō Horii)
144th Infantry Regt.
1st Co., 55th Cavalry Regt.
1st Bn., 55th Mountain Engineer Regt.
2nd Co., 47th Mobile AA Bn.
6 Army Transports (part of the MO Invasion Force)
25th Air Flotilla (5th Air Attack Force)
(Rear Adm. Sadoyashi Yamada, Commander, 25th Air Flotilla)
1st Force (Tainan Air Group, at Rabaul, Lae) (18 Zero and 6 Type 96 fighters)
2nd Force (4th Air Group, at Rabaul, Lae) (17 Type 1 land-attack bombers)
3rd Force (Motoyama Air Group, at Rabaul) (26 Type 96 land-attack aircraft)
4th Force (Yokohama Air Group, at Tulagi, Shortland Island, Deboyne Island)  
(12 Mavis reconnaissance aircraft, 9 Zero Model 21 fighters)
Special Duty Force (1 AV—Mogamikawa Maru)
Nauru and Ocean Island Invasion Force
(Rear Adm. Kiyohide Shima, Commander, CruDiv 19)
CruDiv 19 (Okinoshima, Tsugaru, minus Tokiwa)
DesDiv 23 (2 DDs—Kikuzuki, Yūzuki)
2 Transports (Kinryū Maru, Takahata Maru)
6th Base Naval Landing Party
Kashima Naval Landing Party
1 CL (Tatsuta); 1 CM (Tsugaru) (after 11 May)
Sources: Bates et al., Battle of the Coral Sea, app. 1, p. 8; Bullard, trans., Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, 
pp. 53, 56–57.
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The Liljeblad Passage was within range of the Paga coast defense battery south of 
Port Moresby, the current there is swift, and sunken reefs lie in the passage and en 
route to harbor. This route, then, was unsuitable for a large landing force. The Basi-
lisk Passage was a standard waterway but was in the direct line of fire from coastal 
batteries. The Padana Nafua route avoided these problems and was considered by 
the planners the most favorable.139
There was also the problem of sustaining troops once they landed. The Port 
Moresby area, poor in water resources, relied on rainwater; it was estimated that 
only four or five thousand troops could be stationed there.140 Supplies would have 
to reach a Japanese garrison by a long and vulnerable sea route either from Ra-
baul or the Huon Gulf, or by land over the fourteen-thousand-foot Owen Stanley 
Range. The ever-increasing enemy air strength in northern and eastern Australia 
would make it difficult for the Japanese to hold Port Moresby even if the landing 
were successful.
On 23 April, Inoue issued Order No. 13 as the basic directive for the MO Op-
eration.141 It directed the South Seas Fleet and the South Seas Force to seize Port 
Moresby, important positions in southeastern New Guinea, and Tulagi Island in the 
lower Solomons; to establish air bases; and to intensify air operation around Aus-
tralia. The services reconciled differences in a new Army-Navy Local Agreement 
on 25 April, and details were worked out by 3 May.142 On 28 April IGHQ issued 
directives for the execution of the operation. For the Japanese high command, the 
overall strategic objective remained isolation of Australia from the United States 
and other Allies. The long-deferred capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi would be 
followed by the occupation of important points in New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. 
From these new bases, the Japanese aircraft and submarines would interrupt, if not 
cut off entirely, the flow of the troops and materiel to Australia and prevent it from 
becoming a base for a counteroffensive.143 
On 28 April, Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi, commander of the MO Carrier Force, is-
sued orders to his forces. As directed by Inoue, his plan included strikes against the 
bases in northeastern Australia. Rear Admiral Hara, commander of CarDiv 5, was 
very dissatisfied with the role assigned to his carriers. He was especially critical of 
the task of conducting strikes against northeastern Australia; in his view, it was too 
risky to operate carriers within the effective range of enemy land bases. Another 
problem was the presence of reefs and other navigational hazards, which would 
limit the maneuvering area for his carriers. Logistical sustainment under way was 
also inadequate; only a single fleet oiler was assigned to CarDiv 5 and its destroy-
ers. On 29 April Inoue modified his order and left it to Takagi’s discretion whether 
to attack enemy air bases or not—Takagi was allowed to cancel the planned strikes 
if he failed to achieve surprise. However, on the same day Yamamoto directed In-
oue to cancel all strikes on northeastern Australia. The MO Carrier Force was to 
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focus exclusively on the enemy carriers. Attacks on Australia’s mainland would be 
conducted by naval land-based aircraft. On 30 April, Inoue formally canceled the 
strikes, at the same time directing Takagi to have CarDiv 5 embark eighteen A6M 
Zero fighters for the 25th Air Flotilla and ferry them to Rabaul.144 The decision 
was made to ferry half of that force to Rabaul on 3 May and the remainder on the 
morning of 4 May.145
Inoue’s plan was extremely complex (see map 3). The planners sequenced the 
objectives and events with little consideration for potential difficulties due to long 
distances, poor radio communications, bad weather, and unforeseen events. The 
Fourth Fleet planners assumed that the enemy commander would be aware of the 
movements of the Port Moresby Invasion Force and would deploy a force into the 
Coral Sea to intercept it. The Japanese nevertheless took it for granted that they 
would achieve surprise. The most fateful mistake, which the Japanese would repeat 
on many occasions in the Pacific War, was to assume that the enemy would pas-
sively accept the Japanese narrative and react in a preordained way.146
General Horii, the South Seas Force’s commander, issued his orders for the op-
eration on 29 April. They specified that the main forces would land at Taurama 
after passing through the Padana Nafua. Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 144th 
Infantry Regiment would pass through the Liljeblad Passage and land on the coast 
at Oiso. These landings would be completed by early dawn on 10 May. The Japa-
nese also planned attacks on the enemy airfield north of Port Moresby.147 
The commander of the 25th Air Flotilla, in his Operational Order No. 3, di-
rected the 5th AAF to cooperate in intensified raids against northern Australia 
and Port Moresby after 1 May; patrol the route of the movement of the MO Car-
rier Force toward Port Moresby; patrol Tulagi and the route of the Tulagi Invasion 
Force; provide air protection for the convoy and over Port Moresby; and conduct 
reconnaissance of the landing sites. The 5th AAF, in turn, in Operational Order 
No. 2 updated its “operational policy.” Specifically, the entire force would “patrol 
the seas,” provide “speedy information concerning enemy naval activities,” and 
seek and destroy the enemy; conduct “repeated attacks and crush the enemy’s air 
strength” in New Guinea with the full strength of the 1st Force (Tainan Air Group) 
and 2nd Force (4th Air Group) prior to the start of the Port Moresby operation; 
patrol the skies over Rabaul and, in cooperation with the army, seek and destroy 
enemy aircraft; conduct reconnaissance over New Guinea and then over northern 
Australia; cooperate with the Port Moresby invasion; carry out various reconnais-
sance duties; provide air protection for the Port Moresby invasion convoy; attack 
and destroy enemy military installations in Port Moresby; and, after the enemy air 
strength in the Port Moresby area was destroyed, “seek out and destroy powerful air 
units in northeast Australia.” The patrol plan of the 25th Air Flotilla for the opera-
tion envisaged eight patrol sectors (A through I), originating at Lae (sector A); at 
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Japanese operational idea 
(scheme)
 THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942 33 32 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
Rabaul (sectors B and C); at Shortland Island (sectors D and E); at Tulagi (sectors F 
and G); and at Deboyne Island (sector I)—all out to 680 miles.148 
Task Organization
Normally in Japanese joint operations, unity of command was rare. Separated 
command for army and naval units was the general practice. However, the Japa-
nese made an exception for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation. Inoue exer-
cised full command and control over all navy and army forces in the operation. 
Rear Adm. Aritomo Gotō was in command of all the invasion forces, and Major 
General Horii was in command of the army units assigned for the occupation of 
Port Moresby.149 
Operational Design
The capture of Port Moresby was the principal and ultimate objective of the entire 
operation. It was an operational objective, in terms of its scale. The Japanese be-
lieved that by controlling Port Moresby they would deny the enemy a major air base 
within effective range of Rabaul. From Port Moresby the Japanese could dominate 
the whole of New Guinea and threaten northern Australia.150 Port Moresby would 
be valuable as a springboard for the subsequent Japanese operations against New 
Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. It would also help secure Lae and Salamaua ports from 
air attacks. For its part, the Combined Fleet believed that the MO Operation could 
induce the U.S. Pacific Fleet to respond, thereby setting a trap for its destruction.151 
However, there was a serious mismatch between ends and means. Even if successful 
in this operation, the Japanese clearly lacked sufficient air strength to counter the 
growing Allied air capabilities in northeastern Australia. Enemy aircraft would be 
still able to attack Japanese forces in the western Coral Sea.152 
The capture of Tulagi was a supporting and major tactical objective. A seaplane 
base there would protect the left flank of Japanese forces moving to seize Port 
Moresby. It would allow the Japanese to extend their search coverage farther east-
ward. Also, the Japanese believed, a seaplane base at Tulagi would make it difficult 
for the enemy to conduct reconnaissance from Nouméa and Port Moresby to track 
Japanese movements.153 The Japanese, in contrast, would be able to search east of 
the Solomons and over the eastern Coral Sea. The plan also envisaged the capture of 
Samarai Island, a mile and a half across, as the key to control of the China Strait.154 
The Japanese made a major error in trying to capture Tulagi and Deboyne Island 
(where a seaplane base would be established) in the course of the MO Operation; 
it might have been better to do so beforehand, making the MO Operation itself 
simpler and more executable. However, the single greatest error in the designing 
of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation was failure to obtain local control in the 
Coral Sea. This should have been the initial and the principal supporting objective 
of the entire operation. The main prerequisite of success was the destruction or 
serious weakening of the enemy’s operational center of gravity, his carrier force; 
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only after that was accomplished would the other objectives have been achievable. 
Instead, the Japanese believed that all force elements could be deployed and sent to 
the objective area almost simultaneously. 
In addition, the plan for logistical sustainment of naval forces was inadequate, 
because of the lack of the fleet oilers capable of underway refueling.155 The supply 
group consisted of only two fleet oilers (some sources say three). Only one was as-
signed to the MO Carrier Force. This greatly increased the time required for the 
carriers to refuel at sea and thereby made them more vulnerable to submarine and 
air attack.
Although the Port Moresby–Solomons operation had unity of command to a 
degree unusual for a Japanese operation in the Pacific War, the majority of naval 
units did not belong organically to the Fourth Fleet. The navy’s land-based aircraft 
were subordinate to Admiral Tsukahara, commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet, 
and the submarines were under the control of Vice Adm. Teruhisa Komatsu, com-
mander of the Sixth Fleet. CarDiv 5 and CruDiv 5 were temporarily under Inoue’s 
command; by the end of May 1942 they were to return to their organic forces.156 
Vice Admiral Takagi was the commander of the MO Carrier Force. However, be-
cause he had little experience in air operations, Rear Adm. Chūichi Hara was in 
tactical command of CarDiv 5.157 
Operational Idea. The Japanese operational idea (scheme) for the Port Moresby–
Solomons operation was very complex. The invasion force was divided into nearly 
a dozen smaller force elements, fragmenting and greatly weakening its overall 
strength. Inoue and his planners divided available seagoing forces into nine ele-
ments for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation and one for the separate Nauru–
Ocean Island operation. A short timeline meant that several force elements had to 
be assigned multiple tasks.158 The operational idea was intended to ensure speed in 
action—almost all forces taking part in the operation would converge toward the 
exit from the Louisiades. The outcome of the entire operation hinged on achiev-
ing surprise. Yet the planners did not develop any deception plan to enhance the 
chances of doing so. The basic idea was to envelop the enemy carrier force, with the 
MO Carrier Force sweeping around to the east of the Solomons and then entering 
the Coral Sea from the southeast, and the MO Main Force coming from the north-
east to the area west of the Solomon Islands.159 
The MO Operation was to be completed within twelve days, from the first force 
deployment to the landing at Port Moresby. No flexibility was incorporated to pro-
vide for delays due to unforeseen events or enemy action. Specifically, the land-
ing at Port Moresby would take place on 10 May (X-day). Tulagi would have been 
captured on X–7 (3 May). A seaplane base would be established at Tulagi on X–6 
(4 May), on Deboyne Island on X–4 (6 May), and on Samarai on X+2 (12 May). 
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Naval construction troops would repair the airfields and receive the fighters of the 
5th AAF at Lae on X+2 (12 May). The Nauru-Ocean Invasion Force, sailing out of 
Kavieng, would seize these two islands on X+5 (15 May).160 
The initial task of the MO Main Force was to provide distant cover for the Tu-
lagi landing and then antiaircraft (AA) defense of the MO Invasion Force.161 Inoue 
wanted the light carrier Shōhō to be part of the MO Carrier Force. However, as 
noted above, at the insistence of General Horii Shōhō was assigned to the MO Main 
Force.162 The Japanese apparently believed the Allies would react strongly to the 
capture of Tulagi and that the MO Main Force should be positioned some 150 miles 
west of Tulagi so as to cover either Tulagi or the MO Invasion Force. However, 
Gotō’s force was not strong enough to defend either force against determined attack 
by enemy carriers.163 The MO Support Force (also called the Moresby Escort Fleet) 
was to support both the Tulagi and Port Moresby landings.164 On X–5 (5 May), 
the Support Force would reach Deboyne Island to construct a seaplane base from 
which floatplanes would search to the south and cover the convoy as it transited 
through the Jomard Passage on X–5/X–4 (5/6 May). On X+2 (12 May) it would 
establish at Samarai Island a seaplane/supply base to protect the supply line to Port 
Moresby.165
The Zuikaku and Shōkaku carrier groups were organized as a single force, there-
by greatly increasing their offensive capabilities.166 The principal tasks of the MO 
Carrier Force were to provide distant cover and protection to the MO Invasion 
Force and to destroy the enemy fleet if it appeared.167 On the way, it was to pass 
within 350 miles of Rabaul to ferry eighteen Zero fighters there on X–8 (2 May).168 
It would then sail east of the Solomons, providing direct support to the Tulagi Inva-
sion Force, and then on X–5 (one day after the flying boats started to use the Tulagi 
base) enter the Coral Sea to support the MO Invasion Force as required. If a strong 
enemy force were detected, the MO Carrier Force would attack and destroy it; oth-
erwise, it would prepare for a decisive encounter while protecting the MO Invasion 
Force. After the landing at Port Moresby, the MO Carrier Force would remain five 
more days in the area to counter any powerful enemy naval force that appeared in 
the Coral Sea. Afterward, it would provide direct support to forces taking part in 
the invasions of Nauru and Ocean Island.169 
The Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarines) would destroy the enemy strik-
ing forces in the Coral Sea, destroy enemy shipping, and conduct reconnaissance.170 
Most submarines that took part in the Port Moresby–Solomons operation belonged 
to the Eastern Detachment of SubRon 8. These submarines were planned to leave 
for Truk in mid-April.171 The task of SubRon 8 was “to prepare for the enemy fleet, 
deploy, and wait for the enemy.”172 On X–5, four submarines from SubRon 8 would 
establish a scouting line about 285 miles southwest of Guadalcanal to intercept any 
enemy force passing from Brisbane and Sydney toward Tulagi. Also, one submarine 
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would patrol off the eastern Australian coast and another near Nouméa.173 The two 
submarines of SubGru 21 (the Raiding Force) would reconnoiter the approaches 
to Port Moresby, attack enemy ships, and guide the invasion convoy to the outer 
harbor.174 However, the submarine force was numerically too weak to reconnoiter 
so large an area as the Coral Sea.175 
Deployment. Though execution of the operation was to be almost simultaneous, 
the actual departures of the forces taking part were staggered; basing areas were 
widely separated, distances to the objective areas were long, and speeds of advance 
varied greatly. The Tulagi Invasion Force and the MO Support Force would sail on 
29 April from Rabaul and Truk, respectively. The MO Main Force would leave Truk 
on 30 April, and the MO Carrier Force would sortie from Truk the next day. The 
MO Invasion Force would sail from Rabaul on 4 May.176 
Information Available to the Allies
Communications intelligence (COMINT) was the U.S. Navy’s principal source of 
intelligence on the IJN at the beginning of the war in the Pacific. The Japanese 
radio messages were at that point intercepted by stations in Hawaii, in the Philip-
pines, on Guam, and on Bainbridge Island (in the state of Washington), as well 
as by a network of direction-finding stations. Two categories of intelligence were 
used: decryption intelligence (DI) was that derived from the text of a message, 
while traffic intelligence (TI) was obtained from a message’s externals, such as its 
originator or addressees. Both DI and TI played major roles in the battle of the 
Coral Sea, and Midway as well.177
By the spring of 1942, three centers were analyzing Japanese radio traffic, all 
regularly exchanging data to assist each other in traffic analysis, call-sign recovery, 
and decryption. In Washington, D.C., was Section G, the Communication Security 
Section (code name NEGAT) of the Office of Naval Communications. The other 
two stations serving the Allied commanders in the Pacific were Fleet Radio Unit 
Pacific (FRUPAC, also known as the station HYPO) at Pearl Harbor and CAST at 
Cavite and later on Corregidor in the Philippines. In April 1942, CAST personnel 
was moved to the newly established inter-Allied signal station, Fleet Radio Unit 
Melbourne (FRUMEL). (FRUMEL was often referred to as BELCONNEN, after 
the Australian Belconnen Naval Transmitting Station, near Ginninderra Creek, 
northwest of Canberra.)178 FRUMEL was subordinate to SWPA command. On the 
CNO staff (known as OpNav), the Navy Radio Intelligence Section, Op-20G, was 
responsible for integrating all COMINT on the IJN.179
The version of the Japanese cryptographic system, Naval Codebook D, used at 
the beginning of war was known to the Americans as JN-25B. Just prior to the war 
the Japanese implemented a random additive table that greatly concerned Ameri-
can cryptanalysts until in February 1942 they concluded that it did not constitute a 
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completely new codebook. HYPO concentrated on JN-25B, in concert with CAST 
(then on Corregidor). NEGAT reinforced the efforts on JN-25B and monitored the 
Japanese diplomatic code, known as “Magic.” The three stations exchanged data 
and reviewed findings through a radio network known as COPEK.180
About half the high-level communications in the IJN used JN-25. This code-
book consisted of a printed list of thirty thousand five-digit numbers, each of which 
stood for a unit designation, a technical term, a verb, and so on. Separate ciphers 
for dates, grid locations, and geographic places also appeared within the messages. 
Before transmission of a message, a series of five-digit numbers taken from a list of 
up to fifty thousand random groups was an enhancement to the cipher. The system 
was primitive in comparison to electrical cipher machines then in use, such as the 
U.S. ECM (Sigaba) and the German Enigma. Nevertheless, the Japanese code sys-
tem itself was formidable.181 
In the spring of 1942 American naval cryptanalysts could not read all, or even 
most of, the messages sent in the JN-25 system. Nor could they analyze more than 
a fraction of the many thousands of communications transmitted by the IJN in 
any one day. What they were mostly able to do was recognize associations, linking 
specific units on the basis of the appearance together of their call signs. Although 
they had deduced the meanings of some code groups, they could rarely read more 
than 10 to 15 percent of the text. By April, the cryptanalysts were  deciphering more 
and more of what they analyzed. The Japanese had used the JN-25B version for 
many months, giving the cryptanalysts more time than usual to work on it. The IJN 
planned to issue a new Naval Codebook D edition in April 1942. However, delays 
in distribution postponed the changeover first to 1 May and eventually to 27 May.182 
Had the Japanese gone over to the new edition as originally scheduled, American 
cryptanalysts would have been in the dark for many weeks at a critical time. 
The most revealing indicators of Japanese future intentions were the digraphs 
and trigraphs used as designators throughout the IJN. They represented specific 
places, throughout the Pacific, and often conveyed organizational information. For 
example, digraphs beginning with A applied to American targets in the Central and 
North Pacific. Australian targets in the Papua/Solomons area were given the initial 
letter R, and groups beginning with D designated British/Australian targets in the 
Indian Ocean. COMINT analysis used that system to identify Japanese targets.183 
COMINT remained the single most valuable source of accurate and timely in-
formation on enemy intentions for Admirals King and Nimitz and the major naval 
commanders in the Pacific. This information was especially critical early in the 
war, when the Allies were numerically inferior to the Japanese. Timely information 
on where the Japanese carrier forces were allowed Nimitz and King to employ their 
own carrier forces for raiding newly acquired Japanese positions.184 Such knowledge 
would soon allow prompt deployment of carrier groups to thwart major Japanese 
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thrusts, notably, as will be seen, in the Coral Sea and at Midway. MacArthur relied 
less on COMINT than did Nimitz and King and far more on visual reconnaissance, 
such as aerial scouting and that from coast watchers.185 
In the first two weeks of March 1942, a daily CINCPac Combat Intelligence Bul-
letin, based on COMINT supplied mainly from Hawaii but with occasional contri-
butions from Corregidor, were sent as messages to all task force commanders. The 
series was replaced on 17 March by the CINCPac Intelligence Bulletin, also based 
on communications intelligence, with contributions from Melbourne. After mid-
March the COMINT centers sent bulletins to CINCPac, usually based on transla-
tions that originated each day in HYPO. A Commander, 14th Naval District (COM 
14) Radio Digest was usually sent onward by CINCPac almost verbatim, as well as 
the COM 14 COMINT summary.186 Intelligence officers and cryptanalysts worked 
together to evaluate the texts of decrypted messages; the intelligence officers of 
the various commands then combined radio intelligence with combat intelligence 
information to produce balanced estimates. 
The most important center for this work in the Pacific was CINCPac Fleet 
Intelligence, under Lt. Cdr. Edwin T. Layton.187 Layton supplied information on 
enemy forces and possible intentions for use by CINCPac’s War Plans Section in 
its situation estimates. Each day he composed a summary of pertinent intelligence 
data, the CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletin, and sent it by radio to COMINCH, Op-
Nav, all CINCPac task force commanders, the Australian and New Zealand naval 
boards, Admiral Leary’s SWPA naval forces, the commander of the British East-
ern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. Special Liaison Officer stationed in 
London for cooperation with the Admiralty. Leary’s staff provided valuable intel-
ligence summaries based on data from the FRUMEL station and aircraft sightings. 
OpNav’s Office of Naval Intelligence broadcast general information on estimated 
Japanese fleet movements and forthcoming operations. The urgency or special 
nature of intelligence information often required that Nimitz’s and Leary’s intel-
ligence officers send specific dispatches to task force commanders for immediate 
action. 
The Allied cryptanalysts read and decoded in spring 1942 a large number of 
IJN messages directly or indirectly related to Japanese plans for the Second Opera-
tional Stage of the war. On 29 January they had decoded the first messages indicat-
ing that the Japanese were conducting searches south of Rabaul;188 in February the 
COMINT centers in Hawaii and Melbourne and on Corregidor issued warnings 
to King, Nimitz, and Adm. Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet. Ad-
miral Leary received warnings of the Japanese future operations in the direction 
of Lae, Port Moresby, and the Solomons. Collectively, these warnings convinced 
Nimitz in late February that a Japanese offensive was planned for the Port Mores- 
by area. Within a week, U.S. task forces had been alerted.189
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The Allies learned on 21 March of the presence in the New Britain area of two 
cruiser divisions (CruDivs 6 and 18), one destroyer squadron (DesRon 6) and one 
gunboat division (Gunboat Division 8).190 But the first specific indication of the 
pending operation against Port Moresby was a decoded Japanese message of 25 
March: “All attack forces continue operations in accordance with [an unidenti-
fied message reference]. . . . On 26th #2 [Air] Attack Force continues to support 
main task and using fighters assist #5 [Air] Attack Force in RZP campaign and 
with scouts carry out patrol in your assigned area. #5 [Air] Attack Force continue 
attacks on RZP and . . . and carry out patrol in your assigned area.”191 Cryptanalysts 
tentatively placed “RZP” in the Port Moresby area. Initially, they believed that both 
RZP and RZQ referred to the Port Moresby area; later they concluded that RZQ 
was a seaplane base in Port Moresby and that RZP was the town itself.192 
Reportedly, Allied analysts read all the Japanese messages in April and May 
1942. They were able gradually to discern Japanese intentions from the movements 
of various naval and air units and arrivals at Truk and New Britain. They received 
such a vast number of messages that even without decoding them all they gave 
Nimitz warning in time to move carrier forces into the Coral Sea.193 
Good indicators of Japanese preparation for a major offensive operation in the 
southwest Pacific were attempts to disguise radio call signs and the use of a new 
code system. The Japanese intention to mislead the Allies (the deceptive calls were 
those of various air groups in the home islands) was nullified because the Allied 
cryptanalysts read the very message that ordered the practice to be initiated.194 Also, 
prior to the execution of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation the Allied traffic 
analysts learned about the Fourth Fleet’s orders to various units and the times for 
their execution. The Allies were also able to obtain knowledge on search sectors 
given to the Japanese aircraft, detection reports on Allied forces, and the actions 
then taken.195 
In April, Allied DI/TI revealed the scope of the pending operation against Port 
Moresby. COMINT regularly recorded movements of the Japanese ships, aircraft, 
equipment, and personnel into the Rabaul area.196 For example, on 1 April COMINT 
learned that two cruisers of CruDiv 6 were present in New Britain, that the re-
mainder of CruDiv 18 and DesRon 6 were in same vicinity, and that the Taichu 
Air Group was expected in the Marshalls–New Britain area shortly. The pres-
ence of CruDiv 7 and DesRon 4 south of Bougainville was also noted. On 2 April 
COMINT noted that the Japanese expected enemy air strength in the New Britain 
area to be greatly strengthened in the immediate future.197 COM 14 messages on 
the same day highlighted numerous indications of an impending offensive from 
Rabaul: the enemy was augmenting and reorganizing its air units in the area, and 
there were numerous movements of seaplane tenders from Truk to Rabaul and 
transfers of aircraft to Rabaul.198 
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The Allied cryptanalysts read on 5 April of the Combined Fleet’s assignment 
of Kaga to the Fourth Fleet; Kaga was an addressee in communications between 
Fourth Fleet and the Combined Fleet regarding the Port Moresby operation. With-
in a few days cryptanalysts linked Kaga and the “RZP campaign,” understood to 
refer to Port Moresby. On 10 April Allied COMINT deduced that Kaga and a new 
Shōkaku-class light carrier, whose name was erroneously transliterated as Ryukaku 
(actually Shōhō) might be used for offensive operations.199 Another indication of 
the possible employment of the Japanese forces in the Coral Sea had come on 7 
April, when the Allies learned that the aircraft based in the Salamaua area had been 
directed to extend their searches up to six hundred miles, from the southeast to 
the south.200 The Japanese commander of an air group in Rabaul informed another 
commander in the Truk–New Guinea area that his unit was conducting searches in 
the sector from 150° to 200° and out to a distance of five hundred miles.201 
The Allies decrypted a message on 8 April indicating that reorganization of air 
forces in the Marshalls and New Britain areas was in progress. When completed, 
the Japanese were expected to have in the New Britain area about eighty bombers, 
plus fighters and one squadron of patrol aircraft.202 The next day, analysts decrypted 
a message revealing that Kaga was still at Sasebo but was expected to proceed to the 
New Britain area in the latter part of April.203 On 9 April the Australian FRUMEL 
station decrypted a message from Yamamoto requesting a report on progress of 
repairs on Kaga. He needed Kaga, it said, as soon as possible, because it was to take 
part in the RZP campaign.204 
Allied intelligence estimated on 10 April that all the available enemy large car-
riers were then in the Indian Ocean and that it would be several weeks before 
any would be available to the South Seas Fleet. The U.S. cryptanalysts apparently 
missed the fact that Kaga was not part of the Striking Force, operating in the Indian 
Ocean. However, their British counterparts at Colombo quickly learned of the two 
carriers of the Striking Force that were to operate in the southwest Pacific. They 
decoded almost in its entirety a message sent to Inoue on 13 April advising that 
CarDiv 5 (Shōkaku, Zuikaku), after detaching near Singapore, would stop on 18 
April at Bako, in the Pescadores, and then proceed to Truk, arriving on the 28th. 
The British Admiralty passed this information to King, who in turn warned Nimitz 
and Leary on 15 April.205 
On 14 April, the American analysts learned by decoding a radio message that 
“Ryukaku” would arrive at Yokosuka on 20 April and by 25 April at Truk, with more 
than twenty aircraft.206 The same day they learned that CarDiv 5 was near Bako; it 
was expected to be in the Truk area by the end of April. They also believed that 
the movement of CruDiv 5 with two heavy cruisers was possibly linked with the 
deployment of “Ryukaku” to Truk, speculating that CruDiv 5 would be assigned to 
the Fourth Fleet.207 A British radio intercept on 15 April indicated that the Japanese 
carrier striking force was leaving the Indian Ocean and that CarDiv 5 would be 
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detached to proceed to Truk, arriving about 21 April. This, combined with a report 
of Capt. Joseph Rochefort, the officer in charge at HYPO, on the southward move-
ment of the Japanese units and supplies, convinced Nimitz that an “offensive in the 
southwest Pacific is shaping up.”208 
On 17 April, the Australian Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (es-
tablished on 5 March 1941) in Melbourne outlined “indications of an imminent 
move by Japan against Australian territory.” It concluded that the enemy intended 
to carry out an offensive from the Truk–New Britain area, probably during the first 
week of May, with the major objective of seizing control of the New Guinea–Torres 
Strait area, involving the occupation of Port Moresby. The review also stated that 
the aircraft carriers Zuikaku and Shōkaku were in transit from Formosa to Truk, 
to arrive on 28 April. The report estimated that the Japanese naval forces for the 
pending offensive would consist of two or three aircraft carriers (Zuikaku, Shōkaku, 
and “Ryukaku”), five heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and a 
submarine force.209
Also on 17 April, a message from COM 14 highlighted the activity of the enemy 
aircraft in the Rabaul area. It noted that the Tainan Air Group had been operating 
from the Rabaul area since 7 April. That unit would receive on 25 April nine dive-
bombers being carried by “Ryukaku.” The 5th (Air) Attack Force was composed 
of heavy bombers and patrol aircraft and was involved in the operations over Port 
Moresby.210 COM 14 pointed out a large increase in the Japanese air strength in the 
New Britain area; a new air group (the Taichi Air Group) had arrived at Rabaul. It 
also believed that “Ryukaku” and CruDiv 5 might be connected with movements 
of shore-based units into Rabaul area.211 On 21 April U.S. COMINT reported that 
the Tainan Air Group had arrived at Rabaul on the 10th. The seaplane tender Kenjo 
Maru was in Rabaul, and another tender, Fujikawa Maru, was en route from Palau 
to Rabaul.212
On 21 April, station BELCONNEN, together with the radio intelligence team 
of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), estimated that intensified air attacks on Port 
Moresby clearly showed that it was the main Japanese objective. Nimitz decided to 
direct TF 17 (then in the vicinity of the Coral Sea) and TF 11 (two days out of Pearl 
Harbor and heading south) to block the Japanese move against Port Moresby.213 
Admiral King requested HYPO’s analysis of the situation in the southwest 
Pacific. Rochefort indicated in his reply, on which Nimitz was an “information” 
addressee, that there was a consensus that the Japanese operations in the Indian 
Ocean had ended and that the Japanese planned a new offensive against eastern 
New Guinea and in the Coral Sea. The enemy objectives were not clear, but there 
was no evidence that the Japanese intended to invade Australia. A light carrier 
(“Ryukaku”) had been assigned, along with a cruiser division, to cover movements 
into the Rabaul area.214 
 THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942 41 40 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
MacArthur’s intelligence section was very skeptical about Japanese intentions 
against Port Moresby. On 21 April, Col. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s assis-
tant chief for intelligence, prepared for his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, 
a status report based on (but not attributed to) COMINT from Melbourne. 
Willoughby questioned the Navy’s view of Japanese naval and ground-based air 
strength in the Fourth Fleet area. He (erroneously) believed the buildup posed more 
of a threat to the coast of Australia and New Caledonia than to Port Moresby.215
On 22 April, there were strong indications of an impending concentration of 
Japanese forces in the Truk area, involving CarDiv 5, CruDiv 5 (less heavy cruiser 
Nachi), “Ryukaku,” and DesDiv 4. CarDiv 5 was expected to arrive at Truk on 28 
April and thereafter probably to move to the New Britain area. The carriers Sōryū 
and Ryūjō were en route to Japan. Additional heavy bombers had arrived at the 
Rabaul area on 19 April. For the cryptanalysts, it was obvious that a major fleet 
operation centering on the New Britain area would start very soon.216 
On 23 April, messages decoded by HYPO and NEGAT and a report from Mel-
bourne indicated that the Port Moresby force included CruDiv 5, CarDiv 5, and pos-
sibly submarines and the light carrier “Ryukaku.” However, it erroneously placed Kaga 
in the Truk area.217 The Allies learned the same day that Inoue had issued Operation 
Order No. 13 to the South Seas Fleet to initiate operations against Port Moresby.218 
On 25 April, Op-20G intercepted a very important message sent by the Fourth 
Fleet the preceding day. That message directed subordinate commands to amend 
the naval call list and thereby revealed the task organization for the Port Moresby–
Solomons operation. Specifically, the No. 3 Truk (Fourth Fleet) Communications 
Section was on 25 April to change page 5 of “naval call list number 117,” inserting 
the following addressees: MO Fleet, MO Occupation Force, MO Attack Force, RZB 
Occupation Force, RY Occupation Force, and 3rd and 5th Special Base Forces. The 
analysts asserted that designator “MO” stood for Port Moresby and “RXB” for Tu-
lagi; “RY” was not definitely known but was believed to be the Gilbert Islands.219 
The Allies learned on 25 April that reinforcements continued to arrive at New 
Britain. The units of Gunboat Division 8 were en route from Sasebo to Rabaul.220 
On the 26th American analysts deduced that three carriers—“Ryukaku,” Zuikaku, 
and Shōkaku—were en route to Truk and would arrive there about 26 April.221 An-
other strong indicator of the pending operation against Port Moresby was a request 
on 18 April for a thousand copies of some documents, including charts of Austra-
lia, to be sent via transport aircraft departing Yokohama on 20 or 21 April.222 The 
Allied analysts believed that on that day the seaplane tender Kasuga Maru was at 
Truk or south of Truk.223 Cryptanalysts falsely believed that the 5th Air Attack Force 
was based in the Carolines (actually in New Britain) and that the urgency of send-
ing these documents indicated that it would be actively engaged in “that sector 
[Australia] shortly.”224 
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On 27 April Allied cryptanalysts noticed increased air and submarine activ-
ity. A decoded message dated 21 April indicated the employment of SubRon 7. 
SubRon 8 was believed to have been in the Rabaul area on 22 April. The CINC of 
the Fourth Fleet addressed CarDiv 5, CruDiv 5 (less Nachi), the cruiser “A KU 3,” 
and DesDiv “RI TE 9” (the latter believed to be DesRon 1, plane guards for CarDiv 
5). COM 14 mistakenly placed the 4th, 5th, and 6th Air Attack Forces in Rabaul; 
the 3rd, it assessed, was in Malaya and the 1st between Wake and Rabaul.225 Actu-
ally, only the 5th AAF was in Rabaul. Air reinforcements for the New Britain area 
were arriving from the Marianas and the Marshalls. CarDiv 5, CruDiv 5, and sev-
eral destroyers were reported operating to the southward of Truk. The Allies also 
learned that the Japanese had detected an Allied task force composed of one carrier, 
one cruiser, and two destroyers at about 230 miles southeast of Rabaul at 1200 on 
26 April.226 
Especially valuable was a Japanese message decoded on 27 April that read, “The 
Mandates force will operate as follows. Comdr . . . , with four unidentified units 
[probably those in the heading], departs Truk and join . . . for operation against 
enemy in RX area. If no contact is made search with RQ as reference point [the next 
part was vague but dealt with responsibilities and orders of various units and ships]. 
With reference to operations of the First Air Fleet and . . . these orders remain in 
effect until canceled.”227 Also on 27 April, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval 
District at Pearl Harbor reported his belief that air reinforcements for New Britain 
would arrive from the Marianas and Marshalls in the immediate future. There were 
more indications that CarDiv 5 and CruDiv 5 (less Nachi) and destroyers would 
operate southward of Truk.228 
On 28 April, COM 14 learned that the Fourth Fleet had directed four units 
to join another group to search for and engage the enemy eastward of New Brit-
ain. The analysts believed that this other force consisted of units from CruDivs 
6 and 18, strengthened by at least one carrier, “Ryukaku,” and perhaps two heavy 
cruisers of CruDiv 5.229 The commander of the Fourth Fleet now sent an urgent 
dispatch that represented an operation order for offensive operations in the south-
east theater. The addressees were the Fourth Fleet, CruDiv 5, CarDiv 5, “Ryukaku,” 
Kamikawa Maru, two or three destroyer divisions, plane guards, the commander of 
submarine forces, and the 4th and 5th Air Attack Forces.230 
In late April, a serious breach of security happened in MacArthur’s headquar-
ters. On 27 April several newspapers in Washington, D.C., published a story that 
read, “Japanese naval forces including ships, planes, supplies and men are concen-
trating in Marshall Islands apparently preparing for new operations.” King was fu-
rious and sent a sharply worded protest to Marshall. On the 30th the War Depart-
ment warned MacArthur to tighten censorship at his headquarters. This story was 
potentially dangerous because it might have indicated to the Japanese that their 
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codes had been broken. However, nothing happened; Japanese agents apparently 
did not pick up the story.231 
The main sources for tactical (as opposed to strategic and operational) intel-
ligence were the reports of land-based reconnaissance aircraft based in northeast-
ern Australia and at Port Moresby, flying boats at Nouméa, submarines, and the 
coast-watcher service. The SWPA’s search of the prospective operating area was 
hampered by long flying distances and corresponding long transits. Flights had to 
be staged through Horn Island. The lack of good bases and of adequate numbers of 
patrol aircraft was sorely felt.232 
In preparation for the operation, as he informed Fletcher, MacArthur modi-
fied existing search plans. Specifically, SWPA aircraft flew flank-reconnaissance 
patrols around Thursday Island, Port Moresby, and Rabaul. They also extensively 
reconnoitered the Solomon Islands and the area southeastward to the boundary 
of the Southwest Pacific Area, as well as the Solomon Sea west of Tulagi. In addi-
tion, SWPA aircraft patrolled from Buna southeastward along the north coast of 
New Guinea and the Louisiades, and then westward, south of the Louisiades, to 
Port Moresby. The area around Townsville was patrolled out to five hundred miles. 
Allied search aircraft conducted routine patrols across the mouth of the Gulf of 
Carpentaria and off Darwin. SWPA bombers and fighters at Port Moresby also 
often conducted photographic and armed reconnaissance around Salamaua, Lae, 
Madang, Gasmata, and Buna. After 1 May, however, no searches east of the Solo-
mon Islands were conducted by either the RAAF from Tulagi or the U.S. Army Air 
Forces in Australia or at Port Moresby.233 
Prior to 2 May, the SWPA’s Allied Air Forces operated only three bases for recon-
naissance missions. The lack of aircraft and flying boats prevented scouting more 
than one of the allocated search areas more often than once a day. The search areas 
barely overlapped and only in two locations: the Solomon Sea and the Solomons. 
The area around the Louisiades was covered by aircraft flying from Townsville, 
Port Moresby, and Tulagi. After Tulagi was abandoned on 2 May, the area over the 
Solomons south of Bougainville and that between Rossel and Rennell Islands were 
left uncovered. The loss of Tulagi was not offset by changing the boundary between 
the SWPA and POA; almost the entire area in which the battle of the Coral Sea was 
to take place was within the SWPA.234 
Subordinate to Nimitz was the seaplane tender Tangier, at Nouméa; it had six 
Catalinas available for search. From 1 through 4 May they flew daily patrols in a 
northwesterly sector out to seven hundred miles. Three Catalinas were used in par-
allel searches separated by fifty miles (their assumed radius of visibility was twenty-
five miles).235 Because of their small numbers, the Catalinas could search only once 
a day. This was not sufficient to ensure detection of enemy forces entering the Coral 
Sea from the eastward around San Cristobal Island or through any of the passages 
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northwestward of that island. Had the Catalinas redeployed to, or staged through, 
Efate, their effective search could have been extended up to 180 miles on the west-
ern leg, far enough to include Tulagi, and 210 miles on the eastern leg, seventy-five 
miles to seaward of Malaita. This would probably have resulted in detection of the 
Japanese carrier force on 5 May. Conducting the search from Espiritu Santo Island 
would have extended the radius even farther to the northwest to the tip of Choi-
seul Island, providing coverage seventy-five miles to the eastward of the Solomon 
Islands.236 
Divided theater command hampered significantly the process of obtaining 
comprehensive and timely information on the whereabouts and movements of 
enemy forces both prior to and during the operation. MacArthur had sole re-
sponsibility for land-based aircraft operating over the Coral Sea, on which, by 
decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nimitz was not allowed to intrude; the con-
sequence was that a large part of the Coral Sea was not searched.237 Another prob-
lem was that Allied land-based aircraft crews were poorly trained for maritime 
reconnaissance. The long flying hours caused fatigue. Also, the number of land-
based search aircraft was limited; during the operation, CTF 17, Rear Admiral 
Fletcher, would be forced to supplement them with carrier-based planes.238
The coast-watcher service had been organized in 1939 by the RAN, which 
had been made responsible for establishing such a service on the northern 
Australian mainland, the Torres Strait islands, New Guinea, New Britain, and 
the Solomon Islands. Coast watchers were drawn from civilian administration 
officers, teachers, planters, missionaries, and other coastal residents. By 1939 
close to seven hundred volunteer coast watchers had been recruited; in early 1941 
Townsville became the coast-watching service’s coordination center. An Area 
Combined Headquarters was also established in Townsville in January 1941 to 
coordinate the defense of maritime shipping. The coast-watcher service reported 
on shipping movements and other unusual activities along some 2,485 miles of 
coastline of Australian New Guinea, the Admiralties, the Bismarck Archipelago, 
the Solomons, and the New Hebrides.239 
The Allies had relatively good knowledge of the Japanese air facilities and 
air strength in the newly occupied areas of eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck 
Archipelago, and the Solomons. However, they estimated inaccurately that on 25 
April the Japanese had sixty-eight aircraft (fourteen fighters, forty bombers, and 
fourteen patrol aircraft) deployed in Rabaul and about twenty-four aircraft (all 
fighters) at Lae.240
Allied Plans and Preparations 
In early 1942 Australian Papua New Guinea was weakly defended and open to 
Japanese attack. By early April 1942 Port Moresby had a small garrison of three 
infantry battalions and several gun batteries.241 Despite public statements that he 
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was committed to the defense of Australia by holding New Guinea, MacArthur 
deployed only one brigade of militia to Port Moresby and sent no reinforcements 
until 14 May, when the battle of the Coral Sea was over, although he had four expe-
rienced Australian Imperial Force brigades and the U.S. 41st Division. The SWPA 
had to rely almost exclusively on land-based aircraft and naval forces to defend Port 
Moresby.242
The SWPA’s Allied Air Forces, under Lt. Gen. George Brett (who had taken the 
post on 20 April 1942), consisted of six groups—three pursuit, one light bombard-
ment, one medium bombardment, and one heavy bombardment—and four RAAF 
squadrons. This force was impressive, but only on paper. There were about a hun-
dred medium bombers and forty-eight heavy bombers, but less than half were op-
erational.243 Brett deployed at Port Moresby three Australian search squadrons and 
one fighter squadron, plus one U.S. squadron of dive-bombers. The major part of 
the Allied air forces was at airfields in Townsville, Cooktown, and Charters Towers. 
Squadrons were sometimes able to put no more than a single plane in the air. Out 
of about five hundred aircraft in the Allied Air Forces inventories, only about two 
hundred, or 40 percent, could support the Coral Sea operation.244 
SWPA Allied Naval Forces, under Vice Admiral Leary, were small and inad-
equate for defending Port Moresby from an enemy landing. Most of the SWPA’s 
surface forces were actually controlled by Fletcher. The submarine force consisted 
of eleven old, S-class boats. Only four to six could be on patrol at any given time; 
they were usually employed around Rabaul and off the eastern New Guinea coast.245 
The Australians were unable to hold their position in the Solomons, because of the 
lack of air cover; they had at Tulagi only about fifty men and a seaplane base with 
four Catalinas, which patrolled out to New Britain and Bougainville. They decided 
on 2 May to evacuate Tulagi after receiving warning from the coast watchers that 
an enemy force was on the way from Rabaul.246
In early April, Nimitz had only one carrier task force at sea—TF 17, with York-
town, under Fletcher—in the eastern part of the Coral Sea. Task Force 11, with 
Lexington, had steamed into Pearl Harbor on 26 March. Lexington was planned to 
complete docking and refit by 15 April. Task Force 16, under Vice Admiral Halsey, 
in Enterprise, was at Pearl Harbor. The new TF 18, Capt. Marc A. Mitscher’s new 
carrier Hornet with several escorts, was expected to sail in the first week of April 
from the West Coast to Hawaii. On 2 April, Nimitz’s staff discussed whether TF 11 
should join TF 17 in the southern Pacific or remain in Hawaii and train together 
with TF 1, commanded by Vice Adm. William S. Pye and composed of old battle-
ships. On 3 April, Rear Adm. Aubrey Fitch relieved Vice Admiral Brown as CTF 
11. Nimitz directed Fitch to sail on 15 April and exercise near Palmyra until 4 May, 
when TF 1 would return to Pearl Harbor. Four days later he informed Fletcher that 
he had taken over command of the SOPAC. Nimitz directed Fletcher to sail east to 
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Tongatabu for replenishment. Task Force 17 would depart Tongatabu on 27 April 
and head back to the Coral Sea. 
Since the 10 March attack on shipping in the Huon Gulf, there had been no 
significant actions by Allied carriers in the South Pacific. However, MacArthur 
wanted them to remain in the area, and on 17 April he expressed concern that car-
riers were leaving the Coral Sea for Tongatabu. He wrote to Nimitz, “[I] consider it 
necessary that one task force [be] maintained in that area at all times to check fur-
ther enemy advance.” Nimitz was surprised at the message but assured MacArthur 
that TF 17 was being withdrawn only to replenish and deal with problems with its 
fighter aircraft. He strongly agreed on the desirability of maintaining a force in the 
Coral Sea and would try to do so.247 But Nimitz privately told King, “It is my convic-
tion that enemy advance should be opposed by force containing not less than two 
carriers.” He again recommended to King that TF 11 be sent to the Coral Sea to join 
TF 17. Nimitz did not want TF 1 to be employed beyond the Palmyra–Christmas 
line and in fact wanted it returned to San Francisco.248
Although he held the posts of CINCPOA and CINCPac, Nimitz did not have 
control over Enterprise and Hornet in April 1942. In January 1942 King and his 
staff planned a diversionary raid (later popularly known as the “Doolittle Raid”) 
on Japan to raise the nation’s morale after a string of Allied defeats in the Pacific. In 
consultation with General Arnold, King decided to use Hornet, which would carry 
sixteen B-25 long-range heavy bombers of the 17th Bombardment Group (Medi-
um), under the command of Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle. Enterprise, under Halsey, 
would accompany the raiding force in support. The two task forces joined on 13 
April, and Halsey incorporated Hornet into TF 16. The bombers would be launched 
at a distance of 450 miles from their targets on 18 April. From decoded enemy ra-
dio messages, U.S. planners knew that the Japanese carriers were still far south of 
Japan and would not interfere with the operation. However, this diversionary raid 
resulted in half of Nimitz’s carrier strength being tied up and unable to take part 
in the operations elsewhere in the Pacific. Otherwise, Nimitz would have had four 
carriers (Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet, and Enterprise) to oppose the thrust toward 
Port Moresby and probably would have inflicted much larger losses on the Japanese. 
Halsey’s TF 16 (Enterprise, plus Hornet attached for the Tokyo raid) was ex-
pected to return to Pearl Harbor on 25 April. It could sail for the South Pacific by 
the end of April and join Fletcher’s TF 17 on about 14 May. The only concern was 
whether Hornet would have its full complement of aircraft. A force of seven fleet 
tankers could support both carrier task forces in the South Pacific until about 1 
June. Afterward, chartered tankers would have to be diverted from West Coast–
Hawaii runs to Fiji and Samoa. Task Force 16 would operate with TF 17 and then 
relieve it when Fletcher left the South Pacific about 15 May, because Yorktown 
needed dry docking and overhaul. Lexington could stay until 1 June, when it 
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would go to Hawaii for dry docking as well. The Catalinas at Nouméa would be 
increased from six to twelve. The SWPA would provide land-based air support. 
A group of cruisers and a half-dozen submarines would be deployed from Hawaii 
to the South Pacific and five more to observe Truk.249 
Plans to counter the pending Japanese offensive against Port Moresby were pre-
pared independently by the SWPA and POA staffs. On 4 April, an Australian study 
argued that the key to the defense of Australia was Port Moresby.250 After the Jap-
anese occupation of Rabaul and points on the New Guinea coast, MacArthur de-
cided to strengthen Allied positions in New Guinea and develop Port Moresby as a 
major air and land base. Though, as noted above, he sent no troops to Port Moresby, 
he directed the expansion of air facilities in northeastern Australia, specifically 
at Townsville and Cloncurry, for its defense; this program was in its early stages 
in late April 1942. MacArthur also made extensive preparations to thwart the 
Japanese attempt to seize Port Moresby. Among other things, he directed SWPA’s 
Allied Air Forces to intensify reconnaissance and concentrate striking forces at 
Townsville and Cloncurry airfields. He planned to conduct repeated air attacks 
against Rabaul in early May; long-range heavy bombers would also attack Lae, 
Deboyne Island, and convoys in adjacent areas. The garrison commanders in 
northeastern Australia and at Port Moresby were alerted to the possibility of the 
enemy landings. Allied Naval Forces also sent three cruisers, organized as TF 44, 
under Rear Admiral Crace to join with TF 17 in the Coral Sea.251
For its part, Nimitz’s staff produced on 22 April a detailed estimate of the 
situation. It assumed that a Japanese offensive in the New Guinea–New Britain– 
Solomons area would begin about 3 May. For Nimitz the problem was how to 
stop the pending Japanese advance in the southwestern Pacific and yet ensure 
the security of Hawaii and of lines of communications with the West Coast. He 
delegated authority to conduct operations directly to Fletcher. When TF 16 ar-
rived, Halsey would take overall command.252 Had Halsey’s carrier group entered 
the Coral Sea, therefore, he would have commanded all Allied naval forces in the 
battle.253 
To divert Japanese attention from the movements of the U.S. forces in the 
South Pacific, Nimitz planned to send the light cruiser Nashville from Pearl Har-
bor on 2 May to the Japanese fishing grounds off Kamchatka (after stopping at 
Midway) to destroy fishing boats. Nashville would transmit messages mimicking 
the presence of a U.S. carrier task force. However, Nashville ran aground leaving 
Midway, and the mission was abandoned. 
The U.S. carrier groups in the Coral Sea had only two fleet oilers for underway 
refueling: the 21,077-ton, 16.5-knot Neosho, and the 17,070-ton (full), ten-knot 
Tippecanoe. There were two more oilers available in Australia, but they were not 
equipped for underway replenishment. Carriers and their escorts consumed very 
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large quantities of fuel, especially at high speed in combat. Fortunately, carriers 
and cruisers could carry sufficient fuel to give them long range and endurance. For 
example, Yorktown carried 7,500 tons of fuel, enough for seventeen days at twenty 
knots. But the 1,900-ton U.S. destroyers of 1942 carried only about five hundred 
tons of fuel, giving them an endurance at fifteen knots of about 4,700 miles, or 
thirteen days. At thirty-four knots—in combat action or when screening fast carri-
ers—their endurance was only thirty-two hours, about 1,100 miles.254 Carriers and 
cruisers often refueled the short-legged destroyers and more quickly than oilers 
could, but to do so the entire task group had to be withdrawn from the operating 
area.
The shortage of fleet oilers was a major Allied weakness and potential vulner-
ability. Fletcher tried always to keep an oiler with his carrier group, except during 
the actual strike operations. He was also greatly concerned that the Japanese not 
discover that he had only two fleet oilers. If the Japanese attacked them, U.S. carrier 
operations in the Coral Sea would be severely restricted.255 
Compared to the Japanese plans, the Allied plan was simple and straightfor-
ward. The single and the most important objective was to prevent the enemy inva-
sion forces from reaching and landing troops at Port Moresby. The prerequisite was 
to deny local control of the Coral Sea to the enemy. This objective could be accom-
plished by the destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s greatest critical strength, 
his carrier force—in modern terms, his operational center of gravity. 
Nimitz issued his Operation Plan 23-42 to Halsey on 29 April. In it he instructed 
Halsey to oppose the enemy advance in the New Guinea–Solomon Islands area. 
Nimitz explained that there were indications that the Japanese would launch an of-
fensive in the southwest Pacific in the first week of May 1942. Probable objectives 
were Port Moresby, the Solomon Islands, and further positions in the Gilbert Is-
lands, with a “possible extension of effort to include strong raids against New Cale-
donia and/or Fiji islands.”256 Nimitz directed that TF 17, composed of the existing 
TF 17 plus TF 11, would operate in the Coral Sea starting on 1 May. These forces 
would be put under command of CTF 16 (Halsey) upon his arrival in the Coral Sea. 
Depending on the situation, TF 17 might be withdrawn to the Central Pacific about 
15 May and TF 11 about 1 June. The seaplane tender Tangier and its twelve patrol 
aircraft, based at Nouméa, would operate as directed by the senior task force com-
mander in the area, as Task Group 17.9.257 Nimitz also informed Halsey that General 
MacArthur had directed his submarine force to start patrolling on 28 April the Port 
Moresby–Rabaul and Louisiades–Samarai Island areas. SWPA forces would search 
the general area, coordinating their actions and cooperating with the other naval 
task forces operating in the South Pacific. MacArthur had made available the Aus-
tralian cruisers Australia and Hobart, the U.S. cruiser Chicago, and two 1,200-ton 
destroyers for the operations with the Pacific Fleet task forces. It had been agreed by 
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the Allied governments that the senior U.S. naval officer commanding a carrier task 
force would, regardless of relative rank, exercise tactical command of the combined 
units operating in the southern and southwest Pacific.258 
On the basis of Nimitz’s Operation Plan 23-42, Fletcher issued his Operation 
Order No. 2-42, in which he stated that the mission of TF 17 was to “destroy enemy 
ships, shipping, and aircraft at favorable opportunities in order to assist in check-
ing further advances by enemy in the New Guinea–Solomon area.”259 He also wrote, 
“This force will operate about seven hundred miles south of Rabaul. Upon receiv-
ing intelligence of enemy surface forces advancing to the southward, this force will 
move into a favorable position for intercepting and destroying the enemy.”260 An 
annex to the operation order contained information on the Japanese air strikes 
against Horn Island, Port Moresby, and Tulagi. It estimated the enemy’s land-based 
air strength at 102 aircraft (forty-two fighters, thirty-six bombers, twenty flying 
boats, and four floatplanes). The enemy searches would, it assessed, extend out to 
six hundred miles from Rabaul and the Shortland Islands. Fletcher anticipated that 
the enemy offensive would start around 28 April. 
Fletcher’s estimate of the enemy’s carrier forces was largely accurate. Among 
other things, it stated that the frontline carriers Zuikaku and Shōkaku had sixty-
three aircraft each (twenty-one fighters, twenty-one dive-bombers, and twenty-one 
torpedo bombers). However, “Ryukaku” was wrongly estimated to carry eighty-four 
aircraft (twenty-one fighters, forty-two dive-bombers, and twenty-one torpedo 
bombers; the air complement of the actual Shōhō was much smaller). In addition, it 
was believed that the 17,400-ton converted carrier Kasuga Maru would be present, 
carrying some forty-five aircraft. These forces were supported, the order stated, by 
two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, sixteen destroyers, two converted seaplane 
tenders, one submarine tender, six submarines, eight gunboats, and nineteen trans-
ports and auxiliary vessels.261 
Execution
The Port Moresby-Solomons operation was executed between 27 April and 11 May 
1942. Combat took place between 3 and 8 May, and the decision was reached in 
a carrier engagement on 8 May (see map 4). In the process both sides made nu-
merous errors in identifying opposing forces. Many wrong decisions were made 
because commanders either received incorrect information on the whereabouts 
and movement of enemy forces, lacked that information entirely, or exercised poor 
judgment.
The major combat involved in the operation can be divided into three phases. 
Phase I comprised the deployment of combat forces and the Japanese landing on 
Tulagi (27 April–3 May), II the Allied attack on Tulagi and preliminaries (4–7 May), 
and III the carrier engagement and withdrawal of forces (8–11 May). 
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Map 4
The execution
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Phase I (27 April–3 May)
The Japanese forces deployed for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation in nine 
force elements, each proceeding toward its assigned area independently. On 29 
April four submarines of SubRon 8 (I-22, I-24, I-28, and I-29) left Rabaul and head-
ed to their assigned patrol area some 285 miles southwest of Guadalcanal; another 
submarine (I-21) took up a station off Nouméa. In early May, two boats of SubGru 
21 (RO-33 and RO-34) sailed out of Rabaul for the waters south of Osprey Reef, 205 
miles north-northeast of Cairns, Australia; they were then to proceed to the ap-
proaches of Port Moresby.262 On 29 April, the MO Support Force sailed from Truk 
southward to pass west of Buka Island and then turn south and eastward toward 
a position west of Tulagi. The next day the MO Main Force sortied from Truk, 
steamed southward toward the passage between Bougainville and Choiseul, and 
then pushed eastward toward a point some 150 miles west of Tulagi. The Tulagi In-
vasion Force, with about four hundred troops of the 3rd Kure Special Unit, sortied 
from Rabaul on 29–30 April. The MO Carrier Force sailed from Truk on 1 May to 
pass eastward of San Cristobal and enter the Coral Sea. Finally, on 4 May the MO 
Invasion Force, with five thousand troops of the South Seas Force and five hundred 
of the 3rd Kure Special Unit, sailed from Rabaul and proceeded southward toward 
Jomard Passage.
On the Allied side, TF 17 spent seven days at Tongatabu for provisioning and 
upkeep. It sailed out of Tongatabu on 27 April and three days later reentered the 
Coral Sea. In the meantime Task Force 11 left Pearl Harbor for the South Pacific. 
At 0615 on 1 May TF 17 and TF 11 met some three hundred miles southwest of 
the New Hebrides. Task Forces 17 and 11 were vulnerable there to surprise enemy 
attack, because, as noted, Allied land-based aircraft did not patrol the central and 
eastern parts of the Coral Sea and there was no coverage of a potential approach by 
the enemy carrier forces eastward of the Solomon Islands.263 Fletcher sent TF 11 to 
join the oiler Tippecanoe, with the cruiser Chicago and destroyer Perkins, at latitude 
16° 00′ south, longitude 161° 45′ east, to take on as much fuel as possible before the 
oiler returned to Efate as directed by Nimitz and to rejoin TF 17 the next morning. 
Fletcher wanted to leave as much fuel as possible on Neosho as a reserve.264 
Allied cryptanalysts continued to provide valuable information to Nimitz, 
Fletcher, and Fitch. For example, on 29 April, COM 14 decoded several messages 
sent by the Fourth Fleet clearly indicating that the MO Operation was under way. 
Fourth Fleet’s Operation Order No. 13 was read in its entirety. It stated that the 
objective of the MO Operation was, first, “to restrict the enemy’s movements and 
[this] will be accomplished by means of attacks on outlying units and various areas 
along the north coast of Australia. The Imperial Navy will operate to its utmost 
until this is accomplished. Further we will continue to operate against all bases used 
by enemy aircraft.”265 
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On 30 April, COM 14 reported that the enemy units active in the New Britain 
area were CruDiv 5, CarDiv 5, “Ryukaku,” and Kamikawa Maru. Kasuga Maru was 
due at Kwajalein on 2 May. COM 14 reaffirmed that the impending offensive was 
meant to capture Port Moresby; the Japanese had intensified aerial reconnaissance 
of Cape Nelson, Samarai Island, and Cape Rodney, combined with intensified 
bombing of Port Moresby and Tulagi. A decoded radio message identified the Port 
Moresby Occupation Force, the Deboyne Detachment, the Rodney Detachment, 
and the Samarai Detachment.266 
On that same day, the Allied analysts learned from a decoded message that 
two Japanese merchant vessels had been ordered to depart about seven days 
prior to the Port Moresby landing and rendezvous with the Saipan base force 
off Deboyne Island. The message also mentioned Samarai and Cape Rodney. All 
these places were in the southeastern part of New Guinea and were good indica-
tions of Japanese intentions. The message also revealed that the enemy planned 
to capture Samarai and Tulagi.267 The Fourth Fleet ordered a search for the Allied 
naval task force, sending air patrols into the sector 080°–120° from Rabaul to a 
distance of seven hundred miles. Air patrols from Maloelap and Kwajalein in the 
Marshalls were extended to six hundred miles.268 Nimitz’s fleet intelligence officer 
(Lieutenant Commander Layton) commented that the Port Moresby operations 
“will begin very soon.”269 
Also on 30 April, the Japanese tried to change their locator system. However, 
HYPO intercepted a Fourth Fleet message that contained lists of both old and new 
designators. That message had been sent to CruDiv 5, CarDiv 5, the Eleventh Air 
Fleet, the 4th and the 5th Air Attack Forces, the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru, 
the carrier “Ryukaku,” destroyer divisions, and air personnel in the Rabaul area.270 
From it HYPO constructed a remarkably accurate Japanese order of battle for the 
Port Moresby–Solomons operation. The Allied cryptanalysts also deduced that the 
operation was already under way but that Australia was not among its objectives. 
They learned that the major force elements taking part in the operation included 
CarDiv 5, CruDiv 5 (less Nachi), CruDiv 18, DesRon 6, and Gunboat Division 8. 
The air units based in the Rabaul area were the 5th AAF with the Tainan Air Group 
and the 4th Force (Yokohama Air Group). Vice Admiral Takagi with CruDiv 5 was 
commander of the Carrier Striking Force, while the CINC of the Fourth Fleet was 
in overall command of the operation. An unspecified number of seaplane tenders 
and transports, the light carrier “Ryukaku,” and one submarine squadron were also 
part of the operation. Melbourne analysts disagreed with some points of HYPO’s 
analysis. However, both stations agreed that the Port Moresby–Solomons operation 
was in progress. The Japanese surface forces taking part were estimated at three 
hundred ships of all types, including three carriers, nine heavy cruisers, fourteen 
destroyers, eight submarines, and thirty-three other warships.271 
 THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942 53 52 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
Extensive security measures were introduced throughout the Combined Fleet 
on 1 May, extending through 5 May. In the Fourth Fleet, changes in the tactical 
call signs of ships and the call signs of all shore stations, the use of false call signs 
by ships of the Port Moresby force, and a marked increase in the volume of high-
priority communications complicated temporarily the task of analyzing the fleet 
communications structure.272 
On 1 May, COM 14 concluded from the analysis of intercepted and decoded 
enemy messages that the “MO campaign” was under way. The area involved was 
southwestern New Guinea and the Louisiades. The enemy forces will consist of 
CarDiv 5, CruDiv 5 (less Nachi), CruDiv 18, DesRon 6, Gunboat Division 8 (now 
called 19th Division); New Britain Air which is known as 5 Air Attack Force and 
consists of Tinian Air Group, 4th Air Corps, and Yokohama Group; first two land 
bombers and fighters; the last one of seaplanes. The Fourteenth Naval District 
estimated that the enemy had sixty-five bombers, sixteen scouting aircraft, and 
an unknown number of fighters. It also believed that the carrier “Ryukaku” and 
one submarine squadron were part of the operation. It estimated that CruDiv 5 
and the CINC of the Fourth Fleet would arrive at Rabaul on 1 May. COM 14 also 
correctly concluded that although the enemy message included Townsville as a 
reference point, Australia would not be attacked in the near future, except by 
submarines.273 
The MO Carrier Force had been tasked to ferry eighteen Zero fighter aircraft 
from Truk to Rabaul, flying them off on 2 May. Unforeseen events caused this 
simple task to disrupt the timetable for the entire operation.274 Everything went 
according to plan until the 2nd, when the force reached a position about 240 miles 
northeast of Rabaul. That day and the next Takagi tried to launch Zeros but failed 
because of bad weather, which also prevented the carriers from refueling. Takagi 
then decided to refuel on the 4th and make another attempt (which was apparently 
successful) before resuming his southerly advance. The loss of two days derailed 
the meticulous synchronization of the plan.275 As it turned out, the MO Carrier 
Force could not be in a position to protect Tulagi until 5 May, too late to have any 
real impact on the situation.276 
In the morning of 2 May TF 17 completed refueling from Neosho, but Fletch-
er was disappointed to receive a message from Fitch that TF 11 would not com-
plete refueling until noon on 4 May. Fletcher also learned, from MacArthur’s 
dispatches, that the enemy was making final preparations for the advance on 
Port Moresby. Because his own force was too far away, he directed Fitch to fuel 
his destroyers on a northwesterly course at night and rejoin TF 17 at daylight 
on 4 May at latitude 15° south, longitude 157° east. Task Force 44 was also to 
join TF 17 at that point (see sidebar, “Allied Task Organization”).277 Task Forces 
17 and 11 steamed at low speed while being refueled. Their tracks crossed and 
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recrossed in the forty-five-by-sixty-mile general area. These maneuvers were 
dangerous, because the Coral Sea was known to be the operating area of the 
enemy submarines.278
On 2 May, the Allied cryptanalysts deduced that two heavy cruisers (Atago and 
Takao) were to arrive at Rabaul at 0800 on 3 May. They also learned that the enemy 
was planning an offensive action against Ocean Island.279 They believed too that 
because of bad weather, the ferrying of ten aircraft to “RR” (Rabaul) had been post-
poned until 3 May. Enemy messages also revealed that CarDiv 5, after the aircraft 
had been ferried ashore, would refuel at the first supply point and arrive on 7 May 
at a position of about fifty miles from an unidentified island.280 Allied analysts also 
decoded a message stating the Japanese objective of the “East New Guinea cam-
paign” as the “destruction of the enemy forces in the area and reduction and oc-
cupation of air bases.” They also knew that the enemy forces operating in the New 
Britain area included CruDiv 5, CarDiv 5, “Ryukaku,” and Kamikawa Maru. They 
knew that enemy aircraft had been directed to search in the sector 80° to 120° from 
Rabaul and out to seven hundred miles. However, the analysts falsely reported that 
“heavy raids will be made upon Townsville and Cooktown.”281 
At about 0800 on 3 May, the Japanese forces landed at Tulagi. The MO Support 
Force set up a direct screen, while the MO Main Force provided distant cover for 
the Tulagi Invasion Force. By dawn on 3 May, the MO Main Force was about 180 
miles west of Tulagi. Aircraft from Shōhō supported the invasion there. However, 
Gotō was unable to stay in the area long, because he had to support the MO Inva-
sion Force.282 Hence, his force departed at about 1100 the same day on a northwest-
erly course toward Queen Caroline Harbor, on Buka Island, for refueling. The MO 
Support Force was about sixty miles west of the MO Main Force, on its way to join 
the MO Invasion Force, then preparing to leave Rabaul. The MO Carrier Force was 
about 210 miles northeast of New Ireland and about 630 miles northwest of Tulagi, 
on a southeasterly course.283
At about 0800 on 3 May, TF 17 was at 16° 43′ south, 159° 24′ east (or about five 
hundred miles south from Tulagi), sailing on a northwesterly course, while TF 11 
was at 16° 26′ south, 161° 50′ east, on a westerly heading. The distance between these 
two forces was about a hundred miles. Fletcher for some reason did not think it nec-
essary to combine TF 17 and TF 11 into a single force. This is somewhat surprising, 
because Nimitz had directed him to combine them—at Point Buttercup, some 320 
miles south of San Cristobal Island. Fletcher had received information that the en-
emy would probably start his operation by 28 April, and he knew about the presence 
of CarDiv 5 at Truk. He should have also assumed that the enemy’s highest priority 
would be to cover his landings with air and surface forces. With TF 11 and TF 17 as 
a single force, Fletcher could have delivered a much more powerful attack against 
the Japanese force that landed in Tulagi. Task Force 11 had completed refueling early 
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and was ready for action, but that was apparently unknown to Fletcher. The two 
forces were beyond visual distance, and it was not desirable to break radio silence.284 
At 1900 on 3 May Fletcher received a message from MacArthur, who informed 
him of the presence of five or six enemy ships at 1700 on 2 May off the southern 
tip of Santa Isabel Island, possibly moving toward Tulagi. MacArthur also stated 
that two enemy transports had been sighted at Tulagi unloading onto barges, at an 
“unspecified time.” Fletcher now regretted that the entire force was not combined 
and able to deliver a powerful strike at daylight the next day. Fletcher directed 
Neosho with one destroyer to proceed to latitude 15° 00′ south, longitude 157° 00′ 
east to meet TF 11 and Crace’s group at about 0800 on 4 May. Afterward, those 
forces would steam eastward and join TF 17 at latitude 15° 00′ south, longitude 
160° 00′ east at daylight on the 5th.285 
Allied radio intercepts at this time revealed Inoue’s orders to subordinate forces. 
In a message decoded on 3 May, Inoue directed that “if the enemy (Carrier) Strik-
ing Force is determined to be in . . . the MO Striking Force will operate as follows: 
Pass [north-northeast?] of RX, thence south; at 0600 on 5 May, after arrival . . . 
proceed in accordance with further orders; if no further orders received, proceed to 
RXB. If plane search is required in southern and . . . sectors ComCarDiv 5 will send 
carrier bombers to RXB at dawn. . . . will proceed to RXB after taking stores.” The 
cryptanalysts believed that “RX” referred to Bougainville and “RXB” to Tulagi.286 
Phase II (4–7 May)
This phase of the operation began with an Allied carrier attack on Tulagi on 4 May. 
For the next three days the opposing carrier forces tried to locate each other. They 
misidentified ships they sighted, and that led to strikes against unintended targets. 
However, by the end of 7 May each side knew the location of the other and was 
prepared for the decisive carrier engagement the next day.
The Japanese landing at Tulagi on 3–4 May was unopposed. Three seaplane tend- 
ers arrived to Tulagi from Santa Isabel on the night of 3 May. The Support Force 
provided a direct screen, while Gotō’s MO Main Force provided distant cover. By 
dawn on the 3rd these forces were positioned about 180 miles west of Tulagi. From 
that position, about twenty aircraft from Shōhō supported the Tulagi Invasion 
Force until, as noted, Gotō had to move away to support the MO Invasion Force.287 
The MO Invasion Force, escorted by one light cruiser and six destroyers, left 
Rabaul on 4 May and sailed southward. It planned to transit the Jomard Passage 
around midnight on 6–7 May and sail around the tip of Papua New Guinea to-
ward Port Moresby.288 Both the MO Main Force and the MO Support Force having 
withdrawn, the Tulagi Invasion Force was left without cover. Yet this seemed to the 
Japanese to pose no immediate danger, because they expected no enemy reaction 
to their landing at Tulagi. In any case, CarDiv 5 was supposed to be about 120 miles 
north of Tulagi and from there would be able to cover it. Unfortunately for the 
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Japanese, Takagi’s force, having been delayed ferrying Zeros to Rabaul, was actually 
340 miles north.289
On 4 May at about 0630, from a position of some 150 miles southwest of the 
island, Yorktown launched the first of three strikes against the enemy ships at Tulagi 
and positions ashore. The first-wave attack was delivered between 0815 and 0830. 
By about 0900, TF 11 and TF 44 were joined, about 250 miles south of TF 17.290 York- 
town’s second wave was conducted between 1210 and 1410 and the third between 
1500 and 1515.291 Some sixty aircraft in all took part in these strikes. Despite a large 
number of bombs and torpedoes dropped, the results were disappointing. Only 
a single enemy destroyer, one auxiliary, and two special-duty minesweepers were 
sunk; four other ships were damaged.292 The remaining enemy transports and mine-
layers and one destroyer immediately left the Tulagi harbor.293 The Japanese lost five 
seaplanes, while the Allies suffered three aircraft lost and eight others damaged.294 
The Japanese continued to build their seaplane base, which became operational on 
6 May and conducted its first reconnaissance flights.295 
The MO Carrier Force was refueling about 350 nautical miles north of Tulagi when 
a report of the enemy attack was received by Takagi. He stopped the refueling and 
directed his force to sail southeast and search for the enemy carriers in the Solomons 
area. These searches were unsuccessful. The Japanese were greatly surprised by the at-
tack on Tulagi. Until then they had firmly believed that the enemy would be forced to 
react to their moves; they now learned that the situation was the other way around.296 
MacArthur transmitted during the execution phase of the operation a number of 
reports to Fletcher on the type, positions, and movements of enemy forces, includ-
ing those he was likely to encounter at Port Moresby. MacArthur also summarized 
enemy activity at Tulagi, Savo, and Guadalcanal, and west of Bougainville, on the 
basis of aerial reconnaissance.297 Because of the poor training of the pilots and in-
adequate number of aircraft, however, searches by SWPA’s land-based aviation were 
unsuccessful in locating the enemy forces on 5 and 6 May.298 
On 4 May, a message was received from FRUMEL outlining the Japanese time-
line for the MO Operation. It was similar in content to the message decoded by the 
U.S. analysts on 3 May. The difference was that FRUMEL’s message stated that the 
MO Striking Force (carriers) would be on X–3 (7 May) southeast of Port Moresby 
and would launch attacks in the Moresby area.299 
On 5 May Nimitz informed Fletcher and Fitch that there were reliable reports 
as of 3 May that the “Orange [i.e., Japanese] Moresby Striking Force composed of 
CruDiv 5 and CarDiv 5 will launch attacks on the Allied bases Port Moresby areas 
on X-Ray minus three, or minus two, days. These attacks will be launched from the 
southeast. X-Ray day is not known but one indication points to 10 May as X-Ray 
day. Above attacks to be carried out until successful completion by Orange.”300 The 
Allied commanders also learned that the MO Carrier Force would be joined by the 
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Tulagi Invasion Force at 1400 on 6 May. The combined formation would leave the 
Coral Sea at about 1800 on 7 May and steam south of Emerald Reef, in Milne Bay.301 
After receiving this message, Fletcher decided to start refueling, move toward the 
Louisiades the next day, and fight a carrier engagement on the 7th.302 Both of Fletch-
er’s carrier groups sailed on a westerly course; Crace’s TF 44 was about fifty miles 
ahead. In the meantime, Takagi’s force turned northwest, passed Rennell Island, and 
sailed toward Guadalcanal. Gotō’s force began to refuel in the Solomon Sea south 
of Bougainville. Neither the Japanese nor the Allied commander knew about the 
other’s presence.303 
On 5 May, Allied intelligence reported that the Japanese might land at Port 
Moresby between 5 and 10 May. SWPA B-17 and B-26 bombers were put on alert.304 
MacArthur’s headquarters also published a translated intercept supporting the 
strong probability that the carrier and its escorts were part of the “occupation force.” 
On 5 May, an intercepted radio message gave a location for the MO Invasion Force 
identical to the one mentioned in aerial reconnaissance reports. MacArthur sent to 
Fletcher and Nimitz a translated intercept from FRUMEL that at 0600 on 5 May the 
MO Invasion Force would be at latitude 8° south, longitude 155° east at a speed of 
twenty-three knots on course 300°. It would leave the Solomon Sea before 7–8 May, 
after the Tulagi force joined it.305
The ships of TF 17, on southwesterly courses, were refueled by Neosho on 5 and 
6 May. At 0735 on the 6th, Fletcher put his Operation Order No. 2-42 in effect.306 
His task organization combined Task Forces 17, 11, and 44 into an enlarged TF 17, 
which now consisted of two large carriers with 116 aircraft, seven heavy cruisers, 
one light cruiser, thirteen destroyers, two fleet tankers, and a seaplane tender. Tacti-
cally, it was divided into five groups (see sidebar, “Allied Task Organization”).307 Task 
Group (TG) 17.2 had a dual mission of operating against the Japanese force advanc-
ing southward and protecting the carriers against air and submarine attacks. The 
main task of TG 17.3 was to defend the carriers. These two groups were so organized 
that they could, depending on the situation, carry out each other’s missions. Fletcher 
believed that four destroyers screening each carrier provided sufficient protection.308 
Because he was senior to Fletcher and the more experienced aviator, Fitch became 
officer in tactical control of all air operations. The enlarged TF 17 would operate 
generally in the Coral Sea, about seven hundred miles south of Rabaul, outside the 
range of Japanese land-based aircraft.309
On 6 May Kamikawa Maru, one of the two seaplane tenders of the Support Force, 
was detached at Deboyne Island to establish a seaplane base. That base became op-
erational the next day. Afterward, the rest of the Support Force was to withdraw 
north-northeast near D’Entrecasteaux Island to protect the right flank of the MO 
Invasion Force.310
Continued on page 59
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Allied Task Organization
POA Forces
(Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, CINCPac, Pearl Harbor)
Task Force 17
(Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher, Yorktown)
TG 17.2 (Attack Group, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid)
 TU 17.2.1 (2 CAs—Minneapolis, New Orleans)
 TU 17.2.2 (3 CAs—Astoria, Chester, CA 33 Portland)
 TU 17.2.4 (5 DDs—Phelps, Dewey, Farragut, Aylwyn, Monaghan)
TG 17.3 (Support Group, Rear Adm. John G. Crace)
 17.3.1 (2 CAs—HMAS Australia, Chicago; 1 CL—HMAS Hobart)
 17.3.4 (2 DDs—Perkins, Walke)
TG 17.5 (Air Group, Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch)
 TU 17.5.1 (2 CVs—Yorktown, Lexington)
 (Yorktown—17 F4F Wildcat fighters, 18 SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bombers, 13 TBD-1 Devastator 
torpedo bombers)
 (Lexington—21 F4F Wildcat fighters, 18 SBD-2 Dauntless dive-bombers, 17 SBD-2 Dauntless 
dive-bombers [scouts], 12 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers)
 TU 17.5.4 (4 DDs—Morris, Anderson, Hamman, Russell)
TG 17.6 (Fueling Group)
 2 AOs (Neosho, Tippecanoe)
 2 DDs (Sims, Worden)
TG 17.9 (Search Group)
 1 AV (Tangier) 
 VP-71 (6 PBY-5s) 
 VP-72 (6 PBY-5s) 
SWPA Forces
(Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Brisbane)
Allied Naval Forces 
(Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary)
TF 42 Eastern Australia Submarine Group
(Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell)
Task Group 42.1 (Capt. Ralph Waldo Christie) 
 1 AS (Griffin, at Brisbane)
 SubDiv 53 (S-44, S-45, S-46, S-47)
 SubDiv 201 (S-37, S-38, S-39, S-40, S-41)
TF 44 
(Rear Adm. John G. Crace, RN; temporarily assigned to TF 17)
 1 CA (HMAS Australia)
 1 CL (HMAS Hobart)
Allied Air Forces 
(Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, Melbourne)
3rd Bombardment Group (light) (Charters Towers) 52 bombers (19 B-25s, 19 A-24s, 14 A-20s)
 8th Light Bombardment Squadron 
 13th Light Bombardment Squadron 
 90th Light Bombardment Squadron 
22nd Bombardment Group (medium) (Townsville Area) 92 bombers (12 B-25s, 80 B-26s)
 90th Light Bombardment Squadron 
 13th Light Bombardment Squadron 
19th Bombardment Group (heavy) (Cloncurry) 48 B-17s 
 30th Bombardment Squadron
 40th Reconnaissance Squadron
 93rd Bombardment Squadron 
 435th Bombardment Squadron
8th Pursuit Group (Townsville Area, Port Moresby) 100 fighters (50 P-39s each)
 35th Fighter Squadron 
 36th Fighter Squadron 
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In the early morning of the 6th Takagi’s carrier force was about 120 miles south-
west of the western tip of Guadalcanal. At that point a flying boat from Tulagi 
detected the U.S. task force and accurately reported its position. Headquarters in 
Rabaul received the report and relayed it to Takagi. Allied cryptanalysts picked up 
the signal;311 Takagi, however, would not receive this information until 7 May.312 
Meanwhile, also on the 6th, Takagi started refueling his ships about 180 nautical 
miles west of Tulagi in preparation for a carrier engagement the next day. Gotō’s 
MO Main Force was south of Bougainville and about five hundred miles to the 
northwest of TF 17.313 
At 0735, four U.S. B-17 heavy bombers from Port Moresby detected the MO 
Main Force some twenty-five miles east of Misima Island, in the Louisiades. At 
that time the enemy transports were seventy to a hundred miles to the northwest 
of other forces.314 The U.S. bombers attacked but inflicted no damage. The MO 
35th Pursuit Group (Sydney) 100 fighters (P-39s/P-38s) 
49th Pursuit Group (Darwin) 90 fighters (P-40s) 
 7th Fighter Squadron 
 8th Fighter Squadron
 9th Fighter Squadron 
Photographic Squadron; 4 aircraft Flight A, 8th Bombardment Squadron
Royal Australian Air Force
No. 11/20 Squadrons (Gavutu-Tanambogo, Tulagi) 4 PBY-5 Catalinas (withdrawn on 2 May 1942)
No. 24 Squadron (Townsville) 3 Wirraways (trainers used as fighters)
No. 32 Squadron (Port Moresby) Hudson bombers
No. 75 Squadron (Port Moresby) 3 P-40s
Tulagi
2/1 Independent Company, Australian Imperial Force (24 commandos)
 (withdrawn on 2 May 1942)
Port Moresby 
Garrison
(Maj. Gen. B. M. Morris, some 5,000 troops) 
39th Infantry Bn.
49th Infantry Bn.
53rd Infantry Bn.
13th Field Regt.
23rd Heavy AA Battery
Detachment, 1st Independent Co.
30th Infantry Bde. Signal Section 
30th Infantry Bde. HQ Defense Platoon 
Fixed Defenses
Moresby Fixed Defenses Fortress Engineers 
Moresby Fixed Defenses AA Artillery (six 3-inch guns)
1st Army Troops Co. 
7th Field Co. 
New Guinea Volunteer Rifles
Papuan Infantry Bn.
8th Military District Section Intelligence Corps 
15th Supply Personnel Co. 
Base Hospital 
Sources: Bates et al., Battle of the Coral Sea, app. 2, table 1; Coulthard-Clark, ”RAN and RAAF Involvement in the Battle of 
the Coral Sea,” p. 66.
 THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942 61 60 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
Invasion Force was detected by three B-17s at 1300, heading for the Jomard Pas-
sage. Inoue knew that at least two of his ship groups had been detected. However, 
he was certain that the Americans had not detected the MO Carrier Force.315 At 
0810 Japanese search aircraft reported sighting what seemed a large enemy force 
about 485 miles south of Rabaul.316 
At about 1000, a reconnaissance flying boat from Tulagi detected TF 17. Takagi 
received that report about 1050, when his force was about three hundred nautical 
miles north of TF 17, still refueling. He sent both carriers, accompanied by two 
destroyers, southward at twenty knots to reduce the distance to the enemy carrier 
force. According to Japanese reports, Takagi believed that the chance to attack the 
enemy carrier force had been lost and turned north at 1800 to await another op-
portunity to attack during the following day.317 At that point the presence of Takagi’s 
force some seventy miles north of TF 17 was unknown to Fletcher. The Japanese 
carriers were shielded by the overcast of a cold front, and search aircraft did not 
detect them. Takagi, for his part, failed to carry out long-range searches on either 
5 or 6 May.318 
At about 1030 four B-17s from Cloncurry, staged through Port Moresby, unsuc-
cessfully attacked Shōhō some sixty miles south of Bougainville. At around 1300, 
Allied search aircraft detected the MO Invasion Force sailing southward toward 
the Jomard Passage.319 By midnight on 6–7 May, the MO Invasion Force was north-
ward of Misima Island; the MO Main Force, with Shōhō, was some ninety miles 
northeast of Deboyne Island.320 Not until the afternoon of 6 May did Fletcher get 
a reliable picture of the situation: the MO Invasion Force would come through the 
Jomard Passage between Misima and Tagula Islands, off the tail of New Guinea, on 
7 or 8 May. The MO Carrier Force was about 350 miles to the southeast searching 
for the enemy carrier force.321 
At 0625 on 7 May, TF 17 was about 115 nautical miles south of Rossel. Fletcher 
would write in his postaction report that he had planned to use the morning air 
search on the 7th to locate the most suitable objective for attack and to obtain posi-
tive or negative information regarding enemy carriers, on which he had obtained 
nothing since the previous afternoon. However, searches to the east and northeast-
ward were not completed, owing to bad weather.322 
During the night of 6 May, Fletcher had received reports from SWPA land-
based aircraft of enemy transports and light cruisers heading toward the Jomard 
Passage. For this reason he directed at 0645 on 7 May that Crace’s TG 17.3, plus 
the destroyer Farragut, proceed northward and block the passage.323 As TG 17.3 
approached, a Japanese seaplane detected it, mistakenly reporting “one battleship, 
two heavy cruisers and three destroyers.” At about 1430, TG 17.3 was attacked by 
twelve torpedo bombers and nineteen land-attack aircraft from Rabaul. All these at-
tacks were skillfully avoided by the Allied ships.324 Crace’s force was also mistakenly 
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attacked by three high-level B-17 heavy bombers, but all their bombs fortunately 
missed their intended targets.325 
At 1526, Crace reported to Fletcher that he was unable to complete his mission 
without air cover and would withdraw to a position some 220 miles southeast of 
Port Moresby. From there TG 17.3 would be able to intercept any enemy force exit-
ing the Louisiades and advancing toward Port Moresby. TG 17.3’s ships, however, 
were low on fuel. Crace also did not have information on the location of TF 17 
or know Fletcher’s intentions. Nonetheless, because of TG 17.3’s presence Inoue 
ordered the invasion convoy to loiter north of the Jomard Passage and await the 
outcome of the pending carrier battle.326
Fletcher had been well aware that Crace would be operating without air cover, 
but he intended that the enemy convoy not slip through the Jomard Passage and 
reach Port Moresby. Fletcher later explained that he had sent Crace north to ensure 
that the invasion was thwarted even if the enemy carriers finished off TF 17 in the 
expected duel.327 Fletcher would also claim, in an interview after the war, that he 
“feared the opposing carriers would quickly neutralize each other,” recalling the 
examples of “many prewar tactical exercises.” In his view, Crace’s group would be 
able to prevent the enemy invasion force from exiting the Jomard Passage whether 
the Allied carriers intervened or not.328
Nonetheless, Fletcher made a wrong decision in detaching TG 17.3. It was too 
risky to employ a surface force without air cover in an area known to be within ef-
fective range of enemy land-based aircraft. It was pure luck (notwithstanding the 
skill of his ships) that Crace’s force was not seriously damaged or destroyed; Fletcher 
had had no way of knowing what would happen. Also, by detaching Crace’s force 
Fletcher seriously weakened the antiair and antisubmarine defense of his carriers, 
which were, in today’s terms, the “friendly operational center of gravity.” With the 
detachment of an additional destroyer during the night of 7–8 May, TF 17 was left 
with twelve instead of nineteen escorts for the decisive engagement that occurred 
on the 8th.329 Had TF 17’s carriers been destroyed, the enemy would have had no 
difficulty destroying TG 17.3 as well.
In the morning on the 7th, Takagi still did not know the whereabouts of any 
enemy carrier force. He made a decision, based on Admiral Hara’s recommenda-
tion, to search southward to make sure that no enemy carrier force was in his 
rear as he moved westward to provide cover for the MO Invasion Force.330 Both 
land-based and carrier-based Japanese search aircraft misidentified enemy ships 
on several occasions that morning. For example, at 0522 a land-based aircraft re-
ported the presence of one enemy carrier about 460 miles southwest of Tulagi. At 
0640, a seaplane reported “one battleship, one cruiser, seven destroyers, and what 
looks like one aircraft carrier” about ninety-five miles south of Rossel Island.331 At 
0722, an aircraft from Shōkaku reported enemy ships about 160 miles away; this 
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was actually TG 17.6, the Fueling Group, Neosho and the destroyer Sims, misiden-
tified as one cruiser and three destroyers. At 0800, without waiting to confirm the 
accuracy of the report, Hara launched against it seventy-eight aircraft (eighteen 
fighters, thirty-six dive-bombers, and twenty-four torpedo bombers). At 0915, 
they sighted Neosho and Sims and attacked, twelve torpedo bombers with fighters 
in the first wave, followed by twenty-six heavy bombers.332 At 1051 the Shōkaku 
pilots realized the mistake in identification, but it was too late. Neosho was hit by 
seven bombs and was heavily damaged, later sinking; Sims was hit by three bombs 
and sank immediately. 
Fletcher believed that the enemy carrier force was somewhere north of his force 
near the Louisiades. Actually, Takagi’s force was about three hundred miles east of 
TF 17. At 0619 Fletcher directed Yorktown to launch ten dive-bombers as scouts. 
About 0815, these search aircraft reported “two carriers and four heavy cruisers” 
a short distance northeast of Misima Island, or some 175 miles northwest of the 
Allied carriers. Fletcher immediately decided to launch an all-out attack against 
these ships. By 1000 ninety-three aircraft (fifty-three dive-bombers, twenty-two 
torpedo bombers, and eighteen fighters) were airborne. At that time, his carriers 
were in the weather front, hidden by overcast, while Gotō’s force, which he had 
just detected, was in broad sunlight. However, after the Allied aircraft were in the 
air it was discovered that this report had been improperly decoded: the pilot had 
actually observed only two enemy heavy cruisers and two destroyers, in addition to 
the reported carrier.333 The attack groups from both Yorktown and Lexington were 
directed to attack what proved to be Shōhō.334
At 1140 Shōhō, defended by only eight fighters and surrounded by cruis-
ers, was attacked by Allied aircraft from both carriers.335 Shōhō was hit with sev-
enteen bombs and five torpedoes. It sank at 1235. Fifteen out of its twenty-one 
aircraft went down with it; 638 men were killed and seventy-three wounded— 
Japanese destroyers rescued about a hundred men. The Allies lost only three air-
craft.336 Despite the success in sinking Shōhō, the Allied aircraft should have at-
tacked other ships in Gotō’s force also and thereby inflicted much higher losses, but 
they did not. Instead they returned to their carriers about 1340; within an hour all 
were rearmed and ready for action. But Fletcher was still in the dark regarding the 
whereabouts of the enemy carrier force. Even if it were sighted that afternoon, it 
would be too late to launch a successful attack. He decided to turn southwest and 
mount a strike the next day. 
At about 1240, Takagi received a report from a seaplane based at Deboyne 
Island of an enemy force some eighty miles south of Deboyne. That was Crace’s 
group. A plane from Rabaul erroneously reported at 1315 sighting an enemy force 
including “two carriers” about 115 nautical miles southwest of Deboyne. Takagi 
then turned his force to a westerly course. About 1500, he informed Inoue that the 
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enemy carriers were about 430 miles west of his force. Hence, he would not be able 
to launch an all-out attack until the next day. 
Shortly after 1500, Takagi received an erroneous report from a seaplane based 
on Deboyne that the enemy carrier force (actually TG 17.3) had changed course to 
the southeast. Hence, at 1515, Hara sent eight bombers to confirm the report by 
searching two-hundred-nautical-mile sectors to the west of the Japanese carriers. 
However, before hearing from them, Hara made a hasty and unsound decision to 
launch an attack on the supposed enemy carrier group; at 1615 he sent twelve dive-
bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers with his most experienced pilots and crews 
to search westward out to 280 miles. In the meantime the first group of aircraft 
returned without having found the enemy ships. At 1747 Yorktown’s radar detected 
the second group; at that time the Japanese carriers were some two hundred miles 
east of TF 17. Yorktown’s eleven fighters were vectored to intercept the incoming 
Japanese aircraft. In the ensuing dogfights, several enemy aircraft were shot down 
and one was damaged, while the Allies lost three. The Japanese pilots now became 
disoriented; at about 1900, six of them tried to land on Yorktown, mistaking it for 
their own carrier until they encountered AA fire and turned away. In addition, 
eleven aircraft were lost trying to make night landings on the Japanese carriers.337 
Only sixteen out of twenty-seven aircraft made it back to their decks.338 By 2000 on 
7 May, when the last Japanese aircraft landed, the opposing carrier forces were only 
about a hundred nautical miles apart.
Phase III (8–11 May)
The two opposing carrier forces did not detect each other until the morning of 8 
May. At about 0615, the Japanese carrier force was about 140 miles east of Rossel 
Island. Hara launched seven torpedo bombers to search from southeast to south-
west out to 250 miles; several aircraft from Rabaul and Tulagi assisted. CarDiv 5’s 
screen was reinforced by two heavy cruisers from Gotō’s force. The MO Invasion 
Force was directed to steam to a position forty miles east of Woodlark Island and 
await the outcome of the coming battle. At that time TF 17 was some 180 nautical 
miles southeast of the Louisiades. 
At 0635, Fitch launched eighteen bombers to search in all directions out to 
about two hundred nautical miles. The Allied carriers were under mostly clear 
skies; visibility was about seventeen miles. In contrast, the enemy carriers were 
now under a warm frontal zone, with low-hanging clouds and heavy overcast; vis-
ibility varied from two to fifteen miles. Nonetheless, Lexington’s aircraft sighted the 
enemy carriers at about 0820, and a few minutes later the Japanese aircraft spotted 
the American ones. The opposing carriers were then about 210 nautical miles from 
each other. The two sides were almost even in strength; the Allied carriers had 116 
aircraft (118 were operational), while the Japanese had 121. The Japanese carriers 
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had a screen of four heavy cruisers and six destroyers, while the American carriers 
had five heavy cruisers and seven destroyers.
Between 0822 and 0915, the Japanese carriers launched a combined strike group 
of sixty-nine aircraft (eighteen fighters, thirty-three dive-bombers, and eighteen 
torpedo bombers). In contrast, the Allied carriers launched their strikes separately. 
From 0840 through 0915, Yorktown sent forty-one aircraft, and all but four reached 
their targets. Lexington launched within the same time frame forty-three aircraft, 
but only twenty-one reached their targets.339 Yorktown’s dive-bombers arrived first 
over the Japanese carriers but had to wait for the torpedo bombers. Shōkaku and 
Zuikaku were about ten thousand yards apart, hidden under a rainsquall and pro-
tected by about sixteen fighters. Yorktown’s aircraft did not find Zuikaku and so fo-
cused all their attention on Shōkaku, attacking at 1100. The torpedo bombers failed 
to achieve any hits.340 Yorktown’s dive-bombers obtained only two bomb hits;341 
however, one of them rendered Shōkaku unable to launch aircraft. Lexington’s air-
craft arrived over their targets at 1130; two dive-bombers attacked Shōkaku and 
scored one hit; two other dive-bombers attacked Zuikaku but missed.342 
In the meantime, at 1044, the Japanese aircraft attacked the Allied carriers. 
Lexington’s radar detected the enemy aircraft at a range of about seventy miles, and 
nine fighters were sent to intercept. However, six of them flew too low and missed 
the enemy aircraft. The Allied carriers were about three thousand yards apart. At 
1113 the Japanese started their attack, giving most of their attention to Lexington. 
Yorktown received one bomb hit, and Lexington was struck by two torpedoes and 
two bombs.343 Lexington was heavily damaged and unsalvageable; it was sunk by a 
destroyer that evening to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Nimitz in his 
action report noted that in contrast to the attacks with entire squadrons the Ameri-
cans practiced, in the Coral Sea the enemy squadrons broke up into small groups 
that attacked from multiple directions.344 After the engagement the Allied carriers 
were left with at least forty-nine operational aircraft, while the Japanese had only 
thirty-nine available to fight the next day.345
Takagi mistakenly believed that both enemy carriers were sinking and so decid-
ed in the early afternoon that he could send the damaged Shōkaku back to Truk.346 
He was not entirely wrong in doing so. As Takagi and Hara informed Inoue, they 
were unable to launch a second strike that afternoon, or probably the next day ei-
ther, for reasons of low aircraft strength, pilot fatigue, and low fuel in the screening 
ships. Because of the repeated interruptions between 4 and 8 May, the MO Carrier 
Force had never fully refueled; some destroyers had only 20 percent of their fuel 
capacity remaining, the rest of them 40 percent.347
In late afternoon on 8 May, Inoue and his staff made a detailed estimate of the 
situation. Only Zuikaku was left undamaged, and it had only half its aircraft. In his 
view, the enemy had lost one carrier and probably another. The question for Inoue 
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was whether the MO Invasion Force could proceed to Port Moresby. He believed 
that a single weakened carrier air group was incapable of protecting it from the 
land-based aircraft in Australia. Also, the Japanese forces needed to regroup. Inoue 
decided to delay the attack on Port Moresby until 3 July. Hence, Inoue directed the 
MO Invasion Force to return to Rabaul. He also decided to hold Tulagi but to aban-
don the seaplane base at Deboyne as untenable for the time being.348 
Inoue’s decision greatly angered Yamamoto, who was convinced that the Japa-
nese had sunk two enemy carriers and won the battle. Yamamoto, who did not 
know that the Japanese carriers had few aircraft remaining, saw no reason why the 
operation should not continue. He could do nothing about the postponement of 
the landing at Port Moresby, but he did not want the enemy naval forces to escape; 
he ordered Inoue to resume his pursuit and “annihilate the remaining enemy force.” 
At about 2300 on 8 May, Inoue directed Takagi and Gotō to resume their attack. 
At 0200 the next day, Zuikaku and its escorts changed course to the southeast and 
then southwest. About one hour later Gotō’s force was joined by Zuikaku’s group. 
Shortly afterward, Inoue changed his mind again and directed both groups to re-
verse course and head northward. On 11 May, Takagi received orders to leave the 
area entirely.349 The Port Moresby–Solomons operation was over.
Aftermath and Assessment
After the loss of Lexington, TF 17 sailed southward to regroup. On the morning of 
9 May a scout plane from Yorktown sighted the enemy carrier force 175 miles to 
the northwest. Fletcher prepared his force for possible attack and launched a strike. 
He also asked for help from SWPA air forces. Brett responded by sending fourteen 
bombers, which reached the target at the same time as the Yorktown group. How-
ever, the target proved to be a reef. That afternoon Nimitz directed Fletcher to re-
turn to Pearl Harbor or the West Coast with both carriers (Nimitz had not yet been 
informed of the loss of Lexington) and the screening ships of the original TF 17. 
Kinkaid’s TG 17.2 would join TF 16. The same day, Fletcher detached Crace’s force 
and brought TF 44 back into existence. Task Force 44 then proceeded to Brisbane 
for refueling.350 
The Allied cryptanalysts learned on 9 May that the enemy MO Carrier Force 
south of the Solomons included CarDiv 5, CruDiv 5, CruDiv 18, and CruDiv 6; 
Gunboat Division 8 was also in the area with landing and occupation forces; “Ryu-
kaku” might also be in the New Britain area. They also learned that Zuikaku and 
Shōkaku were damaged and withdrawing northward.351 
On 10 May, Fletcher sent a message informing Nimitz that he planned to stop 
at Tongatabu on the way to Pearl Harbor.352 Also on 10 May, the Allies learned from 
reading enemy messages that the Port Moresby operation had been postponed, 
that the occupation force would return to Rabaul, and that CruDiv 5 and CarDiv 
5 would refuel in the Bougainville area and then cover the occupation of Ocean 
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and Nauru Islands. CruDiv 6, with two heavy cruisers of the Aoba class, plus gun-
boats and destroyers, would support the Nauru-Ocean invasion.353 Fletcher did not 
respond to these movements. At 1600 on 11 May, Fletcher detached Kinkaid to 
Nouméa, while one heavy cruiser was to rejoin TF 17 at Tongatabu.354 
On 12 May, all indications in Allied COMINT showed that the enemy bomb-
ers in the Marshalls would be moved to Rabaul, though this movement might be 
canceled as a result of the postponement of the Port Moresby offensive. Evidence 
showed that the covering force for the Nauru-Ocean occupation would consist 
of Zuikaku, two Haguros, two Aobas, and one division of destroyers as a screen. 
Zuikaku might be withdrawn to Japan because of the condition of its aircraft. Part 
of the occupation force would leave the Rabaul area around 10 May, with 14 May as 
the date for the assault on Nauru and Ocean Islands.355 
Task Force 16, with Enterprise and Hornet, sailed from Pearl Harbor on 30 April 
for the Coral Sea but did not reach the scene of action in time. Instead, it made a 
feint toward Nauru and Ocean Island. On 15 May, Inoue received a report from 
search aircraft of the presence of enemy carriers some 450 miles east of Tulagi. 
Shortly afterward, he directed the Nauru-Ocean Island Invasion Force to return to 
Truk (the two islands were eventually captured by the Japanese, on 25–26 August 
1942).356 On 16 May, TF 16 reversed its course toward Pearl Harbor, arriving ten 
days later. 
The battle of the Coral Sea was the first in which surface ships did not see each 
other and so had no opportunity to use their guns or torpedoes. All losses on both 
sides were caused by air strikes. The Japanese sank a fleet oiler and a destroyer 
and so heavily damaged a large carrier that it had to be sunk. The Japanese lost 
only one small carrier and a few small ships at Tulagi. They also lost sixty-nine 
aircraft (twelve fighters, twenty-seven dive-bombers, and thirty torpedo bombers) 
and 1,074 men; the Allies lost sixty-six aircraft and 543 men.357 One Japanese large 
carrier was heavily damaged, and the lost aircraft and experienced pilots were hard 
to replace; CarDiv 5 did not rejoin the fleet for more than two months.358 Nonethe-
less, the Japanese achieved a clear tactical victory. The operational victory, however, 
belonged to the Allies, because the Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby by 
sea was stopped and the entire operation delayed. Further, the damage inflicted 
on Shōkaku and losses to Zuikaku’s air wing prevented both carriers from taking 
part in the Midway-Aleutians operation the next month. Had they been available 
then, the chances of Allied victory would have been much lower. After Midway, the 
Japanese decided to seize Port Moresby by land, across the Owen Stanley Range; 
that attempt ultimately failed. 
Conclusion and Operational Lessons Learned 
The Japanese strategic decision in January 1942 to expand their defensive perim-
eter in the aftermath of their initial successes in the Pacific War was due to what has 
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been called “victory disease.” The Japanese were surprised by their quick victories 
and small losses. The leaders of the IJN were far more aggressive than those of the 
army in wishing to prevent the enemy from gaining time and mounting a counter-
offensive. Yamamoto was keenly aware that decisive victory against the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet was the key to consolidating Japanese strategic success before the industrial 
power of the United States became overwhelming. In trying to expand Japan’s de-
fensive line in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, however, naval and army leaders 
clearly did not match their strategic ends and means. Differences between the Na-
val General Staff and the Combined Fleet on whether the main thrust in the Sec-
ond Operational Stage of the war should be in the South, Central, or North Pacific 
resulted in a bad compromise plan. The subsequent changes in timing of the Port 
Moresby–Solomons and Midway-Aleutians operations, coupled with Yamamoto’s 
inability to assign adequate forces to either major operation, were perhaps the main 
reason that both ultimately failed. 
A major problem for the Japanese was a lack of centralized planning at the stra-
tegic level. The Army and Naval General Staffs had to negotiate their differences in 
planning any major army-navy operation. In the IJN’s case, the situation was even 
more complicated because the Combined Fleet, led by Yamamoto, exercised often 
much greater influence in operational planning than the Naval General Staff did. 
In sequencing major operations in two widely separated parts of a theater, strategic 
leadership should make sure that adequate forces are available or becoming available 
for the accomplishment of each operational objective. Also, sufficient time should be 
given for redeployment, upkeep, and rest of forces taking part in the successive major 
operation. Otherwise, the risk of ultimate failure in one or both major operations will 
be considerably increased. Planning of major operations and campaigns should be 
vested in the hands of a single operational commander; competing planning responsi-
bilities result in a compromise plan and often lead to a failure.
In early 1942, the problem for the Americans was how to check further Japa-
nese advances in the southern and southwestern Pacific. Admiral King was the 
most vocal proponent of the view that the Allies should strengthen their defenses 
in the South Pacific and prevent any additional gains by the Japanese; otherwise, 
he argued, it would take much more time and sacrifice to roll back the Japanese 
conquests. The Allied strategy of fighting Germany first was fundamentally sound. 
However, General Marshall and other Army leaders were too rigid in pursuing 
their Germany-first strategy. They fended off King’s efforts to deploy more troops, 
better equipped and trained, to the South Pacific. King’s strategy was vindicated 
by the eventual Allied success in protecting the links between Australia and New 
Zealand and the United States. In determining the main and secondary theaters of 
war, the strategic leadership should not go to extremes and assign almost all the best-
trained and -equipped forces to the main theater; the principle of economy of effort 
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requires that numerically sufficient and highly capable forces be assigned to the the-
ater of secondary effort as well.
The weather played a prominent role in both the Japanese and the Allied car-
rier operations and greatly influenced the outcome of the engagement on the 8th. 
If the Allied carriers had been protected by low-hanging clouds and poor visibility 
as their Japanese counterparts were, the Japanese aircraft might not have been suc-
cessful. Planning and preparation for a major naval operation or campaign require 
thorough study of all aspects of the operating area. Despite all technological advances, 
the weather and climate considerably affect the employment of naval forces and air-
craft. Operational commanders and planners should properly evaluate their potential 
impact on all phases of a major operation or campaign. 
The Port Moresby–Solomons operation was conducted over a major part of the 
Coral Sea and the adjacent Louisiades and the Solomons Archipelago, as well as 
the southeastern part of New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. Allied forces 
deployed from bases in New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and eastern Australia. 
This part of the southwestern Pacific was militarily undeveloped, lacking naval and 
air bases and support facilities adequate for surface combatants, submarines, or air-
craft. The Japanese controlled a number of well-developed naval bases and airfields 
in the Bismarcks and the Carolines and on the southeastern coast of New Guinea. 
The Bismarcks and Solomons provided many natural harbors and anchorages that 
could serve as advance bases or havens for surface ships and as seaplane bases. The 
Allies were less fortunate in that there were very few good bases and airfields in the 
South Pacific; those in eastern Australia were too far away. A major problem for 
both the Japanese and the Allies was the lack of repair facilities for aircraft carri-
ers. Forces taking part in a major operation or campaign will have great difficulty in 
accomplishing their objectives without a well developed theaterwide infrastructure. 
Hence, whenever possible, adequate naval bases and airfields and supporting struc-
tures should be developed ahead of time, in peacetime.
Relatedly, Japanese naval forces and aircraft occupied central positions and so 
operated along relatively short, interior, and divergent lines. Their bases of opera-
tions flanked the sea routes from the U.S. west coast and the Panama Canal to 
Australia and New Zealand. The Allied base of operations in the South Pacific was 
unfavorable for the employment of naval forces and aircraft. During the operation, 
Allied carrier forces occupied a central position. In contrast, the Allied land-based 
aircraft deployed in eastern Australia and New Caledonia occupied an exterior po-
sition and operated along very long and converging lines of operation. Naval war-
fare is invariably aimed at obtaining, maintaining, or disputing control of particular 
oceans or seas. It cannot be conducted without access to bases or ports and airfields 
in the littorals. Such positions and their location, as opposed to enemy positions, still 
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have considerable influence on the successful employment of naval forces. However, 
control of positions means little unless it is combined with the factor of force. Opera-
tional commanders and planners should not overestimate the importance and value 
of either central or exterior positions and resulting lines of operation or communica-
tions. They should try in every way to maximize the advantages and minimize the 
disadvantages of given positions for the employment of their combat forces. Yet what 
counts most is not the geography of the situation but the combat readiness, morale, 
and the skills of the operational commanders in employing their forces in combat.
Both the Japanese and the Allies had undeveloped command structures in the 
theater. The Japanese structure was highly fragmented. The parochialism of the 
two services, a major problem for the Japanese throughout the war in the Pacific, 
was particularly evident at the general-staff level. However, in the planning and 
execution of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation, the Japanese ensured unity of 
effort through unity of command. Admiral Inoue, as the Fourth Fleet commander, 
was responsible for the command and control of all navy and army forces. Yet he 
depended on the Combined Fleet for additional forces and had no influence on 
Yamamoto’s decision to change the operation’s timetable. Operational commanders 
should have sufficient organic forces to ensure that assigned objectives can be accom-
plished; otherwise, it is difficult to exercise mission command. Optimally, they should 
also have full command and control over all subordinate forces during planning and 
the execution of a major operation or campaign.
In contrast to the Japanese, the Allies established at least the rudiments of a 
theater or operational command organization. The Southwest Pacific Area and the 
Pacific Ocean Areas were, in modern terms, “theater-strategic commands.” Most 
combat actions were conducted within the SWPA, under MacArthur. Nimitz, as 
CINCPOA/CINCPac, had exclusive authority over the employment of Task Forces 
17 and 11. As a result, a divided theater command existed both prior to and during 
the battle of the Coral Sea. This created numerous problems in organizing compre-
hensive searches by land-based aircraft and in intelligence sharing. Giving opera-
tional control over TFs 17 and 11 to MacArthur was effectively impossible. Neither 
Nimitz nor King would allow the employment of carrier forces by an Army general; 
the carriers were the only major striking force left in the Pacific Fleet and could not 
be put at risk. Another problem was the lack of an intermediate command level for 
the South Pacific. Nimitz, some four thousand miles from the scene of action, was 
unable to form an accurate and timely picture of the situation in the South Pacific. 
Optimally, in planning and execution of a major operation or campaign, all subordi-
nate forces should be controlled by a single commander. This would ensure the most 
effective control over operational intelligence, fires, logistics, and protection. Theater-
strategic commanders should delegate authority to subordinate theater commanders. 
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Boundaries between the adjacent theaters should not be so rigid as to prevent friendly 
forces from crossing them as needed. 
During the preliminaries, Nimitz employed carrier forces to great effect in react-
ing to Japanese advances in the Bismarcks and on the eastern coast of New Guinea. 
The Allied carrier raids in the southwest Pacific had a much greater effect on Japanese 
planning for the pending Port Moresby–Solomons operation than was realized at the 
time. The carrier raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942 had a great psychological effect on 
the Japanese strategic leadership and people, and it reinforced Yamamoto’s decision to 
go ahead with his planned Midway operation. However, the raid deprived the Allies of 
two large carriers at a time when Admiral King had reliable information from decod-
ed enemy messages about the acceleration of the attack on Port Moresby. Had the To-
kyo raid not taken place, Nimitz would have had four carriers to oppose the Japanese 
thrust toward Port Moresby and probably would have inflicted much greater enemy 
losses. The highest strategic leadership should give to subordinate theater commanders 
full command authority over all forces deployed within their area of responsibility. Nor-
mally, the majority of one’s striking forces should be employed in the theater of main ef-
fort. Hence, these forces should not be employed in a secondary theater, thereby making it 
difficult or even impossible to reinforce the main effort in a timely way. This is especially 
true if one has timely and reliable knowledge of the enemy’s plans and intentions. Also, 
the time between consecutive operations in separate maritime theaters of operations 
should allow timely redeployment of forces from one theater to another. This, in turn, 
requires sound balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force versus an 
operational/strategic objective. 
The Japanese had inadequate knowledge of the situation in the theater. They knew 
nothing of the enemy’s plans or intentions, because of their inability to break Al-
lied codes and their lack of human intelligence sources. Most of their information 
was obtained by scout aircraft and seaplanes based in the Bismarcks–New Guinea–
Solomons area. Their information on the physical features of the objective area and 
on ground defenses and air strength in the southwest Pacific was accurate, but their 
knowledge of enemy carriers—their numbers, whereabouts, and movements—was a 
different matter. Apparently, the Japanese commanders and their staffs had too much 
faith in the reports of their pilots and submariners.
The Japanese seem to have based their decisions and plans on what they assessed 
as the enemy’s intentions and gave insufficient weight to the enemy’s capabilities. 
Generally, and unless the commander possesses reliable and accurate knowledge of the 
enemy’s plans, it is unwise to prepare estimates and make decisions on the basis of en-
emy intentions instead of his capabilities. The enemy can use deception to hide his true 
intentions and actions. 
Japanese planning for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation was deeply 
flawed. First, the plan was based on overly optimistic assumptions. The absence 
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of accurate and reliable information on the whereabouts of the Allied carriers 
did not lead Inoue and his staff to assume the possibility of large enemy forces 
being present in the Coral Sea—to the contrary. The Japanese had a penchant 
for assigning multiple objectives to be accomplished simultaneously or nearly 
so. In this instance, the Japanese tried to accomplish all their objectives in a sin-
gle major combat phase; they put too much emphasis on speed of action. They 
also added such minor tasks as ferrying Zeros to Rabaul without taking into ac-
count the extra time they might take. Operational commanders should not draft 
plans based on either overly optimistic or overly pessimistic assumptions. A lack 
of information on the whereabouts and the movements of the main enemy forces 
should counsel a great deal of caution in drafting operational plans. The factor of 
speed is critical for the successful employment of forces. However, a balance should 
be found between the need for speedy execution of the operation and avoidance of 
simultaneous or nearly simultaneous pursuit of multiple objectives. The mission 
given to a subordinate commander should not be changed by the addition of sec-
ondary tasks; the latter usually take more time than originally envisaged. 
The Japanese relied on the factor of surprise (and presumed enemy passiv-
ity), but they did not prepare an operational deception plan to enhance the 
chances of achieving it. Instead, they unrealistically believed that secrecy alone 
would suffice. Surprise, judiciously conceived and successfully employed, can be 
a most potent factor but should not be counted on. A plan for a major operation 
or campaign should include provision for operational deception to enhance the 
chance of surprising the enemy, but there must be means to ensure success even if 
surprise is not obtained. Secrecy alone is rarely sufficient to achieve surprise. 
The Japanese plan for the Port Moresby–Solomons operation was also overly 
complex. Its success depended heavily on precise synchronization of move-
ments and actions of a large number of force elements, a fact that made Inoue 
reluctant to change the plan until it was too late to have any effect. No provision 
was made for unforeseen events, such as the sudden appearance of the enemy 
or his reactions, for mistakes made by the Japanese commanders, or for bad 
weather. Finally, the Japanese task organization was too fragmented. The result 
was a considerable reduction in the combat potential of the force as a whole. 
The Japanese plans could work well only if everything went according to the 
plan and the enemy reacted as envisioned. Too many intermediate objectives 
slow one’s operational tempo, and they require commitment of larger forces and 
more time for the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. They also result in 
overly complicated plans. Task organizations should be simple, straightforward, 
and logical. The principle of unity of effort through unity of command should 
be applied. Division of a force into several smaller elements should generally be 
avoided. 
 THE PORT MORESBY–SOLOMONS OPERATION AND ALLIED REACTION, 27 APRIL–11 MAY 1942 73 72 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
The single greatest advantage the Allies had over the Japanese was accurate, reli-
able, and timely knowledge of enemy plans and intentions. The Allied commanders 
knew of the high-level Japanese debate about the Second Operational Stage of the 
war months and weeks before resulting plans were executed. King and Nimitz had 
great faith in the work of their cryptanalysts and used this tremendous advantage to 
the fullest; otherwise, they would not have been able to employ their forces so suc-
cessfully. By reading and properly analyzing enemy radio messages they were able 
to concentrate and prepare TF 17 and TF 11 in the Coral Sea in time to oppose the 
advance toward Port Moresby. 
MacArthur and his staff, in contrast, apparently had little confidence in COMINT 
and instead depended on the relatively unreliable reports of land-based search air-
craft based in northeastern Australia and at Port Moresby. Their information had 
only tactical value, limited by inadequate numbers of aircraft, long flying distances, 
and poor training of their crews for searches over seas and oceans. Searches by TF 
17 aircraft, for their part, were limited by divided theater command. The absence of 
searches from the Solomons was one of the main reasons why the MO Carrier Force 
was not detected prior to entering the Coral Sea. Fletcher, who was not informed 
by the SWPA of the gaps in the coverage by its aircraft, never had a full operational 
picture of the situation after the enemy forces were initially detected. In planning a 
major operation or campaign, commanders and their staffs should focus on creating an 
operational picture of all aspects of the situation in a given theater of operations. Hence 
the need to convert information obtained from strategic and tactical intelligence into 
operational intelligence; otherwise, a critically important operational perspective on the 
situation will be missing. Operational commanders should not arbitrarily decide which 
sources of intelligence are more important; all sources of intelligence should be used in 
obtaining a picture of the operational situation and its trends. 
Allied planning and preparations to counter the enemy thrust into Papua New 
Guinea started in late March 1942, when the first reliable information was obtained 
about the Japanese intentions in the southern and southwestern Pacific. The single 
major problem was how to concentrate a sufficiently potent carrier force in the Coral 
Sea. The U.S. Navy had only seven large carriers, and not all of them were available 
for action in the South Pacific. Another major problem was the shortage of oilers 
capable of underway replenishment. There was also an acute shortage of destroyers 
to screen the carrier forces and escort the transports. Fletcher’s Operation Order No. 
2-42 was a classically simple and executable plan. Nonetheless, in contrast to the Japa-
nese, it had the Allied carriers operating separately, not as a single group. This greatly 
weakened the strike packages in combat with the enemy carrier force. Plans should be 
comprehensive but simple and logical. They should be also flexible enough to accommo-
date unforeseen events, due to either natural causes or the actions of commanders. Also, 
the success of a major operation at sea is heavily dependent on the logistical support 
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and sustainment. Operational commanders, not logisticians, are directly responsible for 
synchronizing the operations and logistics.
The Japanese execution of the Port Moresby–Solomons operation matched the 
meticulousness, but also the rigidity, with which it had been planned. From the land-
ing at Tulagi on 3 May until the end of the operation on 11 May, the opposing carrier 
forces made largely unsuccessful efforts to find each other, and mistaken identifica-
tions led to many minor and several major unsound decisions. Hara’s decision to 
launch a late-afternoon strike against what he believed to be an enemy carrier force 
was a reckless gamble that cost a number of hard-to-replace experienced pilots. Simi-
larly, Fletcher’s decision to detach Crace’s TG 17.3 could have ended in the destruc-
tion of Crace’s unprotected group or greater losses for the carrier force because of 
the resulting weakening of its ship-based antiair and antisubmarine defense. Neither 
Hara’s nor Fletcher’s decision can be justified from the information each had or did 
not have at the time it was made. 
Further, and although directed by Nimitz, Fletcher ran undue risks by waiting 
until 6 May to put his operation order into effect and finally combine TF 17 and TF 
11 into an enlarged TF 17. Finally, Inoue was too slow in changing or modifying his 
plan in the face of unforeseen events, usually only after it had become obvious that 
the original plan could not be carried out. He did not display “operational vision” 
—the ability to assess a situation properly, anticipate the flow of events accurately, and 
then react quickly and decisively when something unforeseen happens.
In the course of the execution of a major operation or campaign, operational com-
manders should keep a running estimate of the situation and make quick decisions. 
Their focus on the ultimate objective should be unwavering, but they should be will-
ing to modify or even abandon intermediate ones. Sequencing and synchronization of 
movements should be flexible; otherwise, the plan will most likely fail. Reports from 
commanders directly involved in carrying out a task should never be exclusively relied 
on; if they cannot be cross-checked against other sources of information they should be 
treated as assumptions. As Helmuth von Moltke the Elder observed and has been often 
repeated since, no plan survives the first contact with the enemy. The enemy has a will of 
his own and will react in ways that rarely can be foreseen and that might even appear ir-
rational. Though operational commanders and their staffs should try to obtain the best 
knowledge and understanding possible of all aspects of the situation in a theater, there 
will be always gaps, in which they must make reasoned assumptions. High-stakes risks 
must sometimes be taken, but they should be calculated—an operational commander 
must find a proper balance between overcautiousness and recklessness. Finally, friction 
can be minimized but never mastered; chance, mistakes, and pure luck are inherent to 
warfare. The knowledge, judgment, and skills of commanders and their subordinates 
therefore remain, as they have in the past, the keys to success in war. 
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II The Midway-Aleutians Operation, 25 May–14  
June 1942
The Japanese Midway-Aleutians operation—or, as it is popularly known in the United States, the battle of Midway—represented a turning point in the Pacific War of 1941–45. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) suffered the 
greatest defeat in its proud history. After June 1942 Japan was forced onto the stra-
tegic defensive and was never able to regain the initiative before its unconditional 
surrender in August 1945. In operational terms, the Midway-Aleutians operation 
comprised in fact two major and “eccentric” offensive naval/joint operations con-
ducted in two adjacent theaters of operations. The U.S. forces involved also con-
ducted two major naval/joint operations, but from a central position. Despite the 
passage of time, the Midway-Aleutians operation is still rich in lessons valid for 
today and in the future.
The Strategic Situation, Spring 1942
The principal objective of the Japanese, in what they called the “First Operational 
Stage of War,” was to destroy and capture the most important American, British, 
and Dutch positions in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, the 
Japanese planned to secure the positions gained in the southern area. They were 
greatly surprised at the speed and easiness of their own early victories in Decem-
ber 1941–April 1942. 
Prior to December 1941, the Japanese had controlled Korea, Manchuria, and 
coastal areas of China’s mainland. In the Central Pacific, the Japanese were in pos-
session of the Mandates, as they were called (that is, the Marianas [less Guam], 
the Marshalls, and the Carolines). In December 1941 they occupied the U.S.-
controlled Wake Island and Guam.1 By early 1942 the Japanese had conquered 
Malaya, in a brilliant campaign. The British strongpoint of Singapore fell on 15 
February 1942. The Japanese invaded the Philippines in the first week of Decem-
ber 1941. By 2 January 1942 the capital, Manila, had fallen into their hands, and 
the defending American and Filipino forces had been forced to withdraw to the 
Bataan Peninsula on Luzon. The United States was facing complete defeat in the 
Philippines. 
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In January 1942, the Japanese also moved into Burma. By 7 March British troops 
had evacuated Rangoon, and by May the Allied forces in Burma were in full retreat. 
Siam (Thailand today) became Japan’s ally, signing a military alliance on 21 Decem-
ber 1941. On 17 December 1941 the Japanese invaded the resource-rich Netherlands 
East Indies (NEI); by 9 March 1942 the entire NEI was in Japanese hands. In the 
process the Japanese decimated the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command 
forces that opposed them. By April 1942 the Japanese had gained control of South-
east Asia and the southwest Pacific, a vast expanse rich in natural resources (oil, tin, 
rubber, and bauxite), and had incorporated it into what they called the “Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.” The Japanese defense perimeters now stretched from 
the Kuril Islands southeastward through Wake, the Marianas, the Marshalls, and the 
Gilbert Archipelago, then along the northern coast of New Guinea through Borneo, 
Java, and Sumatra, up to the Malay Peninsula, and then again westward from the 
borders of Indochina to Siam, Burma, and the border of India. In January 1942 the 
Japanese started an advance into the southwest Pacific. They captured Rabaul, on 
New Britain, in the Bismarck Archipelago, and several key positions in the Solo-
mons. In March 1942 they also seized the ports of Lae and Salamaua on the eastern 
coast of New Guinea and thereby threatened Port Moresby, on Papua New Guinea. 
The Allied navies suffered a series of defeats in the initial phase of the Pacific 
War. In the Japanese view, the remainder of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was now trying 
to regroup. The hub of American activity was Hawaii. American carrier raids in 
the Central and southwest Pacific in early 1942 greatly alarmed the Japanese high 
command. The United States was also reinforcing some key islands in the southern 
Pacific. The Japanese were also concerned that the United States might use the 
Aleutians to stage bombing raids against the Kurils.2
The Theater
The Midway-Aleutians operation was conducted over the major part of the Central 
and northern Pacific. In the Central Pacific, the United States controlled the Hawai-
ian Islands, a chain of small islands and reefs stretching for about 1,200 miles north-
westward from there (Midway, Kure, Pearl and Hermes Reef, French Frigate Shoals, 
Lisianski, and Laysan), and Johnston Island, some 750 miles southwest of Oahu.
Aside from the Hawaiian group, the most important remaining American po-
sition in the Central Pacific was Midway Atoll. Midway is an almost-enclosed cir-
cular reef about six miles in diameter and consisting of Sand Island and Eastern Is-
land. Sand Island is less than two miles long and encompasses an area of 1.4 square 
miles. Eastern Island is little more than a mile long, with an area of 0.52 square 
miles. Eastern Island is nearly flat, rising only twelve feet above the ocean, while 
the dunes on Sand Island rise to about forty feet, protected from wind erosion by 
six-to-eight-foot evergreen shrubs.3 The islands lie behind a substantial coral reef 
that protects them from rough seas and all but the most severe tsunamis. Midway 
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has a semitropical climate, due to the effect of the warm Japanese Current, a stream 
of warm water passing north of the island; the average temperature in the summer 
is seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit and in the winter sixty-five degrees.4 
The weather was to have a significant effect on the employment of both the 
Japanese and the U.S. forces in the coming operation. However, the Japanese would 
be much more affected, because of the longer distances their forces had to tran-
sit before reaching their operating area near Midway. In May and June of each 
year, storm disturbances frequently pass between northern Japan and Midway. 
They are accompanied by frontal systems that are preceded in turn by rain and 
areas of low visibility. Between periods of storm, fog frequently develops about 
three hundred miles northwest of Midway and extending westward and north-
ward. Frontal systems approaching Midway often dissipate rapidly, leaving bro-
ken low and intermediate clouds and reduced visibility. In the northern Pacific, 
surface winds circulate counterclockwise around low-pressure areas and clockwise 
around highs. Because front systems move eastward from Japan’s home islands, 
actual weather conditions to the north and west of Midway could be predicted ac-
curately by Japanese meteorologists several days in advance of their forces’ planned 
arrival. In contrast, the American forecasters no longer had weather stations in 
the northwest Pacific. Hence, they were unable to forecast weather accurately for 
the Midway area. In late May and early June 1942, a large, nearly stationary high- 
pressure area formed northeast of Midway. It caused fronts to the northwest of 
Midway to stagnate and those to the west and southwest to break up. It also pro-
duced considerable fog northeast of the island.5
In the northern Pacific, the United States controlled Alaska and the Aleutian 
island chain. The Aleutians extend westward about 1,200 miles from the Alaska 
Peninsula to a point some 230 miles from the Kamchatka Peninsula. They encom-
pass some fourteen large and fifty-five smaller islands plus numerous islets, with 
a combined area of about 6,820 square miles. The great majority of the Aleutian 
Islands are of volcanic origin and hence are uniformly rocky and barren, with pre-
cipitous mountains and scant vegetation. The westernmost island, Attu, is about 
twenty-two miles long and twelve miles wide. It is very mountainous, with eleva-
tions up to three thousand feet, and has several good harbors. The island of Kiska 
is twenty-two miles long and seven miles wide. The largest island is Unimak, sixty-
five by twenty-two miles, with mountains rising up to 9,300 feet. The coasts of most 
of the Aleutian islands are rocky, and their approaches are very dangerous. Strong 
winds and tidal currents make navigation among the islands very hazardous.
The weather is characterized by violent gales, heavy precipitation, long periods of 
fog, and rapid and unpredictable changes of temperature.6 Annual rainfall averages 
forty to fifty inches, spread over most of the year. For example, Attu can expect five 
to six days of precipitation per week, with rain or fog of varying intensity, and has 
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on average no more than eight to ten clear days a year.7 The average temperatures 
are fifty degrees in the summer and thirty-three in the winter. Temperatures below 
zero are rare.8 During the winter months, a low-pressure system, the Aleutian Low, 
prevails. The Aleutians are subject to frequent cyclonic storms and heavy squalls, as 
well as to snow in the winter and fog in the summer. In fact there is almost constant 
fog, caused by the warm Japanese Current mixing, as it passes about five hundred 
miles south of the Aleutians and then turns southward toward the coast of North 
America, with the cold waters of the Bering Sea. The weather, however, is highly 
localized; areas of high visibility can often be found within twenty miles of fog.9 The 
weather in the Aleutians is affected as well by the cold water of the Kamchatka (or 
Subarctic) Current, which passes from the Bering Strait to a point midway down the 
Kuril chain, then curves northeastward and passes between the Japanese Current 
and the Aleutians. It is unusually strong in the vicinity of the Aleutians.10 
In May and June the weather in the Aleutians is in transition from winter to 
summer. In the summer months most storms move directly through the Aleutians, 
causing extremely variable winds and weather. In the winter there is a severe icing, 
frequent gales, and low clouds.11 Winds are generally gusty because of the deflec-
tion of air currents by the steep mountainous slopes. The strongest winds are in 
March. Winds and fogs may persist together for many days. Humidity is always 
high. Special hazards to navigation are “williwaws,” winds that blow down from 
mountains with great force. They sometimes reach gale strength within half an 
hour. The mountains are concentrated on the northern sides of the islands, and 
williwaws make it difficult to find a lee along the northern shores.12 
Theater Geometry
The distances separating various points within the Japanese- and the U.S.-controlled 
areas in the northern and Central Pacific were measured in hundreds and thou-
sands of miles (see map 5). For example, the distance from San Francisco to Tokyo 
is about 5,150 miles. The distances from Seattle and San Francisco to Dutch Har-
bor, on Unalaska Island, are about 1,965 and 2,360 miles, respectively. Some 3,755 
miles separate Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima Bay; Dutch Harbor is about 2,290 miles 
from Pearl Harbor; San Francisco is about 2,400 miles and Seattle 2,680 miles from 
Pearl Harbor. The distance from Pearl Harbor to Midway is about 1,320 miles and 
to Wake, 2,680 miles. Johnston Island and Marcus are 715 and 3,050 miles, re-
spectively, from Pearl Harbor, which is in turn about 3,820 miles from Saipan. The 
distance from Pearl Harbor to Wotje Atoll, in the Marshalls, is about 2,280 miles. 
Attu is some 650 miles from Paramushiro, in the Kurils, and about 1,100 miles from 
Alaska’s mainland. Kiska is about 610 miles west of Dutch Harbor and about 180 
miles east of Attu. 
The employment of the Japanese and U.S. forces during the Midway and Aleu-
tians operations was greatly affected by the number, size, and effectiveness of naval 
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The theater and its geometry
 THE MIDWAY-ALEUTIANS OPERATION, 25 MAY–14 JUNE 1942 87 86 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
and air bases. Relative positions, the lengths of respective bases of operations, and 
distances to physical objectives largely dictated the selection and the number of 
lines of operation/retreat, and lines of communications for each side. 
The Japanese had large numbers of well-developed naval bases and airfields in 
the home islands. One of the largest and most important was Hiroshima Bay. The 
majority of the Combined Fleet (Rengō Kantai) was based at Hashirajima Anchor-
age, in the southern end of Hiroshima Bay. About sixteen miles to the northeast 
was Kure, with a great naval arsenal and shipyards; its anchorage was large enough 
to accommodate the entire fleet. It was also well defended by antiaircraft (AA) bat-
teries and antitorpedo nets, and patrolled by small ships. Each ship when at anchor 
was linked by land phone to the naval headquarters in Tokyo, thereby ensuring 
security of communications.13 At Tokuyama, near the west end of the Inland Sea, 
was the largest fuel depot in the IJN. Maizuru, on the western coast of Honshū, 
was a base for the Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF). The Sasebo naval complex 
encompassed anchorages at Imari and Hirodo and the ports of Takeshiki (Tsu-
shima), Kagoshima, Kuji, and Amami-Ōshima and Wakamatsu (the Gotō Islands). 
Another major naval base was at Yokosuka, Tokyo Bay. 
The most important Japanese naval base in northern Hokkaidō was at Ōminato; 
Akkeshi Bay and Mutsu Bay Anchorages were also used by surface ships. In the 
Kurils, the largest and most important naval base was on the second-largest island, 
Paramushiro. A large airfield capable of accommodating heavy bombers had also 
been built on this island.
The Japanese had few good bases, however, in the Central Pacific. With the 
exception of Truk, in the central Carolines, none were capable of major fleet re-
pairs. Marcus Island had a runway and facilities for ships. Wake Island had a sea-
plane base. In the Marshalls, Kwajalein Atoll served as an advance submarine base 
and had a newly constructed airfield. There were excellent facilities on Roi Island. 
Ebeye Island, Kwajalein, had a seaplane and submarine base; its lagoon was large 
enough to accommodate a large number of ships. Maloelap had an excellent fleet 
anchorage. A new airfield was built on Taroa Island, in Maloelap Atoll, with sea-
plane facilities and ramps. Wotje had an airfield with two runways, and it could 
provide a limited support for submarine operations. Jaluit had excellent facilities 
available for handling seaplanes. Eniwetok had a good fleet anchorage, seaplane 
facilities, and a submarine base.14
The U.S. Pacific Fleet used several large, and many smaller, naval bases and air-
fields along the West Coast; the major ones were at San Diego and Mare Island, Cal-
ifornia, and Bremerton, Washington. Also available was the Canadian naval base at 
Victoria, British Columbia.15 The largest U.S. Pacific naval base was at Pearl Harbor, 
on Oahu. This large (five hundred acre) base had a navy yard with four large dry 
docks. Pearl Harbor served as a base for both surface ships and submarines. The 
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naval air station on Ford Island had a 5,400-foot runway and facilities for seaplanes. 
Pearl Harbor also had a large number of fuel, ammunition, and supply depots, and 
power plants, as well as a radio station, naval hospital, and housing for personnel.
Midway had a small base for land and seaplanes, primarily used by patrol air-
craft. A small submarine base was used as a refueling point for boats en route or 
returning from patrol. The only airfield was on Eastern Island. There were also 
seaplane facilities inside the lagoon. There were limited fuel supplies for surface 
ships. An underwater telegraph cable connected Midway with Honolulu. On each 
of the main islands there was a radar installation. To the east, small anchorages 
existed at Pearl and Hermes Reef and at French Frigate Shoals. Johnston Island had 
a small naval air station; a few Navy patrol planes operated there, and occasionally 
Army aircraft also. Kure Atoll, some fifty-five miles west-northwest of Midway, had 
a seaplane anchorage in a lagoon.16
Alaska and the Aleutians lacked well-developed naval or air bases. The principal 
bases for U.S. naval forces and aircraft were on Kodiak Island and at Dutch Harbor. 
Dutch Harbor served as a base for submarines and seaplanes. It was protected by 
the Army troops stationed at nearby Fort Hears. Kodiak had a naval air station for 
land aircraft and seaplanes, a submarine base, and limited logistical facilities; it was 
protected by troops at Fort Greely. These bases were supported from Seattle, where 
existed dry-dock and repair facilities.17 In addition, numerous small harbors in the 
Aleutians could be used in an emergency.
In Alaska proper, Ladd Airfield, near Fairbanks, had an Army air base with a 
nine-thousand-foot concrete runway. Nome had an Army staging field and small 
infantry garrison. Anchorage had two operational airfields. Cordova, with one run-
way, served as the Army staging airfield. Yakutat had an excellent nine-thousand- 
foot runway for land planes. Juneau had an Army staging airfield; about 485 troops 
were assigned to the base. At Ketchikan was a headquarters for the U.S. Coast 
Guard. Annette Island had an Army staging field; it also served as an operating 
base for a squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force pursuit planes.18
Japanese ships and naval and land-based aircraft operated from a base of opera-
tions stretching from the northern tip of the Kurils through the eastern shores of 
the home islands and the Bonins to the Mandates and Guam. The extreme length of 
this base of operations made it vulnerable to attack. Japanese ships and aircraft had 
to operate along long and converging lines of operation to reach operating areas 
south of the Aleutians and in the vicinity of Midway. Those based in the Mandates, 
however, operated from a central position, which offered relatively short and di-
verging lines of operations. 
The U.S. base of operations extended from San Diego to Seattle and then curved 
toward Alaska and the Aleutians chain. Hence, like their Japanese counterparts, 
U.S. ships and aircraft operated from a very long and highly exposed base of 
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operations. The Hawaiian group, together with the chain of islands stretching to 
the northwestward (i.e., out to Kure Atoll), plus Johnston Island to the south, con-
stituted in itself a semicircular, some-two-thousand-mile-long base of operations, 
one that occupied a central position. Hence, the U.S. ships and aircraft based there 
operated along short and diverging lines of operation.
Japanese Strategic Leadership
The Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), in Tokyo, was responsible for all the 
strategic and operational planning for both services. It consisted of army and navy 
sections (or general staffs). Plans for major operations prepared by the army or the 
navy were usually made without the input of the other service. Joint operations 
were discussed at liaison conferences. For each major operation, unity of effort 
would be ensured by the terms of an Army-Navy Central Agreement. Afterward, 
the Army and Naval General Staffs would issue final orders for the operation.19 
The second-highest planning echelon in the IJN was Combined Fleet Head-
quarters. Plans prepared at the Naval General Staff and Combined Fleet were after-
ward elaborated on by the numbered naval and air fleets, sea area (local defense) 
fleets, and subordinate major tactical commands.20 Final plans were prepared after 
discussion between the Commander in Chief (CINC), Combined Fleet, and the 
Chief of Naval General Staff. In theory, strategic decision making for the navy was 
the prerogative of the Naval General Staff. In 1941–42, however, the CINC, Adm. 
Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943), often played a dominant role in formulating na-
val strategy. 
The main reasons were Yamamoto’s strong personality and his enormous pres-
tige and influence in the IJN. He had assumed command of the Combined Fleet in 
1939. Yamamoto was ambitious, smart, and politically adroit.21 He had keen fore-
sight and warmhearted human understanding.22 Yamamoto was very concerned 
that the balance of military strength between the United States and Japan would 
shift against Japan within two years; hence, he felt that Japan’s only hope lay in seek-
ing a quick decision that might induce the enemy to come to terms.23 Yamamoto 
was extremely popular, especially among the aviators—he was one of the foremost 
promoters of naval aviation.24 Yet he created many enemies among senior Japanese 
officers. Among other things, Yamamoto had been a strong supporter of the Wash-
ington and London naval treaties and was an opponent of Japan’s alliance with 
Nazi Germany.25 Detractors accused Yamamoto of making the Combined Fleet his 
fiefdom. He also dominated the Japanese naval strategy and thereby effectively un-
dermined the checks and balances of the navy’s strategic planning process.26 
Yamamoto was capable of making bold and imaginative decisions. At the same 
time, he insisted uncompromisingly on his plans. He also sometimes made hasty 
decisions. On one hand, Yamamoto exerted strong and unequivocal leadership; 
unlike many other senior Japanese flag officers, he was a true leader. Yamamoto 
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took active roles in conferences following Combined Fleet maneuvers. Yet he did 
not use his staff officers as his brain trust but rather as aides for executing his own 
ideas.27 He provided his subordinates clear-cut guidance; they always knew what 
they had to accomplish.28 In contrast, neither Adm. Osami Nagano, Chief of Naval 
General Staff, nor his deputy, Vice Adm. Seichi Ito, was very active in the planning 
process. They allowed the staff to take the initiative, expressing their own views 
only when a plan was submitted for their approval. In 1942, Naval General Staff 
thinking largely reflected that of the Plans Division of the First (or Operations) 
Section, led by Rear Adm. Shigeru Fukudome.29
The Japanese Strategic Decision
The Combined Fleet started planning for the Second Operational Stage of the war 
on 5 January 1942.30 The Naval General Staff followed suit in the first half of Febru-
ary. The Combined Fleet began at this time to study the option of invading Midway. 
The genesis of that option was the Combined Fleet’s Operation Order No. 1, of 5 
November 1941, in which Midway and the Aleutians had been listed as positions 
to be invaded or destroyed at the earliest opportune moment. In contrast, the Naval 
General Staff strongly favored capturing Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia.31 
The views of Yamamoto and his chief of staff, Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki, on 
future operations in the Pacific and adjacent ocean areas were very different from 
those of their counterparts in the Naval General Staff. Ugaki enjoyed a reputation 
as one of Japan’s best officers. He had become Yamamoto’s chief of staff in August 
1941.32 Ugaki agreed with Yamamoto that the enemy had to be decisively defeated 
soon, because time was working to the American advantage. Yamamoto was disap-
pointed that U.S. carriers had not been destroyed in the attack on Pearl Harbor; as 
early as 9 December 1941 he had directed Ugaki to reexamine the idea of invading 
Hawaii, and by early January Ugaki was actively working on it.33 
The idea was first to capture and occupy, in early June 1942, Midway Atoll and 
the islands of Johnston and Palmyra (not quite a thousand miles south-southeast 
of Johnston) and then deploy land-based aircraft to them. This would create favor-
able conditions for an invasion of Hawaii. If possible, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be 
engaged in a decisive battle. Yamamoto was confident of victory in such a battle.34 
On 29–30 March, preliminary plans for the Midway operation were drawn up 
at Combined Fleet Headquarters. On 2 April, Cdr. Yasui Watanabe, the operations 
officer on Yamamoto’s staff, was sent to Tokyo to present the plan officially for ap-
proval. He quickly realized that there would be difficulties.35 There was an exten-
sive exchange of views between Watanabe and Cdr. Tasukichi Miyo, First Section’s 
air officer, representing the Naval General Staff. Miyo pleaded vigorously against 
the plan and voiced a long list of objections. He argued that the New Caledonia–
Fiji–Samoa operation was more feasible, some preparations having already been 
made. Also, because of the supply situation for aircraft and air materiel in general, 
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it would be next to impossible to reequip depleted air groups of the First Air Fleet. 
(The problem with aircraft was in fact very serious. All air units were supposed to 
be equipped with reserve aircraft amounting to some 30 percent of their orders of 
battle. Yet a very large number of units had no reserve aircraft at all and were below 
normal operating strength.)36 
The Naval General Staff argued that Midway was near the main naval base of 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet and hence could be strongly defended by carriers, submarines, 
and land-based aircraft. As a result of the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, 
the enemy would not be taken by surprise. Japanese forces would operate without 
land-based aircraft for scouting or reconnaissance; that would mean a reduction in 
striking power, because carrier-based aircraft would have to supplement the recon-
naissance aircraft of battleships and cruisers. The Naval General Staff did not ex-
clude the possibility that the enemy would come out and fight a decisive battle but 
believed it questionable (as it turned out, erroneously) that he would risk his mea-
ger strength to defend Midway. The enemy might well chose to conserve his surface 
strength and, if the island were captured, simply neutralize it, taking advantage of 
its remoteness from Japan and proximity to Hawaii.37 Another major problem was 
that even if Midway were captured, it would be very difficult to supply a garrison 
there. Miyo was doubtful that the loss of Midway would significantly and adversely 
affect American morale.38 
On 5 April, discussions continued, with Admirals Ito and Fukudome in atten-
dance. Watanabe reiterated Yamamoto’s position that the success or failure of Ja-
pan’s entire strategy in the Pacific would depend on whether the U.S. Pacific Fleet 
was destroyed. Yamamoto strongly believed that by launching the proposed opera-
tion against Midway it would be possible to draw out the enemy carrier force and 
destroy it in a decisive battle.39 
The Naval General Staff accepted the Midway operation but insisted that it in-
clude the simultaneous capture of the western part of the Aleutian chain. This new 
objective arose from the Army General Staff ’s belief that enemy heavy bombers, 
if based in the western Aleutians, could be used for attacks against the Kurils and 
Hokkaidō and that the Japanese had to take countermeasures.40 The Army General 
Staff also argued that capturing part of the Aleutian chain would cut communica-
tions between Soviet Russia and the United States; the Naval General Staff agreed.41 
The Army General Staff, for its part, approved the plan for the Midway operation 
without difficulty, because it would be predominantly naval in character. The army 
had to provide only a small number of troops to reinforce the SNLF.42
The Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet Staff greatly differed on the 
timing of the Midway-Aleutians operation. The Naval General Staff contended that 
it should be delayed until late June; the Naval General Staff was unwilling to divert 
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forces assigned to the Port Moresby–Solomons operation—from which the battle 
of the Coral Sea was to result in early May (see chapter 1)—to offensive operations 
in the Central and North Pacific.43 The Combined Fleet, as noted, wanted the land-
ing on Midway to take place in early June; the Naval General Staff argued for about 
three additional weeks for preparations. However, the Combined Fleet insisted that 
the operation had to be launched with a full moon and that delaying for an entire 
month until the next one might seriously reduce its chances of success.44 Yamamoto 
let it be known that he and his staff were ready to resign if his views were not ac-
cepted.45 The Naval General Staff reluctantly agreed on 5 April to his timetable for 
the Midway-Aleutians operation.46 
Directive No. 86 for the Second Operational Stage of War was issued by IGHQ on 
16 April.47 Port Moresby was to be occupied in early May 1942, Midway and the Aleu-
tians in early June, and Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia (the FS operation) in July.48 
The Allied “Doolittle Raid” on 18 April 1942 did not change the IGHQ decision. 
However, it had an effect, in that Yamamoto and other proponents of the Midway-
Aleutians operation used it to reinforce their insistence that the operation not be 
delayed but carried out as scheduled—to prevent a potential second raid on Tokyo.49 
Japanese Plans
On 5 May the Naval General Staff issued to Yamamoto Order No. 18, for the cap-
ture of Midway and “strategic” (actually major tactical) points in the western Aleu-
tians in cooperation with the army. On the same day, IGHQ announced an Army-
Navy Central Agreement on the Midway and Aleutians operations. Details were 
contained in IGHQ’s Order No. 94, also issued on 5 May.50 
The plan envisaged two separate groups of forces, one for Midway (Operation 
MI) and another for the Aleutians (Operation AL). The forces taking part in the 
Midway operation specifically were divided into five large elements: the Main Force 
(First Fleet), under Admiral Yamamoto; the First Mobile Force (Kidō Butai—a term 
of convenience, not a formal name) (First Air Fleet [Dai-ichi Kōkū Kantai]), under 
Vice Adm. Chūichi Nagumo; the Midway Occupation Force (composed of the Sec-
ond Fleet; the IJN’s principal surface force), under Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondō; the 
Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarines), under Vice Adm. Teruhisa Komatsu; 
and the land-based (Base Air Force) Eleventh Air Fleet, under Vice Adm. Nishizō 
Tsukahara. 
Nagumo and his carrier force had the most critical role with respect to Midway. 
Nagumo, fifty-five years old, was a torpedo specialist, had held numerous seagoing 
commands, and was held in high esteem in the IJN. He had led the successful at-
tack on Pearl Harbor and the raids in the Indian Ocean. He was very businesslike 
but at the same time personally approachable, sympathetic, and warmhearted to-
ward junior officers. He was also willing to delegate responsibility to subordinates. 
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Reportedly, Nagumo displayed a lack of initiative and often merely approved rec-
ommendations of his chief of staff. By the time of the Midway operation he seems 
to have lacked the vigor and fighting spirit he had once possessed.51 Nagumo was 
on friendly terms with Yamamoto, but Yamamoto was unhappy that Nagumo was 
appointed as commander of the First Air Fleet. He believed Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa, 
who was a more air-minded officer, would have been a better choice.52 Admiral Uga-
ki disliked Nagumo, attributing to him simple stupidity and a tendency to panic.53
The Northern Area (Aleutian) Force was divided into five major force elements: 
Northern Area Force, Main Body; the Second Mobile Force; the Adak-Attu Occu-
pation Force; the Kiska Occupation Force; and the Patrol/Reconnaissance Group 
(see sidebar 1).
In its Order No. 94, IGHQ stated that by capturing Midway the Japanese would 
prevent future attack on their homeland from the Hawaii area. Also, the enemy 
fleet would be destroyed, if it appeared on the scene of action. The navy and the 
army would capture Midway and quickly establish a base for land aircraft and sea-
planes. Kiyua (Kure) Atoll would be captured to facilitate the invasion of Midway. 
The Main Force would support the Midway Occupation Force. The First Mobile 
Force would destroy enemy air strength on Midway prior to the landing. All the 
navy’s forces would be under command of the CINC of the Combined Fleet on 
board the flagship of the Main Force, the superdreadnought Yamato. The army’s 
forces would be led by the IKKI (Ichiki) Detachment commander.54 IGHQ Order 
No. 94 further stated that both the Midway and the Aleutians operations would 
start almost simultaneously in the early part or middle of June. Saipan was to be 
the assembly point for the Midway Occupation Force. The navy would be respon-
sible for protection of the army troops at the ports of embarkation; once they were 
embarked, the fleet commander would be in command of the army units. In the 
course of the landing, the most senior navy or army officer would be in charge. Af-
ter the capture of Midway, the navy would be responsible for its defense. The army 
units would be withdrawn one week after the island was secured.55
The Combined Fleet’s final plan set the date of the landing on Midway (N-Day) 
as 7/6 June (that is, Tokyo time / Honolulu time). The selection of N-Day was based 
primarily on the need for a full moon to facilitate night movements; 7/6 June was 
the last day until almost a month later when the moon would be right for the land-
ing.56 Another factor was the time required to repair, overhaul, and resupply the 
ships of Nagumo’s First Mobile Force and Kondō’s Second Fleet, which had re-
turned to home waters from the Indian Ocean in late April. The entire Midway- 
Aleutians operation would be completed by 20/19 June.57 
After “annihilating” the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Combined Fleet would return to 
Japan for yet another offensive. Between 15 and 20 June the main body, Second 
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Japanese Task Organization
Midway Operation
Main Force (First Fleet): Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, CINC, Combined Fleet Flagship Yamato)
BatDiv 1 (Yamato, Mutsu, Nagato)
1 Light Carrier (Hōshō—8 B4Y1 Type 96 bombers) 
1 Destroyer (Yukaze)
Screen 
(Rear Adm. Shintaro Hashimoto, Commander, DesRon 3 [flagship light cruiser Sendai])
DesRon 3
 DesDiv 11 (Fubuki, Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki, Murakumo)
 DesDiv 19 (Isonami, Shikanami, Ayanami, Uranami)
Special Force
2 Seaplane Tenders (Chiyoda, Nishin—carrying two MTBs and six midget submarines)
1st Supply Group
2 Oilers (Naruto, Toei Maru)
First Mobile Force (Kidō Butai / First Air Fleet) 
(Vice Adm. Chūichi Nagumo, Commander, CarDiv 1 [flagship Akagi])
Carrier Division 1
Kaga (18 A6M2 Type 00 Zeros, 18 D3A1 Type 99 Vals, 18 B5N2 Type 97 Kates)
Akagi (19 A6M2 Type 00 Zeros, 18 D3A1 Type 99 Vals, 18 B5N2 Type 97 Kates)
Carrier Division 2
(Rear Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi [flagship Hiryū])
Sōryū (18 A6M2 Type 00 Zeros, 16 D3A1 Type 99 Vals, 18 B5N2 Type 97 Kates)
Hiryū (18 A6M2 Type 00 Zeros, 18 D3A1 Type 99 Vals, 18 B5N2 Type 97 Kates)
Support Group
(Rear Adm. Hiroaki Abe [flagship Tone])
BatDiv 3, 2nd Section (Haruna—3 E8N2 Type 95s; Kirishima—3 E8N2 Type 95s)
CruDiv 8 (Tone—3 E13A1 Type 0s, 2 E8N2 Type 95s; Chikuma—3 E13A1 Type 0s, 2 E8N2 Type 95s)  
Screening Group 
(Rear Adm. Susumu Kimura, Commander, DesRon 10 [flagship light cruiser Nagara])
DesRon 10
 DesDiv 4 (Arashi, Nowaki, Hagikaze, Maikaze)
 DesDiv 10 (Kazagumo, Yugumo, Makigumo)
 DesDiv 17 (Isokaze, Urakaze, Hamakaze, Tanikaze)
Supply Unit
5 Oilers (Kyokuto Maru, Shinkoku Maru, Tōhō Maru, Nippon Maru, Kokuyo Maru)
1 Destroyer (Akigumo) (assigned on 3 June; from DesDiv 10)
Midway Occupation Force (Second Fleet) 
(Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondō, Commander, Second Fleet [flagship heavy cruiser Atago])
Covering Force, Main Body
(Rear Adm. Gunichi Mikawa, Commander, BatDiv 3, 1st Section)
BatDiv 3, 1st Section (Kongō—3 E8N2 Type 95s; Hiei—3 E8N2 Type 95s)
CruDiv 4, 1st Section (Atago, Chōkai)
CruDiv 5 (Haguro, Myōkō)
Screen
(Rear Adm. Shoji Nishimura, Commander, DesRon 4 [flagship light cruiser Yura])
DesRon 4
 DesDiv 2 (Yudachi, Murasame, Harusane, Samidare)
 DesDiv 9 (Asagumo, Minegumo, Natsugumo)
Carrier Group
1 Light Carrier (Zuihō—6 A6M2 Type 96s, 6 A5M4 Type 96, 12B5N2 Type 97- Kates)
1 Destroyer (Mirazuki)
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Close Support Group
(Rear Adm. Takeo Kurita, Commander, CruDiv 7 [flagship Kumano])
CruDiv 7 (Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma, Mogami)
DesDiv 8 (Arashio, Asashio)
1 Oiler (Nichiei Maru)
Transport Group
(Rear Adm. Raizō Tanaka, Commander, DesRon 2 [flagship light cruiser Jintsu])
12 Transports (Kiyozumi Maru, Keiyo Maru, Zenyo Maru, Goshu Maru 2, Toa Maru, Kano Maru, Argentina Maru, 
Hokuriku Maru, Brazil Maru, Kirishima Maru, Azuma Maru, Nankai Maru) 
3 Patrol Boats (Patrol Boat No. 1 [old DD Shimakaze], Patrol Boat No. 2 [old DD Nadakaze], Patrol Boat No. 34 
[old DD Suzuki]—carrying Kure and Yokosuka 5th SNLFs [for Sand Island] and Army Ichiki De-
tachment [for Eastern Island]; 2 construction battalions, survey group, and “weather group”—
total 5,000 men)
1 Oiler (Akebono Maru)
Close Screen
(Rear Adm. Raizō Tanaka, Commander, DesRon 2 [flagship light cruiser Jintsu])
DesRon 2
 DesDiv 15 (Kuroshio, Oyashio)
 DesDiv 16 (Hatsukaze, Yukikaze, Amatsukaze, Tokitsukaze)
 DesDiv 18 (Kasumi, Arare, Kagerō, Shiranuhi)
Seaplane Tender Group (Kure Occupation Force)
(Rear Adm. Rūitarō Fujita, Commander, CarDiv 11 [flagship Chitose])
CarDiv 11
 1 Light Seaplane Carrier (Chitose—16 F1M2 Type 0 Pete scouting seaplanes, 4 E13A  
reconnaissance seaplanes)
 1 Destroyer (Hayashio)
 1 Patrol Boat (No. 35, carrying troops)
Minesweeping Group
(Capt. Sadatomo Miyamoto)
4 Minesweepers (Tama Maru No. 3, Tama Maru No. 5, Shonan Maru No. 7, Shonan Maru No. 8)
3 Submarine Chasers (Nos. 16, 17, 18)
2 Cargo Ships (Meiyō Maru, Yamafuku Maru)
1 Supply Ship (Sōya)
Supply Group 
4 Oilers (Genyō Maru, Kenyō Maru, Sata, Tsurami)
1 Repair Ship (Akashi)
Advance (Submarine) Expeditionary Force 
(Vice Adm. Teruhisa Komatsu, Commander, Sixth Fleet [flagship light cruiser Katori, Kwajalein])
Midway Submarine Group
(Rear Adm. Chimaki Kōno, Commander, SubRon 3 [flagship tender Yasakuni Maru, Kwajalein])
SubRon 3
 SubDiv 11 (I-174, I-175)
 SubDiv 12 (I-171, I-169, I-168)
 SubDiv 13 (I-121, I-122, I-123—taking part in K operation; afterward to be deployed on KO line)
SubRon 5
(Rear Adm. Tadashige Daigo [flagship tender Rio de Janeiro Maru, Kwajalein])
 SubDiv 19 (I-156, I-157, I-158, I-159)
 SubDiv 30 (I-162, I-165, I-166, I-168)
Eleventh Air Fleet
(Vice Adm. Nishizō Tsukahara, Commander, Eleventh Air Fleet)
Midway Expeditionary Force (6th Air Group)
(Capt. Chisato Morita)
6 A6M2 Type 00s (carried on board Akagi)
9 A6M2 Type 00s (carried on board Kaga) 
3 A6M2 Type 00s (carried on board Hiryū)
3 A6M2 Type 00s (carried on board Sōryū)
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22nd Air Squadron (Marcus Island)
12 G4M1 Type 01 Rikko-Betty attack aircraft
24th Air Squadron, 14th Air Group (Jaluit Island)
6 K6K4 Type 97 flying boats
24th Air Flotilla (Kwajalein)
(Rear Adm. Minoru Maeda)
4th Air Attack Force
 1st Force (Chitose Air Group, Kwajalein—36 topedo bombers)
 1st Air Group (36 A6M2 Type 00, 36 torpedo bombers, Aur, Wotje)
 14th Air Group 18 flying boats, Jaluit, Wotje)
Special Duty Units
1 Light Seaplane Carrier (Kamoi Maru)
1 Seaplane Tender (Hogashu Maru)
1 Cargo Ship (Paran Maru)
1 Destroyer (Tachikaze)
Aleutians Operation
Northern Area Force, Main Body: Vice Adm. Boshirō Hosogaya, Commander, Fifth Fleet
Northern Area Force, Main Body 
(Vice Adm. Boshirō Hosogaya [flagship Nachi])
1 Heavy Cruiser (Nachi)
2 Destroyers (Ikazuchi, Inazuma)
Supply Group
2 Oilers (Fujisan Maru, Nissan Maru)
3 Cargo Ships
Second Mobile Force 
(Rear Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, Commander, CarDiv 4 [flagship Ryūjō])
CarDiv 4
 Ryūjō (16 A6M2 Type 00 Zeros, 20 B5N2 Type 97 Kates)
 Junyō (18 A6M2 Type 00 Zeros, 15 D3A1 Type 99 Vals)
CruDiv 4, 2nd Section (heavy cruisers Takao, Maya)
DesDiv 7 (Ushio, Sazanami, Akebono)
1 Oiler (Teiyō Maru)
Guard Force (Aleutians Screen)
(Vice Adm. Shirō Takasu [flagship Hiyūga])
BatDiv 2 (4 battleships—Hiyūga, Ise, Fusō, Yamashiro)
CruDiv (Light) 9 (2 light cruisers—Kitakami, Ōi)
DesDiv 20 (Asagiri, Yugiri, Shirakumo, Amagiri)
DesDiv 24 (Umikaze, Yamakaze, Kawakaze, Suzukaze)
DesDiv 27 (Ariake, Yugure, Shigure, Shiratsuyu)
2nd Supply Group
2 Oilers (San Clemente Maru, Toa Maru)
Adak-Attu Occupation Force
(Rear Adm. Sentarō Omori [flagship light cruiser Abakuma])
DesRon 1
 DesDiv 21 (Wakabe, Hatsushimo, Nenohi, Hatshuharu)
1 Transport (Kinugasa Maru—carrying 1,200–man North Sea [Hokkaidō] Army 
 Detachment)
1 Minelayer (Magane Maru)
Kiska Occupation Force
(Capt. Takeji Onoji [flagship light cruiser Kiso])
CruDiv 21 (light cruisers Kiso, Tama)
CruDiv 22 (light cruisers Asaka Maru, Ahata Maru)
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Fleet, and First Mobile Fleet would concentrate at Truk and prepare for the inva-
sion of New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, in cooperation with the newly created 17th 
Army. Reportedly, Hawaii was to be invaded in the latter part of 1942.58 
The Plan for the Midway Operation. The basic IJN plan for the Midway operation 
was extremely complex. Moreover, it contained several serious flaws. Among other 
things, the Japanese assumed that everything would work as planned. No adequate 
attention was given to the possibility that the enemy might react to the landing on 
Midway earlier than assumed. Yamamoto presumed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet was 
already beaten and that all that was required was to draw out its carriers to com-
plete their destruction. He failed to take into account the enemy’s will to fight.59
The final plan for the Midway operation envisaged accomplishment of two suc-
cessive objectives. A major tactical objective was the capture of Midway and its sub-
sequent development as an advance base from which to put under surveillance 
enemy forces operating out of Hawaii. The second and much more important ob-
jective was to draw out the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s remaining strength to engage and 
destroy it in a decisive battle. This objective was the operational objective, in terms 
of its scale. Yamamoto was convinced that a landing on Midway would almost cer-
tainly provoke an enemy reaction, because the island was important for defense of 
Hawaii.60 The landing would not require that the Japanese first obtain local sea con-
trol (as they needed but failed to do in their unsuccessful Port Moresby–Solomons 
operation). They would probably obtain at least temporary sea control in the North 
and Central Pacific if they succeeded in destroying the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s carrier 
force—that is, the enemy operational center of gravity. 
Operational Idea. The operational idea for the Midway operation followed a 
standard Japanese pattern. The sequencing of the objectives was meticulous but 
Screen
DesDiv 6 (Hibiki, Akatsuki, Hokaze)
Minesweeper Division 13 
3 Auxiliary Minesweepers (Hakuhō Maru, Kaihō Maru, Shinkotsu Maru)
Transports
2 Transports (Hakusan Maru—carrying the 550-man Maizuru SNLF; Kumagawa Maru—carrying 700 labor 
troops and construction equipment)
Seaplane Tender Group
1 Seaplane Tender (Kimikawa Maru—8 E13A1 Type 00s)
1 Destroyer (Shiokaze)
Patrol and Reconnaissance Group (SubRon 1)
(Rear Adm. Shigeaki Yamazaki [flagship I-19])
 SubDiv 2 (I-15, I-17, I-19)
 SubDiv 4 (I-25, I-26)
Sources: Bates, Battle of Midway, pp. 241–43; Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, pp. 80–84; Morison, History of United States 
Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 4, pp. 87–93, 172–74; Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, pp. 450–61.
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extremely rigid. Little if any flexibility was given to subordinate commanders to 
improvise in case the original schedule was for some reason derailed. 
One of the key elements for Japanese success in the Midway operation was time-
ly information on the presence of enemy carriers in the prospective operating area. 
Hence, Yamamoto ordered a second “K operation,” air reconnaissance of Pearl Har-
bor, for N–7 (31/30 May—the first K operation having been flown in early March, 
as described below; see map 6). If the conditions were unfavorable that day the 
operation would be postponed, but if it could not be carried out prior to N–4 (3/2 
June), the entire operation would be canceled.61 Two Kawanishi Type 2 flying boats 
of the 24th Air Flotilla would be used in the K operation. They would take off from 
Wotje and make an intermediate stop at French Frigate Shoals, where they would 
be refueled by three boats of Submarine Division (SubDiv) 13 (part of Submarine 
Squadron [SubRon] 3) in the evening of 30 May (Honolulu time). They would 
fly to Pearl Harbor, reconnoiter, looking for carriers and battleships, and return 
directly to Wotje.62 One submarine would serve as a beacon west of French Frigate 
Shoals; one boat would be stationed south of Hawaii to rescue pilots if necessary; 
and another would report weather conditions.63 On N–5 (2/1 June), it was planned 
to establish three submarine cordons, or screens, off the approaches to Hawaii and 
Midway. Specifically, two cordons of one squadron each would be deployed north-
west and west of Hawaii (and halfway between Hawaii and Midway); another cor-
don, of one squadron, would be deployed farther north, toward the Aleutians. All 
of them would reach their assigned positions by 2/1 June (N–5).64
At 0130 on N–2 (5/4 June) and until N-Day the First Mobile Force would launch 
pre-invasion air strikes on Midway from about 250 miles northwest of the island.65 
The aim would be to destroy enemy air strength, installations, and any surface forces 
nearby. On N–Day (6/5 June) the Seaplane Tender Group would occupy Kure Atoll 
to use it as a seaplane base for direct support of the Midway landing. In the mean-
time, the Transport Group, carrying some five thousand troops, would move to-
ward its objective with its escorts. At dawn on N-Day (7/6 June) the Transport 
Group would put the landing force ashore simultaneously on Eastern Island and 
Sand Island, supported by the Close Support Group of heavy cruisers; the main 
body, Second Fleet, would take a position south and southwest of Midway to screen 
the flank of the landing. It was expected that any major enemy fleet reaction would 
happen after the landing. Hence, on N-Day the Japanese forces would move into 
positions of readiness for a decisive battle. The forces assigned to fight that battle 
were the First Mobile Force, the main body of the Second Fleet, the Main Force’s 
Guard Force (Aleutians Screen), and elements of the submarine force.66 
Combined Fleet planned to use several tactical methods in a decisive battle dur-
ing the Midway operation. Should the enemy force move west of 160° east longi-
tude, it would be attacked first by the cruisers and submarines, with surface combat 
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forces coming up and giving support as the situation warranted. If the enemy ad-
vanced north of 40° north latitude, the attack would be conducted by the Second 
Mobile Force and SubRon 1, supported by the Guard Force. If south of that line, 
the enemy fleet would be attacked by the First Mobile Force and SubRons 3 and 5, 
supported by the main body of the Second Fleet and Main Force of the First Fleet. 
If the enemy advanced in full strength, the Midway and Aleutians forces would 
unite and engage it. In that case, the Guard Force would rejoin the main body, and 
the First and Second Mobile Forces would be combined and put under Nagumo’s 
command.67 Should the enemy advance westward in full force and the entire fleet 
be required, SubRon 1, assigned to the Northern Area Force, would be put under 
the direct command of the submarine force commander.68
The Japanese believed that the attack on Midway would surprise the Americans 
and so felt free to divide their forces as they pleased. In the event, all major forces 
were deployed beyond mutually supporting distances. Yamamoto’s Main Force 
would be deployed about six hundred miles northwest of Midway. The First Mobile 
Fleet would operate some three hundred miles east of the Main Force. The main 
body of the Second Fleet would be deployed south and southwest of Midway and 
some six hundred miles to the north of the First Mobile Force. The Guard Force 
would be located about five hundred miles northward of the Main Force. The Sec-
ond Mobile Force would operate some three hundred miles east of the Guard Force.69 
Missions. The First Mobile Force mission was to destroy the enemy fleet by decisive 
action and provide support to the Midway Occupation Force. The rigid scheduling 
of N-Day and positioning for delivering pre-invasion strikes by the First Mobile 
Force greatly restricted the freedom of action of Nagumo’s force.70 The Main Force 
would provide support to the First Mobile Force. The Guard Force would initially 
support the Aleutians operation. The Midway Occupation Force was divided into 
nine smaller force elements. The Transport Group would land five thousand men 
of the Kure and Yokosuka SNLFs and the army’s Ichiki Detachment, under the 
cover of the Close Support Group.71 The main body would provide distant cover 
to the Transport Group and Close Support Group. The Seaplane Tender Group 
would establish a seaplane base on Kure Atoll. The Minesweeping Group would 
clear mines in the approaches to Midway’s landing beaches.72 
The Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarines) was tasked with conducting 
reconnaissance and destroying enemy surface forces. In the area between Hawaii 
and Midway would be deployed two submarine squadrons and one division.73 
SubRon 3, with eight boats, would patrol along Cordon A (KO line) some 300 nau-
tical miles west of Oahu, Hawaii. SubRon 5, with eight boats, would patrol along 
Cordon B (OTSU line) some 450 nautical miles northwest of Oahu. These subma-
rines were tasked to reconnoiter the approaches to Pearl Harbor between late May 
and 3 June. SubDiv 13, with three boats, was assigned as logistical support for the 
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planned flying-boat mission from French Frigate Shoals (the K operation). Each of 
its boats carried forty tons of aviation gasoline and twelve tons of lubricating oil, 
and their torpedoes had been removed.74 After the completion of the K operation, 
SubDiv 13’s boats would patrol along Cordon C (the HEI line).75 The Japanese plan-
ners envisaged using Midway as an advanced base for their submarines.76
All land-based naval aircraft (of the Base Air Force) in the Central Pacific were 
assigned to the Eleventh Air Fleet, composed of two air flotillas, the 24th and the 
26th. The 24th Air Flotilla was deployed in the Marshalls and on Wake Island. 
With augmentation from the 26th Air Flotilla, it was operationally designated the 
“4th Air Attack Force.” Its commander, Rear Adm. Minoru Maeda, was in charge 
of all naval land-based aircraft in support of the Midway operation. The Chitose 
Air Group became the 1st Air Attack Force; the 1st Air Group became the 2nd Air 
Attack Force, and the 14th Air Group, the 3rd Air Attack Force. The 26th Air Flo-
tilla (less its detachment to the 24th) was in the home islands and on Marcus Island. 
Fighter units from the 25th Air Flotilla were temporarily assigned to the carriers in 
the Midway-Aleutians operation.77 
The 1st Air Attack Force would conduct patrols of the northern section of the 
Marshalls and the Wake Island area. The 2nd Air Attack Force would patrol the 
central part of the Marshalls. The 3rd Air Attack Force would patrol southern sec-
tions of the Marshalls and Gilbert Islands and reconnoiter Howland, Baker, Nauru, 
Ocean, and Ellice Islands. Tender Kamoi Maru would cooperate with the 14th Air 
Group at Imieji and Wotje; one cargo ship would transport supplies and base per-
sonnel of the 14th Air Group. One destroyer would perform screen duties for the 
3rd Air Attack Force and transport aviation supplies and material; one cargo ship 
would transport personnel and supplies as assigned. Detachments of the 1st and 
3rd Air Attack Forces would be deployed to Midway when directed and report to 
the commander of the 6th Air Attack Force there. The 4th Air Attack Force was 
tasked to conduct patrols in the Marshalls, as well as to intercept and destroy ene-
my fleet units and to attack the enemy’s installations on Oahu.78
The Plan for the Aleutians Operation. The Japanese attack on the Aleutians was 
planned as a major secondary and offensive naval/joint operation. Despite some 
claims to the contrary, it was not primarily designed as a feint or meant to draw 
enemy forces away from the sector of main effort—that is, Midway-Hawaii. The ul-
timate objective of the Aleutians operation was operational in its scale. It comprised 
a number of intermediate major and minor tactical objectives (air raids on Dutch 
Harbor, Adak, and Kiska; the capture and destruction of installations on Adak; the 
capture of Attu and Kiska; and so on). The Japanese originally planned to withdraw 
their forces from the western Aleutians in mid-September before the onset of win-
ter.79 The western Aleutians would be of little use as air bases during the greater 
part of the year because of severe weather conditions. Nevertheless, the Combined 
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Fleet’s planners did calculate that their temporary capture would, in addition to its 
primary aim of destroying enemy installations there, protect the northern flank of 
the Japanese thrust toward Midway and act as a diversion that might throw the en-
emy off balance. The Japanese planners also believed that air patrols eastward from 
the home islands would provide warning of enemy movements from the north.80 
The Army-Navy Central Agreement of 5 May stated that the objective of the 
Aleutians operation was to capture or destroy points of “strategic” value in the 
western Aleutians to check the enemy air and ship maneuvers in this area. The 
army and navy, in close cooperation, would invade Attu and Kiska and destroy 
installations and equipment on Adak. The navy would provide “strong” support 
for the invasion forces and at the same time send a carrier unit to raid Dutch Har-
bor, for the main purpose of reducing enemy air strength prior to the landings. 
The overall commander would be the CINC of the Combined Fleet. The com-
mander of the army troops (a single battalion and one engineer company) would 
be commander of the North Sea Detachment. The invasion force would assemble 
at Akkeshi Bay, on Hokkaidō, on or about 23 May. The navy would be responsible 
for the transport and escort of army units from the point of embarkation to the 
assembly point.81
Vice Adm. Boshirō Hosogaya, the CINC of the Fifth Fleet, would take over op-
erational control of the army units immediately after the time of their assembly. 
Should both the army and navy units be engaged in the same area ashore or in 
landing operations, the senior commander of either service would take charge. Op-
erational orders were issued on 12 May, by which forces assigned to the Aleutians 
operation were directed to assemble at Ōminato.82
On 20 May, the Northern Naval Force issued Order No. 24, specifying the ob-
jectives of the Aleutians operation as follows: “(1) destroy the enemy forces and 
military installations at Dutch Harbor and Adak; (2) attack and occupy Kiska and 
Attu so as to restrict and prevent enemy offensive sea and air operations in the 
North Pacific; and (3) to maintain our (Japan’s) offensive policy, detailed plans, and 
alternative plans had to be formulated.” The same order provided details of five 
pre-scripted alternative courses of action for the Japanese forces, depending on the 
conditions at the time of the operation.83 IGHQ had considered occupying Dutch 
Harbor but abandoned the idea because of insufficient shipping.84 Yamamoto made 
in the Aleutians operation the same error he did for Midway, widely dispersing the 
main force elements. For example, the Second Mobile Force would be three hun-
dred miles east of the Guard Force.85
Order No. 24 envisaged a three-“distribution” (phase) operation. In the first 
phase, naval forces would provide cover and support the initial landings, until 
control was turned over to the land forces. Specifically, the Adak-Attu Occupation 
Force would destroy installations on Adak and invade Attu.86 The Kiska Occupation 
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Force would invade that island. The six submarines of SubRon 1 would be respon-
sible for “patrolling, locating, and attacking vital operational areas.” The Toko Air 
Group Detachment (six flying boats and four transports) would locate and attack 
enemy ships.87 The Aleutians operation had the same N-Day as the Midway opera-
tion. The operational idea for the Aleutians operation envisaged that on N–3 (4/3 
June) the Second Mobile Force would carry out a raid against Dutch Harbor aimed 
at making that base inoperable. On N–1 Day (6/5 June) the Second Mobile Force 
would conduct air raids on Adak and Kiska.88 On N–1 Day (6/5 June), the Adak-
Attu Occupation Force would (as originally planned) land on Adak, destroy instal-
lations there, and then withdraw.89 On N-Day (7/6 June), the SNLF would land 
and occupy Kiska. On N+5 (12/11 June) the army North Sea Detachment would 
advance to Attu and occupy the island. 
The Aleutians landings would be supported by the Second Mobile Force, the 
main body of the Fifth Fleet, the Guard Force, and elements of the submarine 
force.90 The Seaplane Tender Group would be deployed to the Kiska area to recon-
noiter the Bering Sea just north of the Aleutians subsequent to the landings. Sub-
marines would scout “strategic areas” of the Aleutians and monitor the entrance 
of the port of Seattle;91 the six boats of SubRon 1 would be deployed there. IGHQ 
made a decision to limit landings in the western Aleutians to Attu and Kiska. Yama-
moto accordingly revised his plans and rescinded the landing on Adak.92
In the second phase of the operation, naval forces would provide support during 
the consolidation phase of the landing in the western Aleutians until such time as 
there was little possibility of the enemy’s counterattack.93 The Adak-Attu Occupa-
tion Force would be dissolved and its surface ships reassigned to the main body, 
Fifth Fleet. Additional forces would be assigned from the forces that had taken part 
in the Midway operation.
In the third phase, the Japanese naval forces would be reorganized for the long-
term defense of the area. The Fifth Fleet would be responsible for defense of the 
occupied areas of the western Aleutians, as well as Midway and the approaches to 
the home islands. The end of the third phase was set for 20 June 1942.94 In addition 
to one heavy cruiser (Nachi), three light cruisers, and seven destroyers, the Fifth 
Fleet would also have four Kongō-class battleships, eight heavy cruisers, and three 
light carriers (Ryūjō, Junyō, and Zuihō), plus the large carrier Shōkaku (its Coral Sea 
damage repaired) and seven additional boats of SubRon 2.95 
Logistical Support. Underway logistical support for the Midway and the Aleutians 
operations would be provided by fleet oilers and supply ships. Each combatant for-
mation would be followed by a group of oilers and supply ships, under the direct 
command of the supported unit’s or group’s commander. The Japanese command-
ers tried to refuel ships at every opportunity. In no case was the fuel on hand to be 
allowed to drop below 60 percent of total capacity. When within striking distance 
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of the enemy, smaller ships were refueled, as was the practice in the U.S. Navy, from 
battleships. For the Midway operation, all ships were loaded with three months’ 
supply of stores, food, and medical supplies, in addition to the normal load of arms 
and ammunition.96 The oilers would be able to provide support for up to one week.97
Deployment Plans. Deployment of the Combined Fleet forces taking part in the 
Midway-Aleutians operation was predicated on the selection of the N-Day. To 
meet an N-Day of 7/6 June, all the forces had to sortie between 26 and 29 May. 
The Northern Area Force would sail from Ōminato, and the Midway Occupation 
Force (except for the main body) from Saipan and Guam in the Marianas. Kondō’s 
main body, Nagumo’s First Mobile Force, and the Main Force under Yamamoto 
would sail out from Hashirajima Anchorage, in the western part of the Inland Sea, 
and head directly to the operating area. The Main Force would split en route into 
two parts: the Guard Force would veer off to the northeast to screen the Aleutians 
operation while its major part under Yamamoto would continue toward Midway.98
Reaction to the Plan. The reactions of subordinate commanders to Yamamoto’s plan 
ranged from enthusiastic support to skepticism. For example, Admiral Hosogaya 
welcomed the operation, because he was eager finally to see some combat. Rear 
Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi, commander of Carrier Division (CarDiv) 2, was enthu-
siastic and one of the staunchest supporters of the plan. In contrast, Kondō and his 
staff had great misgivings. Kondō preferred to attack New Caledonia to cut off lines 
of supplies between the United States and Australia.99 Admiral Tsukahara too was 
disappointed with Yamamoto’s decision. He had expected the next major operation 
to be in the Indian Ocean and already moved his headquarters to Bangkok. (As it 
turned out, his land-based aircraft would play no role in the Midway operation.) 
The only forthright opposition came from the CINC of the Fourth Fleet, Vice Adm. 
Shigeyoshi Inoue. He felt that considering Japan’s limited resources, the capture of 
Midway would dangerously overextend the area to be defended. He bluntly told 
Combined Fleet that the Fourth Fleet would be unable to supply Midway after it 
was captured.100
Future Plans. Yamamoto intended that the majority of forces taking part in the 
Midway operation would thereafter assemble at Truk, on or about 20 June, to pre-
pare for the FS operation, in early July. The Main Force would return to its home 
bases in Japan or proceed to Truk to support the FS operation. The submarine force 
would continue its Hawaiian operations for the time being from its new advance 
base at Midway. The majority of the Northern Area Force would return after the 
Aleutians operation to Ōminato. The Guard Force would return either to Ōminato 
or to Tokyo Bay. It would then be employed to protect transports within the Mid-
way and Aleutians areas and would prepare to counter enemy actions east of the 
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home islands during the next phase of the war. The submarine force would con-
tinue the Aleutians operation.101
Information Available to the Japanese Commanders
In planning the Midway-Aleutians operation, Combined Fleet relied on informa-
tion obtained from radio direction finding (RDF), radio intercepts, scouting by 
land-based aircraft and seaplanes, and exploitation of open sources. The most im-
portant source of radio intercepts for the Japanese was the Owada Mura Com-
munications Unit, at Musashino, which continuously monitored all enemy radio 
transmissions.102 The Japanese were unable to break the Allied codes used in radio 
communications and therefore lacked knowledge of American intentions. 
In late May 1942, the Japanese estimated that in the Hawaiian area there were 
about sixty flying boats, a hundred Army bombers, and two hundred fighters.103 Sur-
face strength was estimated at two or three carriers, two or three “special” (escort) 
carriers, four or five heavy cruisers, three or four light cruisers, some thirty de-
stroyers, and twenty-five submarines.104 These estimates were correct except that no 
battleships were actually present, and only eight cruisers and fourteen destroyers 
were available at the time of battle.105 The Japanese estimated (erroneously) that 
about six “special” carriers had been completed and that about half of them were 
in the Pacific.106
The Japanese assumed that the carriers Hornet and Enterprise were at Pearl Har-
bor. The carrier Ranger was believed definitely to be operating in the Atlantic. The 
carrier Lexington was believed to have been sunk by a Japanese submarine near 
Hawaii in January 1942, but there were reports that it had returned to the U.S. 
west coast and was undergoing repairs.107 (It was actually Saratoga that had been 
attacked; but it had survived and was being repaired in Bremerton.) The Japanese 
were unable to obtain any information on Wasp.108 On 18 May, a search plane of 
the Fourth Fleet (South Seas Force) detected an enemy task force of two carriers 
to the east of the Solomons, a sighting that suggested that Hornet and Enterprise 
had sortied from Pearl Harbor to operate in the southwest Pacific. This report was 
confirmed subsequently by radio intelligence.109
Japanese naval intelligence assessed that Midway was defended by about 750 
Marines and Coast Guardsmen and by AA artillery.110 In contrast, the army believed 
that there were some two thousand Marines and fifty to sixty planes on Midway.111 
The Japanese estimated that in the Midway area the enemy had twenty-four patrol 
aircraft, twelve Army bombers, and twenty fighters and that these numbers could 
be doubled in an emergency. Several patrol boats were assessed to be stationed at 
Midway and a number of submarines operating to the west of the island. The cor-
rect figures for 3 June were one and a half flying-boat squadrons with thirty PBY 
Catalina flying boats, one Marine fighter squadron, twenty-one Army bombers, 
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one Marine dive-bombing squadron (thirty-four planes), twenty-one Army bomb-
ers (four B-26s and seventeen B-17s), and six Navy torpedo bombers.112 The air 
strength on Midway could in fact be rapidly doubled as soon as a Japanese inten-
tion to attack was known.113
The Japanese believed that the enemy flying boats were conducting regular 
day and night patrols over a semicircular area west of Midway out to six hundred 
miles.114 They also assessed that the patrols in the northwestern and northern sec-
tors from Midway were not “strict” (thorough). However, the Japanese erred in this, 
because in fact American patrol aircraft flew daily searches out to seven hundred 
miles and covered also the northern sectors from Midway. The Japanese believed 
that after 29 May the enemy had conducted aerial patrols at Midway, Hawaii, the 
Aleutians, and Palmyra, even in bad weather.115 
The Japanese had neither precise nor reliable information on the Aleutians.116 
Their information on the military topography of the islands was out of date beyond 
the most rudimentary data on terrain. In mid-May the Japanese planned a secret 
seaplane reconnaissance of the area west of Adak. Seaplanes flew from a tender 
(Kimikawa Maru), which was escorted by one light cruiser. The mission was unsuc-
cessful, because of inclement weather; in addition, the only telephotographic recon-
naissance of Kiska attempted was abandoned because of bad weather. The Japanese 
also had only a meager amount of data about the enemy strength in Dutch Harbor.117 
Prior to 26 May, a Japanese submarine conducted reconnaissance of the Attu, 
Adak, and Kiska areas. It reported that there were no enemy ships present or im-
portant installations. On 27 May a report from another Japanese submarine, recon-
noitering the Kodiak area, indicated one enemy heavy cruiser and one destroyer 
entering the harbor. The same submarine also reported the presence of three patrol 
boats and one destroyer at Women’s Bay, some six miles southwest of Kodiak, and 
two patrol boats at Kodiak. On 29 May, a Japanese submarine reported two de-
stroyers, one naval transport or minelayer, and some patrol boats at the entrance 
of Dutch Harbor. On the 30th, a Japanese submarine on its way to its assigned 
patrol area off Seattle sighted naval vessels seven hundred miles west-northwest of 
that city, heading northwest. The Owada Mura Communications Unit detected the 
presence of three to four enemy ships at Kodiak, one believed to be a light cruiser, 
and three to four warships at Dutch Harbor.118
The Japanese believed the enemy had deployed several destroyers, two gun-
boats, and one tender for small flying boats in the Aleutians. They assumed that 
there were extensive military facilities at Dutch Harbor and that military installa-
tions also existed on Adak, Kiska, and Attu.119 The Japanese believed that Dutch 
Harbor was garrisoned by about 4,750 Army troops and 640 sailors.120 They also 
estimated that ground defenses at Dutch Harbor had been recently reinforced 
and that twenty planes had been deployed at Dutch Harbor and Kodiak.121 They 
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estimated that on Attu the enemy had troops (in unknown numbers), a wireless 
station, and a weather reporting station.122 The anchorage on Attu was known to 
be capable of accommodating seaplanes. The Japanese believed that on Adak the 
enemy had only a wireless station. The Bay of Alliance on Adak Island, they noted, 
could accommodate a large number of ships.123 They falsely believed that on Kiska 
the enemy had two to three hundred Marines (in fact, there were only ten unarmed 
men) plus one wireless station and an observation station.124 
Japanese Preparations
By the end of April, the majority of the forces—with the exception of CarDiv 5, 
Zuikaku and Shōkaku, detached for the operation against Port Moresby—that were 
meant to take part in the Midway operation had been concentrated. The main as-
sembly point was Hashirajima Bay.125 
The Combined Fleet did not have sufficient time to make thorough preparations 
for the Midway-Aleutians operation. The First Air Fleet and Second Fleet did not 
return to home waters until 22–23 April 1942. Also, many ships had to be sent on 
a fruitless search for the enemy carrier force that raided Tokyo and other cities on 
18 April. All the ships required much time for maintenance and repairs, and their 
crews needed rest after being at sea for almost five months. By late April, all the 
ships had gone into repair and maintenance periods. The carrier pilots underwent 
training at Kagoshima (Akagi), Kanoya (Kaga), Tomitaka (Hiryū), and Kasanohara 
(Sōryū), while the bomber leaders trained at Iwakuni. 
No major accidents occurred during training. Nagumo stated that inexperi-
enced pilots had barely reached the point where they could make daytime landings 
on their carriers. Even some of the more experienced pilots had lost some of their 
skills. There was no opportunity to exercise together two or more carriers. The 
results of a mock torpedo firing on 18 May were disappointing. There was also in-
sufficient time for training the pilots of dive-bombers. Night-flying skills had been 
greatly reduced by replacement and transfer of personnel. In general, the combat 
effectiveness of each ship was greatly lowered because the need for repairs and 
maintenance left inadequate time for training.126 
In addition, CarDiv 5 would be unavailable for the Midway-Aleutians opera-
tion. This reduced the overall strength of the First Mobile Force to 250 aircraft 
(including twenty-one Zero fighters to be ferried to Midway). Shōkaku arrived in 
Japan heavily damaged on 17 May for repairs that would need at least three months. 
Zuikaku arrived home on 21 May undamaged but with less than 40 percent of its 
aviators; the plan was now to redeploy Zuikaku to Truk to take part in the FS opera-
tion. Nevertheless, Yamamoto insisted that the Midway-Aleutians operation pro-
ceed as scheduled.127
The time for preparation of the Northern Area Force was also inadequate. 
Both light carriers of the Second Mobile Force and their accompanying destroyers 
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required thorough maintenance. In addition, three destroyers assigned to the 
Fifth Fleet returned to Ōminato from the southwest Pacific just one day before the 
scheduled departure for the new operation.128 The shore installations at Akkeshi 
Bay were also unable to handle such a large force, and there were difficulties in 
obtaining adequate supply of oil. Hence, the assembly point was shifted to Mutsu. 
On 9 May, the army’s North Sea Detachment (1,200 men) was formed. It departed 
thirteen days later on board a transport, arriving at Ōminato with one destroyer on 
23 May.129 This detachment and the 3rd SNLF, from Maizuru, were put under com-
mand of Admiral Hosogaya.
On 1 May, the Combined Fleet conducted four days of war games on board 
Yamato to test the feasibility of the plan. The war game, directed by Admiral Ugaki, 
went according to the script. During the game Nagumo’s force was attacked by 
enemy land-based aircraft while his planes were bombarding Midway. It was ruled 
by umpires that Akagi and Kaga had been hit by nine bombs and sunk; Ugaki arbi-
trarily reduced the number of hits to only three, leaving Kaga sunk but Akagi only 
slightly damaged. Even that damage was subsequently made moot when Akagi and 
Kaga reappeared as participants in the follow-on phase of the game, covering New 
Caledonia and the Fiji Islands. The quality of the game suffered also because sev-
eral major tactical commanders and their staffs had not had enough time to study 
the plan for the Midway operation.130 
After the game concluded on 4 May, two additional days were devoted to study 
and briefings on the operation. Various recommendations to improve the plan 
were made but, for the most part, were rejected. For instance, Kondō suggested 
postponing the operation to allow more time for combat training. Ugaki responded 
that this was impossible unless it was put off for an entire month, or there would be 
not enough moonlight for night maneuvering off the invasion beaches.131 
Nonetheless, the war game had revealed many flaws in the plan. Among other 
things, the Combined Fleet’s staff erroneously assumed that the American carriers 
could not reach Midway before it was captured and the Japanese established strong 
air cover. If this condition was not met, disastrous results would follow.132 Another 
problem was inadequate radio communications on the flagship of the First Mo-
bile Force, the carrier Akagi; Yamato had much better communications equip-
ment. Notwithstanding, recommendations that Yamamoto assume direct control 
of Nagumo’s forces were also rejected. Cdr. Minoru Genda (a brilliant officer who 
served on the staff of the First Air Fleet) urged reorganization of the carrier groups. 
Admiral Yamaguchi specifically proposed that the First Mobile Force operate as 
three groups, each consisting of three or four carriers with adequate numbers of 
battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Combined Fleet Headquarters agreed to this 
proposal in principle but had done nothing by the time the Midway operation was 
executed.133
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On 25 May, a final planning conference for the Midway-Aleutians operation was 
held. Nagumo there informed Yamamoto that his force could not sortie on 26 May—
the carriers needed an extra day to complete their preparations. For this reason the 
pre-invasion air strikes were moved from N–3 (4/3 June) to N–2 (5/4 June). Yama-
moto again refused, however, to alter the N-Day or delay the attack on the Aleutians. 
He took a calculated risk that by N–3 the enemy searches from Midway would not 
have reached far enough west to detect Kondō’s Midway Occupation Force.134
The most serious omission in the planning by the Combined Fleet, however, 
was that the senior seagoing commanders—Admiral Nagumo, commander of the 
First Mobile Force, and Admiral Kondō, of the Second Fleet—were not consulted 
at all. The reason was that both fleets were actively engaged in the southern opera-
tions until mid-April, and Yamamoto did not want to divert their attention from 
the tasks on hand.135 This was a serious error on the part of Yamamoto and his chief 
of staff, Ugaki; it meant that neither Nagumo nor Kondō had an opportunity to 
provide early input to the plan they would have to execute.
U.S. Command Organization
Adm. Chester W. Nimitz was Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas 
(CINCPOA)—in modern terms, a theater-strategic commander. As the commander 
of the Northern and Central Pacific Areas (theaters of operations, in modern 
terms), he was also an operational commander. At the time of the battle of Mid-
way, Nimitz was still nominally commander of the Southern Pacific Area, pending 
the arrival of Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, who would arrive on 19 June. As 
the theater commander, Nimitz was in command of all Allied naval, ground, and 
air forces within his area of responsibility and was subordinate to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) in Washington, D.C. In addition, Nimitz was the CINC of the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet (CINCPac), another operational-level command. In that capacity he 
was directly subordinate to Adm. Ernest J. King, who was Commander, United 
States Fleet (COMINCH) / Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Directly subordi-
nate to Nimitz as CINCPac were the commanders of Northwestern and Hawaiian 
Sea Frontiers and of Patrol Wings, Pacific Fleet / Naval Base Air Defense, as well 
as of a number of seagoing task force commanders (CTFs). The headquarters of 
CINCPOA and CINCPac, the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and Patrol Wings, Pacific 
Fleet / Naval Base Air Defense, were on Oahu, as were those of the U.S. Army’s 
commanding general (CG) of the Hawaiian Department and the commander of 
the Seventh Air Force.
What the American Commanders Knew
As in the battle of the Coral Sea in early May, U.S. Navy communications intelli-
gence (COMINT) was the most important source of intelligence on the IJN’s plans 
and movements prior to the execution of the Midway-Aleutians operation. In the 
spring of 1942, the U.S. Navy had within the CNO’s office in Washington, D.C., 
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the Radio Intelligence Section (Op-20G), responsible for integrating all COMINT 
on the IJN and for preparing assessments for Admiral King and other senior com-
manders, including Admiral Nimitz. Also in Washington, in the Office of Naval 
Communications, was a COMINT station code-named NEGAT. In the Pacific 
theater the U.S. Navy operated two COMINT stations, at Pearl Harbor and Mel-
bourne, respectively code-named HYPO and FRUMEL. They provided intelligence 
on the IJN to Admiral Nimitz and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of the 
Southwest Pacific Area, and other high Allied commanders in the theater. Ameri-
can COMINT in the Pacific, however, was handicapped by the loss of the stations 
on Guam and on Corregidor. In addition, the HYPO station was critically short of 
trained operators and analysts, and most of its equipment was obsolete.136
Admirals Nimitz and King were the chief users of the COMINT on the IJN. 
Generally, they were kept current on the whereabouts and pending movements 
of enemy carrier forces. This, in turn, allowed them to deploy U.S. carrier forces 
in a timely way, as the battle of the Coral Sea illustrates. Subordinate task force 
commanders regularly received COMINT from Nimitz. Starting on 17 March, they 
received daily CINCPac Intelligence Bulletins (which replaced CINCPac Combat In-
telligence Bulletins) produced by HYPO. Another series, the Radio Digest, produced 
by the commander of the 14th Naval District (COM 14), was usually sent onward 
by CINCPac almost verbatim, as were the COM 14 COMINT summaries.137 Intelli-
gence officers and cryptanalysts worked together to evaluate the texts of decrypted 
messages; the intelligence officers of the various commands then combined radio 
intelligence with combat intelligence information to produce a balanced estimate. 
Nimitz was fortunate to have the services of two outstanding intelligence pro-
fessionals, Cdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, chief of the HYPO station, and Lt. Cdr. Edwin 
T. Layton, the CINCPac fleet intelligence officer. Layton worked very closely with 
Rochefort in compiling the situation estimates for the CINCPac staff ’s War Plans 
Section. He also briefed Nimitz daily from decrypted intelligence reports, traffic 
intelligence summaries, and any other intelligence sources. Layton had standing 
orders to interrupt Nimitz at any time if he received critical COMINT.138 Each day 
Layton sent the CINCPac Intelligence Bulletin by radio to COMINCH, OpNav (the 
CNO staff), all CINCPac task force commanders, and other high Allied command-
ers in the Pacific and the Indian theaters. 
Rochefort, for his part, was an ideal combination of intelligence office and 
cryptanalyst. However, he was fiercely independent, and that greatly irritated his 
superior at Op-20G in Washington, Capt. John R. Redman. Rochefort’s relation-
ship with Redman was often acrimonious. Redman wanted each analyst to work 
on a specific and narrow topic, leaving the overall assessment to the Op-20G sec-
tion. This was not the way Rochefort worked. During the critical weeks preceding 
the battle of Midway, Rochefort’s deductions of enemy intentions were much more 
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accurate than Op-20G’s. But Redman and his brother, Joseph R. Redman, Deputy 
Director of Naval Communications, wanted to show Admiral King how effectively 
they had reorganized naval intelligence.139
By early 1942 Allied cryptanalysts already had evidence of a possible Japa-
nese intention to extend their defensive perimeter beyond the Wake–Marshalls– 
Gilberts line. On 5/4 March, Vice Admiral Inoue, commanding the Fourth Fleet, 
launched, as noted above, a minor armed reconnaissance over Oahu, known 
as the K operation. As would be planned again in May, the Japanese used four- 
thousand-mile-range Kawanishi Type 2 flying boats from Wotje, in the Marshalls, 
some two thousand miles from Hawaii. They landed on French Frigate Shoals, 
about five hundred miles northwest of Hawaii, refueled from a submarine, and 
flew over Oahu, dropping a few bombs for psychological effect.140 
The first Japanese reference to Midway, as “AF,” in radio messages appeared on 
4 March 1942. (The A of the digraph indicated the American portion of the Japa-
nese geographic-designator system.) On 13 March American cryptanalysts broke 
a major, headquarters-level Japanese code, known as “JN-25,” and CAST on Cor-
regidor definitely identified “AF” as Midway. The digraph appeared again on 17 
and 25 April in messages broken and translated by FRUMEL and NEGAT. Op-20G 
agreed that AF pertained to Midway but only for communications, not geographic, 
purposes. This interpretation would later cause a great deal of confusion between 
Op-20G and the HYPO station.141
As for the North Pacific, as early as March 1942 there were vague indications of 
possible Japanese operations in the Aleutians. For example, in April, the Second Fleet 
asked for charts of the Gulf of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and the Bering Sea.142
In March and April 1942, COMINT provided details of a Japanese redeploy-
ment of land-based air units and equipment for the occupation and subsequent 
defense of Midway from homeland bases to the Mandates. On 11 March, Layton 
and Rochefort wrote that the buildup of the Japanese land-based aircraft in the 
Mandates represented a real threat to the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Central and North 
Pacific. The cryptanalysts warned that the Japanese were planning an attack on 
Midway. However, these warnings were not universally accepted by high naval of-
ficials in Washington, who (erroneously) believed instead that the Japanese might 
attack the U.S. west coast at any time.143
In late April and early May, Nimitz was particularly interested in the where-
abouts and movements of the strongest enemy surface force, Admiral Kondō’s Sec-
ond Fleet. That fleet was involved in the search for Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr.’s 
Task Force (TF) 16 between 18 and 25 April. Shortly after 26 April, the American 
analysts located Second Fleet in the northern area, close to Soviet-controlled waters. 
After the 27th the Second Fleet observed radio silence, and the American analysts 
inferred that it would be employed for further action, “possibly in the Aleutians.”144
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On 2 May, a decrypted message from Rear Adm. Kazutaka Shiraishi, the Second 
Fleet chief of staff, to the 5th Base Air Force (part of the Fourth Fleet) in Saipan re-
vealed the Japanese plan to deploy formations referred to as “A Force” and “Striking 
Force” to Truk for a period of about two weeks after 20 June. The sender requested 
that an anchorage be designated for these forces.145 This message actually pertained 
to the Japanese plan to use their fleet to the southward in the aftermath of the 
Midway operation.146 
By early May, the IJN’s radio communications activity in the vicinity of Japan had 
been perceptibly increased by exercises conducted by various forces preparing for the 
Midway and the Aleutians operations.147 A radio intercept on 4 May provided an indi-
rect clue that the Japanese planned a major offensive. In that message, the commander 
of the First Fleet informed the commander of Battleship Division (BatDiv) 3 that “these 
ships will be undergoing repairs during the time of the said campaign; work has already 
been started on. . . . The date of completion being [about 21 May], will be unable to ac-
company you in this campaign.”148 Another intercepted message contained an undated 
anchorage assignment at Truk for the units of the Midway strike force and the Second 
Fleet. Taken together, these two messages created confusion in Washington and Hawaii. 
NEGAT’s analysis inferred the existence of more than one enemy striking force in the 
Central Pacific; it warned that their rendezvous possibly indicated a second phase of the 
Midway operation, possibly involving an attempt to invade Hawaii.149
On 5 May American analysts intercepted a message from Combined Fleet to Tokyo: 
“For currently scheduled operations expedite delivery of fueling hoses for the follow-
ing units: CruDiv [Cruiser Division] 4, CruDiv 7, DesRon [Destroyer Squadron] 4, 
DesRon [or Destroyer Division (DesDiv)] 8.”150 This message suggested an operation 
that would require underway replenishment. The Japanese were constantly gathering 
weather reports for the northern areas and expressing concern about U.S. Aleutians 
patrols.151
As early as 6 May there were indications that the Japanese were considering opera-
tions in the Hawaiian area.152 A radio intercept that day revealed that the Japanese might 
try another K operation in May. The analysts in Melbourne and Hawaii agreed from the 
outset that the Japanese intended to attempt another seaplane reconnaissance of Oahu. 
HYPO explained that K, or “King,” was an abbreviation for “AK”—the Japanese digraph 
for Pearl Harbor.153
HYPO and FRUMEL reported the pairing of CarDivs 1 and 2 for an exercise in the 
Japanese home waters between 3 and 12 May. Another important piece of evidence 
was the HYPO translation of a message sent on 7 May on the agenda for an air com-
manders’ conference organized by Admiral Nagumo to be held at Kagoshima Bay on 16 
May.154 Among other topics, the conference was to address the battle for air superiority, 
the organization of dive-bombing, torpedo attacks, bombing, and strafing, and meth-
ods for long-range and base reconnaissance.155
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On 8 May, Allied COMINT analysts learned about a message to the First Air 
Fleet saying, “DesDiv will be required at Bako [in the Booko Archipelago, Formosa] 
until 20 May and will be unable to participate in your forthcoming campaign. Please 
arrange for some other suitable shift.” Another message, to DesRon 17, revealed the 
task organization of the First Air Fleet: “In accordance with Commander Striking 
Force Operation Order No. 6 screening destroyers are assigned as follows: DesDiv 
. . . to Akagi; DesDiv . . . to Hiei, Kongō, and Hiryū. Akagi departs Yokosuka 15 May; 
Hiei, Kongō, and Hiryū depart Sasebo 21 May; ComDesDiv. . . . [some of its units 
will screen Hiryū.] In company with . . . depart Yokosuka 17 May, rendezvous with 
three units; rendezvous at place near Yokosuka and on 18 June proceed to Sasebo 
operating offensively against submarines en route.”156 
On 8 May, HYPO broke and translated a message on the basis of which it cor-
rectly associated the First Air Fleet with several Second Fleet elements. The ana-
lysts learned that a new striking force, the First Air Fleet, would be led by Admiral 
Nagumo. It would consist of CarDivs 1 and 2, CruDiv 8, and two battleships of 
BatDiv 3. The other major force was Kondō’s Second Fleet.157 The next day, the 
analysts at Melbourne intercepted and translated Order No. 6 of the First Air Fleet, 
which confirmed beyond a doubt that a new carrier striking force had been cre-
ated. Another radio intercept the same day revealed that a major movement of that 
force would occur on 21 May. Both Rochefort and Layton advised Nimitz that the 
Second Fleet and First Air Fleet were expected to operate in combination at the end 
of May.158
In contrast, Op-20G had little information on then-current Japanese intentions, 
except in connection with the Port Moresby–Solomons operation. In the first week 
of May, radio traffic intercepts indicated that the First, Second, and Fifth Fleets 
might be involved in the new operation. However, the Washington office was in the 
dark about the pending operation’s objectives, precise times, or force composition.159
On 13 May, the Japanese mentioned for the first time the objective of the forth-
coming “campaign” (major operation) in a message from an unidentified source to 
chiefs of staff of the Combined Fleet, Second and Fourth Fleets, and the Eleventh 
Air Fleet: “the PS [Saipan] . . . force which is concerned in the occupation of MI 
[later identified as Midway] scheduled to hold an operation conference on the 26th 
and to depart on the 27th; therefore the No. 5 Shima Maru and the . . . should ar-
rive PS [Saipan] by 1200 26th.” The American COMINT analysts were unable to 
comment on this message until 20 May. Yet they were aware on 15 May what the 
Japanese objectives would be.160 
On 13 May, the American cryptanalysts decoded two radio messages that pro-
vided significant clues about Japanese intentions. In one, a ship requested eight 
charts to be sent to Saipan and held for it. Op-20G quickly identified seven out 
of the eight charts—all of them were for the Hawaiian Islands area.161 The second 
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message directed a freighter, Gosha Maru, to load fuel hoses at Imieji and proceed 
to Saipan. The same message also ordered an air unit to embark its base equip-
ment and ground crews and advance toward “AF” (Midway).162 In addition, and 
on the same day, Allied analysts at Hawaii and Melbourne decoded Second Fleet’s 
Operation Order No. 22, which indicated an interest in the Marianas and also out-
lined control of units of the Eleventh Air Fleet then being deployed to the Saipan-
Guam area preparatory to the forthcoming “campaign.” These messages provided 
strong indications that the future offensive would involve Midway and thereby 
reduced concern that the Japanese might attack the West Coast.163
Also on 13 May, Nimitz, on the basis of information obtained by COMINT, 
directed the commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier to establish surface patrols 
of the French Frigate Shoals. For this reason the second Japanese K operation, 
planned, as noted above, for the end of the month, would be canceled.164
On 14 May, a radio intercept provided more details about the force composi-
tion and objectives of the pending Japanese offensive in the eastern part of the 
Central Pacific. Analysts commented that preparations were being made for of-
fensive operations by a force similar to the one that had attacked Pearl Harbor: 
BatDiv 3, with three or four battleships; CarDivs 1 and 2, with three or four, but 
possibly five, carriers, plus eight destroyers; CruDivs 4 and 8, with four heavy 
cruisers; and DesRon 1, with one light cruiser and twelve destroyers. They also 
noted that the carrier aircraft from at least two carriers (Kaga and Sōryū) and 
probably destroyers were then conducting gunnery exercises in the Sea of Japan.165 
On 14 May, on the basis of COMINT, Admiral King issued an estimate of the 
situation considerably different from one he had issued on the 12th. As he had 
in March after the Japanese K operation, he directed Nimitz to declare a state of 
“Fleet Opposed Invasion.” King postulated that the enemy had four options: 
• Attack the Midway–Oahu line in force in the first week of June
• Simultaneously attack the Aleutians chain
• Capture Ocean and Nauru Islands on about 17 May
• Reinforce New Britain / New Guinea and strike southeastward anytime 
between 25 May and 15 June.166 
On 14 May, Nimitz duly declared a state of “Fleet Opposed Invasion” for Ha-
waii and Midway. This order gave Nimitz full control of all military and naval 
forces in the area. However, Gen. Delos C. Emmons, CG of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, challenged Nimitz’s decision to defend Midway, although he was privy to all 
Nimitz’s intelligence. On 25 May he warned Nimitz not to give too much credence 
to reports of Japanese intentions and advised him to rely instead on the enemy’s 
capabilities. (After the battle of Midway, Emmons would apologize to Nimitz.)167
On 15 May, intercepted Japanese messages indicated a concentration of en-
emy forces in the Saipan area, primarily seaplane tenders. The Kawanishi Type 
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97 flying boats based at Imieji, an intercept suggested, might launch long-range 
attacks on the Hawaiian Islands. In another, DesRon 1 showed interest in fu-
eling arrangements for motorboats in connection with an occupation in the 
Alaska-Aleutians area; that force would depart from a port in northern Japan 
after topping off fuel at Ōminato.168 U.S. Navy radio intelligence reported that 
CINC, Second Fleet had lately been associated with CarDivs 1 and 2, BatDiv 3, 
and numerous destroyer units, “Marus” (freighters), and auxiliaries, suggesting 
that these might constitute a force meant to strike to the southward or toward 
Hawaii. This warning was given three weeks before the battle of Midway.169 
On 16 May, radio intercepts revealed that a strong task force in Japanese 
waters was preparing for offensive operations, possibly in the North Pacific. 
They also showed that two weather observation ships (freighters) were in the 
vicinity of Wake and two others east of the Marshalls. Air searches from Japan 
extended out to six hundred miles. Some thirty heavy bombers had arrived in 
Japan from the East Indies. There were indications that Air Squadron (AirRon) 
22, last reported in the Singapore–Indian Ocean area, might return to Japan to 
join the 1st Air Attack Force in operations with the Fifth Fleet. Intelligence re-
ports indicated that submarine operations in northern waters would increase.170
By 16 May, Op-20G and the COMINCH’s War Plans staff, under Rear Adm. 
R. K. Turner, believed that a strong enemy force that was to deploy from Ja-
pan in the last week of May 1942 was related to an offensive against northeast 
Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji starting between 15 and 20 June. A mes-
sage from King’s headquarters on 15 May, however, shows that his staff did 
not ignore Midway as a possible Japanese objective. The same message also 
incorrectly reported the existence of a second strike force, by associating a force 
assembling in Saipan and scheduled to leave on 24 May with the carrier ele-
ment of the Northern Strike Force (actually the Northern Area Force). Op-20G 
believed that the objective of that force was possibly to eliminate Midway or 
divert U.S. forces from the South Pacific and from Alaska. The same message 
also suggested that Howland and Baker Islands, rather than Ocean and Nauru, 
might be the enemy objective.171
On 16 May, NEGAT mistakenly warned the War Plans staff in Washington 
that the “K campaign” would be a large-scale attack on Hawaii. Nimitz gen-
erally agreed instead with the intelligence analysts at Hawaii and Melbourne. 
In his estimate of the situation the same day, Nimitz stated that the Japanese 
would attack Midway and raid Oahu in the first part of June. He also speculated 
that the enemy bombing of Oahu, using seaplanes, might be delayed until the 
full moon at the end of the month (he probably meant the end of May). Nimitz 
also believed that “unless the enemy is using radio deception on a grand scale, 
we have a fairly good idea of his intentions.”172
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On 17 May, the COMINT analysts learned that two strong task forces were being 
formed in northern waters, comprising BatDivs 1 and 2 (six battleships); CarDiv 
3, with two carriers plus possibly one or two auxiliary carriers, with plane guards 
(destroyers); CruDivs 4 and 7, with four to six heavy cruisers; and DesRon 1, with 
one light cruiser and twelve destroyers. The indications were that all or most of 
these units would depart Japan after topping off fuel at Ōminato. In fact, the CINC 
of the Fifth Fleet had originated a movement report that included CarDiv 3, and 
there were indications that BatDivs 1 and 2 had already departed Kure.173 The same 
day, radio intercepts revealed that the Japanese would commit to the forthcoming 
offensive five large carriers (Kaga, Akagi, Sōryū, Hiryū, and Zuikaku) and one light 
carrier (Junyō). From another message it was learned that submarines “prior . . . will 
be [positioned] 150 miles more or less east of A1 [probably a garble for AF1].”174 On 
17 and 18 May, radio traffic analysts produced several associations of enemy units 
that indicated the makeup of the Aleutian forces.175
On 18 May, radio intercepts revealed that about thirty land-based fighters of 
the 6th Air Group would be loaded on the 22nd on board the carriers of CarDivs 1 
and 2 and then ferried to Midway.176 More details were learned the same day about 
the readiness and pending movements of the enemy forces. BatDivs 2 and 3 were 
believed to be ready to sail soon from Kure. CarDiv 3 was believed to be ready 
for combat. Ōminato was indicated as a possible departure point for operations in 
northern waters. CruDiv 4 was believed to be ready to sail. The status of CruDiv 
7 was uncertain. DesRon 1 was believed to be departing Sasebo between 13 and 
23 May. One of its divisions was reported en route north with CruDiv 5. The Fifth 
Fleet appeared to be closely connected with the operations in hand. BatDiv 3 of 
the Second Fleet, with the possible exception of the battleship Kirishima, would be 
ready on 21 May. The carrier Kaga of CarDiv 1 was now ready and believed actively 
engaged in rehearsals with a target ship. Akagi was reported to have departed Yoko-
suka 15 May and probably had already joined Kaga. Sōryū, of CarDiv 2, was ready 
to sail, and Hiryū was scheduled to sortie from Sasebo on 20 or 21 May. All the car-
riers had embarked their planes, with the exception of Hiryū. There were some in-
dications that CruDiv 8 had moved to the Mandates. DesRon 2 was believed ready, 
except that one division might be escorting Shōkaku to home port; this squadron 
would, it was believed, take part in the Midway operation.177
On 19 May, the COMINT analysts obtained further details about the move-
ments of forces assigned to the Midway-Aleutians operation. It was revealed that 
CruDiv 7 would probably operate in the Second Fleet area instead of the First 
Fleet area and that CruDiv 5 might be included in the operations of the Fifth Fleet. 
SubRon 1 and shore-based aircraft of the 6th Air Attack Force would be probably 
employed in conjunction with the Fifth Fleet; AirRon 23 was expected to oper-
ate these aircraft. A new unit, DesRon 17, and land-based aircraft of the 14th and 
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Chitose Air Groups would probably operate with the Second Fleet. CruDiv 4, as-
signed to the Aleutians operation, would arrive at Kure on 19 May and would not 
reach northern Japan until 25 May. CruDiv 5 was scheduled to arrive at Yokosuka 
on 22 May. Armed merchant ships of the Fifth Fleet would be employed as patrol 
vessels in the Aleutians.178
A message decoded on 19 May revealed that CarDivs 1 and 2 would attack Mid-
way for a period of two days (N–2 to N-Day) prior to the landing attempt, from 
a position probably to the northwest of the island. The carrier force commander 
asked to receive weather reports three hours prior to takeoff on the first day of said 
period. On the day of the landing the carrier force would try to reach a point fifty 
miles northwest of Midway before launching its planes as quickly as possible.179
The NEGAT station continued to believe that “AF” was a communications, not 
geographic, designator. In contrast, Rochefort and Layton were still firmly (and 
correctly) convinced that “AF” pertained to Midway. They had recovered some A 
designators that equated to the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, so they 
assumed that AF was in the same general area.180 Some analysts in Op-20G argued 
that “AF” referred to Samoa, some believed that it was a geographic designator for 
Hawaii, and others thought that the U.S. west coast would be the next target.181 For 
this reason Rochefort and Layton dreamed up a scheme to trick the Japanese into 
revealing the true meaning of the AF designator—sending a fake radio message 
in plain English stating that the distillation plant on the atoll had broken down (a 
serious matter, because Midway had no other source of freshwater). Layton ap-
proached Nimitz, who alone had authority to endorse a deception effort. Nimitz 
agreed to the plan.182 Hence, a message was sent on 18 or 19 May via the cable 
from Honolulu to the commander of the naval base on Midway instructing him to 
send an unencoded message to COM 14 stating, in effect, that his distillation plant 
had suffered a serious casualty and that freshwater was urgently needed; COM 14 
would reply, again not in code, that “water barges would be sent, under tow, soon-
est.” Japanese intelligence would pick up the messages and disseminate them in the 
daily intelligence reports; these would, in turn, be intercepted by Op-20G, which 
would determine whether a water situation at Midway was mentioned.183 
On 22 May, the FRUMEL station published the following translation: “KIMIHI 
(Naval Intelligence Tokyo)—The AF (Midway) air unit sent following radio mes-
sage to Comdt 14th [Naval] District: ‘AK’ on 20th. ‘Refer this unit’s report dated 
19th, at the present time we have only enough water for two weeks. Please supply 
us immediately.’ Note [by FRUMEL]: Have requested 14th District check this mes-
sage—if authentic it will confirm identity ‘AF’ as Midway.”184 This message ended all 
controversy about the true meaning of the AF digraph.
On 20 May, the radio intercepts revealed exercises involving two fleets south of 
Japan’s home islands; “Fleet B,” commanded by the CINC of the Combined Fleet, 
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simulated the U.S. Pacific Fleet, while “Fleet A,” under the CINC of the Second 
Fleet, represented the Combined Fleet. The scenario for the exercise was the attack 
on Midway (the Bonin Islands represented Midway). The exercise was conducted 
on 20–22 May.185 On 20 May, Nimitz learned that the Midway Occupation Force 
could sortie from Saipan on 27 May. By estimating its sailing time, he concluded 
that the enemy force would reach Midway on 1 June. 
Another message the same day revealed that the Japanese had changed the AF 
designator to MI (for Midway). By then the American analysts had pieced together 
all the essential elements of the pending Japanese offensive. Nimitz was well aware 
that the Japanese would employ almost their entire Combined Fleet and that he 
would need everything he had to counter their attack.186
In the last week of May, the Japanese radio activity was greatly increased because 
of the intense preparations for the forthcoming operation. COMINT analysts re-
ceived a large number of messages on the composition of various elements of the 
Combined Fleet and their pending movements. This information was confirmed 
by the appearance of new tactical call signs and by exercise radio traffic that indi-
cated impending movements of forces. This prompted Nimitz to speed up prepara-
tions of the Pacific Fleet. The reported movements of enemy ships toward Ōminato 
clearly indicated the assembly of the Northern Force; for this reason Nimitz 
activated Task Force 8. The movements of the enemy Transport Group for Midway 
led Nimitz to issue a series of situation estimates (on 20, 22, 23, and 27 May).187 
On 21 May, Allied radio intercepts revealed that the commanders of certain 
forces, believed to be principally seaplane tenders in the Saipan area, would hold a 
conference on 26 May and that their forces would depart the next day. Their exact 
mission was unknown, but fragmentary evidence indicated that it was related to 
deployment of land-based aircraft on Midway after the island was captured.188 Al-
lied analysts also deciphered an outline of the organization of the enemy forces for 
the pending operation against the Aleutians. Ōminato was identified as the main 
base for the forces operating in the northern area.189
On 22 May, British intelligence sent a message to the U.S. Navy providing details 
on the composition of Japanese forces for the pending Midway operation. However, 
the British had no evidence that the Japanese planned to employ their Northern 
Area Force against the Aleutians.190
Nimitz had great confidence in the judgment of his intelligence advisers. He also 
was confident that he had made sound decisions based on the information received 
through COMINT. At the same time, he was very much concerned about his own 
force’s operations security. On 22 May he sent a message to Admirals Halsey (CTF 
16) and Frank Jack Fletcher (CTF 17) ordering them to maintain strict radio silence 
at all times, especially among aircraft about to land; frequent reports showed that 
Japanese COMINT was monitoring air-ground chatter in and out of Pearl Harbor. 
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He also warned General MacArthur that enemy radio intelligence stations were in-
tercepting air-to-ground radio messages between Port Moresby and Allied aircraft. 
MacArthur immediately changed the codes.191
On 23 May, radio intercepts suggested that the carrier Zuikaku was expected to 
have all its replacement aircraft on board by the 28th. It was suspected that Zuikaku 
would be assigned to the Northern Area Force. The Fifth Fleet was concentrat-
ing in the Ōminato-Kurils area. All or part of AirRon 22 was expected to operate 
from Paramushiro in connection with the shore-based aircraft of the 1st Air Attack 
Force.192
On 24 May, Allied analysts assessed that Saipan had apparently been designated 
the assembly point for the task force assigned to attack Midway. Some units of this 
force were already at Saipan, but many of its major elements were still near Japan. 
At least two battleships of BatDiv 3, possibly all four, were at Ariake Bay, in south-
eastern Kyūshū. CarDivs 1 and 2 were either in “Empire waters” (Inland Sea) or in 
the vicinity of the Bonins. CruDiv 7 was en route to Saipan. Analysts also noted an 
increase in weather reports from the Mandates area. The enemy intelligence was 
showing increased interest in the patrols by U.S. aircraft in the Hawaii area. All 
available information indicated that attack on and occupation of Midway was the 
objective of the force being assembled at Saipan. However, Allied attention was also 
given to the fact that a force based at Saipan could move with almost equal ease in 
the direction of Australia.193
On 24 May, the Allied analysts obtained more details on the forthcoming 
Aleutians operation. Radio intercepts indicated that assembly of naval forces at 
Ōminato for offensive operations was almost complete; a few light units and auxil-
iaries were still en route from the Yokosuka area. It was believed that the CINC of 
the Fifth Fleet, on board the heavy cruiser Nachi, would be in general command of 
the northern operations. It was indicated that the movement northward would be 
initiated on 27 May, although the carrier striking force might not leave Ōminato 
until later.194
On 25 May, U.S. COMINT concluded that the Japanese attack on Midway would 
definitely take place on 4 June, while the attack on the Aleutians would start on 3 
June. This assessment was the result of cross-referencing by all three COMINT 
stations in the Pacific theater.195 Despite objections from his own staff, Nimitz ac-
cepted Layton’s analysis and decided to base his final timetable on these dates.196 
Over the next few days the COMINT stations decoded and interpreted numer-
ous messages that gave the American commanders detailed and accurate knowl-
edge of the composition and pending movements of all the Japanese forces in-
volved.197 For example, on 26 May, Allied COMINT obtained more details on the 
Northern Area Force. In the Ōminato-Kurils area were assembled the CINC of the 
Fifth Fleet (with the flagship heavy cruiser Nachi); CarDiv 3, with one large carrier 
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and one or two auxiliary carriers; CruDiv 4, with two heavy cruisers; DesRon 1, 
with one light cruiser and twelve submarines; SubRon 1, with one tender and eight 
to ten submarines; fifteen armed merchantmen; one or two seaplane tenders; and 
the 6th Air Attack Force, with about thirty heavy bombers. This force was expect-
ed to depart Ōminato by 27 May and conduct offensive operations in the eastern 
Aleutians. It would probably proceed northeastward in waters adjacent to the Ku-
rils. Land-based aircraft, probably on Paramushiro, were expected to provide an 
air patrol and possibly eventually to transfer to a base that had been occupied. Pos-
sible additions to the Fifth Fleet were Zuikaku, plus plane guards, and CruDiv 5, 
with two heavy cruisers.198
Bad news came on 27 May, when the Japanese introduced a new cipher, called 
“Baker 9” by the American analysts. This rendered unreadable almost all Japanese 
messages intercepted until 5 June. However, the analysts at HYPO were able with the 
aid of RDF to obtain some information on Japanese movements, including those of 
the carrier forces taking part in the Midway and Aleutians operation. Some enemy 
messages continued to be sent in the earlier code (“Baker 8”); these were intercepted 
and read, and they proved to be still valuable in discerning Japanese intentions.199
U.S. Preparations and Plans
The American high naval officials in Washington and Hawaii realized that the 
Japanese would not long remain inactive after their setback in the Port Moresby– 
Solomons operation, known in the United States as the battle of the Coral Sea, in 
early May. Preparations and planning for defense of Midway and Hawaii had been 
made, on the basis of the excellent intelligence available to Admirals Nimitz and 
King and other Navy and Army commanders.
Nimitz’s 14 May declaration of a state of “Fleet Opposed Invasion” assigned the 
Navy principal responsibility for repelling that invasion. Yet the Army would have 
overall control over all naval local defense forces specifically assigned by CINCPac, 
as well as all Army forces, except for air units allocated by defense commanders to the 
Hawaiian Sea Frontier for operations over the sea. Nimitz assigned the commander 
of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier responsibility for the defense of Midway itself.200
In mid-May, King and Nimitz had different views about the real objective of 
the pending Japanese offensive. On the basis of the recommendations of his intel-
ligence advisers, King was convinced that the Japanese planned a new advance in 
the southern Pacific.201 After the battle of the Coral Sea, King became unwilling to 
risk the remaining U.S. carriers. He even suggested to Nimitz that carrier aircraft be 
flown ashore to augment land-based aircraft, “in order to preserve our carriers.”202 
In contrast, Nimitz argued that carriers should retain their aircraft and be used as a 
mobile reserve. Nimitz was also convinced that the Japanese planned a new offen-
sive in the Central Pacific; he wanted freedom to move his carriers as the situation 
required. Yet in April King ordered Nimitz to keep at least two carriers in the South 
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Pacific. For this reason Halsey’s TF 16 was sent south after the Doolittle Raid on 
18 April. Nimitz became very concerned that he might not be able to timely con-
centrate his carriers in the Central Pacific. Because of the long distances involved, 
Nimitz required a definite decision; he pressed King on 14 May to reconsider his 
order to keep two carrier groups in the south. 
King procrastinated, not being as certain as Nimitz was that the next Japanese 
move would be against Midway.203 On the 16th, Nimitz decided on his own to recall 
Halsey and so informed King. Nimitz calculated that King’s silence would implicit-
ly endorse his decision; if King disagreed, he would reverse it. In a carefully phrased 
message on 16 May, Nimitz repeated his argument that King’s intelligence analysts 
should reassess their views on the next enemy move in the Pacific. He reassured 
King that Halsey would return to the South Pacific if new information indicated 
that the Japanese offensive would be in that area. After a further discussion with his 
intelligence advisers, who finally concluded that Midway and not the South Pacific 
would be the next target, King changed his mind. On the 17th he sent Nimitz a 
message that he agreed with his decision.204 
On 18 May, Nimitz redirected submarines to patrol an area some fifty miles 
northwest of Midway.205 On the 21st he established, as noted above, TF 8, under 
Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald. He directed Theobald to oppose the enemy ad-
vance into the Alaska-Aleutians area. Theobald was to coordinate with the Army 
forces in Alaska (other than the Air Force Alaska Defense Command, under Gen. 
Simon Bolivar Buckner). The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that Commander of 
the Eleventh Air Force (established on 15 January 1942—formerly the Alaskan Air 
Force, established on 28 December 1941) Gen. William O. Butler would command 
all U.S. Army and Navy air units in Alaska and would report directly to Theobald.206 
As has been seen, the preparations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet for the forthcoming de-
fense of Midway/Hawaii and the Aleutians greatly accelerated when Nimitz learned 
from radio intercepts the precise dates of the planned Japanese attack. On 26 May, 
Halsey’s TF 16 returned to Pearl Harbor and immediately began preparations for 
the battle. CINCPac Intelligence Bulletin No. 72 on 26 May informed task force com-
manders, including Admiral Theobald, that the Japanese northern force had begun 
to depart from Ōminato. COM 14 published an assessment the same day that all 
enemy carriers were at sea.207 
On 30 May, Nimitz informed CG of the Hawaiian Department and Com-
mander, Patrol Wing Two that Commander, Naval Base Air Defense had author-
ity to order Army bombers on missions, including basing them on Midway. Com-
mander, Task Force 9, who was also Commander, Patrol Wings, Pacific, now had 
operational control of all Navy reconnaissance planes except those on Midway 
and Johnston Islands and over specifically assigned Army bombers based on Oahu, 
including the Seventh Bomber Command.208
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Upon the arrival of TF 16 Nimitz received the bad news that Halsey had fallen 
very ill and had to be hospitalized. He had counted on Halsey, as the most ex-
perienced and aggressive carrier admiral, to be in charge of all carriers for the 
forthcoming operation. Halsey’s logical replacement would be Rear Adm. Leigh 
Noyes. However, Halsey insisted, to Nimitz’s surprise, that Rear Adm. Raymond 
A. Spruance, his cruiser group commander, replace him instead. Spruance was in 
Halsey’s view the only flag officer to whom he could entrust command of two car-
riers. Halsey recommended that Spruance retain Halsey’s entire staff, except for 
the flag aide. Nimitz did not know Spruance personally but had heard of his su-
perb reputation as a strategist. Spruance was also known to be calm and to ponder 
deeply before making a decision. Nimitz agreed with Halsey’s recommendation, 
and Spruance became the new CTF 16.209 
Spruance’s chief of staff was Capt. Miles R. Browning, who had served under 
Halsey. Browning was an experienced aviator but was very unpopular among the 
aviators, because of his bad temper. He was emotionally unstable, often angry and 
excited, and (when off duty ashore) drank too much. Browning was also a poor 
administrator.210
Fletcher and his TF 17 with damaged Yorktown arrived at Pearl Harbor in the 
afternoon of 27 May. The damage to Yorktown was so extensive that it was estimated 
that at least several weeks would be required to make it ready for operations.211 Some 
estimates were that repairs would take ninety days. But Nimitz wanted York town to 
be ready for combat in forty-eight to sixty hours;212 Nimitz directed the navy yard to 
complete the necessary repairs by 30 May.213 After extraordinary efforts, Yorktown 
was ready for sea as Nimitz requested.214
Theobald arrived in the Aleutians on 27 May. The state of “Fleet Opposed In-
vasion” gave Theobald command over all U.S. forces in the Alaska-Aleutians 
theater.215 He was informed that American intelligence believed that the enemy forces 
for the Aleutians included one group destined for Kiska and another possibly for 
Attu. Nimitz also alerted Theobald that enemy heavy bombers would be based on 
Paramushiro. Yet Theobald did not believe the intelligence, provided by both the Ha-
waii and Melbourne COMINT centers. He decided to deploy his forces about four 
hundred miles south of Kodiak to prevent the enemy from getting between him and 
the eastern Aleutians and Alaska.216 That unsound decision would render Theobald’s 
forces unable to prevent the subsequent Japanese occupations of Kiska and Attu.
Nimitz issued his Operation Plan 29-42 on 27 May 1942. The plan, only about ten 
pages long, reflected the command style of King and some other admirals—it told 
subordinates what needed to be done, gave them the necessary resources, provided as 
much information on the enemy as possible, and then let them alone to accomplish 
their assigned missions. (King was known to dress down commanders for oversuper-
vising subordinates with excessively complex and detailed directives.)217 
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Nimitz stated in Operation Plan 29-42 that the enemy was expected to attempt to 
capture Midway in the near future, employing a force of two to four battleships, four 
to five carriers, eight to nine heavy cruisers, sixteen to twenty-four destroyers, and 
eight to twelve submarines, plus a landing force with seaplane tenders. The attack on 
Midway might be preceded or followed by an attack on Oahu.218 He estimated that the 
enemy action would be a full-scale attack, aimed at the quick occupation of Midway 
for use against the Hawaiian area. The enemy operation could start as soon as 30 May. 
From the COMINT reports Nimitz believed that the enemy would conduct a 
preliminary reconnaissance by submarines, then a high-speed approach by car-
riers; a preliminary attack by carrier aircraft would begin at daylight or during 
moonlight and continue for about two days, or until defending air forces had been 
eliminated. He estimated that for this purpose one or more enemy carriers might 
closely approach the island in daylight, from a northwesterly direction. The attack 
on Midway would be very intense, so as to prevent the island from refueling and 
rearming aircraft—a task that might be complicated at night by gunnery bombard-
ments. The attacking enemy carriers would be shielded from attack. The enemy 
would probably carry out the landing on Midway at night and, if it were success-
ful, would bring in aircraft, motor torpedo boats (MTBs), and base equipment. 
The enemy would concentrate submarines in the vicinity of Midway and some two 
hundred miles west of Oahu. If the U.S. carriers were detected early in the opera-
tion, they would become the primary attack objective of the Japanese carriers.219
Nimitz considered employing Task Force 1, based at San Francisco, in the pend-
ing operation but decided against it. TF 1 did not have an adequate force of destroy-
ers and cruisers to protect against surface forces and aircraft. Nimitz also did not 
want to reduce the screen for the carrier forces.220 Yet for some reason he decided 
to assign five cruisers and four destroyers to the North Pacific Force (TF 8).221 (This 
decision was perhaps unsound, because it was far more critical to strengthen the 
defenses of the carrier striking forces—the U.S. operational center of gravity—than 
those of the Aleutians. Nimitz was well aware of the large force the Japanese had 
assigned in the north. He simply lacked sufficient combat strength to match the 
Japanese superiority in carriers, battleships, and other large surface combatants in 
the Aleutians area.)
Nimitz intended to employ only forces with long-range striking power. A fast 
carrier striking force would comprise three carriers (Enterprise, Hornet, and York-
town) and provisionally a fourth (Saratoga), from TF 11 (then in San Diego, under 
Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch) if it arrived in time. Nimitz’s intent was to use long-
range search aircraft to detect the enemy early and then to attack it with his carrier 
striking force. All available submarines would be stationed along the approaches 
to Midway and Oahu, both to detect the approaching enemy and support the car-
rier striking force in case of withdrawal. Nimitz planned to have on Midway the 
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maximum number of land-based aircraft that could be accommodated. Additional 
ground forces would be provided for the garrison, plus more gun batteries and 
mechanized equipment, MTBs, and patrol craft. Nimitz decided to position his 
carrier striking force northeast of Midway and thereby occupy a flanking posi-
tion against enemy forces coming from the northwest.222 Also, this position was 
favorable for intercepting the Japanese forces approaching either Midway or the 
Aleutians. This was based on the timely and accurate communications intelligence 
he had obtained by the COMINT.
Nimitz organized his forces (see sidebar 2) into the Striking Force (TF 16 and 
TF 17), TF 1 (Battleships), TF 7 (Submarine Force), TF 9 (Patrol Wings, Pacific / 
Naval Air Base Defense Force), the Hawaiian Sea Frontier Forces, and TF 8 
(North Pacific Force). The Striking Force, under Fletcher, consisted of two carri-
er task forces, TF 17 (under Fletcher) and TF 16 (under Spruance). Nimitz stated 
in his operation plan that the availability of TF 17 as a unit would depend on the 
condition of Yorktown (then undergoing repairs). If Yorktown were not available, 
instructions would be issued regarding the employment of the remainder of the 
task force.223 
Nimitz directed the Striking Force to hold Midway and “inflict maximum 
damage on enemy by employing strong attrition tactics.”224 He wrote, “We must 
endeavor to reduce his forces by attrition-submarine attacks, air bombing, attack 
on isolated units. . . . If attrition is successful the enemy must accept failure of his 
venture or risk battle on disadvantageous terms for him.”225 
This emphasis on “attrition” was reportedly a result of direction by Admiral 
King. The term was poorly chosen; what Nimitz really described was the employ-
ment of diverse combat arms, or “combined-arms tactics,” not force-on-force or 
attritional tactics. Normally, an inferior force should avoid attrition as a tactic 
when confronting a much stronger enemy, because it lacks a margin of numerical 
strength ultimately to prevail. In a separate letter of instruction to Fletcher and 
Spruance Nimitz wrote, “In carrying out the task assigned in op plan 29-42 you 
will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to 
mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy force 
without prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the 
enemy.”226 They were also directed not to “accept such decisive action as would be 
likely to incur heavy losses in our carriers and cruisers.”227 
The Striking Force would take up its position northeast of Midway on 30 May. 
The intent would be to obtain initial advantage against the enemy carriers attack-
ing the island. TF 16 would depart from Pearl Harbor on 28 May; other forces 
would join TF 16 as directed by Nimitz. Oilers would depart in company with 
TF 16 and “operate as ordered by senior Striking Force commander in area of 
Continued on page 126
 THE MIDWAY-ALEUTIANS OPERATION, 25 MAY–14 JUNE 1942 125 124 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
U.S. Task Organization
Striking Force: Rear Adm. Frank J. Fletcher
Task Force 17 (Rear Adm. Fletcher)
TG 17.5 (Carrier Group) 
 Yorktown (27 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters, 19 SBD-3 bombers, 18 SBD-3 bombers, 15 TBD-1 
Devastator torpedo bombers)
TG 17.2 (Cruiser Group, Rear Adm. William W. Smith)
 Astoria 
 Portland 
TG 17.4 (Destroyer Screen, Capt. Gilbert C. Hoover, Commander, DesRon 2)
 DesRon 5 (Hammann, Hughes, Morris, Anderson, Russell)
 DesDiv 22 (Gwin, en route to TF 16, joined TF 17 on 5 June 1942)
Task Force 16 (Rear Adm. Raymond A. Spruance)
TG 16.5 (Carrier Group) 
 Enterprise (27 F4F-4s, 18 SBD-3 observation planes, 19 SBD-2/-3 bombers, 14 TBD-1s)
 Hornet (27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 16 SBD-3 observation planes, 19 SBD-3 bombers, 18 TBD-1 torpedo 
bombers)
TG 16.2 (Cruiser Group, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid)
 New Orleans, Minneapolis, Vincennes, Northampton, Pensacola, Atlanta 
TG 16.4 (Destroyer Screen, Capt. Alexander R. Early, Commander, DesRon 1)
 DesRon 1 (Phelps, Worden, Monaghan, Alywin)
 DesRon 6 (Balch, Conyngham, Benham, Ellet, Maury)
Oiler Group
2 Oilers (Cimarron, Platte)
2 Destroyers (Dewey, Monssen)
Task Force 1: Vice Adm. William S. Pye
Carrier Group
 2 Battleships (Pennsylvania, Tennessee) 
 1 Auxiliary Aircraft Cruiser (Long Island—12 SOCs, 7 F4F-4s)
Battleship Division 3 (Idaho, New Mexico, Mississippi)
Battleship Division 4 (Maryland, Colorado)
Destroyer Screen
 8 Destroyers (Craven, Dunlap, Fanning, Aaron Ward, Cushing, Porter, Drayton, Dale)
Task Group 11.1 (Capt. Dewitt C. Ramsey)
 1 Carrier (Saratoga—1 SBD-3 Dauntless, 13 F4F-4 Wildcats, 22 SBD-3 Dauntlesses)
 1 Light Cruiser (San Diego)
 4 Destroyers (Mahan, Smith, Preston, Laffey)
Task Force 7 (Submarines): Rear Adm. Robert H. English, Commander, Submarine Force 
Pacific, Pearl Harbor
TG 7.1 (Midway Patrol Group)
 12 Submarines (Cachalot, Flying Fish, Tambor, Trout, Grayling, Nautilus, Grouper, Dolphin, Gato, 
Cuttlefish, Gudgeon, Grenadier) 
TG 7.2 (Support Group [“Roving Short-Stops”])
 3 Submarines (Narwhal, Plunger, Trigger)
TG 7.3 (North of Oahu Patrol)
 4 Submarines (Tarpon, Pike, Finback, Growler)
Patrol Wings Pacific / Task Force 9 (Naval Air Base Defense Force), Pearl Harbor: Rear Adm. 
Patrick N. C. Bellinger
Patrol Wing 1 (VP-11, VP-12, VP-14, VP-72, VP-91)
Patrol Wing 2 (VP-23, VP-24, VP-44, VP-51)
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Hawaiian Sea Frontier, Pearl Harbor: Rear Adm. David W. Bagley
(Midway Local Defenses)
Midway Naval Air Station, Capt. Logan C. Ramsey, Commander
 Sand Island Seaplane Base (14 PBY-5s, 11 search aircraft)
 Eastern Island Airfield, Naval Air Station Utility (1 J2F-2)
Marine Aircraft Group 22 (2nd Marine Air Wing)
 VMF-221 (21 F2A-3 Buffalo; 7 F4F-3 Wildcats)
 VMSB-241 (19 SBD-2 Dauntlesses, 21 SB2U-3 Vindicators)
Patrol Wing 2, Detachments
 VP-23 (14 PBY-5 Catalinas)
 VP-24 (3 PBY-5A Catalinas)
 VP-44 (8 PBY-5A Catalinas)
 VP-51 (3 PBY-5A Catalinas)
Patrol Wing Reinforcements (30 PBYs)
Seventh Army Air Force, Detachments (22 B17E Flying Fortresses, 4 B-26B Marauders)
Torpedo Squadron 8, Detachment (6 TBF-1 Avengers)
Midway Local v  Ground Defenses (Capt. Cyril T. Simard, USN)
 6th Marine Defense Battalion (reinforced), Fleet Marine Force
 3rd Marine Defense Battalion 
 3rd Marine Raider Battalion, AA and Special Weapons personnel
 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, Company “C” (Sand Island)
 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, Company “D” (Eastern Island)
 22nd and 23rd Provisional Infantry Companies
Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 1 (8 MTBs—PT 20, PT 21, PT 22, PT 24, PT 25, PT 26, PT 27, PT 28)
(Deployed in the Hawaiian Archipelago)
Kure
 2 MTBs (PT 29, PT 30)
 4 Small Patrol Craft
French Frigate Shoals
 1 Seaplane Tender (Thornton)
 1 Destroyer Tender (Ballard) 
 1 Destroyer (Clark) 
Pearl and Hermes Reef
 1 Oiler (Kaloli) 
 Crystal (PY 25, converted yacht)
 1 Tug (Vireo)
Lisianski
 YP 284 (converted tuna boat)
Gardner Pinnacles
 YP 345
Laysan
 YP 290
Necker Island
 YP 350 
Midway Relief Fueling Unit
 1 Oiler (Guadalupe)
 2 Destroyers (Blue, Ralph Talbot)
North Pacific Force (Task Force 8): Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald
TG 8.6 (Main Body, Rear Adm. Theobald)
 2 Heavy Cruisers (Indianapolis, Louisville)
 3 Light Cruisers (Nashville, St. Louis, Honolulu)
 DesDiv 11 (4 destroyers—Gridley, McCall, Gilmer, Humphreys)
TG 8.1 (Air Search Group)
 20 PBYs (Patrol Wing 4), 1 Army Air Forces B-17, on 2 destroyer seaplane tenders 
(Williamson—4 PBY-5As; Gillis—12 PBY-5As) and 1 small seaplane tender (Casco—4 
PBY-5As) 
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operations.”228 All the submarines were to reach their assigned stations by the 
morning of 3 June.229 TF 7 was tasked to “inflict maxim damage to enemy.” The 
priority of targets was carriers, battleships, transports, cruisers, and auxiliaries.230 
The commander of the Patrol Wings, Pacific was directed to deploy aircraft to 
Midway and Johnston Island. They would be subordinate to the naval air station 
commander (CNAS) on Midway. One patrol-plane tender would be deployed at 
French Frigate Shoals. The commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier was to obtain 
early information of the enemy forces by conducting daily air searches with the 
maximum number of planes available and out to the maximum practicable radius 
from Midway. He was to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, particularly on 
carriers, battleships, and transports, and to protect his forces on the ground. Forces 
on Midway should be withdrawn to Oahu if necessary to avoid their destruction.231 
The U.S. command-and-control arrangement for the forthcoming defense of 
Midway was clear and straightforward. Broad tactical direction of all forces in the 
Midway area was retained by Nimitz. He allowed freedom of action to the car-
rier task forces commanders and CNAS Midway. TF 16 and TF 17 operated under 
Fletcher, whose immediate superior was Nimitz.232 After TF 16 and TF 17 sailed 
out from Pearl Harbor, Nimitz was able to communicate with each commander 
but they were unable to communicate with him without revealing their positions 
to the enemy. Fletcher and Spruance had full freedom to decide when to launch 
their air strikes and when to advance or withdraw from their assigned positions in 
TG 8.2 (Surface Search [Scouting] Group)
 1 Gunboat (Charleston)
 1 Oiler (Oriole)
 5 Coast Guard Yard Patrol Vessels (Haida, Onondaga, Cyane, Aurora, Bonham)
 14 District Patrol Vessels
TG 8.3 (Air Striking Group, Brig. Gen. William O. Butler)
 21 P-40s, 12 B-26s, 2 B-18s (Fort Randall, Cold Bay)
 12 P-40s (Fort Glenn, Umnak)
 15 P-39s, 17 P-40s, 5 B-17s (Kodiak)
 25 P-38s, 15 P-39s, 4 P-36s, 7 B-17s, 5 B-18s, 12 B-26s, 2 LB-30s (Anchorage)
 Pursuit Squadrons 11, 18, 54 (Army—50 P-40s, 25 P-38s)
 Bomber Squadrons 36, 77 (Army—12 B-36s, 5 B-17s)
 Bomber Group 28 (Army—14 B-26s)
 Fighter Squadron 12 (12 F4Fs)
 Canadian fighter squadron (30 fighters)
 Canadian reconnaissance squadron (15 aircraft)
TG 8.4 (Destroyer Striking Group, Commander, DesDiv 6)
 9 Destroyers (Case, Reid, Brooks, Sands, Kane, Dent, Talbot, King, Waters) 
TG 8.5. (Submarine Group)
 SubDiv 41 (S-18, S-23, S-27, S-28, S-34, S-35)
TG 8.9 (Tanker Group)
 2 Oilers (Sabine, Brazos)
 SS Comet
Sources: Bates, Battle of Midway, pp. 244–46; Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 4, 
pp. 87–93, 172–74.
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the vicinity of Midway. Their forces were able to communicate internally prior to 
combat only via visual signals.233 
On 28 May, Nimitz alerted all subordinate commanders that the deployment of 
the Japanese striking forces was under way. He directed Spruance and his TF 16 to 
the area northeast of Midway. Air searches from Midway intensified significantly 
after 30 May. On average, twenty patrol aircraft at a time conducted searches as far 
as seven hundred miles from Midway.234 Several patrol planes conducted searches 
from Johnston Island out to five or six hundred miles.
In his Operation Order 28-42, issued to Admiral Theobald on 27 May, Nimitz 
directed TF 8 to operate in the North Pacific against an expected attack in the 
Aleutians.235 He stated that there were indications that the Japanese had completed 
plans for an amphibious landing to secure an advance base in the Aleutian Islands, 
the attempt to commence in late May 1942. The enemy force consisted of CarDiv 
3 (Ryūjō, plus one or two other carriers); one heavy cruiser (Nachi, flagship of the 
CINC of the Fifth Fleet); one to three heavy cruisers; a section of CruDiv 4, with 
two heavy cruisers; two light cruisers; DesRon 1 (less one destroyer division) plus 
DesDiv 2, with sixteen destroyers; and SubRon 1, with eight to ten submarines. 
The above-listed forces were estimated to have arrived at northern Japan on 25 
May, to refuel and proceed to the Aleutians. They would probably cover and escort 
a group of transports, landing-craft carriers, seaplane tenders, cargo vessels, and 
tankers. It was expected that some small auxiliary patrol vessels would conduct re-
connaissance and patrols in the Aleutians.236 (This estimate was reasonably correct 
regarding the number of and types of combatants that took part in the early phase 
of the Aleutians operations, but the actual deployment date was 23, not 25, May. 
The remainder of the Japanese force for the Adak and Kiska occupation departed 
Ōminato on 27 May.)237 
Nimitz’s orders on 27 May to Theobald were accompanied by a comprehensive as-
sessment of the enemy Northern Area Force and its preliminary timetable. Theobald, 
however, treated that valuable report (and its subsequent refinements containing 
more detail on the timing and plan of the enemy attack) as the product of Japanese 
deception and refused to include it in his plans.238 Instead, he made his own (and 
erroneous) assumptions on the situation. Among other things, he believed that the 
Japanese intended to seize bases in the Unimak–Dutch Harbor–Cold Bay area, with 
Kodiak-Kenai as a further objective. The enemy’s first move, he thought, would be a 
surprise bombing and strafing attack against airfields within supporting distance of 
selected landing sites.239 Theobald planned to defend the Unimak–Dutch Harbor– 
Cold Bay area by timely detecting enemy surface forces with long-range aircraft and 
picketboats (small cutters and converted fishing vessels). All available bombers based 
at Fort Glenn, Fort Randall, and Cold Bay would be employed against enemy ships. 
A force of destroyers based at Makushin Bay, on Unalaska Island, would be employed 
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as a “weapon [of] opportunity.” He aimed to deploy a force of cruisers plus several 
destroyers at the southern approaches to Kodiak. Fighters based at Fort Glenn would 
be used for the defense of Dutch Harbor.240
Theobald had many difficulties in organizing the defense of the Aleutians. His 
forces were clearly inadequate for the task. They were not only small but had to 
be deployed over a large part of the theater, and he could not expect reinforce-
ments.241 In any case, he had insufficient naval forces and land-based aircraft to 
oppose two Japanese light carriers.242 Theobald had to rely on Catalinas and Army 
pursuit planes to detect the enemy approaching the Aleutians. Some twelve out 
of his twenty PBYs were at Dutch Harbor; the Army planes, however, were mal-
deployed. General Butler, commander of the Eleventh Air Force, objected to de-
ploying them at Kodiak and Anchorage and wanted to leave unoccupied the two 
westernmost Army airfields, at Cold Bay and Otter Point, on Umnak (in the Fox 
Islands group). Theobald was opposed to that. He finally persuaded Butler to send 
60 percent of his planes to the two westernmost bases, from where they could sup-
port naval forces in defense of Dutch Harbor.243
On 27 May, Theobald issued an operational plan in which he stated (wrongly) 
that the enemy attack could be expected in the first few days of June, probably 
in the Unimak–Dutch Harbor–Cold Bay area.244 Theobald decided to deploy his 
main body some four hundred miles due south of Kodiak, where he could de-
fend the eastern Aleutians and Alaska.245 This decision clearly contradicted the 
intelligence Nimitz had provided to him on the Japanese intention of capturing 
islands in the western Aleutians. In this way Theobald made the main body of TF 
8 irrelevant in the pending operation. 
Theobald ordered daily searches to start on 28 May from the three western-
most Army airfields to a distance of four hundred miles and from Kodiak out to 
seven hundred miles. In addition about twenty picket ships would be deployed 
south of the Aleutians and in the Bering Strait approaches to Dutch Harbor. 
Theobald planned to have these pickets on station by 3 June. However, several 
cutters were too far away to arrive in time and others were too unseaworthy to 
remain on station.246
The Correlation of Forces
The Japanese had overwhelming superiority over the U.S. forces in both the 
Midway and the Aleutians operations. Yamamoto commanded a fleet more than 
twice the size of the U.S. forces opposing him.247 The Japanese had four (versus 
three) large carriers and two (versus none) light carriers. They had 215 aircraft 
on board their large carriers (seventy-three fighters, seventy dive-bombers, and 
seventy-two torpedo bombers).248 The three Japanese light carriers had ninety-
three aircraft (forty-six fighters, fifteen dive-bombers, and thirty-two torpedo 
bombers).
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The United States had 187 combat aircraft on board its large carriers (seventy- 
nine fighters, sixty-seven dive bombers, and forty-one torpedo bombers—this 
number did not include thirty-two observation dive bombers). In addition, the 
Americans had on Midway sixty-eight Marine aircraft (twenty-eight fighters and 
forty dive-bombers), thirty-four Navy aircraft (twenty-eight patrol aircraft and six 
torpedo bombers), and four medium and nineteen Army long-range bombers. 
In the Midway operation, the Japanese had absolute superiority in battleships 
(seven versus none). The Americans were also inferior in the number of heavy 
cruisers (eight versus ten), light cruisers (none versus ten), and destroyers (seven-
teen versus forty-six). The Japanese had a greater number of 4.7- and six-inch guns 
on board their surface ships. The Americans had more aircraft on board cruisers 
(twenty-eight to fourteen).249 Both sides had assigned to the operation the same 
number of submarines (nineteen to nineteen). 
For the Aleutians operation the Japanese had assigned two light carriers, three 
heavy cruisers, four light cruisers (plus two auxiliary light cruisers), and thirteen 
destroyers. However, their superiority was potentially much greater because the 
Guard Force (four battleships, two light carriers, twelve destroyers) could be em-
ployed in the support of the Aleutians operation. In contrast, TF 8 had only two 
heavy and three light cruisers and thirteen destroyers. The Americans had a slight-
ly larger number of submarines (six versus five).
The Japanese had a more balanced carrier force. Their carrier aircraft were of 
nearly homogeneous design. The Zero fighters were superior to their American coun-
terparts. The Japanese dive-bombers were highly effective. The Japanese pilots were 
superb;250 they also had much more combat experience than the American pilots. 
The major weaknesses of the Japanese were inferior intelligence information, 
lack of radar and automatic aircraft-homing equipment, an inadequate number of 
heavy AA machine guns, poorly armored or no self-sealing tanks on aircraft, and 
limited land and air reconnaissance from Wake Island.251 The Japanese radio gear 
was technically much inferior to U.S. equipment.
Among the U.S. advantages was the use of radar for fighter direction. American 
aircraft were fitted with self-sealing fuel tanks and armor. U.S. ships had techni-
cally superior radio equipment, and their communications with shore commands 
were more reliable, because of the shorter distances involved. Many U.S. ships and 
aircraft were equipped with radar. The American weaknesses included inability to 
concentrate aircraft and fighter defense due to the separation of independent car-
rier groups, using different cruising instructions. Also, TF 16 and TF 17 had never 
operated together. The Yorktown air wing was a composite formed of aircraft that 
had been assembled from three carriers and had never operated together. U.S. car-
rier aircraft generally lacked homogeneity in speed and range. The performance of 
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American fighters was inferior to that of the Zero. The U.S. torpedo bombers were 
slow, and their torpedoes were not as effective as their Japanese counterparts.252 The 
U.S. Striking Force had an insufficient number of AA heavy machine guns.
Perhaps the greatest American advantage was surprise—the Japanese did not 
expect the U.S. carriers to be in the area prior to the planned landing on Mid-
way. Also, the Japanese ships and submarines operated from an exterior position 
and had to transit much longer distances from their bases to the operating areas. 
This, in turn, meant not only much longer transit times but also great logistical 
difficulties. In contrast, the U.S. Striking Force occupied a central position and was 
interposed between the First and Second Mobile Forces. It operated along diver-
gent and short lines of operation. It was near a major fleet base, and its logistical 
support was much simpler than that for the enemy forces. For example, the lines of 
operation for the First Mobile Force and main body stretched 2,300–2,400 nautical 
miles from their bases to the operating area northwest of Midway. In contrast, lines 
of operation for the U.S. Striking Force from Pearl Harbor to the operating area 
were between a thousand and 1,100 nautical miles. In the north, the Second Mobile 
Force had to steam about three thousand nautical miles from Ōminato to a posi-
tion some four hundred miles south of Dutch Harbor, while TF 8 operated along 
lines of operation only several hundred miles long.
Deployment of the Opposing Forces
The Japanese forces that took part in the Midway operation deployed from basing 
areas in the Inland Sea and Central Pacific (see maps 7 and 8). In the early evening 
of 26 May, Nagumo’s First Mobile Force left Hashirajima Anchorage in Hiroshima 
Bay. Yamamoto’s Main Force also departed Hashirajima on the 26th. It sailed east-
ward to the position 35° north, 165° east longitude, where the Guard Force was 
detached at about 1500 on 3 June.
The Midway Occupation Force left the Saipan-Guam area in several separate 
groups. The Minesweeping Group departed on 25 May. This group was followed on 
the night of the 27th by the Transport Group, Close Support Group, and Seaplane 
Tender Group. Kondō’s main body sortied from Hashirajima during the morning 
of 28 May.253 Most of the submarines taking part in the Midway operation pro-
ceeded to Kwajalein Atoll, arriving about 10 May; two submarines had to return 
home because of engine troubles, and one returned owing to the illness of its com-
manding officer. The three boats of SubDiv 13 completed repairs by early May and 
arrived at Kwajalein about the 20th. SubRon 5 and the tender Rio de Janeiro Maru 
departed for Kwajalein on 16 May and arrived there the end of the month.254
The forces assigned for the Aleutians operation deployed from their bases 
in northern Honshū and the Kurils. The Northern Area Force, Main Body, left 
Ōminato on 25 May, setting a course toward the area southeast of Attu. At noon 
on 26 May, the Second Mobile Force sortied from Ōminato on easterly and then 
 THE MIDWAY-ALEUTIANS OPERATION, 25 MAY–14 JUNE 1942 131 130 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
KA
MC
HA
TK
A
Pe
tr
op
av
lo
vs
k
H
ak
od
at
e
H
O
KK
AI
D
Ō
Ō
m
in
at
o
To
ky
o
Yo
ko
su
ka
Ku
re
HO
NS
HŪ
Vl
ad
iv
os
to
k
BU
N
G
O
ST
RA
IT
IW
O
 JI
M
A
SA
IP
A
N G
U
A
M
S 
E 
A 
  O
 F
O
 K
 H
 O
 T
 S
 K
KU
RIL
 IS
LA
ND
S
M
A
RS
H
A
LL
 IS
LA
N
D
S
W
A
KE
IS
LA
N
D
EN
IW
ET
O
K
JO
H
N
ST
O
N
 IS
LA
N
D
H
AW
A
II
O
A
H
U
KU
RE
M
ID
W
AY
A
 L
 E
 U
 T
 I 
A
 N
   
I S
 L
 A
 N
 D
 S
KO
M
A
N
D
O
RS
KI
IS
LA
N
D
S
AT
TU KI
SK
A
A
M
CH
IT
KA
A
D
A
K
O
tt
er
Po
in
t
DU
TC
H
HA
RB
OR
U
M
N
A
K
KO
D
IA
K
Va
nc
ou
ve
r
Se
at
tle
YA
P
C
A
RO
LI
N
E 
IS
LA
N
D
S
TR
U
K
PO
N
A
PE
W
O
TJ
E
KW
A
JA
LE
IN
JA
LU
IT
H
iro
sh
im
a
N
ag
as
ak
i
CH
RI
ST
M
A
S 
IS
LA
N
D
TA
RA
W
A
Sa
n
Fr
an
ci
sc
o
BO
N
IN
IS
LA
N
D
S
Ka
go
sh
im
a
Sakhalin
Pa
ra
m
us
hi
ro
M
A
RC
U
S
IS
LA
N
D
MARIANAS
24
00 3
KI
SK
A
 O
CC
U
PA
TI
O
N
 F
O
RC
E
24
00 3
15
00 2
15
00 1
15
00 31
15
00 30
70
0 
M
I.
70
0 
M
I.
AD
AK
-A
TT
U
   
  O
CC
U
PA
TI
O
N
 F
O
RC
E
“T
EI
” L
IN
E
15
00 2
24
00 3
PA
TR
O
L
VE
SS
EL
S
11
PA
TR
O
L
VE
SS
EL
S
40
0 M
I.
40
0 M
I.
400 
MI.
40
0 M
I.
04
00 27
08
00 29
07
00 27
24
00 3
09
00 1
07
00 2
07
00 1
14
00 31
24
00 3
09
00 2
09
00 31
TG
 8
.6
05
00
TG
 8
.6
TU
 1
.1
.4
24
00 3 TG
 1
1.
1
10
00 31
10
00 2
TU
 8
.1
.4
10
00 1
“O
TS
U
” L
IN
E
“H
EI
” L
IN
E
“K
O
” L
IN
E
700 
MI.
500 
MI.
80
0 
M
I.
80
0 
M
I.
TF
-1
7
TF
-1
6
3-
SS
24
00 3
TF
s 
16
 &
 1
7
16
00 2
10
00 30
09
00 31
10
00 29
SE
CO
N
D
   
M
O
BI
LE
 F
O
RC
E
70
0 
M
I.
FI
RS
T 
M
O
BI
LE
 F
O
RC
E
M
A
IN
 B
O
D
Y
M
AI
N
FO
RC
E
15
00 29
03
00 31
03
00 2
15
00 3
24
00 3 2
40
0
315
00
13
30 3
15
00 3
24
00 3
14
00 2
1-
SS
00
00 2
15
00 1
15
00 31
60
0 
M
I.
10
50
 M
I.
70
0 M
I.
24
00 3
24
00 3
SE
A
PL
A
N
E
TE
N
D
ER
G
RO
U
P
M
IN
ES
W
EE
PI
N
G
 G
RO
U
P
M
ID
W
AY
FO
RC
E
OC
CU
PA
TI
ON
= 
U
.S
. F
or
ce
s
= 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 F
or
ce
s
=L
EG
EN
D
10
00 1
H
O
U
R
D
AY
16
0°
18
0°
16
0°
14
0°
14
0°
13
0°
13
5°
14
5°
15
0°
15
5°
16
5°
17
0°
17
5°
17
5°
17
0°
16
5°
15
5°
15
0°
14
5°
13
5°
13
0°
12
5°
16
0°
E
18
0°
16
0°
W
14
0°
W
14
0°
E
13
0°
E
13
5°
E
14
5°
E
15
0°
E
15
5°
E
16
5°
E
17
0°
E
17
5°
E
17
5°
W
17
0°
W
16
5°
W
15
5°
W
15
0°
W
14
5°
W
13
5°
W
13
0°
W
12
5°
W
60
°N
40
°N
20
°N
45
°N
50
°N
55
°N
35
°N
25
°N
30
°N
15
°N
10
°N
 5
°N
60
°
40
°
20
°
45
°
50
°
55
°
25
°
30
°
15
°
10
°
 5
°
0
501
00 1
502
00 2
50
nm
M
A
P 
3:
 M
O
VE
M
EN
TS
 O
F 
TH
E 
O
PP
O
SI
N
G
 F
O
RC
ES
 A
N
D
 S
EA
RC
H
ES
 U
N
TI
L 
24
00
, 3
 JU
N
E 
19
42
Map 7
Movements of the opposing 
forces and searches until 
2400, 3 June 1942
 THE MIDWAY-ALEUTIANS OPERATION, 25 MAY–14 JUNE 1942 133 132 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
KA
MC
HA
TK
A
Pe
tr
op
av
lo
vs
k
H
O
KK
AI
D
Ō
Ō
m
in
at
o
To
ky
o
Yo
ko
su
ka
Ku
re
HO
NS
HŪ
Vl
ad
iv
os
to
k
BU
N
G
O
ST
RA
IT
IW
O
 JI
M
A
SA
IP
A
N
G
U
A
M
S 
E 
A 
  O
 F
O
 K
 H
 O
 T
 S
 K
M
A
RS
H
A
LL
 IS
LA
N
D
S
W
A
KE
 IS
LA
N
D
EN
IW
ET
O
K
JO
H
N
ST
O
N
IS
LA
N
D
H
AW
A
II
O
A
H
U
FR
EN
CH
 F
RI
G
AT
E
SH
O
A
LS
KU
RE M
ID
W
AY
A
 L
 E
 U
 T
 I 
A
 N
   
I S
 L
 A
 N
 D
 S
KO
M
A
N
D
O
RS
KI
IS
LA
N
D
S
AT
TU KI
SK
A
A
M
CH
IT
KA
A
D
A
K
O
tt
er
Po
in
t
DU
TC
H
HA
RB
OR
U
M
N
A
K
KO
D
IA
K
Va
nc
ou
ve
r
Se
at
tle
YA
P
C
A
RO
LI
N
E 
IS
LA
N
D
S
TR
U
K
PO
N
A
PE
W
O
TJ
E
KW
A
JA
LE
IN
JA
LU
IT
H
iro
sh
im
a
N
ag
as
ak
i
Sa
n
Fr
an
ci
sc
o
BO
N
IN
IS
LA
N
D
S
Ka
go
sh
im
a
Sakhalin
Pa
ra
m
us
hi
ro
MARIANAS
DE
PA
RT
ED
 18
30
 28
 M
AY
DATELINEDATELINE
WE
AK 
FRON
T 
   
24
00
 2
 J
UN
E
16
0°
18
0°
16
0°
14
0°
14
0°
13
0°
13
5°
14
5°
15
0°
15
5°
16
5°
17
0°
17
5°
17
5°
17
0°
16
5°
15
5°
15
0°
14
5°
13
5°
13
0°
12
5°
16
0°
E
18
0°
16
0°
W
14
0°
W
14
0°
E
13
0°
E
13
5°
E
14
5°
E
15
0°
E
15
5°
E
16
5°
E
17
0°
E
17
5°
E
17
5°
W
17
0°
W
16
5°
W
15
5°
W
15
0°
W
14
5°
W
13
5°
W
13
0°
W
12
5°
W
60
°N
40
°N
20
°N
45
°N
50
°N
55
°N
35
°N
25
°N
30
°N
15
°N
10
°N
 5
°N
60
°
40
°
20
°
45
°
50
°
55
°
25
°
30
°
15
°
10
°
 5
°
= 
U
.S
. F
or
ce
s
= 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 F
or
ce
s
LE
G
EN
D
KIS
KA
 OC
CU
PA
TIO
N F
OR
CE S
EC
O
N
D
 M
O
BI
LE
 F
O
RC
E
D
EP
A
RT
ED
 1
20
0 
26
 M
AY
IN
TE
N
D
ED
 S
TA
TI
O
N
 O
F
G
U
A
RD
 F
O
RC
E
13
00
3 
JU
N
E
FR
O
M
 S
A
N
 D
IE
G
O
15
15
1 
JU
N
E
TF
11
 (S
AR
AT
O
G
A)
15
30
3 
JU
N
E
07
00
3 
JU
N
E
TF
-1 
(BA
TT
LE
SH
IPS
)
2 
CL
s 
2 
D
D
s
05
00
 3
 JU
N
E
TG
 8
.6
 F
O
RM
ED
2 
CA
s
2 
D
D
s
10
00
 2
9 
M
AY
RE
N
D
EZ
VO
U
S
TF
 1
6 
&
 T
F 
17
16
00
 2
 JU
N
E
FU
EL
IN
G
31
 M
AY
TF
 17
TF
16
06
00
30
 M
AY
M
IN
ES
W
EE
PI
N
G
  G
RO
U
P
M
ID
W
AY
 O
CC
UP
AT
IO
N 
FO
RC
E
DE
PA
RT
ED
26
 M
AY
DE
PA
RT
ED
26
 M
AY
M
AI
N
 F
O
RC
E
FI
RS
T 
M
O
BI
LE
 F
O
RC
E
15
00
3 
JU
N
E
13
30
3 
JU
N
E
M
A
P 
4:
 D
EP
LO
YM
EN
T 
O
F 
TH
E 
O
PP
O
SI
N
G
 F
O
RC
ES
• T
RA
N
SP
O
RT
 G
RO
U
P
• S
EA
PL
A
N
E 
TE
N
D
ER
 G
RO
U
P
• C
LO
SE
 S
U
PP
O
RT
 G
RO
U
P
   
   
   
   
 2
04
0 
27
 M
AY
M
ID
W
AY
 O
CC
U
PA
TI
O
N
 F
O
RC
E
M
A
IN
 B
O
D
Y 
D
EP
A
RT
ED
 2
8 
M
AY
D
EP
AR
TE
D
 1
70
0 
25
 M
AY
D
EP
A
RT
ED
 1
30
0 
2 
JU
N
E
AD
AK
—
AT
TU
 O
CC
U
PA
TI
O
N
 F
O
RC
E
D
EP
AR
TE
D
 E
AR
LY
 A
FT
ER
N
O
O
N
 O
N
 2
8 
M
AY
D
EP
AR
TE
D
 3
0 
M
AY
D
EP
AR
TE
D
 2
8 
M
AY
N
O
RT
H
ER
N
 A
RE
A
 F
O
RC
E,
 M
A
IN
 B
O
D
Y
D
EP
A
RT
ED
 2
 JU
N
E
0
501
00 1
502
00 2
50
nm
Map 8
Deployment of the opposing 
forces
 THE MIDWAY-ALEUTIANS OPERATION, 25 MAY–14 JUNE 1942 133 132 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
northeasterly courses to a point some four hundred miles south of Dutch Harbor.255 
The Kiska Occupation Force departed Ōminato in the early evening on the 28th, 
stopped at Paramushiro for supplies, then left for Kiska in the early afternoon of 
2 June. The Adak-Attu Occupation Force sortied from Ōminato in the early after-
noon of 28 May.256
Both the Midway and the Aleutians forces steamed eastward under the cover of 
carrier aircraft and also shore-based aircraft, from the home islands, Paramushiro, 
Marcus, Wake, and Wotje, as well as from other bases in the Mandates.257
On the American side, TF 16 sortied from Pearl Harbor on 28 May and pro-
ceeded to its assigned area northeast of Midway. TF 17 departed Pearl Harbor on 
30 May and advanced to its assigned position northeast of the island. Both TF 16 
and TF 17 were covered by the land-based aircraft from Oahu for the first two days. 
TFs 16 and 17, though not organized as a single force, generally stayed within sup-
porting and visual-signaling distance.258 The reasons for this separation, as noted 
above, were that the carrier forces had different cruising instructions and had never 
operated before together. Another reason, however, was a belief at that time (not 
necessarily correct) that independent carrier groups had a better chance of repuls-
ing an air attack. In addition, there would be a much smaller risk of collision than 
with a large number of ships in a tight formation.259
CTF 7 deployed thirteen submarines to points on 200- and 150-mile-radius cir-
cles covering the western and northern approaches to Midway. A few submarines 
were posted on an eight-hundred-mile circle northwest of Oahu; the last ones to 
become available went to a hundred-mile circle also centered on Oahu.260
On 30 May, Nimitz radioed to task force commanders his latest and most de-
tailed information on the composition of the enemy forces. He wrote that the en-
emy Carrier Striking Force consisted of four carriers and that its screen consisted 
of only two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and a dozen destroyers. The Midway 
Occupation Force had two or three heavy cruisers, two seaplane carriers, from two 
to four seaplane tenders, and from twelve to eighteen transports and cargo ships. 
Nimitz also described a “Close Covering Force” of one carrier or converted car-
rier, two fast battleships, five heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers. He estimated that 
sixteen enemy submarines were assigned to scout the Hawaii–Midway area. (His 
enemy’s order of battle missed Yamamoto’s Main Force completely.) Nimitz reiter-
ated his belief that the landing on Midway would take place on 5 June (or a day 
earlier than actually envisaged in the enemy plan). He also estimated that carrier air 
attacks could begin on the night of 2–3 June. A radio intercept had revealed that the 
rendezvous point of the enemy forces would be about 685 miles west of Midway, at 
the extreme radius of B-17s.261
Nimitz made a decision on the basis of his estimate of the situation prior to the 
beginning of the operation that the best position for the Striking Force was the 
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northeast of Midway. That, as noted above, would place the U.S. carriers in a flank-
ing position with respect to the enemy carrier forces, expected to advance from the 
northwest. Spruance was in complete agreement with Nimitz. TF 16 refueled on 31 
May from two fleet oilers, Cimarron and Platte. Spruance took station some 325 
miles northeast of Midway. Fletcher’s TF 17 was refueled by the same two fleet oil-
ers on 1 June and the next day at about 1600 joined TF 16. Fletcher then assumed 
command of both task forces and directed Spruance to operate TF 16 some ten 
miles southward of TF 17 but to remain within visual-signaling range.262
On 31 May, Task Unit (TU) 1.1.4 (Battleships, Battle Force) executed Oper-
ation Plan 1-42. The objective was to destroy any enemy surface force about to 
raid the West Coast—the assumption being that the Japanese planned to attack San 
Francisco. TU 1.1.4 sortied from San Francisco—two battleships (Maryland and 
Colorado) and three destroyers—and took a position 650 miles west of San Francisco. 
Task Force 1 lacked organic air cover except for the planes on board the battleships. 
Its position was within the range of the U.S. land-based search aircraft in the San 
Francisco area but outside that of bombers and fighter aircraft. TU 1.1.4 was directed 
to remain until 14 June and then to return to port. The task force’s remaining ships 
would stay at San Francisco to defend its harbor against enemy air attack.263 Task 
Force 11, with the carrier Saratoga, under Rear Admiral Fitch, sailed from San 
Diego on 1 June. However, it would be unable to take part in the defense of Midway 
unless the enemy attack was behind schedule.264
The Midway Phase
Yamamoto’s plan started to unravel almost at the outset. Because of the delays in 
overhaul, the boats of SubRon 5 deployed late. They reached their assigned posi-
tions on the Cordon B line on 4 June, two days later than originally envisaged.265 
By then the enemy carriers had already passed it. To make the situation worse, the 
planned K operation, intended to provide information on the presence of the en-
emy fleet at Pearl Harbor, was also derailed. On 31/30 May, a refueling submarine 
reached French Frigate Shoals and to its surprise found two U.S. ships at anchor. 
The 24th Air Flotilla commander accordingly ordered postponement for twenty-
four hours, hoping that the enemy ships would depart. This proved to be wishful 
thinking; instead, the Americans deployed seaplanes to the base as well.266 On 30/29 
May, a Japanese submarine reported that enemy activity in the vicinity of French 
Frigate Shoals was extensive and that flying boats were operating there. The same 
evening the commander of the 24th Air Flotilla canceled the entire operation.267 
The First Mobile Force refueled on 31 May and 1 June.268 On 2 June, cloudy 
weather with occasional rain prevailed near Yamamoto’s Main Force. Nagumo’s 
force, some six hundred miles ahead of Yamamoto’s, entered an area of thick fog; 
refueling had to discontinue because of poor visibility.269 Dense fog made it very 
difficult to change the direction of forces’ movement. One of the Japanese supply 
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ships violated strict radio silence and used a short-range radio to send a message 
to Yamamoto’s flagship, Yamato, then five to six hundred miles away. The Japanese 
assessed that this message was probably heard by the enemy.270 Japanese radio in-
telligence also reported that of 180 intercepted enemy messages some seventy-two 
were marked “urgent.”271 
Movements on 3 June
On 3 June, the First Mobile Force and the Main Force bore 310° from Midway at 
distances of some six hundred and nine hundred miles, respectively. The Trans-
port Group was west, at 650 miles, from Midway; the Seaplane Group was in com-
pany with the Transport Group. The Close Support Group was west and 575 miles 
from Midway. The main body was west and 670 miles from the island, and the 
Minesweeping Group, west-southwest 450 miles.272 During the night of 2–3 June, 
Fletcher shifted the Striking Force to an operating area some 175 miles westward of 
code-named Point Luck, 260 miles north of Midway.273 
At 0904 on 3 June, Navy PBY search aircraft from Midway made first contact 
with the enemy forces west of Midway, some seven hundred miles away. The sight-
ing report read, “Two cargo ships, bearing 247 and 470 miles from Midway.” At 
0925, another PBY reported, “Main Body, six ships, bearing 261 degrees, and seven 
hundred miles from Midway, course 90 degrees, speed ten knots.”274 A third report, 
received at 1100, cited the presence of eleven ships on an easterly course at nineteen 
knots.275 The first two reports referred in fact to the Minesweeping Group, the third 
to the Transport Group.276 
At 1523, nine B-17s from Midway attacked what they reported as five enemy 
battleships or heavy cruisers and forty other ships some 570 miles from Midway. 
They claimed to have hit two ships—one heavy cruiser or battleship and a transport 
—and possibly to have damaged another heavy cruiser and a transport.277 However, 
no hits were scored by the B-17s.
On the Eve of the Carrier Engagement
In the night of 3–4 June the First Mobile Force approached Midway from the 
northwest under the cover of a moving front system of scattered showers and a low, 
broken cloud ceiling that varied between a thousand and 2,300 feet. At the leading 
edge of the front was an area of overcast—towering cumulus clouds, heavy show-
ers, and reduced visibility—that prevented effective scouting by American aircraft 
operating from Midway. Farther to the east, the U.S. carriers were under a “dying” 
warm front. The sky was cloudy with high broken and lower scattered clouds; ceil-
ings were unlimited over the task force but dropped to a thousand feet to the west.278
Nagumo’s estimate of the situation prior to the carrier engagement on the 
morning of 4 June illustrates the attitude prevalent among the Japanese command-
ers regarding the ability of their American counterparts to frustrate and ultimately 
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defeat their plans. Nagumo stated that the “enemy lacks the will to fight” but was 
likely to counterattack if the Japanese landing on Midway proceeded “satisfacto-
rily.” The enemy would conduct reconnaissance mainly to the west and south but 
would not maintain a “strict vigil” to the northwest or north. The radius of the 
enemy patrol aircraft, Nagumo asserted, was about five hundred miles. Nagumo 
was confident that the enemy was not aware of the Japanese plans and assumed 
that his force would not be discovered until the morning of 5 June at the earliest. 
Nagumo also believed that there were no powerful enemy units, with carriers, in 
the vicinity. He was convinced that after attacking Midway and destroying the 
enemy shore-based air strength to facilitate the landing, “we would . . . be able to 
destroy any enemy task force which may choose to counter attack.” In his view, an 
enemy counterattack by shore-based aircraft could be neutralized by defending 
aircraft and AA fire.279 
On the eve of the carrier engagement Nimitz sent the following message to his 
subordinate commanders: “The situation is developing as expected. Carriers, our 
most important objective, should soon be located. Tomorrow may be the day you 
can give them the works. The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinge on 
the developments of the next two or three days.”280
Spruance’s plan was based on a discussion he had had with Nimitz and Fletch-
er on 27 May. He intended to position his two carriers on the flank of the enemy 
carrier force and to rely on surprise and secrecy. Spruance also wanted to launch 
an all-out attack on the enemy carriers before they attacked his task force, com-
mitting his entire air strength in a massive strike and holding nothing in reserve. 
His aircraft would focus their attacks on the enemy carriers. Only if he had air-
craft left would Spruance then attack battleships and cruisers.281 Spruance decid-
ed not to move westward to close the enemy carriers before they were damaged. 
Spruance also did not want to put TF 16 within seven hundred miles of Wake 
Island, where, he knew, the Japanese had reinforced their air strength. Neither 
did Spruance wish to sail so far west of Midway that the enemy could close in 
with his superior strength and crush him.282 
Spruance imposed strict operations-security measures on TF 16. He prohib-
ited any radio transmission that could reveal the positions of ships. No “talk be-
tween ships” (line-of-sight radio) could be used, even to bring in an aircraft that 
had failed to return to the carriers.283 
The Clash of Carriers
On the morning of 4 June, surface winds in the vicinity of the front northwest of 
Midway were variable. Nearer to Midway the surface winds, under the influence 
of the northwestern high-pressure area, were from the southeast. This was advan-
tageous to the Japanese; their carriers would be closing to Midway when steam-
ing into the wind to launch aircraft. At the same time, the U.S. carriers were at a 
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disadvantage because they would have to turn away from the enemy to launch or 
recover aircraft, wasting time and fuel.284
At about 0430 on 4 June, the First Mobile Force was some 240 miles west of 
Midway. The weather then was clear, with scattered clouds. Visibility was ex-
cellent, the ceiling was 1,500–3,000 feet, and the wind was from the southeast. 
Nagumo’s carriers mounted their first strikes, intended to eliminate U.S. air strength 
and soften up ground defenses on Midway. The first wave consisted of 108 aircraft 
(thirty-six fighters, thirty-six bombers, and thirty-six torpedo bombers). The torpe-
do bombers were armed with bombs, not torpedoes.285 The other half of Nagumo’s 
aircraft were armed with both torpedoes and bombs, in case of an encounter with the 
enemy surface forces. He ordered searches by only eight aircraft (one aircraft each 
from Akagi and Kaga, four Type 0 reconnaissance seaplanes from the heavy cruis-
ers Tone and Chikuma, and two short-range Type 95 seaplanes from the battleship 
Haruna) to cover nearly the entire eastern semicircle out to three hundred miles and 
the northernmost sector out to 150 miles.286 (This number was clearly insufficient.) 
Nagumo also decided not to launch fighters for combat air patrol (CAP). This was in 
contrast to the then-standard American practice of having CAP airborne at dawn.287 
At dawn on 4 June, Fletcher moved TF 17 and TF 16 at 13.5 knots to a position 
about two hundred miles north of Midway. Fletcher depended on the Midway air-
craft to detect the enemy carriers.288 At 0415, some twenty-two PBYs from Midway 
were aloft, sweeping the western sectors (200°–020°) for the suspected two enemy 
carrier groups. They were directed to search out to seven hundred miles in their in-
dividual sectors or until all enemy carriers were found. In case of emergency, PBYs 
would divert to Laysan and Lisianski Atolls.289
At 0545, a PBY reported many enemy planes heading for Midway, 150 miles dis-
tant and bearing 320°. At 0552, another PBY sighted two enemy carriers and many 
ships on the same bearing at 180 miles, course 135°, speed twenty-five knots.290 At 
about 0603, Spruance received, in plain language from a PBY based on Midway, a 
first report of the presence of two enemy carriers some 175 miles west-northwest 
from TF 16. (The reported position of the enemy carriers was about forty miles in 
error;291 the actual distance was about 215 miles.) Spruance ordered, “Launch the 
attack.” His order to attack was a calculated risk. A strike at longer distance risked 
the loss of many planes and pilots. His TBD torpedo bombers and the new F4F 
Wildcat fighters had a combat radius of only 175 miles. In contrast, the maximum 
effective range of the SBD dive-bombers was two hundred miles. Spruance knew 
that the enemy had in all four to five carriers. He expected that other enemy carriers 
would be near those already sighted.292 However, this was by no means certain. If 
the enemy carriers were widely separated then Spruance risked using all his aircraft 
against only a part of the enemy force and thereby exposing his TF 16 to attack by 
other enemy carriers.293 
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At 0620, TF 16 and TF 17 were directed by Fletcher to operate five to ten miles 
apart. After receiving a contact report by the Midway plane on the enemy forces 
—described as composed of two carriers and other ships, including battleships, 
bearing 320°, 180 miles from Midway, course 135°, speed twenty-five knots—
Fletcher directed Spruance to proceed westward and launch attacks.294 TF 16 then 
steamed on a westerly course at twenty-five knots. The sea was calm and the vis-
ibility good, the wind six to seven knots from the south-southwest.
At 0648 Spruance divided TF 16 into two groups, each centered on a carrier 
(they would operate separately until 1930 on 4 June). At about 0700, Spruance esti-
mated that Nagumo’s force was about 155 miles away (the actual distance was 190 
miles). Enterprise and Hornet started to launch their first attack waves at 0702. Each 
carrier launched sixty aircraft (thirty-five dive-bombers, fifteen torpedo bombers, 
and ten fighters). Within half an hour the launch was completed.295 At 0830, York- 
town started launching only thirty-five aircraft (seventeen dive-bombers, twelve 
torpedo bombers, and six fighters). Fletcher had decided to keep the major part of 
TF 17’s aircraft in reserve pending more reliable information on the enemy carriers 
from the Midway aircraft.296
Spruance knew that his force had been detected by an enemy search plane and 
that he had lost the factor of surprise. Yet he erroneously believed that the seaplane 
that had sighted TF 16 was from a tender located southeast of Midway (it was ac-
tually from the cruiser Tone).297 Browning calculated that the Japanese planes at-
tacking Midway could not return to their carriers until 0900, until which time the 
enemy commander, even if he knew where the U.S. carriers were, had to maintain 
course toward Midway to recover them. However, the Japanese recovered their 
planes earlier than Browning anticipated.298 Spruance intended to hit the two re-
ported enemy carriers before they carried out a second strike on Midway.299 The 
presence of the third enemy carrier was not known to Spruance at that time, and 
that of the fourth until much later.300
At about 0700, Nagumo received a report from the leader of the first wave that 
a second attack on Midway would be necessary. Believing that there was no threat 
from enemy forces, Nagumo decided on a second strike.301 He discontinued the 
standby status of the ninety-three planes he had been keeping in reserve and or-
dered (in what proved to be a fatal mistake) that aircraft be dropped to the hangar 
decks to clear the flight decks for recovery of the Midway strike. Nagumo ordered 
the torpedo planes on Akagi and Kaga to be rearmed with bombs and the dive-
bombers in Hiryū and Sōryū to carry high-explosive instead of armor-piercing 
bombs. The rearming of the aircraft would require about one hour in all.
Between 0700 and 0830, some sixty aircraft based on Midway made repeated 
attacks on the enemy carriers. All encountered fierce resistance by Japanese fighters 
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and heavy AA fire from the ships. At about 0600, CNAS Midway directed fourteen 
Army B-17s then en route to attack the Midway Occupation Force to attack instead 
the enemy carriers, then some two hundred miles northeast of their own position. 
At 0710, four Army B-26s armed with torpedoes attacked the enemy carriers from 
an altitude of two hundred feet but scored no hits; two of the B-26s were shot down, 
and the surviving two were heavily damaged and made unfit for further use.302 At 
0755, sixteen Marine dive-bombers conducted a “gliding” attack (that is, rather 
than from a nearly vertical dive, because of the inexperience of the pilots); eight 
were shot down, and the other eight returned to base damaged (two of them so 
badly as to be written off).303 At 0810, the third attack, by the fourteen B-17s, im-
mediately followed; 8,500 pounds of bombs were dropped from altitudes of twenty 
to twenty-three thousand feet. The B-17s claimed three hits and two probable hits 
on the enemy carriers, but all their “hits” were actually near misses.304 At about 0820 
(or 0827), eleven Marine dive-bombers from Midway flew over the carriers but 
attacked the battleship Haruna instead, making no hits. At almost the same time 
six torpedo planes from Midway attacked Nagumo’s carriers; their attack failed, 
though all but two planes returned safely.305 
Nagumo first received reports of the presence of the enemy force at 0728 from 
the No. 4 search aircraft launched by Tone. The message he received stated, “Ten 
ships, apparently enemy, sighted, bearing 010 degrees, distant 240 miles from Mid-
way, course 150, speed more than 20 knots.” This critical message reached Nagumo 
after several minutes’ delay. It came as a surprise to Nagumo and his staff, who had 
not anticipated an enemy force would appear so soon. The lack of precise informa-
tion on the composition of the enemy force led Nagumo to send a reply, “Ascertain 
ship types and maintain contact.”306 The pilot replied at 0809, “Enemy is composed 
of five cruisers and five destroyers.” One minute later, an amplification was added 
that the enemy was accompanied by “what appears to be a carrier.”307 By 0800, the 
wind had weakened to a light breeze, four or five knots. This forced Nagumo’s car-
riers, to generate sufficient wind over their flight decks, to steam at twenty-one 
knots away from the enemy’s carriers in order to launch and recover. Visibility was 
thirty-five to forty miles, and the temperature was pleasantly cool (68–70 degrees 
Fahrenheit).308
By 0745, Nagumo had changed his mind about the second strike on Midway. 
He directed his force, “Prepare to carry out attack on enemy fleet units. Leave tor-
pedoes on those attack planes which have not as yet changed to bombs.” At that 
time, Akagi and Kaga were already thirty minutes into rearming their torpedo 
planes with 1,765-pound bombs; the process was more than half complete. Hence, 
Nagumo ordered that the rearming of the two other carriers’ torpedo planes be im-
mediately suspended and directed his whole force to prepare for a possible attack 
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on enemy ships. In addition, all the Zeros he had assigned as the escort for the sec-
ond strike on Midway were sent aloft to reinforce the CAP that had been launched 
against the repeated attacks by U.S. land-based aircraft. As a result, the only aircraft 
armed appropriately for an attack on ships and on the flight decks ready for takeoff 
were thirty-six dive-bombers of Hiryū and Sōryū. Nagumo believed that the risks 
of sending out an attack force without fighter protection were too great. Hence, he 
thought that the wiser course was first to recover both the Midway strike planes 
and the second-wave fighters that had been diverted to CAP and then, temporar-
ily retiring northward to avoid further air attack, to reorganize his forces. Finally, 
when all preparations were complete, Nagumo planned to turn around and destroy 
the enemy carrier force by an all-out attack.309 Admiral Yamaguchi of CarDiv 2 ad-
vised Nagumo to launch instead an immediate attack with aircraft until then held 
in reserve against the detected enemy carrier to the northeast. Nagumo ignored 
that advice and made a fateful decision to delay his attack until he was ready for a 
massive and coordinated strike.310 
Yamaguchi had extensive sea service. Prior to 1941 he had commanded in turn 
a light cruiser, heavy cruiser, and battleship, and the IJN’s first combined air group. 
He was known as a highly aggressive and competent but also hot-tempered officer 
—the epitome of the traditional samurai code. Yamaguchi had had misgivings 
about Nagumo’s ability to command the First Air Fleet. He had even gone so far as 
to complain to Ugaki that Nagumo lacked boldness.311 
At 0845, Nagumo sent a message to Yamamoto and Kondō, “Enemy force of one 
carrier, five cruisers and five destroyers discovered at 0800, bearing 010 degrees, 
distant 240 miles from Midway; we will head for it.” Nagumo expected to have 102 
aircraft ready for launching at 1030. Most of the fighters would have to be used to 
defend their own carriers; only twelve Zeros would be assigned to protect the at-
tacking dive-bombers.312 Yet his planned attack group had already broken down, 
because he had to recover the aircraft returning from their attack on Midway. To do 
that, Nagumo’s four carriers were grouped in a boxlike formation in the center of a 
screen of two battleships, three cruisers, and eleven destroyers.313
The attack by the U.S. aircraft was piecemeal (see map 9). The three air groups 
searched for the enemy independently. The fighter aircraft failed to protect slow 
torpedo planes from the enemy CAP. Hornet’s dive-bombers never found the en-
emy carriers.314 The lack of fighter cover, the poor visibility, the distance, the delay 
in locating the enemy force, and the Japanese tactics of concentrating their fight-
ers against slow torpedo bombers combined to prevent a coordinated attack by 
the Enterprise and Hornet air groups. Moreover, it resulted in heavy losses for the 
torpedo bombers.315 At 0920, Hornet’s torpedo bombers attacked without waiting 
for the arrival and support of dive-bombers. About eight miles from the carriers 
they were intercepted by the enemy fighters and were shot down one by one. Not a 
single torpedo bomber survived.316 Around 1000, torpedo bombers from Enterprise 
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Map 9
The Midway phase, 0900– 
2400, 4 June 1942
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and Yorktown attacked the enemy carriers, and they too met heavy opposition. En-
terprise lost ten out of fourteen torpedo bombers and Yorktown ten out of twelve. 
Yet, by accident, coordination of torpedo and dive-bomber attacks was almost 
achieved—the dive-bombers struck only a few minutes after the attack of the tor-
pedo bombers had ended.317 Of forty-one torpedo planes from three American car-
riers, all but six were lost. Nevertheless, the attacks by the torpedo bombers forced 
the enemy carriers to make radical evasion maneuvers, which in turn prevented 
them from launching more aircraft. Also, the torpedo bombers pulled Japanese 
fighters down to near sea level, enabling the dive-bombers that followed a few min-
utes later to attack virtually unopposed and to drop bombs on decks full of aircraft 
being refueled.318
At 1020, Nagumo ordered the launch of an attack group of thirty-six dive-
bombers (eighteen from Hiryū, eighteen from Sōryū), fifty-four torpedo bombers 
(eighteen each from Akagi and Kaga, nine each from Hiryū and Sōryū), and twelve 
fighters (three from each carrier). Yet just two minutes later, two dive-bomber 
squadrons from Enterprise and one dive-bomber squadron from Yorktown ap-
peared overhead. Within five or six minutes, three Japanese carriers were heavily 
damaged and left burning; Kaga received four bomb hits and five near misses; Sōryū 
and Akagi suffered three hits each.319 At 1046, Nagumo left Akagi and transferred 
his flag first to a destroyer (Nowaki) and then to a cruiser (Nagara). Five minutes 
later he sent a message to Yamamoto, “We plan to have Hiryū engage enemy carri-
ers; we are temporarily withdrawing to the north to assemble our forces.”320
By 1100 Admiral Yamaguchi had launched eighteen dive-bombers and eight 
fighters from Hiryū. They reached Yorktown at about noon and scored three bomb 
hits.321 Yorktown was heavily damaged and listing; soon the ship was dead in the 
water. At 1313, Fletcher shifted his flag to the cruiser Astoria. Spruance, observing 
the big, black cloud, assumed that Yorktown had been hit hard and dispatched two 
cruisers and two destroyers to help and provided fighter protection for the crippled 
carrier.322 Yorktown’s planes landed on Enterprise and Hornet and took part in all 
subsequent attacks.323 
In the meantime, at about noon, Kondō, acting on his own initiative, notified 
Yamamoto that his force was heading toward the First Mobile Force at twenty-eight 
knots. Some twenty minutes later, Yamamoto issued the following order: “All forces 
will operate as follows and attack the enemy in the Midway area; 1200 position of 
Main Body 35° 08ʹ N 171° 05ʹ W; course 120 degrees, speed 20 knots.” He directed 
Kondō to rendezvous with the First Mobile Force as soon as possible. The Midway 
Occupation Force was to detach part of its strength to cover the Transport Group 
and withdraw temporarily to the northwest. SubRons 3 and 5 were ordered to take 
positions along the Cordon C line.324 Yamamoto realized that though at that time he 
had two carriers left, only one was available for combat, Hiryū. That is the reason 
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that he directed Second Mobile Force to join Kondō’s main body. He also temporar-
ily postponed the landing on Midway and Kiska.325
At about 1310, Yamamoto directed Kondō’s main body to conduct a night bom-
bardment of Midway. This task was assigned to Rear Adm. Takeo Kurita’s Close Sup-
port Group. Kurita received that order at about 1500. He was at that time some four 
hundred miles west of Midway and his chances of reaching the target area before 
dawn were slim. In any case, he would have to withdraw during the daylight and 
would be vulnerable to the enemy’s air attack.326
Yamamoto also started to prepare his remaining forces for a night action. In 
Order No. 156, issued around 0950, he specified “Method C” a pre-scripted tactic 
stipulating engagement by the entire fleet, according to doctrine, with major ele-
ments of the enemy force moving westward. The Second Mobile Force would come 
under command of the main body, Second Fleet. SubRons 1, 3, and 5 would be un-
der the Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarines) commander. The Main Force 
operating in the Aleutians area would be joined by, presumably, the Guard Force.327
Spruance intended to destroy the remaining enemy carrier, Hiryū, but wanted to 
delay the attack until he learned its exact position.328 An element in the decision was 
that Enterprise and Hornet needed more time to get themselves organized and their 
planes rearmed and refueled.329 Browning contested Spruance’s decision and urged 
an immediate launch. Yet Spruance was adamant. For some reason, Spruance did 
not launch any search planes, either from the carriers or from cruisers. Spruance 
was content that someone else should find the enemy.330
By 1402 Yorktown had its flight deck operational and was able to steam at nine-
teen knots. However, ten torpedo bombers from Hiryū attacked Yorktown at 1445 
and scored two torpedo hits, causing complete loss of power. Within twenty min-
utes after being hit, the crew began to abandon the ship. However, Yorktown con-
tinued to float despite a heavy list.331 
At 1445 a Yorktown plane reported a Japanese force of one carrier plus other 
heavy ships and destroyers some 110 miles west of the U.S. forces. Spruance now 
finally gave the order to launch a second attack. However, Browning and staff car-
ried out the order poorly, although they had had plenty of time to prepare. The sec-
ond attack was launched not until 1515, or fully thirty minutes after the order was 
given. Someone on Spruance’s staff signaled Hornet that Spruance did not know 
the position of the enemy carrier whose planes were attacking Yorktown. Three 
minutes later Spruance’s staff sent Hornet a corrected message relaying the contact 
information received on board Enterprise a half-hour earlier. Still Hornet did not 
receive an order to attack, although Spruance had given the order to Browning thir-
ty minutes earlier. At 1530 Enterprise started to launch twenty-four dive-bombers, 
many of them survivors from Yorktown. Finally the staff sent a signal to Hornet at 
1539 to launch its attack group, less the fighters. Hornet started launching its planes 
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at 1605; sixteen dive-bombers were launched, while the fighters remained behind 
to protect the carriers. For the second time Browning and the staff failed to support 
properly Spruance at the most critical times. Obviously, the earlier raids by TF 16 
against weakly defended strongpoints in the Central Pacific had not prepared them 
for the much more demanding work of a carrier-versus-carrier engagement.332 
Now it was Hiryū’s turn to be attacked, by dive-bombers from TF 16’s carriers. 
At about 1700 Enterprise’s dive-bombers scored four, possibly five, bomb hits on 
Hiryū; Hornet’s planes scored no hits. By 1800, Hiryū was left ablaze and unable to 
operate aircraft. Kaga, abandoned at about 1640, exploded and sank at 1925; Sōryū 
sank at 1913; and two minutes later, Akagi was abandoned. 
Despite the horrendous losses of the day, Yamamoto sent a message at 1915 that 
read as follows: “The enemy fleet has been practically destroyed and is retiring east-
ward; Combined Fleet units in the vicinity are preparing to pursue the remnants 
of the enemy forces and, at the same time, to occupy Midway; the main body will 
reach 32° 08ʹ N 175° 45ʹ E at 0300 on 5 June; course 090°, speed twenty knots; the 
First Mobile Force, the Midway Occupation Force less CruDiv 7 and submarine 
force will immediately contact and attack enemy.”333 At 2340 Kondō issued an order 
for a night action: “The Midway Occupation Force, the main body will reach posi-
tion 30° 28ʹ N 178° 35ʹ W at 0300 on 5 June. Afterward, the searches will be con-
ducted eastward in an effort to engage the enemy at night. The First Mobile Force 
less Hiryū, Akagi, and their escorts will reverse course immediately and participate 
in the night engagement.”334
The Night of 4–5 June. At about 1845, Fletcher detached two cruisers, Vincennes 
and Pensacola, to join Spruance’s TF 16. He delegated responsibility for combat to 
Spruance; Fletcher would take charge of efforts to salvage Yorktown the next morn-
ing.335 But that evening Spruance lost contact with the enemy forces. Yorktown was 
nonoperational. TF 16’s carrier air groups had been decimated. No support from 
other forces was in sight. Spruance had to weigh the risks of pursuit versus possible 
damage to the enemy. In his report he wrote, “I did not feel justified in risking a 
night encounter with possibly superior enemy forces but on the other hand I did 
not want to be too far away from Midway the next morning. I wished to have a 
position from which either to follow up retreating enemy forces or to break up a 
landing attack on Midway.”336 Accordingly, at 1915 Spruance set TF 16 on a course 
to the east at a speed of fifteen knots.337
Spruance later said of his decision not to pursue the enemy force during the 
night of 4–5 June, “We had to keep moving because of the possible presence of en-
emy submarines. Our primary mission was still to prevent the capture of Midway. 
We did not know whether the enemy would continue with that task, or whether 
the loss of his three carriers, and the damage we had inflicted on the fourth, would 
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cause him to give up the attempt. Should I continue steaming west, with a view to 
overtaking and engaging the enemy? If I did this, we would run the risk of a gun 
engagement during the night with possible superior forces, at a time when our two 
aircraft carriers could not operate. . . . The Japanese were believed to have two fast 
battleships with their carrier force. The Japanese were reputed to be well trained in 
night gunnery and in night destroyer attacks.”338 Spruance turned back westward 
shortly after midnight on 5/4 June. 
Spruance was criticized for abandoning the pursuit. Yet he made a sound deci-
sion, because the Japanese had in fact started to concentrate their forces, leaving the 
transports almost unprotected. At 1400 on 4 June, Kondō’s force of four heavy cruis-
ers, two Kongō-class battleships, the light carrier Zuihō, and one destroyer squad-
ron changed course to the northeastward. By midnight Kondō was some 125 miles 
from Nagumo’s battleships and cruisers. Rear Adm. Raizō Tanaka, the commander 
of DesRon 2, with one light cruiser and ten destroyers, was not far behind. Had En-
terprise and Hornet sailed westward they would have run into the Japanese ships.339
Yamamoto’s Decision. At 0015 on 5 June, Yamamoto ordered Nagumo and Kondō, 
whose forces were, respectively, maneuvering for a night attack on the enemy car-
riers and a bombardment of Midway, to suspend these operations and join the 
main body: “The Midway Occupation Force (less the Transport Group presently 
standing by, but including CruDiv 7) and First Mobile Force (less Akagi, Hiryū, 
and their escorts) will join the Main Body at 0900 today. The Main Body will be 
in position 32° 08ʹ N 179° 01ʹ E; course 090 degrees speed 20 knots.”340 Yamamoto 
had learned that Kurita’s force’s position had been in error and that he could not 
possibly conduct a bombardment on schedule.341 At 0215, two heavy cruisers from 
Kurita’s Close Support Group, Mogami and Mikuma, collided while maneuvering 
to avoid a submarine contact; both were damaged, Mogami heavily. 
At 0255, Yamamoto sent a message canceling the Midway operation. He direct-
ed Kondō’s main body, the Midway Occupation Force, and the First Mobile Force 
(less Hiryū and its escorts) to refuel in the morning of 5 June. The Transport Group 
was directed to sail westward, out of range of aircraft from Midway.342 By the early 
morning, both Akagi and Hiryū had sunk. 
Attacks by Task Force 16 on 5 June. At daybreak on 5 June, TF 16 headed westward 
at fifteen knots and into bad flying weather. When the weather cleared, Spruance 
had a choice between two groups of enemy ships to attack, one west of Midway and 
the other northwest. Spruance chose to attack the one to the northwest, which was 
farther away but reportedly contained a crippled carrier and two battleships, one of 
them reported damaged.343 
At 1700, Spruance launched air searches out to 250 miles. His aircraft found two 
groups of the enemy ships to the southwest some forty miles apart. The southerly 
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group consisted of two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. The initial search report 
indicated that the other group consisted of one carrier and five destroyers; this was 
later corrected to one battleship and three destroyers, then to two heavy cruisers, 
one light cruiser, and two destroyers.344 The situation during the night of 5 June was 
not promising for inflicting further damage, so Spruance ordered TF 16 to turn 
westward and steam at fifteen knots for the rest of the night. Spruance ordered this 
slow speed because he did not want to run into enemy battleships; another reason 
was a shortage of fuel in his destroyers.345
The Final Actions. At 0510 on 6 June, TF 16 launched eight dive-bombers for a two-
hundred-mile search in the western semicircle. They made two contacts: at 0640 
on two heavy cruisers and two destroyers four hundred miles from Midway, and 
at 0645 the heavy cruisers Mikuma and Mogami, 435 miles from Midway. Hornet’s 
planes struck Mogami between 0930 and 1000. At 1140, the Enterprise group dis-
abled Mikuma. About 1500, Hornet launched a final attack that sank Mikuma and 
left Mogami gutted and abandoned.346 
In the morning on 6 June, the heavily damaged Yorktown was still afloat; the 
salvage parties were on board, the destroyer Hammann was secured alongside, 
and four other destroyers circled nearby to provide protection against submarines. 
However, a search plane from Chikuma sighted Yorktown and transmitted the in-
formation to the submarine I-168. At 1335, Yorktown and Hammann were hit with 
two torpedoes each; both sank, with considerable loss of life.347
In the midafternoon of 6 June, Yamamoto apparently renewed his hopes of 
fighting a decisive battle with the enemy carriers. He estimated that the enemy now 
had at least one carrier, two converted carriers, and several cruisers and destroyers. 
Should the enemy forces continue in pursuit, Kondō would be able to engage them 
in a night battle; alternatively, Yamamoto’s Main Force would be able to fight a deci-
sive battle the morning of 7 June. In Yamamoto’s mind, the key prerequisite for suc-
cess was to neutralize the enemy’s airpower. However, he was left with only about a 
hundred aircraft on board four light carriers (Hōshō, Zuihō, Ryūjō, and Junyō), aside 
from the seaplanes carried by battleships, cruisers, and seaplane tenders. Therefore, 
it would be necessary to lure the enemy force within the range of the fifty bombers 
on Wake Island. Yamamoto issued an order at 1500 to all ships: “Combined Fleet 
units operating in this area will catch and destroy the enemy task force within at-
tack range of air forces based on Wake Island. At 1530 from position 33° 24ʹ N 169° 
00ʹ E, the main body, First Mobile Force, and 2nd Section of BatDiv 3 will proceed 
on course 180 at 18 knots. The Guard Force will support Northern Area Force. The 
Eleventh Air Fleet will take every opportunity to attack the enemy.”348 
By sundown on 6 June, TF 16 was some four hundred miles west of Midway. Its 
pilots had seen three full days of action. Spruance had detached destroyers to be re-
fueled, and four of those remaining were low on fuel. This did not provide a margin 
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of safety in an area where enemy submarines were operating. There would be little 
gain in a stern chase, and if he continued westward, there was a good possibility of 
running into superior enemy forces. Spruance ordered a turn to the east.349 
The Aftermath. Because the enemy fleet was not detected and his destroyers were 
low on fuel, Yamamoto decided at about 0700 on 7 June to call off the attempt to 
reengage and instead to return to home waters.350 The Midway operation would end 
with the return of the Combined Fleet to its bases on 14 June.
On 8 June, Spruance broke off pursuit and steamed to the refueling rendezvous 
with TF 17. Nimitz ordered TF 16 to receive replacement aircraft for Enterprise and 
Hornet and then proceed northward to join with TF 8 to oppose Japanese forces 
reportedly converging on Dutch Harbor. When that report proved false, Nimitz 
ordered Spruance to return to Pearl Harbor.351
The Aleutians Phase
Just prior to and during (see map 10) the execution of the Aleutians operation, 
much of the information the Japanese received on the situation was obtained from 
aircraft launched by the seaplane tender Kimikawa Maru or submarines of SubRon 
1, which became part of Northern Area Force on 10 May. Three SubRon 1 subma-
rines were directed to the eastern part of the Aleutians to reconnoiter the islands 
of Chirikoff, Sitkinak, and Kodiak.352 These boats left the Kodiak area at the end of 
May and patrolled the waters off Seattle. The remainder of SubRon 1 left Japan in 
mid-May. Four boats were directed to patrol the approaches of, respectively, Dutch 
Harbor, Adak, Attu, and Kiska. After reconnoitering these areas they were to cruise 
along the southern side of the Aleutian chain from a point some three hundred 
nautical miles south of Kiska. By 4 June they had reached a point about two hun-
dred miles south of Dutch Harbor.353 
On the basis of this air and submarine reconnaissance, Admiral Hosogaya be-
lieved that Dutch Harbor could be easily captured. He believed (incorrectly) that 
Kiska and Attu had land defenses and patrol craft. Also, from intercepted radio 
messages, Hosogaya estimated that there were about twenty patrol aircraft and ten 
fighters based at Dutch Harbor. (In reality, there were only twelve patrol planes at 
Dutch Harbor, plus four patrol aircraft at Cold Bay and Sand Point. There were 
no fighters at Dutch Harbor, but there were twelve to seventeen at Fort Glenn on 
Unimak Island.) Hosogaya learned from radio intercept that after 5 June five enemy 
surface ships would be dispatched from Hawaii to reinforce the Aleutians. The evi-
dence of more ships at Dutch Harbor was only fragmentary. On 2 June, Hosogaya 
received an assessment from Japanese naval intelligence: “It seems that reinforce-
ment to the extent of sixteen patrol planes [has] been recently made. There are now 
two squadrons each in Kodiak and one at Sitka, operations of patrol aircraft based at 
Dutch Harbor are frequent; it is difficult to determine accurately the radius of these 
operations but it seems some three hundred miles.” The Japanese had a fair estimate 
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The Aleutians phase
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of the enemy strength on the Aleutians. However, they had no knowledge of the 
newly constructed Army airfield, or its assigned aircraft, at Fort Glenn on Unimak 
Island. This was to have an adverse effect on the operations of Admiral Hosogaya.354
The weather had a significant effect on the employment of Japanese carrier- 
based aircraft during the Aleutians operation. On 3 June, a low-pressure area 
was centered some four hundred miles due east of Dutch Harbor. Another low 
was about 150 miles northwest of Attu. There was between them a ridge of high 
pressure. Showers and low ceilings were characteristic of the weather except for 
the high-pressure ridge, where flying conditions were average. On 3 June av-
erage flying conditions prevailed in the Dutch Harbor area. The next day, how-
ever, a low-pressure area was centered northwest of Dutch Harbor; its relat-
ed frontal system was just west of Dutch Harbor and moving eastward—the 
same that had been in the vicinity of Attu the previous day. Yet another low- 
pressure area and frontal system was some 360 miles to the west of Dutch Harbor 
and moving also in an easterly direction. Dutch Harbor itself had low ceilings and 
reduced visibility due to fog. By 1530 of the 4th the first front had passed and the 
weather cleared; overcast gave way to scattered clouds at three thousand feet, and 
the visibility improved except for fog in scattered areas.355 
On 3 June, the Second Mobile Force made a run toward Dutch Harbor, elud-
ing U.S. search planes. By 0250 on the 4th, the Japanese carriers had reached their 
launching position 165 miles south of Dutch Harbor.356 The first strike was launched 
at about 0430 on 3 June. The attack group was composed of fifteen aircraft (six 
fighters and nine dive-bombers) from Ryūjō and twenty-one aircraft (nine fight-
ers and twelve bombers) from Junyō. The weather at the launch point was very 
unfavorable—poor visibility and low clouds (650 to 980 feet). For that reason, the 
carriers had to attack independently. Because of the bad weather, Junyō’s group had 
to turn back.357 Ryūjō’s group, however, found good weather, with a ten-thousand-
foot cloud ceiling, over Dutch Harbor. It struck shortly after 0807. The attack lasted 
about twenty minutes and inflicted considerable damage. A new strike at 0900 was 
ordered against five U.S. destroyers at Makushin Bay, on the northwest side of the 
same island, Unalaska. Second attack wave consisted of nine aircraft (three fighters 
and six dive bombers) from Ryūjō and twelve aircraft (six fighters and dive- 
bombers) each from Junyō. However, the weather there favored the defenders, and 
the Japanese aircraft were unable to locate the destroyers.358 The Japanese carriers 
and destroyers, which had approached Dutch Harbor to a distance of 130 miles, at 
around 1200, started their withdrawal. That day TF 8’s main body was some five 
hundred miles southeast of the Second Mobile Force but Theobald was unable to 
locate the enemy force. On 4 June he received word of a strike on Dutch Harbor. 
Theobald then, in the evening on 4 June, left the main body on board cruiser Nash-
ville and headed for Kodiak.359 
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In the meantime, on 4 June, the U.S. aircraft on Umnak, at Dutch Harbor, and 
at Cold Bay had lost contact with the Second Mobile Force. They tried to regain 
contact for days but ultimately failed. The enemy carriers were beyond their effec-
tive range. The situation in the Aleutians was very confusing and uncertain and 
produced many false reports. Not even Nimitz had full knowledge of the situation 
in the north.360
Rear Adm. Kakuji Kakuta’s Second Mobile Force refueled destroyers during 
the night of 4–5 June and changed course westward for Adak; he had received 
orders from Yamamoto to soften up the enemy defenses on the island. However, 
the fog became so thick that he had to reduce speed to nine knots. Bad weather 
was predicted to the west, but there would be good weather over Dutch Harbor. 
In fact at about 1200 on 5 June a reconnaissance aircraft from Ryūjō reported that 
weather conditions over Dutch Harbor were improving. So Kakuta decided to 
launch a second attack against Dutch Harbor. At 1600 his carriers launched thirty- 
two aircraft (eleven dive-bombers, six torpedo bombers, and fifteen fighters). The 
Japanese aircraft destroyed oil tanks, seaplane hangars, and other installations in 
the Dutch Harbor area. American pilots, however, finally detected the enemy car-
riers. Junyō’s group encountered on its way back some ten U.S. fighters east of 
Umnak Island. The Japanese claimed eight enemy planes shot down, of which 
four would be confirmed; Japanese losses were one fighter and four bombers.361 
Several Army heavy bombers sent to attack the carriers scored only several near 
misses.362 
The plan for the Aleutians operation underwent several changes after the First 
Mobile Force lost three carriers. At 0920 on 5 June, Yamamoto issued Operation 
Order No. 155, directing the Second Mobile Force to join the First Mobile Force 
in the Midway area. Some thirty minutes later Yamamoto issued his orders for a 
decisive battle using Method C, and temporarily suspended the Aleutians opera-
tion. The Second Mobile Force and DesRon 1 headed toward Midway. At 2355 on 
5 June (Tokyo time), Yamamoto canceled the attack on Midway. At 0700 on the 
6th the Second Mobile Force and DesRon 1 were returned to the Northern Area 
Force, by Combined Fleet Order No. 162. The same order directed that the North-
ern Area Force be reinforced by two battleships (Kirishima and Hiei) of BatDiv 3, 
the two heavy cruisers (Tone and Chikuma) of CruDiv 8, the four destroyers of 
DesDiv 4, one seaplane tender (Kamikawa Maru), and one light carrier (Zuihō). 
However, this order was canceled on 8 June.363 The Northern Area Force would in-
stead be reinforced by the other two battleships of BatDiv 3 (Kongō and Haruna), 
CruDiv 5 (Myōkō and Haguro), CruDiv 9 (Kitikami, Ōi), and Zuihō, plus, after 13 
June, one large carrier (Zuikaku) from CarDiv 5, the four destroyers from DesDiv 
20, three each from DesDiv 24 and DesDiv 27, and two fleet oilers (San Clemente 
Maru and Toa Maru), accompanied by one destroyer.364
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The Japanese landing forces moved eastward toward their assigned objectives 
in the western Aleutians under the cover of the weather front. Only the most 
fragmentary air reconnaissance was possible.365 In the morning on 5 June, the 
Adak-Attu Occupation Force reached a position about six hundred miles south-
west of Adak. Then an order was received from Hosogaya that the Aleutians 
operation had been temporarily suspended and that DesRon 1 was to sail south 
to take part in the Midway operation. However, the next day, at about 1300, an 
order was received from Yamamoto that the Northern Area Force was to resume 
the Aleutians operation according to Alternative Plan No. 5.366 This plan, drawn 
up in case the landing at Adak was canceled, envisaged that the Adak-Attu Oc-
cupation Force would invade only Kiska and Attu. The Second Mobile Force 
would be tasked to destroy installations on Adak.367 The Adak-Attu Occupa-
tion Force turned back and proceeded to Attu. Some 1,200 Japanese troops were 
landed at Holtz Bay during the morning of 7 June. However, because of the 
dense fog, a part of the landing force struck Massacre Bay instead, capturing 
the entire population of some forty Aleuts, including fifteen children, and two 
Americans. 
The Kiska Occupation Force, augmented by one seaplane tender and one de-
stroyer from the Adak-Attu Occupation Force, proceeded according to the plan 
and landed on Kiska on 7 June. There was no opposition; only ten members of 
the U.S. weather station were on the island.368
Upon the news of the Japanese landings on Attu and Kiska, a U.S. seaplane 
tender with PBYs headed toward Atka Island (in the Andreanof group), halfway 
between Dutch Harbor and Kiska. On 10 June, the PBYs discovered four enemy 
ships in Kiska Harbor and a tent colony on Attu. This was the first indication for 
the American commanders of the Japanese presence in the western Aleutians. 
After receiving these reports, Nimitz promptly ordered a submarine group to 
move toward the western Aleutians. He also directed the PBYs with the seaplane 
tender then at Nazan Bay, on Atka, and Army bombers at Cold Bay to bomb 
enemy positions. These attacks were conducted over two days but had no effect 
on the Japanese. On 14 June, the Japanese moved their flying boats from Para-
mushiro to Kiska and then attacked the U.S. positions at Nazan Bay.369
In the aftermath of the battle of Midway, Nimitz intended to send the carriers 
Enterprise and Hornet to rendezvous with Saratoga, take on replacement planes, 
and proceed north to engage the Japanese. Theobald came ashore at Kodiak on 
8 June to confer with his commanders on how to destroy the Japanese force. 
Returning to his flagship, he sailed south of Kodiak. On 10 June he learned that 
Enterprise and Hornet would not come north and that the enemy had already oc-
cupied Kiska and Attu. Theobald again went ashore on Kodiak so that he could 
be better informed on the situation and make necessary decisions.370
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The Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska did not remain uncontested by the 
Allies. The U.S. surface forces, submarines, and Army aircraft were involved in a 
series of skirmishes with the enemy forces in the summer of 1942 and in the winter/ 
spring of 1943. In August 1942, the Army established an air base on Adak Island. 
The largest action was the battle of the Komandorski Islands on 26 March 1943. 
Then, a cruiser/destroyer force (one heavy and one light cruiser and four destroy-
ers) under Rear Adm. Charles McMorris tried to destroy a Japanese convoy (three 
transports, one light cruiser, and three destroyers) accompanied by a cruiser/ 
destroyer force (two heavy cruisers and one light cruiser and two destroyers) under 
Admiral Hosogaya. During the battle two Japanese cruisers were damaged; one U.S. 
cruiser and two destroyers also suffered some damage. The battle represented an 
Allied victory, because the Japanese stopped resupplying their garrisons on Kiska 
and Attu with surface ships and only occasionally used their submarines. Because 
of the remoteness of the area and the difficult weather conditions the Allies were 
unable to recapture the western Aleutians until mid-1943. On 11 May, the Allied 
forces invaded Attu; all enemy resistance ended on 29 May. The Allies invaded 
Kiska with some thirty-four thousand troops on 15 August 1943, only to find that 
the Japanese forces had been secretly evacuated on 28 July. The U.S. Army aircraft 
had bombed abandoned positions for almost three weeks. Afterward, until the end 
of the war, the Allies used the bases in the western Aleutians to mount numerous 
air raids against the Japanese forces deployed in the Kurils. The Japanese were also 
forced to deploy relatively large ground forces and aircraft to the Kurils because of 
fear of Allied invasion.
Results and Aftermath
Japanese losses in the Midway operation were extremely high. They had lost four 
frontline carriers, 253 aircraft, and one heavy cruiser. In addition, one heavy cruiser 
had been heavily damaged and one destroyer had suffered moderate damage, while 
one battleship, destroyer, and oiler had suffered slight damage. Some sources claim 
that the Japanese lost 332 aircraft, including 280 that went down with the carriers.371 
About 150 Japanese pilots were saved, but the Japanese had lost some 3,500 men. In 
contrast the United States had only ninety-two officers and 215 men killed. How-
ever, three carrier air groups had been decimated.372 American losses in aircraft had 
been heavy—147 shot down.373 
The IJN and the government faced a serious problem regarding how to present 
the news of the losses at Midway to the Japanese public. On 10 June, the IJN briefed 
the Imperial Liaison Conference on the results of the Midway operation. The deci-
sion was made there to conceal the true extent of the catastrophe. Except for Em-
peror Hirohito and top members of the court, few civilians were told the extent of 
the Japanese losses.374 The Midway operation was described to the public as a major 
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victory. On 10 June, the Navy Ministry was directed to list Japanese losses as one 
carrier sunk, one carrier and cruiser heavily damaged, and thirty-five aircraft lost. 
Five days later, Admiral Ugaki announced that “except for those made public by the 
Naval General Staff nothing should be revealed about the Midway and the Aleutian 
operations within as well as outside of the Navy.” The navy informed its rank and 
file that the carrier Kaga had been sunk and the carrier Sōryū and heavy cruiser 
Mikuma heavily damaged. The ships’ names would not be announced publicly. 
Eventually a directive was issued that the names of Kaga, Sōryū, and Mikuma 
would be struck from the register at a suitable opportunity and that Akagi and 
Hiryū would remain on the register but listed as unmanned. The names of those 
killed in action would be gradually released to the families but without mentioning 
the names of the ships on which they had served.375 
Conclusion and Operational Lessons Learned
The Japanese conducted the Midway-Aleutians operation in two separate but ad-
jacent theaters of operations. Both operations were almost purely naval, although 
some army units took part in each. In contrast, the U.S. defense of Midway (and the 
Hawaii area) and the Aleutians (and Alaska area) was a more multiservice, or joint, 
effort. Yet the U.S. Pacific Fleet had a dominant role in both operations. 
The Midway-Aleutians operation was an all-or-nothing effort on the part of 
Yamamoto to force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to come out and fight a decisive battle. He 
achieved that purpose but was himself decisively beaten. In what is popularly called 
the battle of Midway of 4–7 June 1942, the IJN lost four large carriers, with many 
aircraft and combat-experienced pilots. These losses were hard to replace. However, 
most important of all was that the battle of Midway marked the beginning of the 
end for the IJN. Its aura of invincibility was shattered, for all to see. The battle of 
Midway represented the turn of the tide in the war in the Pacific and began a chain 
of events that eventually led to the unconditional surrender of Japan in August 1945.
Formally, the Naval General Staff was solely responsible for developing strat-
egy and strategic planning in the IJN. However, that responsibility was in practice 
shared with the Combined Fleet staff, led by Admiral Yamamoto. Because of his 
enormous prestige and influence in the IJN, especially in the aftermath of the high-
ly successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto dominated Japanese naval 
strategy in the spring of 1942. Yamamoto too often imposed his will on the Naval 
General Staff. Among his biggest flaws as a naval operational commander were 
rigidity in planning, a propensity to fragment and then widely disperse major force 
elements, and attempts to accomplish multiple objectives almost simulta neously. 
Yamamoto applied the principle of using overwhelming force at the decisive time 
and place to an extreme. The operation as ordered by the Imperial General Head-
quarters represented a compromise between the Combined Fleet and the Naval 
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General Staff—a dual major offensive naval/joint operation conducted over vast 
distances. IGHQ made a major error in ordering both operations to be conducted 
simultaneously instead of sequencing them, scheduling the Aleutians operation for 
some time after the successful completion of the Midway operation. 
Strategic or operational objectives should be determined on the basis of thorough 
analysis of the enemy’s factors of space, time, and force. The operational command-
ers and their staffs should then evaluate friendly factors of space, time, and force, 
and balance them, individually and collectively, with the respective strategic or op-
erational objectives. Any serious imbalance or disconnect should result in either the 
scaling down, modification, or even change or abandonment of a particular strategic 
or operational objective; otherwise, there will be a danger of a serious setback or even 
defeat. The strategic level of command alone should determine strategic objectives to 
be accomplished; operational commanders should not be allowed to drive—or worse, 
dominate—the determination of strategic objectives or the timing of their accomplish-
ment. The planning process at each level of command should be centralized, but the 
execution of the plan should be decentralized. This is especially critical at the stra-
tegic and operational levels; otherwise, the result is a compromise plan and greatly 
increased likelihood of failure.
The Japanese plans for both the Midway and the Aleutians operations were 
overly complex. Their execution was based on a rigid timetable. This rigidity in 
thinking is also shown in the prescribed methods for fighting a “decisive battle.” 
Several such methods were prepared for the Midway operation, each based on a 
scripted scenario rather than a running estimate, in case of radical changes in the 
tactical or operational situation. Hence, the flexibility necessary to react to unfore-
seen events and fleeting opportunities was sorely lacking. Operation plans should 
be simple and flexible. The more complex the plan, the higher the likelihood of fail-
ure. Pre-scripted responses to drastic changes in the operational or tactical situation 
should be avoided. Maximum freedom of action should be given to commanders on 
the scene of action to make decisions based on the situation as it develops. 
The original operational idea envisaged using the landing on Midway as a lure 
to the U.S. Pacific Fleet to come out and engage in a decisive battle. However, this 
operational objective was violated because the First Mobile Force was tied to a cer-
tain location for two days and thereby lost flexibility of movement. The reason was 
a faulty assumption about the enemy’s possible reaction. Yamamoto believed that 
the enemy force would not depart its base until after Midway had been attacked. 
Yet the destruction of the enemy’s carrier forces—the true enemy operational cen-
ter of gravity—should have been the main objective, and everything else should 
have been subordinate to that. 
A defective and inadequate pre-invasion scouting and reconnaissance plan lost 
any opportunity to give warning of the enemy fleet when the submarines were 
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delayed for two days in getting under way. The K operation therefore became criti-
cally important for success, but it failed, because it was too rigidly planned to allow 
an alternative when the original plan could not be carried out. 
The Japanese assumptions about the enemy’s strength and probable reactions were 
in general overoptimistic. The enemy was supposed to respond according to the Japa-
nese expectations. Admiral Yamamoto presumed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet was al-
ready beaten and that all that was required was to draw the American carrier forces out 
to where their destruction could be completed. The plan for the Midway-Aleutians 
operation was based on the idea of achieving this quickly by massing the overwhelm-
ing strength of the Combined Fleet against the enemy’s strongest force at the decisive 
place and time. The Combined Fleet’s planners properly determined that the ultimate 
objective in the Midway operation was the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s carrier striking force, 
whose destruction would achieve the operational objective of the entire operation—
sea control of the eastern part of the Central and North Pacific. The strategic effect of 
defeating the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be, they assessed, to force the United States to 
seek a negotiated peace with Japan. 
In contrast, the ultimate objective of the Aleutians operation, although opera-
tional in its scale, was temporary in terms of duration. The Japanese intended only 
to occupy temporarily certain key positions in the western Aleutians. Another, 
less important, objective was to draw enemy forces northward from the Midway- 
Hawaii area—which would seem to contradict Yamamoto’s intent of defeating a major 
part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a decisive battle. 
Yamamoto made an unsound operational decision in employing all the available 
strength of the Combined Fleet for the Midway-Aleutians operation. In doing so he 
observed the principle of mass but grossly violated the principle of economy of effort. 
The commitment of a major part of the—not the entire—Combined Fleet would have 
been sufficient (provided that a sound plan was prepared and skillfully executed) to 
accomplish the principal objective in both operations. Also, his planners showed a 
bias toward major surface forces by employing all their available battleships and heavy 
cruisers. For example, the landing on Midway could have succeeded without the pres-
ence of the main body, Second Fleet, with its battleships and cruisers. Likewise, the 
inclusion of the Guard Force of battleships and cruisers is hard to justify, especially 
since it was deployed beyond supporting distance of the very forces it was supposed to 
support. Finally, Yamamoto himself should have remained in Tokyo to exercise overall 
control over the Combined Fleet, not gone to sea with the Main Force. 
The operational commander should make judicious decisions in determining the 
size, type, and mix of forces required to accomplish the ultimate objective of a major 
operation or campaign. Normally, not all available forces should be employed; the 
principle of economy of effort should be applied. Unnecessarily large forces greatly 
complicate the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation.
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The operational idea for the Midway operation lacked creativeness. It was in 
some ways very similar to the ill-fated Port Moresby–Solomons operation. In 
both cases the amphibious landing was to “lure” the enemy out for a “decisive 
battle,” in which it was a given that the Japanese would be victorious. The Japa-
nese apparently did not consider, or prepare a plan for, operational deception. 
The operational idea (scheme) for a major operation should be creative and there-
by avoid past patterns. It should ensure the speed of execution of an operation. It 
should present the enemy with multiple threats. A sound operational idea should 
also include whenever possible operational deception. No one is strong enough at a 
decisive place and time.
In planning for the Midway operation, the Japanese violated the principle of 
objective, as noted above, by tying the First Mobile Force for two days to an area 
northwest of Midway. They allowed a rigid timetable for the landing to restrict 
severely the First Mobile Force’s movements just when the need to engage enemy 
carriers required from Nagumo flexibility in handling his carrier groups. The 
accomplishment of the ultimate operational objective should dominate at all times 
both the planning and the execution of a major operation. Major or minor tactical 
objectives should not be allowed to endanger the accomplishment of the ultimate 
objective. Major tactical commanders should have sufficient freedom to act—that 
is, authority to modify or change tasks, as long as they remain within the frame-
work of the higher commander’s intent.
The timing of the entire Midway-Aleutians operation was based on condi-
tions—specifically, the phase of the moon—favorable to the landing. Yet the 
landing was only a major tactical objective and hence secondary to the ultimate 
objective of the Midway operation, obtaining sea control through the destruction 
of the enemy carrier striking forces. Major and minor tactical objectives that are 
not part of the operational objective have lesser importance. The timing of the entire 
major operation should not be based on the conditions required to accomplish such 
subordinate objectives. 
The Japanese expected that their attack on Midway would surprise the enemy. 
They made a fatal miscalculation in assuming, as has been seen, that the enemy 
would not react until the landing took place. Apparently, no thought was given 
to the possibility that this assumption might be wrong. Success should not depend 
solely on achieving surprise. The commander should not assume that certain things 
will not happen without accurate and reliable knowledge of the enemy plans and 
movements.
The Japanese underestimation of the enemy and overestimation of the enemy’s 
likelihood of following the Japanese narrative were shown in the planning for the 
Midway-Aleutians operation. The plan included “sequels” (actions to be taken 
after a given objective is accomplished) but not “branches” (alternative courses 
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of action should the original plan be derailed or be rendered unexecutable by 
enemy action or one’s own mistakes). A sound operation plan should invariably 
include alternative plans, or branches. No plan survives the first contact with the 
enemy. The enemy has a will of his own and can act and react unpredictably, even 
in ways that one might perceive as irrational. 
The Japanese commanders had fairly good knowledge of the situation on Ha-
waii and Midway but not of precise locations and movements of the enemy carri-
ers. The Japanese continuously monitored radio transmissions, but their inability 
to break the U.S. codes greatly limited their ability to learn the enemy’s inten-
tions. For the Aleutians, their knowledge of the situation was very rudimentary. 
The majority of the Japanese forces assigned to the Midway-Aleutians operation 
were deployed and in combat almost continuously between the end of November 
1941 and the end of April 1942. In addition, one carrier group with its escort, 
which had taken part in the Port Moresby–Solomons operation, did not return 
to home waters until the third week in May 1942. The Combined Fleet urgently 
required an “operational pause,” a period between the end of one major operation 
and the start of the next. All its forces, the carriers in particular, had to undergo 
maintenance and repairs and to replace personnel. They also needed sufficient 
time for rehearsals of the plans for the Midway-Aleutians operation, in a series 
of small and large exercises. Yet Yamamoto was unwilling to change the N-Day 
to allow all this. The result was that most of the Combined Fleet was not prop-
erly prepared for Midway and the Aleutians operations. Operational commanders 
should ensure that adequate time is given to preparing their forces for forthcoming 
operations. Otherwise, no matter how good the plan, the entire effort might well 
fail. The timing of the operation should be based also on the time needed for prepa-
rations rather than on other factors. 
The Combined Fleet prepared and conducted a four-day war game to test the 
plan for the Midway-Aleutians operations. However, the game’s entire scenario 
was pre-scripted and therefore of limited value. The war game was essentially 
used to justify the plan as presented by Ugaki and his planners. The war game was 
not used to assess objectively the overall plan and its main elements and identify 
its weaknesses, so as to make necessary changes. War games when properly under-
stood and conducted can be extremely useful in identifying the weaknesses in plans 
and orders. Pre-scripted outcomes should not be used to justify decisions already 
made or to confirm validity of plans. Concerns expressed by the participants of a 
war game should be given fair hearings and not simply dismissed.
In contrast to the Japanese, the American command organization ensured unity 
of effort by achieving unity of command. Nimitz was both a theater-strategic and 
operational commander. He had full operational control of the Navy and Army 
forces within his area of responsibility. As the CINCPac he also had full command 
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and control over all task forces—that is, major tactical commanders. He was 
nominally subordinate not only to the JCS but also to Admiral King, who was 
COMINCH/CNO. The theater commands should be established in advance, prefer-
ably in peacetime. This is the only proven way to ensure centralized planning of cam-
paigns and of major operations, and then their decentralized execution. Theater com-
mand also ensures centralization of all theaterwide functions, such as intelligence, 
logistics, and protection. Normally, however, a theater-strategic commander should not 
be at the same time theater-of-operations commander or the commander of theater/ 
numbered forces. 
The American operational and tactical commanders had knowledge and un-
derstanding of the situation much superior to those of their Japanese counterparts. 
COMINT proved its value by giving Nimitz and King accurate, timely, and reli-
able knowledge of the enemy’s current and future operations. This in turn allowed 
Nimitz and his staff to fuse tactical and strategic information into operational 
intelligence. Without his firm belief in the accuracy of information provided by 
Rochefort and Layton, Nimitz would not have been able to concentrate in time 
his numerically smaller forces in the Hawaii-Midway area. Using the information 
obtained by COMINT, Nimitz and King made a number of organizational and 
operational decisions in May 1942 that would significantly contribute to the suc-
cessful defense of the Hawaii-Midway area and the Aleutians. Knowledge of the 
enemy’s intentions through decryption of messages is of inestimable value for timely 
and sound operational decisions prior to the start of a major operation or campaign. 
Yet COMINT has little value once combat actions start. Once the opposing forces are 
in contact, the outcome depends on the speed and soundness of the commanders’ deci-
sions, on their judgment and experience, and on the skills and courage of the sailors 
and airmen. One should be always aware that a clever enemy might use messages 
to gain a decisive advantage by feigning intentions—that is, practicing deception to 
achieve surprise. 
Nimitz’s operational plans for defense of Hawaii-Midway and the Aleutians 
were short, simple, and straightforward. They were also flexible in execution. They 
were largely based on the information gained from COMINT. One could take is-
sue, however, with Nimitz’s decision to detach cruisers/destroyers to TF 8. The 
Japanese forces assigned to the Northern Area Force were both numerically and 
qualitatively superior, so assigning a few more cruisers and destroyers to Admi-
ral Theobald would not make any difference. These ships were badly needed for 
protection of the carriers in the Hawaii-Midway area. In contrast to the American 
plans, the Japanese plan for the Midway operation began to unravel almost at the 
very beginning. The cancellation of the second K operation made it impossible to 
obtain critically important reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor. The scout submarines, 
having reached their assigned patrolling lines two days late, missed the transit of 
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the enemy carrier forces to their operating area north of Midway. Timely informa-
tion on the whereabouts and movements of the enemy forces is critical for the success 
of a major operation. Optimally, such information should be obtained from diverse 
sources. Reliance on a single source of information should be avoided.
The Japanese forces were separated by several hundreds of miles—that is, 
they were beyond mutually supporting distances. All had to maintain strict radio 
silence. Yamamoto was for all practical purposes an observer from the time the 
Main Force left its base until the first encounter with enemy forces. One’s force ele-
ments should be deployed within mutually supporting distances of other forces; other-
wise, the entire operation might result in a serious setback or even defeat.
The most decisive event in the entire Midway operation was the clash of the 
opposing carrier forces on 4 June. Spruance made a quick and sound decision to 
launch a full-load attack against the enemy carriers. This decision was risky, be-
cause the enemy carriers were some 155 miles away and the maximum effective 
range of the U.S. carrier aircraft was only about 175 miles. By sheer coincidence, 
when the U.S. aircraft came over their targets the Japanese carriers had their decks 
full of aircraft being prepared to strike. The first attacks resulted in fatal damage to 
three out of four Japanese carriers. 
Nagumo’s performance on 4 June has been much criticized, and justifiably 
so. He clearly did not act with the speed and aggressiveness that the situation de-
manded. One error was that he did not employ an adequate search disposition in 
the morning of 4 June. If he had used two-plane searches, the enemy force would 
probably have been detected. He made initially a sound decision to withhold half 
of his air group in reserve in case the need arose to engage enemy surface forces; 
the other half was sent to attack Midway. However, a more serious mistake was as-
sembling the strikes from proportionate numbers of aircraft from each carrier. Al-
though this considerably increased the speed for launching and recovering aircraft 
it also greatly increased the vulnerability of the entire First Mobile Force in case of 
a sudden appearance of the enemy carrier force. The Japanese were too sure that 
the enemy carriers would appear only after the landing on Midway. A much better 
solution would have been to have each group composed of aircraft from only two 
carriers. Obviously, however, Nagumo’s single greatest error was his decision to 
complete the recovery and rearming of the air group that had attacked Midway and 
only then launch an all-out attack, with aircraft from all four carriers. He should 
have launched an immediate attack on the enemy carrier force with all available air-
craft (at the time he made the decision Nagumo knew about the presence of only a 
single carrier force), regardless of whether they were properly armed and protected 
by fighters or not. This decision is difficult to justify, because at the time Nagumo 
knew that only a single enemy carrier was present, not all three. As it happened, 
when the enemy aircraft attacked, Nagumo’s carriers were caught flat-footed and 
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eventually all four were sunk. Yet this outcome of the clash between the opposing 
carrier forces was not by any means preordained. Had Spruance or Nagumo made 
different decisions at critical times, the results for each side would have been prob-
ably different too. 
Operational commanders should make quick and good decisions instead of wait-
ing and making the “best” one. Normally, the best way to proceed is to use overwhelm-
ing force at the decisive place and time. Even this tenet should not be dogmatically 
applied, however; commanders base their decisions on the facts of the situation. Very 
often speed of action is much more important than mass. Also, the validity of a com-
mander’s decision should be evaluated on the basis not of knowledge gained after the 
fact but of that which a commander had at the time. 
Spruance was unjustifiably criticized by some for not pursuing the enemy car-
rier force in the night of 4–5 June. Yet Spruance made the right call, in tempo-
rarily withdrawing eastward rather than risking a night encounter with a much 
stronger force. Spruance had no way of knowing that Yamamoto had in fact di-
rected several major groups, including battleships, to seek a decisive battle with 
him; nor did Spruance know precisely at that stage of the war how superior the 
Japanese really were in night gunnery and torpedo tactics. His decision can be 
simply explained by his sense that TF 16, with its six cruisers and nine destroyers, 
was not a match for any enemy force that included battleships, heavy cruisers, 
and destroyers in a night engagement. 
In the Aleutians, the Japanese were relatively more successful than in the Mid-
way operation. With the exception of attack on Adak, they accomplished all the 
objectives stipulated in their plan. The Japanese superiority over the weak U.S. 
forces was overwhelming. Yet Admiral Theobald facilitated their success by fo-
cusing on the defense of the eastern, rather than western, Aleutians. The reason 
was Theobald’s rejection of the intelligence obtained through COMINT and re-
ceived through his superior, Nimitz. Theobald decided to be his own intelligence 
officer and proceeded to base his decisions on false assumptions. Subordinate 
commanders should integrate intelligence received from the higher commander, in 
the absence of their own sources of information on the enemy. They should not 
make planning assumptions based on little or no knowledge of the enemy or their 
intuition. 
One of the major reasons the Japanese met defeat in the Midway operation was 
their almost unbounded faith in their own superiority and omnipotence. They 
convinced themselves that in any encounter with the U.S. Pacific Fleet their success 
was ensured. In both the planning and the execution of the Midway-Aleutians opera-
tion, Yamamoto failed as the operational commander. The outcome of the Midway- 
Aleutians operation is a classic case of how superiority can be easily squandered 
if the operational commander thinks tactically rather than operationally. 
N O T E S
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Professional arrogance is a dangerous trait. It often leads to hubris, a complete loss 
of connection with reality. No enemy should ever be underestimated. He has a will 
of his own and will not conform to one’s expectations. Even enormous technological 
and numerical superiority is often inadequate in itself to ensure success in a major 
operation or campaign. One of the first and foremost prerequisites of success for the 
operational commander is to maintain an operational, vice tactical, perspective on 
the situation. The outcome of any war—and war at sea is no exception—depends 
primarily on the quality of the human factor, not on one’s technological or numerical 
superiority.
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III Japanese A-Go Operation (Battle of the 
Philippine Sea), 13–22 June 1944 
Situation and Theater
The Japanese A-Go operation was activated on 13 June as a reaction to the U.S. invasion of the southern Marianas (Operation FORAGER). The entire operation lasted about ten days. The Japanese forces consisted of nine 
carriers with 473 aircraft, some 630 land-based naval aircraft, about fifty surface 
combatants, and twenty-two submarines. The U.S. forces that initially took part 
in FORAGER consisted of some 67,500 troops and some 550 ships (not including 
logistical support and underway-replenishment ships).1 The U.S. forces included 
fifteen large and light carriers, with about 950 aircraft, and seven escort carriers, 
with about 170 aircraft, plus about 180 other surface combatants and twenty-eight 
submarines. In addition, the United States had about 880 aircraft based in the Gil-
berts and the Marshalls, though relatively few took part in the invasion of Saipan. 
The Japanese were strategically on the defensive, but the A-Go operation it-
self was a major naval offensive operation, aimed at denying local sea control to 
the enemy. In contrast, the United States was strategically on the offensive, with a 
major amphibious landing under way; the Fifth Fleet conducted a major defensive 
naval operation aimed to maintain local sea control around the southern Marianas. 
The clash between the opposing carrier forces on 19–20 June resulted in a decisive 
victory for the Fifth Fleet. However, the Fifth Fleet’s operational objective was not 
consolidated, because the enemy fleet escaped, if much weakened, to fight another 
day. The planning and execution of the A-Go operation and the battle of the Philip-
pine Sea by the respective sides are rich in lessons that are valid even eighty years 
after the event and will remain so for many years in the future.
Strategic Background 
The United States developed a series of plans from 1924 through 1938 that contem-
plated an advance across the Central Pacific in case of war with Japan. These plans 
were code-named ORANGE. The planners assumed that it would be essential to es-
tablish subsidiary U.S. bases in the Japanese mandated islands for the purpose of 
protecting the line of communications between the Philippines and the continental 
United States. It was generally agreed that bases in the Marshalls and probably in 
the Carolines would have to be seized to facilitate the advance of the U.S. fleet to 
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the Philippines or to protect its lines of communications in the western Pacific. The 
Marianas played a marginal role in these considerations, because they were north 
of the main strategic axis (direction) from Hawaii to the Philippines. These plans 
were the first rudiments of the wartime Central Pacific strategy.2 
All U.S. prewar plans were prepared under the assumption that the United States 
would be engaged in a war with Japan alone. However, with the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September 1939 and gradual strengthening of links with Great Britain, 
this assumption became invalid. It became necessary for the United States to reach 
agreement with its potential allies in anticipation of its actual entry into the war 
against the Axis.3 Hence, the American, British, and Canadian staff representatives 
met in Washington, D.C., on 29 January 1941 (the ABC-1 conference) to discuss 
possible strategies should the United States become an active participant in a war.4 
They agreed that “should the United States be compelled to resort to war” the At-
lantic and European area would be considered the “decisive theater,” because Ger-
many was the predominant member of the enemy coalition. This was the genesis 
of the “beat Germany first” concept, which would remain the basic strategy of the 
Western Allies until 8 May 1945.5
In April 1941, the U.S. Joint Board set about bringing its own plans up to date in 
light of these conversations. The resulting new strategic plan, RAINBOW 5, merely 
restated the decision of ABC-1 and assigned more specific tasks to U.S. forces. Ger-
many would be defeated first; the Philippines would be held as long as possible; the 
U.S. fleet would prepare to capture positions in the Marshalls and Carolines.
During the TRIDENT conference, held in Washington, D.C., on 12–27 May 
1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) and the British prime minister, 
Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965), and their military advisers discussed the situ-
ation in the Mediterranean theater, Burma, and China. They also reaffirmed their 
determination to get on with the war in the Central Pacific. On 14 May 1943, the 
American representatives circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) a paper, 
drawn up by the various subcommittees of the U.S. Joint Staff, entitled “Strategic 
Plan for the Defeat of Japan.” Actually, the paper was more an estimate than a plan. 
The main strategic principles endorsed by the highest American planners for the 
war in the Pacific in 1943–44 assumed that to bring about the unconditional surren-
der of Japan it would be necessary to obtain a foothold in China, so as to make best 
use of that country’s enormous manpower and to establish air bases from which to 
conduct the strategic bombing of Japan. China’s mainland could be entered from 
the west, through Burma, or from the south, through the Strait of Malacca, the 
South China Sea, and Hong Kong. Another axis of advance was across the Pacific 
through the Celebes Sea to Hong Kong. The American planners envisaged a two-
pronged approach to the Celebes Sea and Hong Kong: a westward advance from 
Hawaii through the Central Pacific, and a westward advance from the Solomons 
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Archipelago to the Bismarcks, then northward along the eastern coast of New Guinea. 
They selected the advance across the Central Pacific to receive the main effort. 
Adm. Ernest J. King (1878–1956), Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Com-
mander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH), was the strongest advocate of 
the drive through the Central Pacific. He was especially keen for the capture of the 
Marianas. King argued that for many years prior to the war students at the Naval 
War College in Newport, Rhode Island, had studied the problem of supporting or 
recovering the Philippines as a prerequisite for defeating Japan. The advance from 
Hawaii to the Philippines via the Central Pacific had been considered the best ap-
proach. King firmly believed that the Marianas were the key to the western Pacific. 
Their capture would seriously endanger the Japanese sea lines of communications. 
Moreover, it would most likely bring the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) into a deci-
sive battle. The Marianas would also provide bases from which to attack the Japa-
nese home islands. 
In the final session of the TRIDENT conference on 27 May, the CCS did not com-
mit itself specifically to an invasion of the Marianas. However, its members agreed 
to the proposed two-pronged advance across the Pacific. They also agreed that the 
Allied strategic objectives in 1943–44 should be air operations in and out of China; 
ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians; seizure of the Marshalls and the Caro-
lines; capture of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and New Guinea; and 
intensification of operations against enemy lines of communications. 
In July 1943, the Allies modified their plans for the Central Pacific drive, hav-
ing realized that a direct assault on the Marshalls from Hawaii would require more 
shipping and troops than were available. It might have also required draining forces 
from Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Another reason 
was the need to obtain much better aerial photography of the Marshalls before 
invading them; very little was known about the enemy defenses there. Hence, the 
Gilberts were selected as the initial operational objective in the projected Central 
Pacific campaign. This island group would provide air bases for photographic re-
connaissance of the Marshalls. The Joint Chiefs directed Adm. Chester W. Nimitz 
(1885–1966), Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) and Com-
mander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPac), on 20 July 1943 to capture 
Tarawa in the Gilberts and Nauru as a preliminary to the invasion of the Marshalls. 
The target date for the invasion of the Gilberts (Operation GALVANIC) was set for 
15 November 1943.
During a conference at Quebec (QUADRANT) on 17–24 August 1943, the Allied 
leaders accepted the revised plan for the Central Pacific. This included capture of 
the Marshalls, Ponape, Woleai, and Truk in the Carolines; development of Truk as 
a major fleet base; and capture of Yap and the Palaus. At Admiral King’s insistence, 
the Marianas were included as a possible alternative to the Palaus or as a concurrent 
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operation. Nimitz proposed substituting Makin, in the Gilberts, for Nauru, as being 
closer to the Marshalls. That recommendation was accepted—Nimitz was autho-
rized to seize Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama in the Gilberts. On 20 November, the 
Allied forces invaded Tarawa and Makin, and within four days both atolls had been 
captured. Apamama was then occupied.
A new factor that helped King’s case for the invasion of the Marianas was an 
announcement by the Army Air Forces (AAF) that a new very-long-range (5,830 
miles) heavy bomber, the B-29 Superfortress, would soon be introduced. By late 
1943, it had become apparent that the B-29s would not be off production lines in 
sufficient numbers to play an important role in the preinvasion bombardment of 
Europe and that the B-17s and B-24s already there were sufficient for the task. That 
meant they could all be employed against Japan; the question was how best to do 
so. These new heavy bombers could be based in Australia, China, or the Marianas. 
Gen. George Kenney (1889–1977), commander of the Allied Air Forces, SWPA, ar-
gued that the new bombers should be assigned as a matter of the priority to his own 
command. However, Gen. Henry H. Arnold (1886–1950), commanding general 
of the AAF, rejected Kenney’s idea, presenting instead an “Air Plan for the Defeat 
of Japan” in which he estimated that by October 1944 ten groups of B-29s, each 
with twenty-eight planes, might be available. Their use would require the capture 
of island positions within 1,500 miles of Honshu. Arnold proposed also to build a 
chain of airfields north and south of Changsha, China, all within the effective B-29 
range from Japanese cities. However, AAF planners were not very happy with bas-
ing B-29s in China, partly because of the logistical difficulties and partly because 
they were skeptical of the ability of the Nationalist Chinese to hold the airfields. Ac-
cordingly, after the Quebec conference Arnold urged that the Marianas be captured 
and D-day for the operation be advanced to mid-1944.
At the SEXTANT conference, in Cairo on 4–6 December 1943, Roosevelt and 
Churchill approved a new schedule of operations in the Pacific that assigned the 
capture of the Marianas a target date of 1 October 1944. This operation would fol-
low invasions of the Marshalls in January, Ponape in May, and Truk in July. The 
SWPA’s forces were scheduled to seize Kavieng (on New Ireland), Manus (in the 
Admiralties), and Hansa Bay (northeast coast of New Guinea) and then to move 
to the tip of the Vogelkop Peninsula, on New Guinea, in August 1944. The CCS 
too endorsed the Central Pacific route. Its “Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan” 
stated that the Allies ultimately intended to “obtain objectives from which we can 
conduct intensive air bombardment and establish a sea and air blockade of Japan, 
and from which to invade Japan if this should prove necessary.” This would require 
a single axis of advance across the Central Pacific in time for a major assault in the 
Formosa–Luzon–China area by the spring of 1945. Two axes of advance would be 
mutually supporting, but a drive across the Central Pacific alone promised a faster 
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advance toward Japan and its vital lines of communications, an earlier capture of 
strategic air bases close to the Japanese home islands, and of greatest importance, 
greater likelihood of triggering a decisive battle with the enemy fleet.
The preliminary draft of the Central Pacific campaign plan (GRANITE) issued 
by Nimitz on 27 December 1943 envisaged the following sequence of operations in 
1944: invasion of Kwajalein, in the Marshalls, on 31 January; an attack on Kavieng 
and air strikes on Truk on 20 March; and assaults on Eniwetok on 1 May, Mortlock 
(Nomoi Island) on 1 July, Truk on 15 August, and Saipan, Tinian, and Guam on 
15 November. On 13 January 1944 Nimitz issued a revised GRANITE plan. Among 
other things, the captures of Mortlock and Truk were rescheduled for 1 August. 
The possibility was also suggested of bypassing Truk and invading the Palaus on 21 
August, making it possible to invade the Marianas by 1 November. Nimitz’s plan-
ners assumed that Palau would be less costly and time-consuming to take than the 
Japanese stronghold Truk.
In the last days of January 1944, SWPA and Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) rep-
resentatives met at Pearl Harbor to discuss pending operations in both theaters. 
Among the participants were Admiral Nimitz; his chief of staff, Rear Adm. Charles 
H. McMorris; Vice Adm. John H. Towers, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet; 
MacArthur’s chief of staff, Gen. Richard K. Sutherland; General Kenney; and Vice 
Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid. Nimitz presented a revised GRANITE plan. There were 
almost immediate objections from the SWPA. Sutherland argued for pooling all 
available resources in the Pacific: “If Central Pacific would move against Palau af-
ter the Marshalls as the next operation and . . . make available to Southwest Pa-
cific Area, the amphibious force now contemplated for Truk, we can take all New 
Guinea, the Kai and Tanimbars, and Halmahera in time to join you in amphibi-
ous movement to Mindanao this year.” Both Kenney and Kinkaid dismissed the 
Marianas as a base for bombing Japan. Even some members of Nimitz’s staff were 
doubtful of their value; Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman (1896–1951, CNO from 
1949 to 1951), Nimitz’s deputy chief of staff, believed that the capture of the Mari-
anas would be extremely costly and that ports seized would be of limited usefulness 
to the Pacific Fleet. McMorris doubted that long-range bombing of Japan would in 
any case cause the capitulation of Japan.
Admiral King, hearing about the conversations at Pearl Harbor, was furious. In 
a stern letter to Nimitz he declared that the idea of rolling up the Japanese by ad-
vancing along the New Guinea–Halmahera–Philippines axis instead of up the lines 
of communications across the Central Pacific was absurd. He also asserted that 
such ideas were not in accordance with prior decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS). King was not the person to stand idly by while theater staffs undermined his 
favorite war plan at the very moment of fruition.
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On 31 January 1944, Central Pacific forces invaded Kwajalein Atoll. After only 
four days’ fighting all the objectives were secured. Majuro Atoll was occupied with-
out resistance. Nimitz was then able to accelerate his plans for invading the western 
Marshalls. Eniwetok was assaulted on 17 February, two months ahead of schedule; 
it was captured after only six days of fighting.
MacArthur’s plans called for simultaneous seizure of Kavieng and Manus on 
1 April 1944. However, he changed this schedule after Allied aircraft flew over 
the Admiralties on 23 February and found no evidence of Japanese presence. 
MacArthur made a quick decision and sent the 1st Cavalry Division to land on Los 
Negros on 29 February.6 Allied troops encountered light resistance.7
In February–March 1944, at a planning conference in Washington, D.C., the 
entire schedule of the operations in the Pacific was reconsidered. Most planners 
agreed on the need to capture a lodgment somewhere in the strategic triangle of 
Luzon, Formosa, and the coast of mainland China. The objective was completely 
to cut off lines of communications between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies 
(NEI). Bases for long-range bombers could be established within reach of Japanese 
industrial centers.8 Admiral Sherman and General Sutherland presented the views 
of their respective commands about the future operations in the Pacific. Suther-
land argued that RENO II (an advance across the north coast of New Guinea to 
Mindanao) and GRANITE campaign plans were each relatively weak and would pro-
duce only slow progress.9 Hence, he proposed a combined advance along the gen-
eral New Guinea–Mindanao axis, bypassing Truk. Combining amphibious forces 
would make it possible to enter Mindanao by 1 December 1944. For such a drive, 
naval forces could be based at Manus. However, MacArthur would require addi-
tional forces from Nimitz; in fact, MacArthur hoped that Nimitz would assign him 
Adm. William F. Halsey (1882–1959), Commander, South Pacific Area (SOPAC), 
as Commander, Allied Naval Forces, because of his ability, rank, and prestige. 
MacArthur sent a message on 2 February reinforcing Sutherland’s argument that 
the proposed offensive could bring Allied forces to the Philippines in December 
1944. In his view, advances along two weak axes should not be conducted; they 
would not achieve strategic results for many months.10
MacArthur’s chief opponent in this debate was not Nimitz but Admiral King. 
Halsey’s SOPAC forces operated in their own area, where they were primarily con-
cerned with the potential threat to Allied forces in the southern and southwestern 
Pacific. King could see no sound reason for placing them under MacArthur’s com-
mand; MacArthur, King declared, apparently did not accept JCS decisions. King 
believed that it was not a propitious time to change strategy in the Pacific.11 He 
insisted that the Carolines and Marianas had to be captured to eliminate the enemy 
threat from the flanks to the Allied offensive in the southwestern Pacific.12
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Gen. George Marshall (1889–1959), Chief of the Staff of the Army, suggest-
ed that the JCS issue a new directive to both Pacific commands, after the Joint 
Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) had been directed to study the matter anew. 
Among other things, the new study should clarify which geographic objectives 
should be captured and their sequence—that is, which axis of advance offered the 
best chance for victory in the Pacific. The JSSC came out clearly in favor of King’s 
and Nimitz’s strategic plan—to the disappointment, not surprisingly, of MacArthur 
and his staff. The JSSC recommended that the JCS resolve the present conflict be-
tween the SWPA and POA campaign plans by directing that the primary effort 
against Japan be made through the Central Pacific and that the SWPA cooperate in 
and support that effort.13
General Marshall was also not completely satisfied with the JSSC’s study, feeling 
that it did not adequately address the allocation of resources or the employment of 
the great Allied superiority in the air. Hence, he directed other committees to study 
the matter further. King agreed that these studies could be beneficial, but he was 
concerned that they would further delay GRANITE. On 5 March MacArthur pro-
posed that the Hansa Bay operation scheduled for 22 April be omitted and that he 
move instead to Hollandia, some three hundred miles farther up the coast of New 
Guinea. He suggested employing for that purpose POA’s fast carriers and shipping 
tentatively earmarked for the Kavieng-Manus operation. These suggestions were 
in line with MacArthur’s RENO II plan, which reached Washington, D.C., within a 
few days.
Nimitz, who was summoned to Washington, argued that if MacArthur’s plan 
were accepted, it would slow down POA operations. He contended to the JCS that 
MacArthur should not retain POA forces after the capture of Kavieng and Manus, 
because that would delay the movement into the Marianas until the approach of 
the typhoon season. The Japanese would gain additional time to strengthen their 
defenses in the Carolines and Marianas, and the Allied plan to reach the Luzon– 
Formosa–China area in early 1945 would be endangered. 
Nimitz suggested two alternative schedules for the remainder of 1944. The first 
contemplated invasion of Truk on 15 June, the southern Marianas on 1 September, 
and the Palaus on 15 November. The second alternative schedule envisaged bypass-
ing Truk and going into the southern Marianas on 15 June, Woleai on 15 July, Yap 
on 1 September, and the Palaus on 1 November. On reconsideration, Nimitz decid-
ed that if the second schedule were accepted the capture of Yap could be deferred 
until the Palaus had been taken and that a fleet anchorage could be established at 
Ulithi. This in turn would advance the target date for the Palaus to 1 October.
In the end, the JCS accepted neither Nimitz’s nor MacArthur’s schedule of oper-
ations in toto. Neither did it accept without changes the conclusion of the JSSC that 
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a fundamental strategic prerequisite of the seizure of objectives in the Formosa– 
Luzon–China coast zone was control of the Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus. At the 
insistence of General Marshall, Mindanao was added as one of the intermediate ob-
jectives that the Allied forces had to seize before proceeding with operations in the 
Philippines. The JCS directive issued to MacArthur and Nimitz on 12 March was 
a compromise between the SWPA and POA plans. It stated that the most feasible 
approach to the Formosa–Luzon–China area was via occupation of the Marianas–
Carolines–Palau–Mindanao zone.
The final schedule of the Pacific operations canceled the Kavieng operation 
and called for the complete isolation of the Rabaul-Kavieng area with the minimal 
forces; early capture of Manus and its development as an air and fleet base; occupa-
tion of Hollandia by SWPA forces (15 April 1944); establishment of control in the 
Marianas–Carolines–Palau area by POA forces by neutralizing Truk and occupy-
ing the southern Marianas (15 June); seizure of the Palaus (15 September); capture 
of Mindanao by SWPA forces supported by the Pacific Fleet (15 November); and 
occupation of Formosa (15 February 1945) or, if necessary, Luzon (15 February 
1945). The objective in occupying the southern Marianas was “to secure control of 
sea communications through the Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the 
Carolines and by the establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japa-
nese sea routes and long range air attacks against the Japanese home land.”
By May 1944, SWPA forces had captured the Admiralties, the Saint Matthias 
islands, New Britain, and Hollandia, on Dutch New Guinea. The Japanese now 
controlled only the area west of a line from Timoeka Island to Wakde, with the 
exception of isolated garrisons at Wewak and Hansa Bay. The Japanese defensive 
perimeter in the Pacific, however, still stretched from the Kurils in the north to 
enclose the Marianas, the western Carolines, western New Guinea, all of the NEI, 
Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines, as well as isolated strongholds in the Bismarck 
Archipelago, the Marshalls, and eastern New Guinea. 
On 15 June 1944 the U.S. forces launched a major joint operation to seize the 
Marianas (Operation FORAGER), invading the island of Saipan, the first of the three 
objectives in the group. Saipan had to be captured first because from it artillery 
could support an attack on Tinian, which in turn offered the best terrain for bomb-
er bases. Guam was more important politically than militarily, as a former Ameri-
can territory.14 Saipan was secured after twenty-four days of heavy fighting. On 
1 August, the U.S. forces invaded Tinian and later in the same month recaptured 
Guam.15 
The Theater 
The Central Pacific encompasses a very large number of islands and archipelagoes. 
Militarily, in 1944 the most important groups were the Gilberts/Ellices, the Mar-
shalls, the Marianas, the Bonins, and the Carolines. 
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The Gilberts/Ellice archipelago forms a long chain of small, scattered atolls and 
islands. There are sixteen atolls of some significance, totaling 166 square miles of 
land, plus nine atolls, in the Ellices, with nine or ten square miles. Most of these 
atolls rise no more than twelve feet above sea level. They consist of hard sand on 
a coral rock base and minilam soil. The vegetation is coconut palms and under-
brush.16 The wet season is from October through March, when westerly winds pre-
vail. Northeasterly trade winds dominate from March to October, during which 
there is very little rain. April is the driest month; from June to November the south-
west monsoon brings five to fifteen inches of rain a month. Annual rainfall is be-
tween 150 and 180 inches. Temperatures vary from lows of sixty degrees Fahren-
heit at night to ninety during the day. Humidity can be high.17
Prior to 1941, the Japanese controlled most of the Micronesian islands, spe-
cifically the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Carolines. These island groups, once 
German possessions, had been taken during World War I by a Japanese expedition-
ary force, in October 1914. In December 1920 Japan had been granted a Class C 
mandate by the League of Nations to govern them, effective 1 April 1922. These 
territories became known as the Japanese Mandated Territory, or simply the Man-
dates. The Japanese undertook a vigorous settlement and economic development 
effort in the islands; by the later 1930s, Japanese settlers outnumbered the native 
islanders (in 1940 the total population would be about 131,200). In 1935, after serv-
ing the required two-year notice, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and 
the Mandates become a “closed territory,” and Westerners were restricted from en-
try.18 Meanwhile, the island of Guam, part of the Marianas Archipelago, and Wake 
Island were administered by the United States, and the Gilberts (Kiribati today) 
remained under British control. 
The Mandates extended for about 2,500 miles in the east–west direction (see 
map 11). They encompassed about 1,460 islands and reefs, with 860 square miles 
of land. The larger islands are of volcanic origin. In mid-1944, most of these islands 
were heavily populated. The smaller islands, especially the Marshalls and Caro-
lines, are coral atolls, most of which were uninhabited.19
The Marshalls consist of a double chain of coral atolls: the Radak (Sunrise) 
chain to the east, the Ralik (Sunset) to the west. These chains are separated by 
about a hundred miles of ocean. They encompass thirty-two islands and 867 reefs, 
about sixty-six square miles in land area. None rises more than a few feet above sea 
level. The main island in the Marshalls is Jaluit, in the Ralik group.20 Jaluit is some 
245 miles from Kwajalein and 110 miles southwest of Majuro Atoll. Jaluit’s lagoon, 
some thirty miles long and twelve miles wide, containing about fifty islands, has 
three deep passages and an anchorage twenty-five to thirty fathoms deep.21 Majuro 
is about five miles long and one mile wide; its anchorage is largely protected from 
bad weather, though occasional northerly and westerly winds cause rough seas.22 
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Map 11 
Japanese mandated islands
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The centrally located Kwajalein Atoll extends for about sixty-six miles and is al-
most eighteen miles wide. Kwajalein encloses 325 square miles of water, with about 
ninety-seven small islands on the surrounding reef. The principal island is Roi. 
In the northern and southern parts of the lagoon the water is between fifteen and 
twenty fathoms deep. The tidal range is about three feet, and the current is two 
knots at the atoll’s entrances, of which the best for larger ships is South Pass.23 Mille 
Atoll, with thirty islands, sixty miles southeast of Majuro, is about twenty miles 
long and ten wide. The sixty-four-island Maloelap group is about thirty miles long 
and between eight and fifteen wide.24
The circular Eniwetok Atoll consists of about thirty low-lying islands, with two 
good entrances to its lagoon—South Channel and East Channel—as well as a shal-
low entrance in the southwest. The anchorage is exposed to the wind in all direc-
tions. Most of the islands are on the eastern side of atoll and have sandy beaches.25
From November to April the prevailing winds in the Marshalls are northeast 
trades. From May to October easterly and southeasterly winds dominate, with fre-
quent calms. Gales seldom occur, though squalls may be expected in June and July. 
The rains fall every month in the year; annual rainfall is about eighty inches. The 
wettest months are May and June, the driest January and February. The annual 
mean temperature is eighty-two degrees Fahrenheit. Fog is very rare.26
Wake Island consists of the island of Wake and two islets—Wilkes and Peale. 
With a surface area of about 1,800 acres, Wake is the largest island in the group. The 
central lagoon is surrounded by a reef. The atoll has a tropical climate, with tem-
perate storms during the winter months and surface temperatures of about eighty 
degrees Fahrenheit in summer and autumn.
The Marianas were the smallest of the Japanese mandated islands. The 425-mile-
long chain of hilly and volcanic islands runs north–south in a shallow curve. The 
northernmost islands are volcanic peaks, rising six to twelve thousand feet above 
the sea bottom. The southern islands are more important militarily and economi-
cally.27 The largest island in the archipelago is Guam (215 square miles), followed 
by Saipan (forty-seven square miles), Tinian (forty square miles), and Rota (thirty-
two square miles). Guam is thirty-two miles long and ten wide;28 Saipan is about 
a hundred miles northeast. Tinian, separated from Saipan by a three-mile-wide 
channel with a swift northeastward current, extends for ten miles and is some five 
miles wide.29
In the Marianas, climate is dominated by tropical maritime air. In the summer, 
equatorial air masses bring increasing temperatures and humidity. In the winter, 
continental air masses occasionally move out over the islands from Asia. The Mari-
anas are affected by the warm Kuroshio Current; the average temperature is about 
eighty-one degrees Fahrenheit. Prevailing winds are easterly.30 The Marianas are 
also affected by southwest monsoons in August and September, bringing strong 
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winds and heavy precipitation. During June, three or four weak fronts pass from 
the northwest, bringing a thin sheet of upper clouds and an increase in lower cloud 
cover to five-tenths or six-tenths, though with little or no precipitation. Normally 
one typhoon per year can be expected, usually in September or October.31
In the Marianas, it is generally more cloudy over land areas than over the sur-
rounding ocean. Cloud cover averages over five-tenths during the dry months and 
eight-tenths during the wet months. The dry season (November to June) is charac-
terized by scattered cumulus clouds between 1,500 and seven thousand feet. Dur-
ing frontal passages, high clouds and lower cumulonimbus, between five hundred 
feet and fifteen thousand, are present. During the wet season (July to November) 
cumulonimbus clouds are invariably present, with bases around 1,500 feet and tops 
varying between seven and twenty-five thousand feet. These clouds generate inter-
mittent heavy showers. A rapid shift from the dry to the rainy season starts about 
1 July. From December to June, rain falls from cumulus or stratocumulus clouds 
associated with weak fronts moving from the northwest. During the rainy season 
the towering cumulonimbus clouds can be as high as twenty-five thousand feet.32 
The Nanpō Shotō is a collective term for the group of islands extending south 
of the Japanese home islands for some 750 miles. They encompass the Izu Islands 
(Izu Shotō), Bonin Islands (Ogasawara-guntō), Volcano Islands (Kazan Rettō), 
Nishinoshima (Rosario Island), Okinotorishima (Parece Vela), and Minami-Tori-
Shima (Marcus Island). The Bonins comprise three smaller groups (Muko Jima, 
Chichi Jima, and Haha Jima), with about thirty subtropical and tropical islands.33 
The weather in June is generally favorable: cloudiness is five-tenths on average, and 
rain can be expected on about three days, during light frontal passages, and one 
day of fog.34
The Volcano group consists of three islands: Iwo Jima, Kita Iwo Jima, and Min-
ami Iwo. Iwo Jima extends four miles from northeast to southwest and is about 
2.5 miles wide. Marcus Island, only about four miles long, has no good anchorage; 
heavy surf makes landing difficult.35
The Carolines (also called the New Philippines) stretch from longitude 130° to 
163° east, about 1,700 miles. In the north–south direction they extend from 10° 
north to the equator. Most of the islands are north of 5° north; the northernmost 
atoll is Ulithi. The Carolines are a vast chain, with 936 coral and volcanic islands, 
enclosing about 1.3 million square miles. However, their land area is only around 
830 square miles.36 The Carolines are geographically divided into western and east-
ern groups. The islands range from fairly large ones, with mountains and streams, 
to tiny, palm-clad islets and coral reefs rising only a few feet from sea level.37 The 
largest islands in the eastern Carolines are Truk (Chuuk today), Ponape (now 
Pohnpei), and Kusaie (Kosrae today). The thirty-mile-long, triangular Truk Atoll 
occupies a central location and consists of about seventy islands/islets. Most are on 
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the reef ’s rim, 150 miles in circumference, but eleven islands and about twenty is-
lets are scattered within the eight-hundred-square-mile lagoon. There are five main 
entrances into the lagoon.38 The principal one, the Northeast Pass, is three-quarters 
of a mile wide and twenty fathoms deep; a reef in the middle narrows it to 750 
yards and reduces its depth to between four and a half and five and three-quarters 
fathoms. Truk Harbor is between the southern side of Dublon Island and Eten Islet; 
its depth varies from one to twenty fathoms. Tides are two to three feet high. The 
bottom is composed of sand, coral, and mud. Currents inside the lagoon are weak. 
There are six other atolls within two hundred miles of Truk.39
The island of Ponape, about 375 miles east of Truk, is the largest of the Caroline 
Islands. Its mountains rise to 2,500 feet. Ponape is covered with forests and has 
many streams. Ponape Harbor is well protected from ocean swells by a barrier reef, 
but its usable area is only five square miles. Hatalinin Harbor, on the east side of 
the island, is a suitable anchorage for only a few ships, having an area of one square 
mile, with depths from five to fifty fathoms. Ronkite Harbor, on the southwestern 
side of the island, has water area of only half a square mile. The lagoon waters on 
the western side of the island, though greatly broken up by coral patches, have a 
usable anchorage of fifteen square miles between Ronkite and Ponape. All three 
ports can be entered through Tauak, Palikir, and Jokaj Passages, varying in width 
between 450 and 150 yards. Ponape has the greatest natural defensive strength, 
with rugged terrain and barrier and fringing reefs offering few openings.40 
Some three hundred miles southeast of Ponape is the island of Kusaie. This 
forty-two-square-mile island is surrounded by coral reefs. It has steep mountains 
and dense vegetation. There are also about a dozen nearby islands. 
The western Carolines comprise the Palau and Yap groups.41 The Palau group 
is the westernmost part of the Carolines. It consists of about a hundred islands 
and islets, encompassing some 185 square miles. All are irregularly shaped and 
mountainous-volcanic in origin.42 Palau is twenty miles long by five wide. Another 
large island is Angaur. Both of these islands have enormous phosphate deposits. 
The town of Koror is located on an island off the southern end of Palau Island.43 
The Yap group consists of four large islands encompassing some eighty square 
miles. The islands are enclosed by broad fringing coral reefs in some places more 
than a mile wide, separated from each other by very narrow channels. All the is-
lands have low hills, with rounded summits and gentle slopes. Streams are intermit-
tent, and lowlands are generally narrow.44 The terrain of Yap island proper, how-
ever, is mountainous and broken, covered with forests of coconut and areca palms, 
bamboo, and crotons.45 The principal harbor is Tonil, on the eastern side of Yap, 
with an entrance only a hundred yards wide, a small anchorage (six-tenths of a 
square mile), and depths of between twelve and twenty fathoms. Spring tides are 
about four feet.46
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The climate in the Carolines is dominated by the northeast trade winds. The 
exception is the area west of 145° east longitude, where the effect of the Asiatic 
monsoons is felt during the summer months. The best weather conditions in the 
Carolines are from April to the end of November, when westerly winds prevail, par-
ticularly in August and September.47 Typhoons can occur in any month, but they 
are most common from July through November, with the highest frequency in Sep-
tember. Daytime temperatures vary from eighty-three to eighty-nine degrees Fahr-
enheit, nighttime between seventy-four and seventy-seven.48 The annual rainfall is 
177 inches. July is the driest month, with only fourteen inches of rain.49 Cloudiness 
is fairly high, with about eight-tenths coverage any month in the year.50
Theater Geometry
The planning and execution of combat employment of naval forces and aircraft 
are greatly affected by geography: position and relative position, the length and 
indentation of coasts, the presence or absence of offshore islands or archipelagoes, 
and distances to be transited. These purely geographic features of a maritime the-
ater largely determine which physical objectives are to be captured, defended, or 
controlled, the length and shape of potential basing areas, the number and size of 
naval and air bases and anchorages, and the length and directional orientation of 
lines of operation and of communications. These natural and human-made factors 
are arbitrarily referred to as “theater geometry.”
Distances from the Marianas to other points in the Pacific are quite large. For 
example, the distances from Saipan to Kwajalein and to Manila are 1,355 and 1,640 
miles, respectively. Guadalcanal, Palau, and Rabaul are 720, 840, and 1,230 miles 
from Saipan. The distance from Saipan to Manila is 1,640, and to Pearl Harbor 
about 3,400. From Saipan to Midway is about 2,210 miles and to Tokyo approxi-
mately 1,260 miles.51 Tarawa, in the Gilberts, is separated by about 1,800 miles of 
water from Saipan. 
Kwajalein is some 2,400 miles southwest of Hawaii. The distance from Truk to 
the Palaus is 1,035 miles and to Guam and Kwajalein, 555 and 925 miles, respec-
tively. Yap is about 730 miles from Truk, and Pearl Harbor is about 3,945 miles 
from Palau.52 From Palau it is about six hundred miles due south to the western tip 
of New Guinea, while Mindanao is about six hundred miles due west.
In June 1944, the Japanese still controlled certain atolls in the Marshalls—Mille, 
Maloelap, Rongelap, and Wotje. Mille Atoll had one X-shaped airfield and two 
emergency seaplane anchorages. It was the only airfield within the fighter range of 
the Gilbert Islands. The best anchorage in the Maloelap Atoll is in its western part.53 
Rongelap was used by the Japanese as submarine and emergency seaplane bases.54 
The Japanese used Wotje Atoll and its seaplane base.55 They had a seaplane base on 
Jaluit and one on Ekidj Island, as well as an airfield on Enybor.56 
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In the Marianas, the Japanese used two airfields on Guam, one on Rota, four on 
Tinian, three on Saipan, and one on Pagan. U.S. intelligence believed that airfield 
on Pagan was only for staging purposes.57 
The Japanese built one airfield on Iwo Jima and one on Chichi Jima.58 These 
were important staging points between the home islands and Micronesia.59 The 
Japanese also had an airfield on Marcus Island.60
In the Carolines, the Japanese used Truk as an advanced submarine base. Truk 
also had an airfield and two seaplane bases.61 On Ponape, the Japanese operated a 
seaplane base on the northeast shore of Langar Island, as well as several seaplane 
anchorages. Kusaie accommodated about a dozen vessels and a seaplane base.62 
Satawan, Puluwat, Woleai, Palau, and Yap each had a Japanese airfield. By late April 
1944 two additional fields were under construction on Palau. The airfield on Yap 
was operational but without aircraft. Palau was also used as a submarine base. Japa-
nese submarines sporadically stopped at Saipan en route to and from the home 
waters.63
The IJN used Brunei Bay and the area of Singapore and Lingga (off the eastern 
coast of Sumatra) as bases for its surface forces. These bases were beyond the effec-
tive range of the Allied land-based aircraft on Morotai. However, they were within 
the range of B-29s based in the China-India-Burma theater. The main shipping 
routes to and from Singapore passed east of the Lingga Archipelago. 
The largest islands in the Lingga Archipelago are Singkep and Lingga. Singkep, 
twenty miles long and twenty wide, rises to some 1,600 feet in its eastern part; the 
remainder is low and marshy. Lingga extends for about thirty-five miles. The east-
ern part of the island is mostly low lying, while its western part is mountainous, ris-
ing to about 3,800 feet. Other islands in the archipelago are hilly, but elevation does 
not exceed five hundred feet. The coasts of the Lingga Archipelago are all highly in-
dented; there are many shallow bays bordered by rocky headlands, and the seaward 
approaches are made difficult by extensive shoals and coral reefs.64 Brunei Bay, on 
the northwest coast of British Borneo, occupied an excellent position for operations 
in the South China Sea. The 330-square-mile bay has water depths varying from 
five to twenty fathoms and could accommodate a large number of ships of all sizes.65 
On Mindanao, the only anchorages of importance are at Masinloc, Dumanqui-
las Bay, Davao Gulf, and Sarangani Bay. Masinloc is about eight miles long and over 
half a mile wide at its narrowest point, but it is completely sheltered from wind or 
sea. Dumanquilas, twenty-five square miles, has depths from two to about twenty 
fathoms; its anchorage is about eleven miles wide at its entrance and can accommo-
date hundreds of vessels of all types. It could be easily mined but is protected from 
all winds and has good holding ground. It was considered by the Japanese the best 
place available south of Manila for a temporary fleet base.66 Sarangani Bay’s anchor-
age is poor, because of its great depths. Davao Gulf also is too deep for anchoring 
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(from twelve to twenty fathoms), except close inshore, greatly limiting the num-
ber of ships that can be accommodated. Additional anchorage space is available at 
Malipano, about seven miles southeast.67
In 1944, the Japanese had thirty-two airfields and strips on Mindanao. Allied 
intelligence estimated that at least six airfields, with a total capacity of five hundred 
aircraft, were within a fifty-mile radius of Davao, on the southern coast. In the Del 
Monte area, on Mindanao’s northwest coast, was a smaller group of fields, with a to-
tal capacity of more than 150 aircraft. Other fields were located on the Zamboanga 
Peninsula. A single field in the vicinity of the Surigao Peninsula in the northeast 
could support fifty to a hundred aircraft.68
The Japanese used a new fleet anchorage at Tawi-Tawi, in the Sulu Archipelago. 
The Tawi-Tawi Group is the third largest in the archipelago;69 it is at the southwest-
ern end of the Philippines. Tawi-Tawi holds a commanding position in relation to 
the Makassar Strait and the Molucca Passage. This ten-by-thirty-mile island has a 
highest elevation of about 1,800 feet. Its anchorage encompasses fifty-three square 
miles, with depths varying from five to twenty fathoms; it is nearly five miles in di-
ameter and is surrounded by extensive coral reefs. Mining of its two closely spaced 
entrances was difficult in 1944 because of the deep water.70 Tawi-Tawi was poorly 
protected against attack by submarines. It also lacked an airfield to train carrier air 
crews.71
By May 1944, the United States built several advanced bases in the Gilberts and 
the Marshalls. On the island of Betio the existing Japanese airstrip was reconstruct-
ed and used for B-24 medium bombers. A fighter airstrip was built on Apamama 
Island. A naval base and air facility was formally established on Majuro Atoll on 4 
May. Majuro’s large and deep anchorage was capable of accommodating the largest 
surface combatants, including aircraft carriers, but Majuro had no shore installa-
tions or medical facilities. The fleet’s needs were met by repair ships, submarine 
and destroyer tenders, tankers, and supply ships. Majuro’s air facilities were capable 
of supporting two Marine dive-bomber squadrons and half a patrol squadron and 
temporarily staging one Army fighter group.72 In mid-March 1944, 4th Marine Air 
Wing headquarters, with Marine Air Group 13, was established on Majuro.73 An 
advanced air base and minor fleet facilities were established on Kwajalein Atoll. On 
Kwajalein was built an airstrip; a seaplane base already existed on Ebeye. After the 
capture of the archipelago in January 1944, the United States reconstructed three 
Japanese airstrips on Roi and Namur.74 A seaplane base was built on Parry Island, 
in Eniwetok (Enewetak today) Atoll. A large airfield was built on Engebi (Enjebi 
today), in Eniwetok Atoll, to accommodate four Marine air squadrons.75 
Allied Command Organization
The Pacific was designated as the U.S. strategic responsibility by a directive of the 
CCS on 30 March 1942. The entire Pacific was divided six days later into three 
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large areas: POA, SWPA, and the Southeast Pacific Area. (The latter never became 
a theater of operation and became essentially irrelevant.)76 This decision was for-
mally approved by President Roosevelt on 30 March 1942. The POA was formally 
established on 8 May 1942. In modern terms a “theater-strategic command,” it en-
compassed a major part of the Pacific Ocean, excluding the Philippines, the NEI, 
Australia and New Zealand, and New Guinea. Admiral Nimitz was appointed as 
CINCPOA; he was also, as noted above, CINCPac. As CINCPOA, Nimitz was sub-
ordinate to the JCS in Washington, D.C. As CINCPac he was directly subordinate 
to Admiral King, CNO/COMINCH. As CINCPac, Nimitz was responsible for ad-
ministration as well as operations. 
The same JCS directive divided the POA into three “Pacific Areas” (or “mari-
time theaters  of  operations,” in modern terms): Northern (NORPAC), Cen-
tral (CENTPAC), and Southern (SOPAC). Nimitz appointed commanders for 
NORPAC and SOPAC but initially retained control of CENTPAC, including the 
Hawaiian Department. In mid-1943, Nimitz transferred command of CENT-
PAC to Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance (he was promoted to a full admiral on 
4 February 1944).
CENTPAC extended roughly from 42° north latitude to the equator.77 Its 
southern boundary started at the equator at 110° west, ran north to 11°, then an-
gled to the Mexico/Guatemala border. In the other direction, at longitude 130° 
east, just off the northwest end of Dutch New Guinea the boundary made a ninety-
degree turn to 20° north, where it turned back to the west and south of Formosa.78 
This boundary was moved to 18° 30ʹ north in June 1944.
On 15 February 1944, Nimitz directed the establishment of Forward Area, 
Central Pacific. Its forward boundaries were the positions held by the Japanese, its 
rearward limits the forward edge of the administrative subareas, including the Ha-
waiian Department and Hawaiian Sea Frontier. Initially the forward area included 
the Ellice, Gilbert, and Marshall Islands. Vice Adm. John H. Hoover, commander 
of Air, Central Pacific, was also designated Commander, Forward Area, Central 
Pacific. He exercised command over all shore-based air forces, island commands, 
and surface forces specifically assigned. He was subordinate to CINCPOA, except 
when other command arrangements were prescribed.79 Major elements of Forward 
Area, Central Pacific were the Air Defense Command; Bomber Command; Search, 
Reconnaissance, and Photographic Command; Dive Bomber and Fighter Com-
mand; and Transport Air Corps.80 
The Marshall Islands Subarea was established by Nimitz on 4 April 1944. It encom-
passed all the Marshalls and adjacent seas extending fifty miles out. Its commander 
was subordinate to the forward-area commander for the local defense, administra-
tion, and supply of the subarea. It was planned that at some future date, Commander, 
Marshall Islands Subarea would become directly subordinate to CINCPOA.81
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Directly subordinate to Nimitz were all seagoing forces, specifically the Fifth 
Fleet (as the Central Pacific Force had been redesignated on 26 April 1944), under 
Admiral Spruance; Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (Task Force [TF] 17), under Vice 
Adm. Charles A. Lockwood; and Service Forces Pacific Fleet, under Vice Adm. 
William L. Calhoun. Directly subordinate to Spruance were the Joint Expedition-
ary Forces (TF 51), under Vice Adm. R. K. Turner; Fast Carrier Forces (TF 58), 
under Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher; and Forward Area, Central Pacific (TF 57), 
under Vice Adm. John H. Hoover.82
Nimitz also controlled all ground and tactical air forces of the U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps in the POA. Gen. Robert C. Richardson commanded U.S. Army 
Forces, Central Pacific (changed to U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area in June 
1944). In 1944–45, the Army forces deployed in POA consisted of five infantry 
divisions, the 7th, 27th, 77th, 81st, and 96th. Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, under 
Gen. Holland M. Smith, consisted of six Marine divisions—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
5th, and 6th. In the POA were deployed the Seventh, Thirteenth, and Twentieth 
Air Forces. The latter, established on 4 April 1944, was a strategic force, directly 
subordinate to General Arnold in Washington, D.C. 
Japanese Command Organization
In contrast to the Allies, the Japanese never had a smooth and working rela-
tionship between the top political and military leaderships. The influence of the 
military, and especially senior army leaders, was overwhelming. All major poli-
cy and strategy decisions were essentially made at Imperial General Headquar-
ters (IGHQ), with little or no input from civilian leaders or other government 
officials.
Emperor Hirohito was the titular head of the Japanese army and navy. The min-
isters of war and the navy reported directly to him. Both ministers were formally 
subordinate to the prime minister, but in practice they were largely independent of 
the rest of the cabinet. The highest body advising the emperor on important mili-
tary matters was the Supreme Military Council, composed of selected generals and 
flag officers. There existed also a Board of Marshals and Admirals, which included 
all fleet admirals and field marshals, but it had little influence on matters that really 
counted.83
IGHQ was also the highest body concerned with operational matters. When it 
was established in November 1937, the navy had misgivings but in fact retained a 
large degree of autonomy, almost equal to that of the army. IGHQ had much less 
authority over the services than the JCS or the British Chiefs of Staff. There was 
no overall chief of staff; thus, no one had the authority to reconcile differences 
between the army and navy. Also, there were no joint army-navy departments or 
bureaus, no joint arena for debating issues of national strategy and drawing up 
strategic and operational plans. 
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Nevertheless, a certain degree of cooperation between the army and navy staffs 
was achieved where otherwise none would have existed.84 IGHQ contained army 
and navy sections, each headed by a chief of staff. The army section, or Army Gen-
eral Staff (AGS), controlled all army forces, including army air force. Its control 
was exercised directly, as in the case of the Air General Army, or indirectly through 
area commanders outside the home islands. The navy section, or the Naval General 
Staff (NGS), was the main operational planning organ of the Japanese navy. As was 
the case in the AGS, many NGS officers held similar billets in the Navy Ministry.
IGHQ acted by the authority of the emperor. At joint meetings, held usually 
twice a week on the Imperial Palace grounds, the two chiefs of the general staffs pre-
sided. The emperor occasionally attended these meetings, but rarely those headed 
by the individual service chiefs. The real authority was in the hands of the chiefs 
of staff. Both were solely responsible for strategy, planning, and operations of their 
respective services. The decisions of IGHQ had to be unanimous; otherwise, no ac-
tion could be taken. If there were disagreement on some important question—for 
example, starting or ending the war—the emperor would resolve the deadlock. The 
prime minister and cabinet were not involved in these matters.85
In theory, the Japanese field commanders were directly responsible to the em-
peror. In practice they were subordinate to IGHQ; there were no direct communi-
cations between the throne and field commanders. Moreover, the Japanese never 
established anything resembling joint or geographically based theater commands. 
Normally, the forces of each service in an area were placed under separate army or 
fleet headquarters, whose commanders received orders through separate channels.86 
Cooperation between the navy and the army was in general bad, especially with re-
gard to air support—better at the highest level, worse at intermediate and lower levels. 
Another problem was personal friction between naval commanders and their army 
counterparts.87
All army field forces were directly subordinate through the operational chain of 
command to the AGS. The Japanese army command structure was rather inflex-
ible. A commander had to follow strictly the chain of command and could not 
directly approach other commanders.88 
Japanese naval organization was quite different from the U.S. Navy’s. Gener-
ally, an administrative command was called a “fleet,” while a major tactical com-
mand was a “force.” The navy grouped most of its combat forces into the Combined 
Fleet, responsible for all naval operations in the Pacific theater.89 The Combined 
Fleet was headed by Adm. Soemu Toyoda, who took that post in May 1944 after 
the death of Adm. Mineichi Koga (b. 1885) in March 1944. The Combined Fleet’s 
responsibilities were roughly comparable to those of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In func-
tional terms, it was composed of “mobile forces” and “area forces.” The former were 
capable of operating in any ocean or sea area. Area forces were normally tasked 
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with the defense of particular geographic regions. They were unable to take strong 
offensive action without assistance from mobile forces. In addition were naval air 
fleets, consisting of naval land-based units and carrier air groups (but only when 
operating from land bases).
In June 1944, directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief (CINC), Com-
bined Fleet were the First Mobile Force, the Central Pacific Area Fleet, the Advance 
Expeditionary Force (Submarines) (or Sixth Fleet), and the Base Air Force (naval 
land-based aircraft). Not all naval forces were part of the Combined Fleet. The 
China Area Fleet, naval district and guard forces, and surface escort forces were 
under the control of the NGS.90
The Combined Fleet underwent a major reorganization in early 1944. The First 
Fleet was disbanded effective 25 February, and the First Mobile Fleet (also called in 
dispatches the First Striking Fleet) was organized from the First and Second Fleets 
and assigned to the Combined Fleet effective 1 March. This resulted in combining 
the six battleships (BBs) of the old First Fleet with the six heavy cruisers (CAs) and 
screening units of the old Second Fleet, thus dividing the striking power of the IJN 
into two fleets—the First Mobile Fleet and the Third Fleet.91 
On 10 March 1944, a new headquarters was placed between the Combined Fleet 
and the Fourth Fleet by the establishment of the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under 
Vice Adm. Chūichi Nagumo (see map 12). By 4 April the majority of what had 
been the Eleventh Air Fleet had been reorganized and renamed the Fourteenth 
Air Fleet.92 The major elements of the Central Pacific Area Fleet were the First Air 
Fleet, under Vice Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, at Tinian, and the Fourth Fleet, under Vice 
Adm. Chūichi Hara, at Truk. The First Air Fleet consisted, in turn, of the 61st Air 
Flotilla, on Peleliu, and the 22nd Air Flotilla, at Harushima, in the Truk group.93 It 
also included, after 5 May, the 22nd, 23rd, and 26th Air Flotillas. Also subordinate 
to the Central Pacific Area Fleet were land-based aircraft: the Fifth Base Air Force 
at Saipan (Rear Adm. Takahisa Tsujimura), the 30th Base Air Force on Palau, and 
seaplane base on Chichi Jima.94 
For the first two years of the war, the Fourth Fleet controlled all the Japanese 
garrisons in the Mandates and was directly subordinate to the Combined Fleet. By 
March 1944 the Fourth Fleet was limited to Truk, the eastern Carolines, and the 
remaining garrisons in the Marshalls.95 The Fourth Fleet consisted of the 4th Base 
Air Force, at Truk (Rear Adm. Masami Kobayashi), and the 62nd, 63rd, 64th, and 
66th Guard Forces, on Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje, and Mille in the Marshalls.96 Until 
the U.S. invasion of Truk, the 31st Army there was responsible for all the army 
forces in the Marianas. Its headquarters was later moved to Palau.97 
Admiral Nagumo’s area of responsibility encompassed the Mandates and the 
Bonins. He was also charged with the escort of maritime transport in the Cen-
tral Pacific and the southeast. Nagumo was formally responsible for all combat 
 JAPANESE A-GO OPERATION (BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA): SITUATION AND THEATER 187 186 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
FO
R
M
O
SA
30
° 15
°
0°0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0 m
ile
s
E
le
va
tio
n 
in
 m
et
er
s
K
F
So
ut
he
rn
 E
xp
ed
iti
on
ar
y 
Fl
ee
t
N
av
y
A
rm
y
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx xxxx
xxxx
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxx
x
xxxx
xxxx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xxx
x
xxx
x
B
U
R
M
A
TH
A
IL
A
N
D
C
 H
 I 
N
 A
FR
EN
C
H
IN
D
O
 C
H
IN
A
15
A
33
A
Th
ai
la
nd
 G
ar
ris
on
 A
rm
y
1 
br
ig
B
ur
m
a 
A
re
a 
 A
rm
y
10
 d
iv
s 
&
 2
 b
rig
s
28
A
In
do
 C
hi
na
 G
ar
ris
on
 A
rm
y
11
 d
iv
s 
&
   
   
   
1 
br
ig
xx
xxx
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
A
N
D
A
M
A
N
 IS
B
A
N
G
K
O
K
M
A
N
D
O
O
N
xxxx
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xxx
P 
A 
C
 I 
F 
I C
   
   
O
 C
 E
 A
 N
N
EW
 G
U
IN
EA18
A
3 
di
vs
xxxx
xxxx
xx
x
N
ew
 G
ui
ne
a
Fo
rc
e
xxxx
xxxx
xxx
xxxx
8F
SO
LO
M
O
N
 IS
G
U
A
D
A
LC
A
N
A
L
C
 O
 R
 A
 L
   
   
S
 E
 A
16
0°
15
0°
14
0°
12
0°
11
0°
10
0°
I N
 D
 I 
A 
N
   
   
O
 C
 E
 A
 N
JA
VA
-1
0°0°10
°
20
°
31
A
1 
di
vs
 &
 3
 b
rig
s
4F
C
   
 A
   
 R
   
 O
   
 L
   
 I 
   
N
   
 E
   
   
   
   
I  
  S
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
2F
4K
F
xx
xx
A 
R
 A
 F
 U
 R
 A
   
  S
 E
 A
13
0°
xxxx
xxx
x
xx
xx
xxxx
xx
xx
xxxxx
N
O
R
TH
B
O
R
N
EO
xx
xx
S
 O
 U
 T
 H
C
 H
 I 
N
 A
   
  S
 E
 A
37
A
1 
br
ig
3F
A
23
0 
pl
an
es
B
 O
 R
 N
 E
 O
7H
A
2 
di
vs
 &
 9
 b
rig
s
29
A
xx
xx
xxx
xxx
xx
x
xx
x
2H
A
6 
di
vs
 &
2 
br
ig
s
CE
LE
BE
S
H
A
LM
A
H
ER
A
xxx
S
ou
th
w
es
t A
re
a 
Fl
ee
t
LU
ZO
N
H
A
IN
A
N
 I
25
A
SU
M
AT
R
A
M
A
LA
YA
M
A
R
IA
N
A 
IS
LE
G
EN
D
PA
LA
U
 IS
xx
xx
xx
xx
xxxx
17
A
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
M
ap
 3
: J
A
PA
N
ES
E 
SO
U
TH
ER
N
 D
EF
EN
SE
 A
R
EA Ce
nt
ra
l P
ac
ifi
c 
A
re
a 
Fl
ee
t
3r
d 
A
rm
y
Ac
ad
em
ic
s/
jm
o/
20
13
/v
eg
o/
JS
D
A
Map 12
Japanese southern defense 
area
 JAPANESE A-GO OPERATION (BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA): SITUATION AND THEATER 189 188 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
operations in the Central Pacific;98 however, in practice, the 31st Army, under Gen. 
Hideyoshi Obata, remained independent, and it in turn had exclusive tactical and 
administrative control over all army units in the Central Pacific. The 31st Army’s 
forces were deployed in “sector army groups” named for their locations—Truk, the 
Marianas, Ogasawara, and Palau.99
The Japanese failure to establish clear-cut command relationships between the 
navy and the army for defense of the Central Pacific had serious consequences for 
the defense of the Marianas against the expected invasion. From the very beginning 
there was friction about it. A final decision made on 15 March was a compromise 
between the two headquarters. Among other things, it was agreed that command of 
each island would rest in the hands of the senior officer, army or navy, present. An 
oral agreement between Nagumo and Obata stipulated that neither would assume 
complete responsibility. Hence, the Japanese had no operational level of command 
in the Central Pacific. This failure resulted in a great deal of confusion, because the 
navy and the army greatly depended on each other. For example, all installations in 
the Marianas used by naval air units were supported by army troops.100
On 23 April 1944, the Japanese reorganized their submarine force, effective two 
days later. Truk, exposed to almost daily air raids, had become unsuitable as a sub-
marine base. All maintenance was shifted to Japan, and the headquarters of the 
Sixth Fleet was moved to Kure. Most of the frontline submarines were put tem-
porarily under Submarine Group 7. Submarine Division 51, less three boats of 
the small RO class, was incorporated into Group 7. Afterward, Submarine Group 
7 consisted of two large I-class boats and seven RO boats. Its main mission was 
to search out and intercept enemy carrier task and invasion forces north of New 
Guinea and in the southeast, as well as to carry out operational transportation in 
the southeast.101
The Commanders
Success or failure in combat largely depends on the experience, judgment, and 
skills of the high commanders and their subordinate commanders. Admiral Nimitz 
was one of the outstanding naval leaders of World War II. He was known for his 
calm, imperturbable personality. He had a great ability to listen to diverse views 
and then to act forcefully. He was also willing to take high but calculated risks. 
Nimitz was also known for his ability to select the right personnel for key assign-
ments.102 Nimitz was humble, polite, and gentle in manner with both subordinates 
and superiors, but he was also a very determined and decisive leader. Nimitz left 
subordinate commanders alone, because in his view looking over their shoulders 
would only inhibit them. At the same time, he made recommendations via radio if 
it appeared that subordinates were overlooking opportunities, and he did not hesi-
tate to intervene when subordinate commanders were not performing well—or, if 
necessary, to fire them.103
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Nimitz reported directly to Admiral King. They both had great respect for each 
other. King was considered a brilliant officer and thinker, but he had an offensive 
manner and a black-and-white approach to dealing with subordinates. Though he 
got along well enough with Nimitz, King had a tendency to interfere in his respon-
sibilities, going so far as to intervene in purely tactical matters.104
The American commanders most directly involved in what became known as 
the battle of the Philippine Sea were Admirals Spruance, Mitscher, and Lockwood. 
Spruance was one of the most able American admirals in World War II. He was 
austere, methodical, and intellectual. His remoteness was intentional.105 Spruance 
was personally extremely quiet and unassuming.106 He had a healthy prejudice 
against publicity in any form; newspaper correspondents found him colorless. His 
main traits were power of decision and coolness in action.107 Spruance had a bril-
liant mind that approached all problems with thorough analysis that led to deci-
sion. Spruance planned in broad terms, leaving details and minor matters of execu-
tion entirely to the discretion of his subordinates.108 He won the respect of almost 
all who came in contact with him.109 A famous American naval historian, Samuel 
E. Morison, notes that Spruance’s leading personality traits were attention to detail, 
poise, and power of intelligent decision.110
Admiral Mitscher (1887–1947) too was an unassuming man, with a soft voice 
and quiet manners. He was averse to personal glory and avoided publicity if he could. 
Mitscher was one of the pioneers of the U.S. naval aviation and had commanded the 
first carrier force in the Pacific Fleet. Admiral King said of Mitscher (his subordi-
nate at the Bureau of Aeronautics in the mid-1930s) that he had “a personality that 
inspires confidence and loyalty. Quiet, forceful, tactful, conscientious, steady and 
practical; an asset to any organization.” This was high tribute, coming from King.111
However, Mitscher was not known for attention to detail or thorough planning. 
He could be sloppy and inattentive. Reportedly, he seldom bothered to read op-
eration orders, preferring verbal condensations from his chief of staff, and he was 
often reluctant to accept advice. One of his greatest strengths, however, was as a 
leader of men. Few commanders were as devoted to his men as Mitscher. He earned 
devotion and admiration partly by exceptional performance and partly by unusual 
thoughtfulness and consideration toward the officers and men under him.112 In 
fact, Mitscher tended to be overly loyal to them, and that was his single greatest 
fault; apparently, it never occurred to him that a subordinate might be inept or 
incompetent.113 
Admiral Lockwood (1890–1967) was another of the greatest American war-
time naval leaders. After commanding several submarines in the interwar years, 
in June 1939 he was appointed as the chief of staff to Commander, Submarine 
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. He was sent as naval attaché to London in February 
1941; in May 1942 he was promoted to rear admiral and appointed Commander, 
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Submarines, Southwest Pacific. He was also Commander, Allied Naval Forces, 
Western Australia until July 1942. After the death of Rear Adm. Thomas Eng-
lish in February 1943, Lockwood became Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific 
Fleet. An aggressive and highly successful leader, Lockwood was well known for 
devotion to his submarine crews. He was promoted to vice admiral in late 1943.
The principal Japanese commanders in the A-Go operation were Adm. Soemu 
Toyoda (1885–1957) and Vice Adm. Jisaburō Ozawa (1886–1966). Toyoda was 
appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet on 1 May.114 He raised his 
flag at Oedo, in Tokyo Bay.115 Toyoda, born in Tokyo, graduated from the Naval 
Academy in 1905 and commanded the battleship Hiyuga in 1930. He was pro-
moted to rear admiral in 1931, vice admiral in 1935, and admiral in 1941. Among 
many assignments, Toyoda was chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1933, com-
manded the North China Fleet in 1937, and one year later became commander 
of the Second Fleet. It was widely expected that Toyoda would get the post of 
CINC, Combined Fleet in 1941, but Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943) got 
that job. Most of Toyoda’s duties during the war were ashore, as the commander 
of the Kure Naval Station and the Yokosuka Naval Base and a member of the 
Supreme War Council (from May 1943) and of the Board of Admirals. Report-
edly, he was highly intelligent and well informed and had opposed going to war 
with the United States. Toyoda seems to have had poor relations with the army, 
which he intensely disliked.116 COMINCH analysts formed a favorable opinion of 
Toyoda, pointing out that he had “extremely wide experience and rose by sheer 
ability” and considering him a forceful and alert officer, if extremely nationalistic 
and hostile to foreigners.117 Toyoda, fifty-nine years old in 1944, was also consid-
ered abrasive and hard-nosed. Because of the lack of combat experience, Rear 
Adm. Ryūnosuke Kusaka was assigned as his chief of staff.118
On 30 March, the fifty-seven-year-old Jisaburō Ozawa was appointed as CINC 
of the First Mobile Fleet. At the same time, he was in command of all carriers and 
directly of one carrier division—in the U.S. Navy these responsibilities would 
have been divided among three flag officers. A torpedo specialist, Ozawa had 
commanded two destroyers, a destroyer division, a cruiser, and a battleship. He 
was chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1937–38.119 In 1939–40 he was the 
commander of the Torpedo School, then of Carrier Division (CarDiv) 1.120 In 
1942 Ozawa led the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, which seized Malaya and the 
NEI. In 1943, he relieved Nagumo as the commander of the Third Fleet, which 
then possessed most of the carriers. In contrast to many of his peers, Ozawa 
was open-minded about naval aviation. He advocated consolidating six carriers 
under a single command, instead of the usual type command, as well as inte-
grating battleships and cruisers with the carrier groups, following the American 
example.121
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Allied Air Strikes in the Central Pacific, January–May 1944
U.S. carrier forces and land-based aircraft of the Army Air Corps based in CENTPAC 
and SWPA conducted a series of strikes and raids against the Japanese strongpoints, 
bases, and shipping in the Central Pacific in the first six months of 1944, in support 
of the planned invasions of the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines. At the same time, 
submarines based in Hawaii and Australia continued their attacks against shipping 
and occasionally smaller surface combatants. The purpose was generally to weaken 
enemy airpower and cut off shipping between the home islands and the Southern 
Resources Area and naval bases and isolated strongpoints in the Central and South 
Pacific. Massive strikes by TF 58 and land-based, long-range bombers aimed to iso-
late areas in which major landings would take place. These strikes significantly wore 
down Japanese air strength and inflicted steady and large losses in shipping. 
On 29 January 1944, TF 58 began strikes against enemy aircraft and air installa-
tions in the Marshalls that continued until 6 February.122 On 31 January forces led 
by Spruance invaded Kwajalein and Majuro, in the Marshalls (Operation FLINT-
LOCK). The Southern Attack Force (TF 51, under Admiral Turner), the Northern 
Attack Force (TF 53, under Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly), and the Reserve Force 
and Majuro Attack Group (TF 51.2, Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill) were supported by 
carrier-based aircraft of TF 58 (Mitscher) and land-based aircraft from TF 57 (Ad-
miral Hoover). Aircraft from Task Group (TG) 58.3, under Rear Adm. Frederick C. 
Sherman, bombed aircraft and air facilities on Engebi Island and Eniwetok Atoll. 
On 1 February, U.S. forces landed on Roi, Namur, and Kwajalein.123 Roi and Namur 
were secured the next day.
On 17 February, TF 58—nine carriers and six battleships, plus accompanying 
cruisers and destroyers—conducted a series of massive strikes against Truk (Op-
eration HAILSTONE). They destroyed 168 enemy aircraft, at the cost of only five.124 
(Other sources say that at least seventy Japanese aircraft and about 200,000 tons 
of merchant shipping were destroyed.)125 The next day, U.S. forces invaded Engebi 
Island, in Eniwetok Atoll (Operation CATCHPOLE). The same day TF 58 struck Truk 
again, sinking one destroyer, one submarine chaser, and one motor torpedo boat.126 
Eniwetok Island was invaded on 19 February.
On 22 February, two task groups (TGs 58.2 and 58.3) attacked Tinian and 
Guam, in the first U.S. carrier attack against the Marianas. They destroyed fifty-
two aircraft in the air, plus a large number on the ground.127 They also sank one 
transport.128 On 8 March Japanese planes bombed Eniwetok and Engebi Island, 
destroying ammunition, petroleum products, and distillation units but inflicting 
no damage on the airstrip.129
Because of the strikes on Truk, Admiral Koga was greatly concerned about a 
possible attack on Palau and ordered his heavy surface forces to avoid air attacks. 
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Koga was proved correct when U.S. aircraft struck Palau on 30 March. In response, 
Koga issued a general order activating “HEI operation, Method 6, Method D” (i.e., 
interception of the enemy fleet by the surface striking force in the western Caro-
lines). Eight submarines (five I class and three ROs) were assigned to patrol in the 
Marshalls; one submarine (I class) sortied from Truk, the remaining six (one I, five 
ROs) at Truk being unavailable for immediate operations. All available submarines 
in home waters (three I-boats and four ROs) were directed to advance to the Palau 
area.130
On 30 March and 1 April, TF 58 conducted large-scale air attacks of airfields, 
shipping, and fleet and air installations at Palau, Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai. The at-
tack on Palau was designed primarily to destroy enemy naval ships and aircraft; 
the attacks on Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai were secondary in importance. TF 58 had 
eleven carriers organized in three task groups, whose strikes were supplemented by 
strikes and long-range searches by aircraft from CENTPAC and SWPA. The U.S. 
submarines were directed to attack shipping, conduct reconnaissance, and provide 
lifeguard services for aviators.131 U.S. carrier aircraft also extensively mined the 
channels into the Palaus, the first time that carrier aircraft laid mines. TF 58 planes 
sank and damaged a fairly large number of the ships at Palau and Angaur.132 On 31 
March, one carrier group attacked Yap, Ulithi, and Ngulu, and on 2 April all three 
groups attacked Woleai. Some 150 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air and on 
the ground, at the loss of only twenty-five U.S. aircraft.133
On 21–22 April, TF 58 bombarded airfields and defensive positions in the Hol-
landia, Wakde, Sawar, and Sarmi areas of New Guinea in support of landings at 
Aitape and Tanahmerah Bay (Operation PERSECUTION) and Humboldt Bay, Hol-
landia (RECKLESS).134 On 29–30 April a force from TF 58 composed of five fleet 
carriers and seven light carriers struck the shipping, oil and ammunition dumps, 
aircraft facilities, and other installations at Truk.135 The plan was to conduct daily 
fighter sweeps by eighty-four planes and then staggered bombing attacks. There 
was considerable opposition to the initial fighter sweep, as well as squally weather 
and heavy cloud cover, but by midmorning all airborne enemy planes had been 
eliminated. Some 2,200 sorties were flown. The 23rd Air Flotilla on Truk lost about 
sixty aircraft in the air and thirty-four more on the ground. Some 170 naval per-
sonnel were killed and three hundred wounded. TF 58 lost twenty-seven planes, 
mostly from antiaircraft (AA) fire.136
On 30 April, nine heavy cruisers and eight destroyers were detached from TF 58 
to bombard positions on Satawan Island, in the Namoi group in the Carolines. On 
1 May, TGs 58.1 and 58.7, with seven battleships and fourteen destroyers, attacked 
wharf areas, a seaplane base, and other installations on Ponape Island.137
On 13–14 May, carrier aircraft and B-24s and B-25s of the U.S. Army Air Forces 
bombed installations at Jaluit.138 On 19–23 May a TF 58 carrier group carried out a 
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series of strikes against Marcus and Wake. On the 19th, night fighters attacked Mar-
cus; these attacks continued during the next day. On the 20th composite groups at-
tacked Marcus, causing moderate damage to buildings and installations but shoot-
ing down few enemy planes, at a loss of four aircraft. The small results were due to 
a lack of targets and bad weather. An attack on Wake was carried out by composite 
groups on 23 May; a number of ground installations were destroyed or damaged.139
Allied Knowledge of the Enemy prior to 30 May
The U.S. intelligence activities in Hawaii and Washington, D.C., had a fairly accu-
rate picture of the IJN’s organizational changes, plans, and orders and of the move-
ments of various forces for many months prior to June 1944. The main sources 
of information were intercepts of enemy radio transmissions, direction finding 
and sightings by long-range bombers and seaplanes, as well as reconnaissance pa-
trols by submarines. Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and all fleet and task force 
commanders in the theater received Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area 
(JICPOA) daily bulletins. (The times used in reference to these bulletins are always 
“minus nine” unless otherwise indicated.) Admiral King in Washington was kept 
informed of Japanese plans and intentions through COMINCH daily summaries 
of radio intercepts. These were based on information transmitted to his staff by 
Nimitz and JICPOA, whose analysts were able either to learn directly about or to 
deduce all major movements of the Combined Fleet in the NEI, the Philippines, 
New Guinea, and the Central Pacific. Radio intercepts were also very helpful in 
decrypting messages sent by the CINC of the Combined Fleet to seagoing forces 
and shore commands. The biggest success was the reading of the Combined Fleet’s 
actual plan to react to the Allied advances across the Central Pacific. 
On 30 December 1943, COMINCH analysts learned that the Japanese NGS 
had shifted its emphasis to offensive air operations. The Japanese, they found, were 
contemplating the creation of a new Carrier Division 3, composed of two escort 
carriers (Chitose, Chiyoda) and one light carrier (Zuihō). The Japanese also in-
tended to have in service twenty-one fighter squadrons and nine torpedo-bomber 
squadrons.140 On 22 January 1944, the same analysts learned from radio intercepts 
that the Japanese had established the First Air Fleet, responsible for patrolling the 
eastern approaches to the home waters. They believed the First Air Fleet consisted 
of about six hundred aircraft and two major training commands (the Fiftieth and 
Fifty-First Air Fleets), the Yokosuka Air Group, and two unidentified groups of 
fighters and medium bombers.141 
On 21 February 1944, COMINCH’s daily radio-intercept summary noted that 
Battleship Division (BatDiv) 3, comprising Kongo, Haruna, and possibly Yamato, 
was at Singapore, part of the Third Fleet. Total Japanese strength in the Singapore 
area was estimated at five battleships, two large carries, four heavy cruisers, five 
light cruisers, and seventeen destroyers.142 COMINCH also learned on 27 February 
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that the Japanese had started preparations to reinforce their defenses of the Caro-
lines and Marianas. The 29th Army Division was being transported in three large 
convoys, thirty vessels, to Saipan and Truk.143
Also on 27 February, COMINCH analysts discerned that the enemy fleet was 
in the process of a major reorganization. They learned that the First Fleet had been 
disbanded, as noted above, and that the First Mobile Force (often called the “First 
Striking Force” in JICPOA/COMINCH intelligence assessments), formed from the 
(disbanded) First and Second Fleets, would be assigned to the Combined Fleet ef-
fective the 1st.
On 28 February, JICPOA reported that BatDiv 1 had been assigned to the newly 
reconstituted Second Fleet. The battleship division had been part of the First Strik-
ing Fleet. The battleship Nagato had been shifted to BatDiv 1 from BatDiv 2 on 25 
February.144 On 25 March, all the Japanese submarines operating in the Central 
Pacific–Solomons–New Guinea area were reported to have come under direct tac-
tical control of the Sixth Fleet.145
On 25 March, COMINCH’s daily radio-intercept summary reported that a new 
2nd Air Attack Force had been created, subordinate to CINC, First Air Fleet and 
with headquarters on Tinian.146 This unit, its forces deployed through the Marianas– 
Truk–Mereyon–Peleliu area, consisted of 302 aircraft.147 The 2nd Air Attack Force 
was responsible for air defense of the eastern Carolines, Marianas, and the Bonins. 
In addition, a part of the Yokosuka Air Group, normally assigned to home defense, 
had been deployed to Marcus and Iwo Jima.148 COMINCH analysts had already 
learned the First Mobile Force had been created, but they mistakenly assessed that 
its principal mission was the protection of communications. They correctly pro-
jected, however, that it would concentrate in the southern Philippines by 10 May.149 
They believed that the First Mobile Force consisted of the First Mobile Fleet (Dai-
ichi Kido Kantai) and the battleship Fusō (because JICPOA’s reports referred to 
some Japanese units differently than their true designations, “First Mobile Force” 
and First Mobile Fleet” are used interchangeably in the following account).150 It was 
reported that the headquarters of CINC, Combined Fleet, temporarily on Palau, 
were to be moved to Saipan via Davao during the evening of 31 March or the morn-
ing of 1 April.151 
On 30 March, COMINCH analysts learned that all submarines available in 
home waters and Truk had been directed to the vicinity of Palau. The next day, six 
to seven submarines in home waters were directed east of Palau. American naval 
analysts did not know how many submarines would sortie from Truk but believed 
about five boats could be available. A day later, they deduced that the Japanese were 
preoccupied with defensive measures because of the presence of the U.S. striking 
force in the Palau area; they had directed all available naval forces in the Singa-
pore area, plus submarines in home waters and at Truk, to proceed to the southern 
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Philippines to attack enemy “occupation forces.” Specifically, CarDiv 1 (with sev-
enty fighters, sixty-five dive-bombers, and fifty torpedo bombers) would proceed 
to Davao via Balikpapan and then seek out and destroy enemy carriers. The 2nd 
Diversionary Attack Force—four BBs (Nagato, Fusō, Kongo, and Haruna), five CAs 
(Tone, Chikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, and Mogami), one light cruiser (CL, Yahagi), 
and ten destroyers (DDs) would sortie out from the Singapore–Lingga area to the 
southern Philippines to destroy U.S. occupation forces, concentrating on the carri-
ers. Except for two heavy cruisers and about four destroyers, this force was under 
the command of BatDiv 1.152 
On 2 April, JICPOA revealed that starting on 31 March the Japanese had con-
ducted communications-deception measures to conceal the movement of the 
601st Air Group on board CarDiv 1 from Singapore to Davao and of surface forces 
from Singapore–Lingga to the southern Philippines.153 The projected move of the 
Sixth Fleet’s headquarters from Truk to Palau was postponed until the end of April 
because of damage suffered at Palau during recent carrier strikes.154 On 3 April, 
COMINCH analysts noted that the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force was proceeding 
to the southern Philippines from the Singapore–Lingga area. The units of South-
eastern Area Fleet—one CA (Aoba), one CL (Ōi), and two DDs—had departed 
Singapore on 2 April and were en route to Balikpapan, to arrive on 4 April.155 
On 4 April, COMINCH intelligence reported that the Japanese had deduced 
that the Allies would not conduct a landing on the Palaus. This had led Koga to 
cancel all preparations to seek out and destroy U.S. “occupation forces.” An im-
portant piece of information was that the Tawi-Tawi anchorage in the Sulu Archi-
pelago would be used as a major fleet anchorage in the defense of the Philippines. 
The 33rd Guard Division has been assigned to the 32nd Base Force at Davao to set 
up defenses and facilities at Tawi-Tawi.156 JICPOA correctly assessed that the en-
emy intended to speed up army reinforcement to the Central Pacific, western New 
Guinea, and the Philippines. It also had evidence that the Japanese believed that 
the Allies would probably conduct landings at Wewak and Hollandia in the near 
future. These landings would be coordinated with air strikes against the Palaus.157
On 6 April, COMINCH noted Japanese efforts to replace aircraft destroyed in 
the strikes against Palau, Mereyon, Woleai, and Truk. The Japanese also planned 
to set up adequate antiair defenses and to strengthen antisubmarine defenses. The 
Japanese redeployed most of the aircraft in the Marianas and on Iwo Jima to these 
forward air bases; few if any replacement aircraft arrived from Japan.158 On the same 
day, JICPOA learned that the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force—five CAs (Atago, 
Takao, Chokai, Haguro, Myoko), one CL (Noshiro), and four or five DDs—had 
departed from Davao on the evening of the 5th. Four days later this force, after 
passing through the Basilan Strait and Balabac Strait, would arrive at the Lingga 
anchorage. This force had left Palau prior to the U.S. strikes.159
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On 7 April, COMINCH intelligence was in the dark about the whereabouts of 
the CINC, Combined Fleet, Adm. Mineichi Koga. Traffic analysis had been unable 
to locate him since 3 April. The analysts noted an extensive search for an aircraft 
belonging to the 851st Air Group lost en route from Palau to Davao at the approxi-
mate time when Koga was scheduled to move his headquarters. An indication that 
Koga had been lost was that CINC, Central Pacific Area Fleet at Saipan seemed 
to have taken charge and issued orders, even to Combined Fleet staff officers.160 
Koga had indeed died in a crash, but it was actually Vice Adm. Shirō Takasu, Koga’s 
deputy and the commander of the Southwest Area Fleet at Surabaya, who took over 
command of the Combined Fleet, for about a month.161
Also on the 7th, the COMINCH team reported “excellent” evidence that the 
major part of the Japanese fleet at Singapore–Lingga would return to the southern 
Philippines, probably Tawi-Tawi, shortly after 15 April. The indications were that 
four tankers assigned to the First Mobile Fleet had been ordered to proceed to 
Balikpapan as expeditiously as possible, take on full loads, and stand by for further 
orders from 15 April. Another important item was an order for the shipment of 
radar tubes to Davao after 15 April.162 Orders to the heavy cruiser Maya and three 
DDs to depart from Yokosuka by 15 April and proceed to the southern Philippines 
indicated that the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force would also return there. Further, 
the Southwest Area Fleet was directed on 6 April to transport troops, under the 
escort of Cruiser Division (CruDiv) 16—one CA, four CLs, and two DDs—from 
Davao to Tawi-Tawi.163 Nimitz believed that these troops were intended to mop up 
guerrillas in preparation for using Tawi-Tawi as a fleet anchorage.164
On 8 April, Nimitz’s staff believed that CarDiv 3 (Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda) 
would not be ready for combat operations prior to 15 April. There was additional 
evidence that the First Striking Fleet would move to the southern Philippines from 
the Lingga anchorage, probably after 15 April.165 COMINCH analysts noted that 
the Japanese continued intensive work on new airfields in the Marianas; more than 
a hundred aircraft of the 62nd Air Flotilla were expected to be sent to that area dur-
ing April. By the 15th a new air base at Rota would be almost complete; it would 
have one eighty-by-1,500-meter runway, taxiways, and barracks for a thousand 
men. The airfield on Guam was not yet complete, but COMINCH analysts esti-
mated that some eighty-three planes, mostly dive- and torpedo bombers, would be 
based there in the near future.166
On 12 April, the COMINCH daily radio-intercept summary had definitive in-
formation that the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force had been directed to sortie from 
the Singapore area on 31 March and proceed to Tawi-Tawi.167 Also, the volume of 
Japanese radio traffic had built up in the southeastern area, possibly related to the 
planned shift of most heavy ships then in the Singapore–Lingga area to Tawi-Tawi 
on 15 April.168
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On 30 April, COMINCH radio intercepts indicated that CarDiv 2 and CarDiv 3 
were in the Inland Sea.169 Radio traffic on 27 and 28 April showed that both CarDivs 
had been making final preparations for sailing to Singapore via Manila. Contrary to 
previous indications, it now appeared that CarDiv 2 would sortie first. COMINCH 
analysts also learned that the First Mobile Fleet had directed CarDiv 2 to transfer 
some fifty replacement aircraft (twenty fighters, eighteen dive-bombers, and twelve 
torpedo bombers) to CarDiv 1 off Manila, probably between 6 and 10 May.170
On 2 May, JICPOA assessed that a movement of the First Striking Fleet from 
the Singapore area to the Philippines could be impending. CarDivs 2 and 3 had 
completed combat training in Japan and would probably depart about that day; 
they might proceed with the battleship Musashi and eight DDs. CarDivs 2 and 3 
would ferry planes for CarDiv 1, and at least some of them would be transferred by 
lighters off Manila. These two divisions would then probably join the First Strik-
ing Fleet in the Singapore–Philippines area. On 30 April, it was now reported, the 
commander of the First Striking Fleet had directed various tankers to an unknown 
place in the Sulu Archipelago, probably Tawi-Tawi. Nimitz estimated that the First 
Striking Fleet would depart the Singapore area about 7 May and proceed to, most 
likely, Tawi-Tawi.171 Fuel reserves were being built up there; three large fleet tankers 
were then loading at Balikpapan under orders to proceed to Tawi-Tawi. In all, six 
tankers and one cargo vessel had received orders to sail for Tawi-Tawi.172
On 8 May, JICPOA had indications that CINC, First Mobile Fleet and units 
under his command had left Singapore and were proceeding in several sections for 
Tawi-Tawi. JICPOA believed that CruDiv 7 would depart Singapore for Manila. 
Practically all fleet units then in the Singapore area would sortie for Davao, Tawi-
Tawi, or Manila. JICPOA also estimated that Musashi, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 3, plus 
about eight DDs then in Japan, would join other units. All together, the Japanese 
would have in the southern Philippines a force of six BBs, two large carriers, two 
auxiliary carriers, five light carriers, eleven CAs, and twenty to twenty-five DDs. 
Most of the tankers were servicing the fleet at Tawi-Tawi and Manila; they were 
escorted by destroyers. Air cover was being given to the convoys proceeding from 
Balikpapan to Tawi-Tawi, in addition to surface escorts.173
COMINCH analysts learned on the 9th that the First Mobile Fleet had sortied 
from Singapore to the southern Philippines two days earlier. Up to fifteen tank-
ers had been diverted from other duties and concentrated near Balikpapan and 
the southern Philippines.174 JICPOA informed all task force commanders and the 
commanders of SWPA and SOPAC that Nimitz believed that Jolo Airfield in Sulu 
Archipelago had been developed by the Japanese as a rear base.175 JICPOA learned 
that enemy intelligence had deduced that Allied operations were imminent, prob-
ably in the Central Pacific area and possibly involving landing operations. Hence, 
on 13 May the Japanese alerted the defenses of the Marianas.176 
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On 12 May, JICPOA revealed that on 4 May, the chief of the NGS had reported an 
urgent need for a delivery that month of aviation gasoline, aerial bombs, torpedoes, 
and machine-gun ammunition to air bases in the Marianas and the eastern and 
western Carolines. He also requested from CINC, Combined Fleet all possible as-
sistance in the transportation, loading, and assembling of the material. COMINCH 
analysts commented that the nineteen airfields listed in that message included two 
airfields on each of the islands of Saipan, Tinian, Mereyon, Harushima, Truk, Pa-
lau, and Peleliu.177 They also noted evidence of a serious shortage of crude oil at 
Balikpapan refineries. A message sent by the Balikpapan fuel depot on 11 May re-
vealed that though seventy thousand tons of oil per month from Java and Sumatra 
was necessary, only fourteen thousand tons had actually been received from Java in 
April; in May it would be 14,300 tons. No oil had been received from Sumatra. The 
apparent reason for that situation was the lack of ships to transport the crude oil.178 
JICPOA had fairly good evidence that the Japanese contemplated eventual com-
pletion of four airfields on Guam and three on Saipan, four on Tinian, three on Iwo 
Jima, two on Puluwat, and two on Ponape, four on Yap, four on Woleai, and five 
on Truk.179
On 13 May, Nimitz informed subordinate task force commanders that the ma-
jority of the First Striking Fleet and Second Fleet had probably not sortied on the 
7th; possibly some Second Fleet units had left the Singapore–Lingga area and were 
on that date in the Makassar Strait–Celebes Sea area. The Japanese plan to transfer 
CarDiv 1 replacement planes from CarDiv 2 units off Manila had been canceled, 
and the movement of CarDivs 2 and 3 from the Inland Sea, and of Musashi from 
the Philippines, had apparently been postponed. However, there were indications 
that these two carrier divisions had left the Inland Sea about noon on 11 May. 
CarDiv 1 and Mogami had been off Borneo’s west coast on 12 May. Some aircraft 
of the 601st Air Group on board CarDiv 1 and shore-based aircraft had arrived at 
Davao on 12 May.180
On 16 May, COMINCH’s analysts had indications that the Japanese planned to 
concentrate the major part of their fleet in the southern Philippines, with CINC, 
Combined Fleet at Davao. They also had information that the First Air Fleet, then 
deployed in the Saipan–Tinian area, would move its units to Palau and Davao.181 
JICPOA learned that Japanese intelligence believed that the U.S. striking force had 
departed the Marshalls on or before 15 May; if had issued a warning to certain 
Central Pacific bases in anticipation of strikes.182 
On 19 May, COMINCH’s analysts learned that on 4 May the chief of the 1st 
Section (Operations Bureau) of the NGS had requested Admiral Toyoda to pay spe-
cial attention to the transport of fuel and ammunition to various bases within the 
Saipan–Truk–Tawi-Tawi–Ambon quadrangle. The pending operation demand-
ed that these supplies be accumulated during May at various listed bases.183 The 
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Advance Expeditionary Force (Submarines) would patrol the Marshalls and north 
of Mussau Island (the Saint Matthias Group, New Guinea), as well as Wevak.184
On 21 May, Nimitz assessed that Southern Army Headquarters had moved 
from Singapore to Manila early in the month. The 22nd, 23rd, and 26th Air Flotil-
las had been assigned to the First Air Fleet. At least part of the 61st Air Flotilla had 
deployed from the Marianas to Palau. The 22nd Air Flotilla had deployed at Truk, 
the 23rd Air Flotilla to Sorong, the 26th Air Flotilla from Palau to Davao, and the 
61st Air Flotilla to Palau and the Marianas. All these air flotillas were subordinate 
to the commander of the First Air Fleet, on Tinian.185 The 25th Air Flotilla, for-
merly at Rabaul, had been dissolved. These redeployments of air flotillas, Nimitz 
felt, suggested that the Japanese believed that Palau and western New Guinea were 
most likely Allied objectives.186
On 21 May, COMINCH analysts learned that CINC, Southeast Area Fleet sent a 
message stating that during the pending “A-Operation” (to counter an Allied inva-
sion of the Marianas), every effort would be made to have at least two airfields at 
Rabaul usable by the evening of each day, though they had been attacked during the 
day. The analysts commented that the “nature of A-Operation is unknown” but that 
there was no indication that it would be more than local in scope. They believed 
(erroneously) that it might be related to supply or evacuation operations in the 
Bismarcks and Solomons.187
On 22 May, JICPOA reported a major reorganization of the Japanese air com-
mands. The First Air Fleet appeared to have assumed administrative and tactical 
command of all shore-based naval aircraft in the Marianas, Carolines, and south-
ern Philippines, Halmahera, the Celebes, and western New Guinea. The CINC of 
the Central Pacific Area Fleet had been stripped of all but a few transport aircraft. 
This was the first time that senior air command had been divorced from area fleets. 
Subordinate to the First Air Fleet were the 22nd Air Flotilla, the 2nd Air Attack 
Force on Truk, the 23rd Air Flotilla (or 3rd Air Attack Force) at Sorong, the 26th 
Air Flotilla (or 6th Air Attack Force) at Davao, and the 61st Air Flotilla (or 41st 
Air Attack Force) on Palau. However, JICPOA erroneously concluded that the air 
deployments indicated that the Japanese considered assaults on Guam, Tinian, or 
Saipan less likely than on Palau, in the southern Philippines, or at some place in 
that vicinity, such as Manokwari (on the Vogelkop Peninsula) or Halmahera.188
On 22 May, JICPOA estimated that Japanese air strength in the Philippines, 
NEI, and New Guinea was about 1,060 aircraft. This figure included some 450 air-
craft (225 fighters, 216 single-engine bombers, and nine floatplanes) embarked on 
CarDivs 1, 2, and 3.189 The 5th Base Air Force’s Vice Adm. Kakuji Sumida was in 
command of the 61st Air Flotilla, with headquarters on Tinian. The 11th Air Flo-
tilla and the 26th Air Flotilla commanders were on Truk and Palau, respectively, 
responsible for operations in the Carolines and the Marianas. The 23rd Air Flotilla, 
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with headquarters at Kendari, in the Celebes, was operating north of Australia.190 
The base air forces had some 372 aircraft, while the army had 234.191 However, 
JICPOA was having difficulty estimating Japanese air strength in the Marianas and 
Carolines, because of uncertainty about the movements of the 61st Air Flotilla from 
Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. On 1 May, that flotilla consisted of ten air groups and 
670 aircraft. Its combat strength had been increased by superbly trained units of 
the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Air Fleets.192 JICPOA assessed that the Japanese 
had in that area 384 aircraft (186 fighters, sixty single-engine bombers, seventy-two 
twin-engine light bombers, sixteen medium bombers, eight flying boats, and forty-
two floatplanes).193 
On 27 May, as Nimitz informed task force commanders, there was no change 
in the location of the enemy fleet commanders, with the exception of Commander, 
First Striking Force and Commander, Second Fleet. They were estimated to be at 
the Tawi-Tawi anchorage. From the information received from U.S. Seventh Fleet 
on 24 May, it was believed that there were some forty vessels at Tawi-Tawi, includ-
ing six carriers and ten battleships and cruisers.194
On the 29th, JICPOA noted numerous flights from the home islands to the 
Marianas. It estimated total Japanese air strength at 550 naval land-based aircraft 
(including 250 fighters, 120 single-engine bombers, eighty twin-engine light bomb-
ers, and fifteen medium bombers), 370 army planes, 1,290 naval local-patrol and 
training aircraft, and 120 army aircraft in training.195 The Yap airfield had assumed 
increased importance for basing fighter aircraft. After mid-May some fighters were 
moved from Guam and Tinian to Palau.196
A most important development was the Allied capture of a copy of the Com-
bined Fleet’s plan to counter the U.S. offensive in the Central Pacific—Combined 
Fleet Secret Order No. 73, code-named Z operation, issued by Admiral Koga on 
8 March 1944. On 29 May, JICPOA made translations available to all major com-
manders in the POA. Allied intelligence believed that the basic strategic principles 
still held good in May 1944.197 An early Z plan had been signed by Koga on 25 Au-
gust 1943. In February 1944, Koga obtained approval by IGHQ to modify it to meet 
the changed strategic situation in the Pacific. He was also allowed to command the 
Combined Fleet from Truk instead of Tokyo.198 
The Z plan was captured by Filipino guerrillas on Cebu Island led by the U.S. 
Army lieutenant colonel James M. Cushing on 3 April. This happened through an 
accident. Faced with an imminent attack on ships anchored in the Palaus, Koga had 
ordered all warships and merchant ships to leave on 29 March and had transferred 
his headquarters ashore. Not wanting to be isolated on Palau, however, he decided 
to move his headquarters to Davao, some six hundred miles west. On the 31st, 
Koga and his staff flew there in three planes. Only one reached its destination. Ko-
ga’s plane ran into a violent tropical storm and crashed on the way to Davao; there 
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were no survivors. The second plane carried his chief of staff, Vice Adm. Shigeru 
Fukudome, with the Z plan in a briefcase, and fourteen staffers. This plane too 
encountered bad weather, and it crashed in the Bohol Strait, two and a half miles 
from Cebu, at about 0230 on 1 April.199 Fukudome and twelve members of his staff 
survived. The Japanese headquarters on Cebu was only about six miles away from 
where they swam ashore, and two survivors made their way there. Fukudome and 
ten others, however, were rescued by Filipino fishermen.200 They were taken to the 
87th Regiment of the Filipino guerrillas and held as prisoners at Barrio Balud, near 
Cebu City. For some reason, Lieutenant Colonel Cushing, who was in command, 
was under the impression that Fukudome was in fact Gen. Twami Furonei, com-
mander of the army and naval forces at Makassar. On 3 April, however, a Filipino 
shopkeeper at Perios, a village near Barrio Magtalisay, saw in the water what turned 
out to be Fukudome’s briefcase and retrieved it.201
The Japanese commander on Cebu learned about the crash from the two 
survivors who reached him and deployed three battalions to search for the other 
survivors. Cushing prevailed on Fukudome to send them a message that the 
guerrillas would release the prisoners if the Japanese stopped slaughtering ci-
vilians. That led to the release of the Japanese prisoners, including Fukudome. 
All of them arrived safely at Cebu, then at Manila, and eventually Tokyo, on 20 
April.202 
The U.S. submarine Haddo was sent secretly to pick up Fukudome’s briefcase, 
plus some forty Americans. Haddo reached Darwin, Australia, on 19 May, and the 
briefcase was flown to Brisbane. The SWPA’s Allied Intelligence Bureau sent the 
document to the Allied Translator and Interpretation Section (ATIS). On 23 May, 
ATIS published a limited-distribution translation; five days later, “A Study of the 
Main Features of Decisive Air Operations in the Central Pacific,” which had been 
completed by the Combined Fleet staff on 10 March 1944, was issued on a limited 
basis to major commands in both SWPA and POA.203
On 29 May, JICPOA provided a detailed rundown of ships believed to be in 
the Philippines–NEI area: six battleships (Musashi, Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, 
Haruna, Fusō), eight carriers (Shōkaku, Zuikaku, Hitaka, Taihō, Ryuho, Zuihō, Chi-
tose, Chiyoda), twelve CAs (Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai, Haguro, Myoko, Kumano, 
Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma, Aoba, Mogami), five CLs (Kinu, Ōi, Yubari, Noshiro, 
Yahagi), and thirty-three DDs.204 The JICPOA analysts estimated that CarDiv 2’s 
training was behind that of CarDivs 1 and 3 and that as of the end of April it would 
probably have had difficulty conducting strikes. CruDiv 5 had been assigned an 
anchorage at Palau, the first use of Palau by major ships since the U.S. strikes at the 
end of March.205 JICPOA estimated that the three Japanese carrier divisions had 
on board 225 fighters, 117 dive-bombers, ninety-nine torpedo bombers, and nine 
reconnaissance aircraft.206 
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On 29 May, JICPOA estimated that in the event of U.S. operations in the Cen-
tral Pacific, it was the Japanese plan to advance either the whole First Mobile Fleet 
or just carrier forces, depending on the fuel situation. The Japanese tanker short-
age, while difficult, was not sufficiently acute to prevent such a move. It was also 
believed that under conditions of tactical advantage, Japanese forces would prefer 
a night action and that their carriers would take a circuitous approach and attack 
from the flank. Much, however, would depend on the availability of shore-based air 
after the initial strikes.207 JICPOA reported that in the Central Pacific the Japanese 
had reduced air searches from six hundred miles to between three hundred and 350 
miles during the critical hours prior to dawn and late in the afternoon. Another 
factor was shortage of medium bombers. The use of dive-bombers and carrier tor-
pedo bombers in predawn searches out to 300–350 miles appeared to be regular 
doctrine at key bases such as Truk and Tinian.208
At 0215 on 29 May, Nimitz’s headquarters advised subordinate commands that 
the Japanese had sped up construction of a second airfield at Yap. He believed that 
CruDiv 5 and the battleship Fusō would soon arrive at Palau from the southern 
Philippines. In another message at 0321, his headquarters reported that CruDiv 7 
was in the Philippines and that Japanese radio intelligence in the Philippines be-
lieved that an important U.S. task force had been in the Marshalls on 27 May. The 
next day, Japanese communications-intelligence units throughout the Central Pa-
cific, the home islands, and the Kurils warned that forces should be in readiness for 
joint action—another indicator that the Japanese expected a major U.S. operation 
would happen shortly. It also implied that the Japanese had made preparations for 
a fleet action to counter such an operation.209
Finally, on 31 May Nimitz’s headquarters informed subordinate commands that 
there was evidence of Japanese fuel shortages in the Marianas. The Japanese would 
soon start work on a 1,200-meter airstrip on Palau. On 30 May, a convoy of the 
transport ships believed to be carrying First Air Fleet base and air personnel had 
departed Saipan for Palau. This shift in the weight of effort suggested to JICPOA 
analysts that the Japanese believed that the next major U.S. operation would be in 
the Palau–western New Guinea area.210
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IV Japanese A-Go Operation (Battle of the  
Philippine Sea), 13–22 June 1944
Planning and Preparation
The U.S. plans for the invasions of the Marianas (Operation FORAGER) were a part of Nimitz’s campaign plan GRANITE II. Operation Plan (OPLAN) 3-44 was issued by Admiral Nimitz on 23 April 1944. 
Allied Plans
The objectives in the southern Marianas were stated as follows: establish a base 
for operations against Japanese sea communications and for long-range air attacks 
against Japan; secure control of sea communications through the Central Pacific; 
and initiate the isolation and neutralization of the central Carolines. In the OPLAN 
Nimitz gave missions to his major subordinate commanders. Admiral Spruance 
was directed to “capture, occupy, and defend Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, and de-
velop bases in those islands, and gain control of the remaining Marianas.” Perhaps 
surprisingly Nimitz did not mention the Japanese fleet. Halsey’s Third Fleet was 
directed to support operations of the Fifth Fleet units by air reconnaissance and at-
tacks on enemy bases. Lockwood’s Task Force (TF) 11 would destroy enemy naval 
forces and shipping, perform observation and life-guard services off Truk, Woleai, 
and Palau, and intercept and destroy enemy forces approaching the Marianas or 
retiring from the assault area. D-day for Operation FORAGER was 15 June (the east-
longitude date). OPLAN 3-44 became effective on 1 May 1944.1 On its basis, all 
major subordinate commanders developed their own operation plans.
Spruance’s OPLAN 10-44 of 12 May 1944 specified that the Fifth Fleet’s mission 
was 
to capture, occupy and place in a state of defense Saipan, Tinian and Guam; drive off or 
destroy enemy forces attempting to interfere with the movement to or the landing opera-
tions at each objective; direct the operations of aircraft of the Joint Expeditionary Force 
and those of Fast Carrier Task Forces, Pacific designated for air support of landings; initiate 
the construction of airfields, the improvement of harbors and the establishment of military 
government, withdraw troops not required for garrison duties, and naval forces not required 
for defense or covering operations as the situation permits, and in accordance with directive 
issued separately.2
Spruance’s plan was based on several assumptions. First, the planners assumed 
that Saipan, Tinian, and Guam were strongly protected and that the enemy would 
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defend them vigorously. The Japanese would employ long-range aircraft from the 
Carolines, Iwo Jima, and Chichi Jima to attack U.S. forces in the southern Mari-
anas. It was further assumed air strikes by the Allied aircraft based in the Marshalls 
and in the South and Southwest Pacific area against the Japanese air bases in the 
Carolines prior to and during FORAGER would prevent serious interference with 
U.S. forces in the southern Marianas. It was thought possible that enemy naval 
forces and carrier-based aircraft would try to prevent the capture of the southern 
Marianas or interfere with the unloading of materiel and personnel after the United 
States had accomplished its amphibious objectives.3
Spruance specified that the mission of the Fast Carrier Task Forces, Pacific 
would be “to prevent interference by enemy air action with the capture of Saipan, 
Tinian and Guam; protect the Joint Expeditionary Force and island positions 
after occupation by our landing forces from attack by enemy surface forces.” 
TF 58’s task groups (TGs), each screened by fast battleships in close tactical sup-
port, would destroy enemy aircraft and air facilities on Saipan, Tinian, Guam, 
Rota, and Pagan commencing three days before D-day—that is, D–3. On D–2, 
after the enemy’s ability to use airfields in the Marianas had been eliminated, TF 
58 would destroy defenses on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. It would also destroy 
aircraft and air facilities on, and shipping present at, Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima.4 
Mitscher, Commander, Task Force (CTF) 58, was given latitude to make changes 
in the employment of his forces due to weather conditions, enemy action, and 
other circumstances to accomplish the tasks prescribed.5
After the bombardment of the enemy positions had been completed, Mitscher 
would transfer Destroyer Division (DesDiv) 12 plus one destroyer (Selfridge) from 
TG 58.2 and Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 1 from TG 58.3 to the Joint Expedi-
tionary Force (TF 51), at a location to be designated by Admiral Turner. Mitscher 
was also directed to provide, beginning on D–1 and as requested by Turner, 
air support to troops on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam.6 Spruance stipulated that TG 
58.1 and TG 58.4 would be released from operations against the Marianas in time 
to allow their refueling and replenishment of aircraft on D–1 in Area DOHENY.7
OPLAN 10-44 specified that Commander, Forward Area, Central Pacific 
would, in coordination with South Pacific and Southwest Pacific forces, deny 
to the enemy the use of air bases at Truk; maintain the neutralization of Wake, 
Wotje, Taroa, Mille, Jaluit, Nauru, Kusaie, and Ponape; and maintain daily air 
searches in accordance with plans prescribed in its annex F. He was also tasked 
to “attack enemy ships and shipping; defend our bases in the Gilberts and Mar-
shalls and provide air transportation.” CTF 57 would, when directed by Spruance, 
move two squadrons of patrol planes, with a tender, to Guam or Saipan and start 
searches from there. Also, when directed, he would move units of Service Squad-
ron 12 to the Marianas and start developing harbors there. CTF 57 was also made 
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responsible for supporting of Central Pacific task forces at the Majuro, Kwajalein, 
and Eniwetok lagoons.8
Spruance’s plan stated that the Third Fleet and the Southwest Pacific Area would 
support operations of Central Pacific task forces by air search and air attacks on 
bases. Commander, Service Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Air Forces, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps; and Commanding 
General, Central Pacific Area would also support the Central Pacific task forces.9
Spruance’s OPLAN 10-44 stipulated that D-day would be the initial landing on 
Saipan, W-day the landing on Guam, J-day the initial landings on Tinian, and M-
day the initial day of as-yet-unscheduled landings against the “objectives not now 
designated.”10
TF 58’s plan specified that the fast carrier forces would on D–3 (12 June) initi-
ate air strikes on Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan; destroy aircraft operating 
facilities, antiaircraft (AA) batteries, and coastal defenses; and burn cane fields in 
Saipan and northern Tinian that might offer concealment.11 On D–2 (13 June), 
TF 58 would continue strikes against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan to 
prevent their airfields from operating. After obtaining control of the air over the 
Marianas, TF 58 would destroy defenses on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam and provide 
cover and support to minesweepers operating off Saipan. Battleships of TG 58.2 
and TG 58.3 escorted by DesDiv 12 (plus Selfridge) and DesRon 1 would destroy 
defenses on Saipan and Tinian and cover minesweeping operations. The battle-
ships would operate beyond the effective range of the enemy’s coastal batteries and 
outside minable waters until they had been swept. Bombardment by the battleships 
in support of minesweeping and harassing fires by destroyers during the night of 
D–3/D–2 (12/13 June) would be as required by CTF 51. Support of minesweeping 
operations by carrier aircraft would be coordinated by Commander, Advance Sup-
port Aircraft, Joint Expeditionary Force.12
TF 58’s plan envisaged that on D–1 (14 June), TF 58 would maintain control 
of the air in the Marianas and provide air support for Saipan and Tinian, as re-
quested by CTF 51. Air support would be coordinated by Commander, Advance 
Support Aircraft, Joint Expeditionary Force, embarked on the battleship Tennessee. 
Commencing on D-1, the escort carriers of TF 51 would provide combat air patrol 
(CAP), antisubmarine patrol, smoke markers, aircraft to drop packages, observer 
aircraft, and artillery-spotting aircraft as well as, within their capabilities, photo-
graphic missions. TGs 58.1 and 58.4 would refuel and proceed to strike Iwo Jima 
and Chichi Jima. Commander, Battleships, U.S. Pacific Fleet would direct DesDiv 
12 (plus Selfridge) to report to Commander, Bombardment Group 1 on the morn-
ing of D–1 west of Saipan and at a distance of ten miles from that group. DesRon 
1 would be released from TG 58.2 and 58.3 in time to proceed to Point RICHFIELD 
and rendezvous with Task Units (TUs) 16.7.3 and 16.7.4 at 0800 on D-day. DesRon 
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1 would refuel and, at a suitable time after refueling, proceed to a position bearing 
085°, distance 120 miles from Point RICHFIELD and rendezvous there with TG 53.1 
at 0800 (in the minus-ten time zone) for duty with TF 53.13
On D-day, TGs 58.2 and 58.3 would maintain control of the air over the Mari-
anas and provide air support for landing operations as requested by Commander, 
Advance Support Aircraft, Joint Expeditionary Force on board the amphibious 
command ship Rocky Mount (AGC 3). On D+1 (16 June) and D+2 (17 June), TGs 
58.1 and 58.4 would conduct strikes on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. Afterward, TG 
58.1 would receive replacement aircraft from TG 58.4 and then, accompanied by 
TU 58.4.1—consisting of Cruiser Division (CruDiv) 11 (two AA light cruisers), 
CruDiv 14 (three light cruisers), and DesRon 12 (eight destroyers)—proceed to 
Area SHELL for refueling.14 
After D-day, TGs 58.2 and 58.3 would maintain control of the air and pro-
vide air support as required at Saipan and Guam. TG 58.2 would refuel at Point 
RICHFIELD on D+1 and TG 58.3 at Point COLLAR on D+2. Each group would re-
place aircraft while refueling. TG 58.1 would refuel in Area SHELL on the afternoon 
of D+4 (19 June). TU 58.4.1 would refuel from the same tanker group on D+5 (20 
June). TG 58.4 (three carriers) and DesRon 23 (six destroyers) would proceed to 
Eniwetok and arrive there on D+6 (21 June).15 There they would refuel, take on 
provisions, replenish aircraft, ammunition, and bombs, and depart upon comple-
tion, about D+8 (23 June).16
Admiral Mitscher’s staff prepared two tactical plans, JOHNNY and JEEPERS. Plan 
JOHNNY pertained to pre-invasion strikes against various targets in the Marianas. 
It stipulated that daylight fighter sweeps would be conducted on D–4 by TGs 58.1, 
58.2, 58.3, and 58.4 from their position about 240 miles bearing 105° from Saipan 
(about 250 miles bearing 080° from Guam). All groups would start their strikes at 
about 1400. Each large carrier would launch sixteen fighters and each light carrier 
twelve; in addition, each task group would launch three torpedo or dive-bombers. 
TG 58.1 would attack Guam and Rota airfields; TG 58.2 would attack Tinian, with 
a focus on the Ushi field; TG 58.3 would attack the Aslito field on Saipan; and TG 
58.4 would attack the Marpi and Charan-Kanoa fields on Saipan.17 Plan JEEPERS 
envisaged fighter sweeps over the Marianas on D–3. All task groups would launch 
fighter sweeps over the target areas by 0515. They would also launch CAP and anti-
submarine patrol, so that flight decks would be clear of armed planes by dawn.18
The plan of the Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force (TF 56) stipulated that 
carrier-based aircraft of TF 58, the Northern Attack Force (TF 52), and the South-
ern Attack Force (TF 53) would support the assault, occupation, and consolidation 
of FORAGER objectives. TF 58 would conduct fighter sweeps against airfields on 
Saipan on D–2 and D–1.19 On D–2, beginning early in the morning, fast battleships 
and destroyers of TF 58 would destroy aircraft and render airfields temporarily 
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useless, destroy coast-defense and AA batteries, burn all unburned cane fields south 
of Mutcho Point and the village of Chatcha, destroy enemy defenses and personnel, 
and cover the minesweeping of the shelf west of Saipan.20
Admiral Lockwood, in his OPLAN 2-44 of 21 May 1944, directed TF 17 to sup-
port FORAGER by 
destroying enemy naval forces and shipping, maintaining observation and lifeguard services 
off Truk, Woleai and Palau, intercepting and destroying enemy forces approaching or with-
drawing from the assault area, stationing lifeguard submarines as requested by commander 
TF 58 for carrier based strikes, and preliminary photographic reconnaissance of enemy 
islands and atolls concerned, as requested by Commander, Fifth Amphibious force.21
Lockwood directed eleven of TF 17’s submarines to cover the movements of Oza-
wa’s forces. Three submarines covered Tawi-Tawi; three were stationed north of 
Luzon, three south of Mindanao, one at the eastern entrance of San Bernardino 
Strait, and one at the entrance of Surigao Strait.22
Lockwood’s plan noted that submarine patrols during the past several months 
had been concentrated in the vicinity of the Marianas and along the approaches 
to the Mariana Islands from home waters, Truk, Palau, and the Philippines. Their 
mission had been to “weaken by attrition reinforcements of enemy troops and sup-
plies being sent to that area.” These patrols would continue during FORAGER, except 
that submarines in the immediate vicinity of the Marianas would move away to 
clear the area for surface forces. Prior to and during FORAGER at least one subma-
rine would be maintained off Truk, Woleai, and Palau for surveillance and lifeguard 
services.23 TF 58 had requested that lifeguard submarines be stationed off Saipan, 
Guam, Chichi Jima, and Iwo Jima on days when carrier air strikes were scheduled.24
An annex of Spruance’s OPLAN 10-44 provided a detailed weather forecast. It 
predicted an area of bad weather about three hundred miles wide around the Mar-
shalls would increase to a width of a thousand miles over the Philippines. Squalls, 
thunderstorms, and heavy rain would be prevalent throughout the area, creating 
unfavorable flying conditions, although aircraft would be able to operate most of 
the time. Only if the equatorial front were reinforced by a subtropical front would 
a mass of heavy rain make flying impossible.25 The winds would be adequate for 
carriers to launch aircraft without excessive speed. A moderate easterly swell was 
expected but would not interfere with carrier operations.26 
During the invasion period, the cloud base would be from a thousand to two 
thousand feet. Normally the clouds would be a few thousand feet thick, some ex-
tending up to ten thousand feet in the form of swelling cumuli when unstable, 
showery conditions were present. The four-to-six-tenths cloud cover over Saipan 
would often obscure targets and prevent accurate high-altitude bombing. However, 
conditions for low-altitude bombing would be excellent. The air operations would 
become more difficult when the rainy season started in July, because of frequent 
showers, many of them very heavy.27 
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For surface ships, winds on D-day would be from the east at from eight to four-
teen knots. Maximum waves would be approximately four feet, two to three feet 
near the shore and within a few miles of the leeward side of the islands. Between 5° 
and 10° north, the wind and sea would allow refueling on either easterly or westerly 
courses; above 10° north, easterly courses would be required. No difficulty was an-
ticipated for refueling in the open sea anywhere in the area of operations.28
Japanese Plans 
Operational planning in the Japanese army and the navy was conducted by the re-
spective general staffs and major field commands. The Army General Staff (AGS) 
and Navy General Staff (NGS) were organized along similar lines; the army was the 
senior service, and, not surprisingly, its staff was larger than the navy’s. The staffs 
consisted of a number of departments or bureaus, of which the most important 
were the 1st, Operations; 2nd, Transportation; 3rd, Intelligence; and 4th, Commu-
nications. Within the NGS, operational planning was the responsibility of the 1st 
Section’s 1st Department while the naval intelligence planning was the responsibil-
ity of the 3rd Department. Radio intelligence was provided by the Special Section 
of the 4th Department.29
Operational plans were developed separately for each service in the 1st Bureau 
of its respective general staff.30 Plans for major operations prepared by the army 
or the navy were usually made without input from the other service. Often, army-
navy disagreement over a joint operation would result in its delay or even aban-
donment. Even when an agreement was reached, the operation would normally 
be executed not by a joint commander but by service commanders. Unity of effort 
would be based on the pertinent Army-Navy Central Agreement.31 The most im-
portant plans involving naval forces normally originated within the NGS. Its chief 
closely cooperated with the navy minister prior to the adoption of any operational 
plan, but once an operation started the navy minister had no control over it, direct 
or indirect.32 Final plans were prepared after discussions between the Commander 
in Chief (CINC), Combined Fleet, and the chief of the NGS. Joint operations were 
discussed at the liaison conferences between the army and the navy, the most im-
portant ones at the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) level. Agreement had 
to be reached with the AGS before a plan was submitted to the chief of the NGS for 
final approval. After a joint operation was agreed on, identical orders were issued 
by the NGS and AGS. If a joint plan involved other government agencies, the navy 
minister’s agreement had to be obtained. If a forthcoming operation exceeded the 
authority delegated by the effective imperial directive to the chief of the NGS, the 
plan was submitted through IGHQ to the emperor for approval. Finally, the plan 
was issued as an order of the NGS.33 It would then be elaborated in more detail by 
the numbered naval and air fleets, area fleets, and subordinate tactical commands.
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The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN’s) planning for the defense of the Central 
Pacific started in August 1943. After the death of Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943, 
his replacement as CINC of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Koga, directed that all 
operations after 15 August 1943 would be designated “Third Phase Operations of 
the War.”34 A new policy formally adopted in September 1943 envisaged employ-
ment of the entire Combined Fleet against the U.S. Pacific Fleet to destroy it in “a 
single blow.”35 IGHQ planned this destruction of enemy forces in mid-1944, after 
the enemy launched attacks in the Central Pacific and the Philippine area.36
IGHQ, in its Directive No. 209 issued on 25 March 1944, outlined the IJN’s “op-
erational policy” in the Third Phase Operations of the War. Among other things, 
it directed that the navy shift from the offensive to the defensive. The IJN’s objec-
tives were destruction of enemy naval and air forces that penetrated into the East 
Asian waters, disruption of enemy shipping routes, and an all-out effort to secure 
Japanese victory in the war. Priority would be given to air operations, surprise at-
tacks, interception within the effective range of the land-based aircraft, intensified 
warfare against enemy sea communications, defense and protection of transport 
ships, and air defense of the home islands.37 For the Combined Fleet the main ef-
fort would be in the southeast area. The majority of its surface strength would be 
concentrated in the “Inner South Seas Area.” Any attack by the U.S. Pacific Fleet 
would be countered with the entire strength of the Combined Fleet, in the Z opera-
tion (the plan of which would be compromised the next year as described in the 
previous chapter).
The original plan for the Z operation was drafted in August 1943 during the 
struggle for the control of the Solomons. It contemplated the movement of the 
main body of the Combined Fleet to fight a “decisive battle” against the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet. The principal base for the Combined Fleet would be Truk; its operating area 
would encompass the entire sea area from the Kurils through the Marshalls and 
the Gilberts to north of the Solomons. The operating area was divided into several 
“operational districts,” according to possible routes of enemy attack, and assembly 
areas for the Japanese main forces were designated. Normally, the main body and 
the battleship force would be within a hundred miles of the First Mobile Force. 
The Combined Fleet designated “interception zones” around each advanced 
base (mainly air bases), within “strategic areas” identified by IGHQ. Each inter-
ception zone was divided into first, second, and third zones of defense. Each base 
would have ground forces. Air bases would be about three hundred nautical miles 
apart. The bases in the third zone of defense were in the Carolines and Marianas. 
In the Inner South Seas Area, the principal advanced base was Truk. For the second 
zone of defense, the bases were Eniwetok, Kusaie, and Ponape, and for the first zone 
of defense the Marshalls, Gilberts, and Nauru and Ocean Islands. Eniwetok and 
Kwajalein were designated as fleet anchorages. The IJN’s objectives were defense 
 JAPANESE A-GO OPERATION (BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA): PLANNING AND PREPARATION 217 216 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
of the main surface transportation routes between the home islands and Southern 
Resources Area, and defense of the fleet anchorages.
The general plan for the Z operation comprised four subordinate plans, desig-
nated A, B, C, and D. Plan A envisaged employment of the First Mobile Force as 
a nucleus for surface strike operations. Plan B envisioned employment of carriers 
with part of their screens to conduct air and surface operations. The main body of 
surface forces would conduct a separate operation. Plan C, a variant of B, contem-
plated  air strikes first by carriers, then Base Air Force aircraft. Plan D contemplated 
the employment of surface forces only.38 Plan Z attached several detailed tables, or 
matrices, listing various enemy options and possible reactions by Japanese forces. 
Plan Z envisaged concentration of the maximum strength of the Combined Fleet 
at the right time should the enemy fleet go on the offensive. The main operation 
would be conducted in the Central Pacific. Aircraft, submarines, and picketboats 
would be employed for early detection of the enemy. Japanese forces would be in 
a state of high combat preparedness from the Kurils and east of the home islands 
to South Sea Islands, the Marianas, the Carolines, and western New Guinea. Most 
Japanese air strength would be employed against the enemy carriers so as to secure 
control of the air prior to the main attack against transport convoys. The enemy 
landing forces were to be destroyed on the beaches. The planners also prepared 
plans for the movements of the Japanese carrier forces to their respective operating 
areas (designated A, C, and D), all beyond the range of the enemy reconnaissance 
aircraft, from which they were to “maneuver to strike the enemy in the flank.” 
The Japanese planners estimated that by the end of March 1944, Carrier Divi-
sion (CarDiv) 1, with the 601st Air Group (eighty-one fighters, eighty-one bomb-
ers, fifty-four attack aircraft, and nine reconnaissance aircraft), would be fully ca-
pable of operating in daylight. About half of its reconnaissance aircraft would be 
able to take off and return to the carriers at night, and about half of all its aircraft 
would be capable of taking off and carrying out strike operations. All the fighters 
and about half the reconnaissance aircraft of CarDiv 3, with the 653rd Air Group 
(sixty-three fighters, twenty-seven attack aircraft), would be capable of operating 
from land bases. However, its attack aircraft would be unable to carry out strikes. 
CarDiv 2, with the 652nd Air Group (eighty-one fighters, thirty-six bombers, eigh-
teen attack aircraft), would have low effective fighting strength. By the end of April, 
both CarDivs 1 and 3 would be capable of surface strike operations, though CarDiv 
2 would have difficulty in conducting attacks against surface ships. Upon the com-
pletion of training, the 601st Air Group on board CarDiv 1 would be deployed to 
the Philippines. The First Mobile Fleet would be deployed at Tawi-Tawi and Palau. 
All forces in the Lingga area would proceed to the Pacific in preparation for the 
start of the Z operation. However, the Japanese anticipated problems in concentrat-
ing all their forces in the southern Philippines, because of fuel shortages. CarDiv 1, 
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CruDiv 7, and DesRon 10 would assemble north of the Bonins. All forces deployed 
in home islands would concentrate in their respective areas.
The Z operation plan described in some detail a “basic policy in the conduct of 
operations.” The strategically most advantageous area would comprise the Mari-
anas, the Carolines, and western New Guinea. Hence, full-scale operations were 
planned for these areas. In case of a full-scale operation in the Marianas–Carolines, 
CINC, Combined Fleet would control the First Mobile Fleet and the Fifth Base Air 
Force. For subsidiary or “feinting” operations, local area-defense forces would be 
primarily employed. Surface operations with the carrier forces as a nucleus in the 
Marcus and Wake areas would be conducted within the range of land-based air-
craft. The planners also anticipated difficulty in the employment of carrier forces 
east of Honshū or in the northeast. The Japanese gave special emphasis to patrol-
ling and searching for the enemy in the important parts of the Pacific; these tasks 
would be given primarily to land-based aircraft. They also planned to conduct air 
raids against the enemy anchorages in the Marshalls, as well as raids by two-man 
submarines and amphibious tanks.
In the conduct of air operations, the emphasis would be to detect enemy fleet 
and landing forces one day prior to any surprise attack in the Marianas, Truk–
Mereyon, or Palau areas. Transports would be the primary objective. If enemy car-
rier forces attempted to obtain air superiority before the arrival of transports, the 
objective would be to “render all carriers useless.” If the enemy carriers and trans-
ports arrived at the same time, the objective would be “full attack at the transport 
convoy.”
The Japanese estimated that their forces would be ready to engage the enemy 
fleet by mid-April 1944. They were confident that the fuel situation would be sat-
isfactory and that Plan A could be executed. If the fuel situation were uncertain, 
Plan B would be executed. If the training levels of the two carrier divisions differed, 
their operations would be based partly on Plan A and partly on B. If training were 
inadequate to conduct a surface strike, and it was possible to achieve surprise, Plan 
C would be executed. If the training level were not sufficient by the end of March, 
air units would operate exclusively from land bases and in accordance with Plan D. 
Surface forces would cooperate in air attacks but would be generally employed at 
night, unless Japanese forces obtained air superiority, in which case surface forces 
would be employed with the carriers during daylight hours.
Plan Z envisaged that prior to a decisive battle, Japanese submarines would 
cease their attacks against shipping in the southern Pacific. Most would be rede-
ployed to the Marshalls. If enemy attack were imminent, most large (I class) sub-
marines would be deployed in distant areas, while land-based aircraft searched for 
the enemy forces. Small submarines (RO class) would be deployed generally three 
to four hundred miles from their bases. The primary targets for the submarines 
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would be transports, but some might be called on to cooperate with the air attacks 
by attacking, if in position to do so, enemy carrier forces or damaged ships. Should 
operations be conducted in the Marcus Island area, the Japanese planned to assign 
four boats in that vicinity.
If a decisive battle were to be fought in the Marianas–eastern Carolines, Com-
bined Fleet Headquarters would be moved to Tinian or Saipan. Alternatively, it 
would be moved to Davao if a decisive battle were to be found in the western Caro-
lines or western New Guinea. If that decisive battle were to take place in the north-
east, headquarters would move to Chitose, on Hokkaidō.
Despite all the planning and preparation, Admiral Koga did not execute the Z 
operation when the U.S. forces actually invaded the Gilberts and Marshalls. The 
main reason was that the Japanese carrier force was at Singapore undergoing in-
tensive training, in order to become ready to serve as a mobile force by the end of 
April.39 After Koga’s death, Admiral Toyoda slightly modified the plan for the Z 
operation and renamed it “A-Go.”40 He also transferred control of battleship force 
to Admiral Ozawa.41 
By April 1944, the Japanese had decided that the defense line connecting the 
Marianas, Truk, and Biak must be held at all cost.42 The A-Go plan envisaged the 
employment of the First Mobile Force—First Air Fleet (carrier striking forces), the 
23rd, 26th, 22nd, and 61st Air Flotillas of the Base Air Force, plus the Advance 
Expeditionary Force (Sixth Fleet) (submarines)—in the pending decisive battle.43 
In the employment of the First Mobile Force, the emphasis was on a daytime at-
tack beyond the effective range of enemy carrier aircraft.44 Base air forces would 
conduct reconnaissance of Tulagi, Guadalcanal and its vicinity, the Admiralties, 
and the islands of Majuro, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok.45 Surprise attacks would be 
conducted against carrier striking forces and anchorages in the Marshalls (the 
TATSUMAKI operation). Five large submarines capable of transporting amphibious 
tanks and launching torpedoes would be sent to the target area.46 
The plan for the base air forces was developed on the assumption that at least 
a third of the enemy carrier force would have been destroyed prior to the decisive 
battle. The remnants would be destroyed in cooperation with the First Mobile Fleet. 
The Base Air Force would be organized into three attack groups, composed of sev-
eral types of aircraft: the 1st Attack Group (Saipan, Tinian, Guam, and Truk); the 
2nd Attack Group (Palau, Yap, and Davao); and the 3rd Attack Group (northern 
Australia and Celebes areas).47 The Base Air Force would conduct reconnaissance 
of Tulagi and its vicinity, the Admiralties, and the islands of Majuro, Kwajalein, and 
Eniwetok.48
Japanese night-fighting doctrine issued in January 1944 called for effective re-
connaissance on the open ocean in cooperation with land-based aircraft and sub-
marines. The enemy, once detected, would be destroyed by all forces, focusing on 
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the flank. If suitable conditions existed, the enemy would be “encircled and anni-
hilated at one blow.” The enemy’s most modern ships would be destroyed first. The 
purpose of night operations was given as the destruction of the enemy’s general 
support forces—that is, carriers, battleships, and large cruisers, in that order. How-
ever, in “intercept” operations (Yogaki Tai), the main attack might be directed first 
against transport groups, then their screening forces. Japanese destroyer squadrons 
would try to avoid screening forces and attack instead the enemy’s main force.49 The 
Japanese doctrine laid down six methods for the employment of cruiser divisions 
and destroyer squadrons.50 
Success in night combat would depend mainly on the timely coordinated ac-
tion of each unit and on the independent actions of each commanding officer. 
The key prerequisites for success would be achieving surprise, keeping an ex-
cellent lookout, taking advantage of weather and geographical conditions, and 
properly using direction finders, radars, and hydrophones. Battleships would 
also take part in night actions, taking advantage of their speed and firepower to 
destroy screening forces and cover and support the advance. Cruiser divisions 
would scout and, in combination with battleship divisions, destroy screening 
forces. They too would cover the advance of the destroyer squadrons. Carrier 
forces would not take part in night fighting except in good visibility. Likewise, 
submarines would not take part; they would be employed primarily for scouting, 
in favorable conditions.51 This night-fighting doctrine was revised by Standing 
Order No. 15 of 1 May 1944, which added two new combat methods but other-
wise left the doctrine unchanged.52
The Japanese planned to employ their submarines for reconnaissance of “stra-
tegic points” and surprise attacks.53 Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi, commander of the 
Sixth Fleet (submarines), issued Operational Order No. 122 on 14 May. Among 
other things, it directed that one large (I class) submarine would be deployed 
between the Admiralties and Wewak, one large boat would be deployed east of 
the Marshalls, and another large boat would be used for transport from the home 
islands to Mille. Additionally, one small (RO) boat would be deployed about a 
hundred nautical miles northeast of Kwajalein; and another would patrol some 
hundred miles northeast of Eniwetok.54 
The Opposing Forces 
Prior to the decisive encounter in the Philippine Sea, the U.S. Pacific Fleet possessed 
superiority in numbers and quality of ships and aircraft (see sidebars). It had more 
fast carriers (seven versus five) and light carriers (eight versus four).55 It possessed 
massive AA defenses. The CAP over U.S. carriers was radar directed;56 American 
fighter direction was superior to that of the Japanese carriers. TF 58 ships had far 
better radar and radio communications.57
Continued on page 223 
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Japanese Order of Battle, May 1942
Commander, First Mobile Force: Vice Adm. Jisaburō Ozawa (Flagship Carrier Taihō)
Force C (Van) 
(Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita, flagship heavy cruiser Atago)
CarDiv 3 (Rear Admiral Sueo Obayashi, flagship Chitose) 
Air Group 653, total 90 aircraft
 Light Carrier Chitose (21 A6M5b Zeros, 3 B6N1 Jills, 6 B5N2 Kates)
 Light Carrier Chiyoda (21 A6M5b’s, 3 B6N1s, 6 B5N2s)
 Light Carrier Zuihō (21 A6M5b’s, 3 B6N1s, 6 B5N2s) 
BatDiv 1, Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki (2 BBs—Yamato, Musashi)
BatDiv 3, Vice Adm. Yoshio Suzuki (2 BBs—Haruna, Kongō)
CruDiv 4, Vice Admiral Kurita (4 CAs—Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai)
Cruiser Squadron 7 (4 CAs—Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, Chikuma)
DesRon 2 (less DesDiv 27), Second Fleet (Rear Adm. Miko Hayakawa, flagship light cruiser Noshiro)
 DesDiv 31 (3 DDs—Asashimo, Kishinami, Okinami)
 DesDiv 32 (2 DDs—Tamanami, Fujinami)
 Attached to Desron 2: 1 DD (Shimakaze)
DesDiv 17, DesRon 10, Third Fleet (1 DD—Hamakaze)
Force A
(Vice Admiral Ozawa, flagship Taihō)
CarDiv 1, Air Group 601, total 209 aircraft
 Carrier Taihō (27 A6M5 Zeros, 23 D4Y1 Judys, 17 B6N1 Jills, 2 D4Y1c Judys) 
 Carrier Shōkaku (26 A6M5a Zeros, 24 D4Y1s, 17 B6N1 Jills, 3 D4Y1c Judys) 
 Carrier Zuikaku (27 A6M5a Zeros, 23 D4Y1 Judys, 17 B6N1 Jills, 3 D4Y1c Judys) 
CruDiv 5, Rear Adm. Shintiro Hashimoto (2 CAs—Myōkō, Haguro)
DesRon 10, Third Fleet (Rear Adm. Susumu Kimura, flagship light cruiser Yahagi)
 DesDiv 10 (2 DDs—Asagumo, Tanikaze)
 DesDiv 17 (2 DDs—Urakaze, Isokaze)
 DesDiv 61 (4 DDs—Hatsuyuki, Wakatsuki, Akizuki, Shimotsuki)
Force B
(Rear Adm. Takaji Joshima)
CarDiv 2, Air Group 652, total 135 aircraft
 Carrier Junyō (27 A6M5a Zeros, 6 B6N1 Jills, 9 D4Y1 Judys, 9 D3A2 Vals) 
 Carrier Hiyō (27 A6M5a’s, 6 B6N1s, 18 D3A2s) 
 Light Carrier Ryuho (27 A6M5a’s, 6 B6N1s) 
Battleship Squadron 1 (1 BB—Nagato)
Heavy Cruiser Mogami
 DesDiv 4, DesRon 10, Third Fleet (3 DDs—Michishio, Nowaki, Yamagumo)
 DesDiv 27, DesRon 2, Second Fleet (4 DDs—Shigure, Samidare, Hayashimo, Akishimo)
Supply Forces
1st Supply Force 
 1 DD (Hibiki)
 3 AOs (Nichiei Maru, Kokuyo Maru, Seiyo Maru)
 DesDiv 21 (1 DD—Hatsushimo)
 DesDiv 22, DesRon 3, Central Pacific Area Fleet (1 DD—Yunagi)
2nd Supply Force 
 3 AOs (Genyo Maru, Azusa Maru, Senyo)
 DesDiv 17, DesRon 10, Third Fleet (1 DD—Yukikaze)
 DesDiv 30, DesRon 3, Eighth Fleet (1 DD—Uzuki)
3rd Supply Force
 1 DD (Tsuga)
 3 AOs (Hayasu, Kosen Maru, Sunosaki-Kosen Maru)
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Sixth Fleet (Submarines)
(Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi, headquarters on Saipan)
 5 I-class SSs (I-5, I-10, I-38, I-41, I-184)
 16 RO-class SSs (RO-36, RO-41, RO-42, RO-43, RO-44, RO-47, RO-68, RO-104, RO-106, RO-108, 
RO-112, RO-113, RO-114, RO-115, RO-116, RO-117)
Base Air Force
(Vice Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, headquarters on Tinian, total 1,290 aircraft)
61st Air Flotilla
 121st Air Group (10 D4Y1 Judys, Tinian; 10 D4Y1s, Peleliu)
 261st Air Group (80 A6M5 Zeros, Saipan)
 263rd Air Group (80 A6M5s, Guam; 40 A6M5s, Yap)
 265th Air Group (40 A6M5s, Peleliu; 15 A6M5b’s, Guam)
 321st Air Group (15 J1N Irvings, Tinian)
 343rd Air Group (40 N1K Georges, Tateyama)
 521st Air Group (80 P1U Franceses, Guam; 40 P1Ys, Tinian)
 523rd Air Group (40 D4Y1s, Tinian; 40 D4Y1s, Yap)
 761st Air Group (40 G4M Bettys, Peleliu)
 1021st Air Group (20 L2D Tabbys, Tinian)
22nd Air Flotilla
 151st Air Group (20 D4Y1s, Harushima-Truk)
 202nd Air Group (40 A6M5s, Harushima-Truk; 40 A6M5s, Mereyon)
 251st Air Group (20 J1Ns, Takeshima)
 253rd Air Group (80 A6M5s, Takeshima)
 301st Air Group (40 J2M Jacks, Yokosuka)
 503rd Air Group (40 D4Yis, Kadeshima)
 551st Air Group (80 B6N1 Jills, Harushima-Truk)
 755th Air Group (40 G4Ms, Guam)
26th Air Flotilla
 201st Air Group (80 A6M5s, Davao)
 501st Air Group (40 A6M5/D4Y1s, Lasang)
 751st Air Group (40 G4Ms, Davao)
23rd Air Flotilla
 153rd Air Group (60 A6M5/D4Y1s, Sorong)
 732nd Air Group (40 G4Ms, Wasile)
 753rd Air Group (40 G4Ms, Menado)
Sources: Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 416–17; Y’Blood, Red Sun Setting, pp. 222–27; Dan Muir, “Order of 
Battle: The Battle of the Philippine Sea 19–20 June 1944,” NavWeaps, www.navweap.com/index_oob/_OOB_WWII 
_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Philippine_Sea.htm. 
U.S. Order of Battle 
Fifth Fleet
(Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, flagship heavy cruiser Indianapolis) 
TF 58, Fast Carrier Task Force
(Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher) 
TG 58.1, Rear Adm. Joseph J. Clark
 Carrier Hornet (Air Group 2—33 SB2C-4C Helldivers, 36 F6F-3 Hellcats, 4 TBF-1Cs, 14 TBM-1C 
Avengers, 4 F6F-3Ns) 
 Carrier Yorktown (Air Group 1—40 SB2C-4C Helldivers, 4 SBD-5 Dauntlesses, 41 F6F-3 Hellcats, 
1 TBF-1C, 16 TBM-1C Avengers, 4 F6F-3Ns) 
 Light Carrier Belleau Wood (Air Group 24—26 F6F-3s, 3 TBF-1Cs, 6 TBM-1Cs) 
 Light Carrier Bataan (Air Group 50—24 F6F-3s, 9 TBM-1Cs) 
 3 CAs (Baltimore, Boston, Canberra)
 1 CL (Oakland)
 DesRon 46 (9 DDs—Izard, Charette, Conner, Bell, Burns, Boyd, Bradford, Brown, Cowell)
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TG 58.2, Rear Adm. A. E. Montgomery
 Carrier Bunker Hill (Air Group 8—33 SB2C-4C Helldivers, 37 F6F-3 Hellcats, 13 TBF-1Cs, 5 TBM-1C 
Avengers, 4 F6F-3Ns) 
 Carrier Wasp (Air Group 14—32 SB2C-4C Helldivers, 34 F6F-3 Hellcats, 15 TBF-1Cs, 3 TBF-1Ds, 
4 F6F-3Ns) 
 Light Carrier Monterey (Air Group 28—21 F6F-3s, 8 TBM-1Cs) 
 Light Carrier Cabot (Air Group 31—24 F6F-3s, 1 TBF-1C, 8 TBM-1Cs) 
 4 CLs (Santa Fe, Mobile, Biloxi, San Juan)
 DesRon 52 (8 DDs—Owen, Miller, The Sullivans, Stephen Potter, Tingey, Hickox, Lewis Hancock, 
Marshall)
TG 58.3, Rear Adm. John W. Reeves
 Carrier Enterprise (Air Group 10—33 SBD-5s, 31 F6F-3 Hellcats, 9 TBF-1Cs, 5 TBM-1C Avengers, 
3 F4U-2 Corsairs) 
 Carrier Lexington (Air Group 16—34 SBD-5s, 37 F6F-3 Hellcats, 17 TBF-1Cs, 1 TBM-1C Avenger, 
4 F6F-3Ns) 
 Light Carrier San Jacinto (Air Group 51—24 F6F-3 Hellcats, 6 TBM-1Cs, 2 TBM-1Ds)
 Light Carrier Princeton (Air Group 27—24 F6F-3s, 9 TBM-1Cs) 
 1 CA (Indianapolis)
 1 Antiaircraft Light Cruiser (Reno)
 CruDiv 12 (3 CLs—Montpelier, Cleveland, Birmingham)
 DesRon 50 (5 DDs—Clarence K. Bronson, Cotten, Dortch, Gatling, Healy)
 DesDiv 100 (4 DDs—Caperton, Cogswell, Ingersoll, Knapp)
 DesDiv 90 (4 DDs—Anthony, Wadsworth, Terry, Braine)
 TG 58.4, Rear Adm. William K. Harrill
 Carrier Essex (Air Group 15—36 SB2C-1Cs, 38 F6F-3 Hellcats, 15 TBF-1Cs, 5 TBM-1C Avengers, 
4 F6F-3Ns)
 Light Carrier Langley (Air Group 10—23 F6F-3s, 7 TBF-1Cs, 2 TBM-1Cs) 
 Light Carrier Cowpens (Air Group 25—23 F6F-3s, 3 TBF-1Cs, 6 TBM-1Cs) 
 CruDiv 11 (4 CLs—San Diego, Vincennes, Houston, Miami)
 13 DDs (Lansdowne, Lardner, McCalla, Lang, Sterett, Wilson, Case, Ellet, Charles Ausburne, 
Stanly, Converse, Spence, Thatcher)
 DesRon 12 (1 DD—Case)
 DesDiv 24 (3 DDs—Sterett, Wilson, Ellet)
 DesRon 23 (3 DDs—Converse, Spence, Thatcher)
TG 58.7, Battle Line (Vice Adm. Willis A. Lee, flagship battleship Washington) 
 BatDiv 6 (1 BB—Washington)
 BatDiv 7 (2 BBs—Iowa, New Jersey)
 BatDiv 8 (2 BBs—North Carolina, Indiana)
 BatDiv 9 (2 BBs—South Dakota, Alabama)
 CruDiv 6 (4 CAs—Wichita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, San Francisco)
 DesDiv 12 (4 DDs—Mugford, Ralph Talbot, Patterson, Bagley)
 DesDiv 89 (5 DDs—Halford, Guest, Bennett, Fullam, Hudson)
 DesDiv 106 (4 DDs—Yarnall [radar picket], Stockham [radar picket], Twining, Monssen)
Tender-Based Air, Saipan, Marianas
Seaplane Tender Ballard (Patrol Squadron 16—5 PBM-5 Mariners)
Land-Based Air, Mokerang Field, Los Negros
Bombing Squadron 101 (12 PB4Y-1 Liberators)
TF 17, Patrol Submarines
(Vice Adm. Charles A. Lockwood)
(Operating in support of the Marianas operation)
 Bonin Islands (6 SSs—Plunger, Archerfish, Swordfish, Pintado, Pilotfish, Tunny)
 East and southeast of the Marianas (5 SSs—Albacore, Seawolf, Bang, Finback, Stingray)
 Ulithi–Philippines (5 SSs—Flying Fish, Muskallunge, Seahorse, Pipefish, Cavalla)
 Off the Surigao Strait (1 SS—Growler)
 Other (2 SSs—Gar, Plaice)
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The Japanese were numerically grossly inferior in carrier-based aircraft (434 
versus 930). This figure included only 222 fighters, 113 dive-bombers, and ninety-
five torpedo bombers; the corresponding numbers for the United States were 475, 
232, and 184. The Japanese also had forty-three floatplanes, versus the Americans’ 
sixty-five.58 As for types, the Japanese had in service modern Mitsubishi A6M Type 
0 (Zero) fighters and fighter bombers, Yokosuka D4Y Suisei (Judy) torpedo bomb-
ers, Nakajima B6N Tenzan (Jill) attack aircraft, and Nakajima B5N (Kate) torpedo 
bombers.
By 1944, the U.S. Navy had in service several excellent carrier-based aircraft, 
such as the Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat (its night version was the F6F-3N) and the 
Vought F4U-2 Corsair fighter, the Curtiss SB2C-1C Helldiver dive-bomber, and 
the Grumman TBF-1/D/TBM-1C Avenger torpedo bomber. Also in service were 
older Douglas SBD-5 Dauntless dive-bombers. The U.S. carrier aircraft could 
search out to 350 miles (carrying extra gas in lieu of weapons), yet their effective 
striking range was only 150 to two hundred miles. 
Japanese aircraft had a much longer search range, some 560 miles, because they 
were not fitted, like their American counterparts, with self-sealing fuel tanks. Their 
attack range was about three hundred miles. The range of Japanese carrier aircraft 
could be increased if they refueled in the Marianas.59 Another major advantage 
for the Japanese was that easterly trade winds predominated in the operating area. 
This would allow Ozawa to approach the enemy carriers, closing the range, while 
launching and recovering aircraft.60 With some luck and skillful calculation he 
could stay outside the effective range of enemy carrier aircraft.61
Most of Ozawa’s carrier commanders were new to their ships, with only two or 
three months’ experience on board.62 Japanese pilots at this stage of the war were 
poorly trained. U.S. naval intelligence believed, from interrogation of the captured 
pilots, that they had only three to four hundred hours of flight time. A large pro-
portion of captured Japanese pilots had been only a few months at most in the 
combat area.63 Actually, the Japanese pilots had much less flight time than they 
were credited with by U.S. intelligence; they were very young and inexperienced. 
For example, the air groups of CarDiv 1 had had only six months of training. None 
of the pilots in CarDiv 2 had more than a hundred hours of flying experience.64 
The pilots of CarDiv 3 had three months of training. Very few Japanese aircraft had 
Seventh Fleet Submarines
(Rear Adm. Ralph W. Christie)
 Southeast of Mindanao (3 SSs—Hake, Bashaw, Paddle)
 Tawi-Tawi area (4 SSs—Harder, Haddo, Redfin, Bluefish)
 Off Luzon (2 SSs—Jack, Flier)
Sources: Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 412–16; Ministry of Defence (Navy), South-East Asia Operations and 
Central Pacific Advance, pp. 244–46. 
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radar, and the crews of those few were not properly trained in its use. Months spent 
at Tawi-Tawi were lost for training purposes because the fleet was kept mostly im-
mobile to save fuel and avoid submarines.65 The air groups had very little experi-
ence in communications, and their radars were totally unusable.66 Their aircraft 
were frequently damaged; maintenance was poor and behind schedule. Prior to the 
sortie from Tawi-Tawi on 13 June, out of 120–130 aircraft sent as reinforcements 
from Yokosuka, some two-thirds of their pilots were still being trained when the 
A-Go operation started.67
In contrast, a pilot in the U.S. Navy had two years of training and three hun-
dred hours of flying time before he was considered fit to fly from a carrier. Most 
of Mitscher’s pilots were combat veterans.68 The U.S. Navy’s method of training its 
pilots was also much more effective. After the battle of Midway in June 1942, the 
U.S. Navy recalled its best pilots to train new ones; in contrast, the Japanese kept 
their best pilots in frontline units until they were lost in combat, and hence their 
replacements were never properly trained. Nevertheless, U.S. naval intelligence at 
that time believed that first-line Japanese pilots were well trained, resourceful, and 
skillful in handling their aircraft. They were assessed as being aggressive, alert, and 
quick to take advantage of any evident weakness on the part of their American 
counterparts.69
The Japanese had available some 630 land-based naval aircraft.70 However, the 
actual effectiveness of the Base Air Force continuously decreased in the months 
preceding the U.S. invasion of the Marianas. This happened despite an increase in 
the numbers of frontline aircraft and an accelerated training program.71 The 23rd 
Air Flotilla suffered heavy losses. It was redeployed from the Netherlands East In-
dies (NEI) to the Central Pacific following the Allied strikes in February–March 
1944. Afterward, it lost many aircraft during the Biak Island operation, and then 
most of its aircraft were transferred to the Carolines.72 About half of both the 2nd 
and 3rd Attack Groups of the Base Air Force was lost at Biak (see sidebar for details 
of that operation) and while returning to A-Go. In addition, just before the decisive 
battle with TF 58, the 1st Attack Group suffered extensive losses from attacks by 
U.S. carrier aircraft against the Marianas, the Carolines, and Iwo Jima. Many crew 
members suffered from malaria, and facilities in the western Carolines were poor. 
As it turned out, only about 20 percent of the 1st Attack Group took part in the 
A-Go operation.73
The Japanese had a potential advantage against TF 58 in that the pending battle 
would take place within the effective range of land-based aircraft at Guam, Rota, 
and Yap. Ozawa counted on the use of two large and several small airfields in the 
Marianas. Theoretically, the Japanese could equalize strength in the air by using 
several hundred land-based aircraft in combination with their carrier aircraft. The 
A-Go operation plan placed five hundred planes at Yap, Palau, Guam, and Tinian in 
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Allied Landing on Biak and Japanese Reaction, 27 May–11 June 1944 
During the preparations for the A-Go operation, the Japanese were faced with a difficult decision—how 
to react to the Allied landing on Biak on 27 May 1944. Biak is the largest island (twenty miles by forty-five) 
in the Schouten group. It controls the entrance to Geelvink Bay (Cenderawasih Bay today), off the western 
tip of New Guinea. About a third of this foot-shaped island is covered by low, flat-topped hills; the rest is 
flatland with thick jungle. Bosnik, on the southeastern coast, was the administrative center. In 1944, some 
twenty-five thousand natives lived on the island.1 Although the Japanese high command anticipated an 
attack on Biak, it was surprised that the assault came so soon. Since 1943 Biak had been considered by the 
Japanese as one of the key points in their perimeter defense. However, on 9 May, IGHQ decided to move 
the defense line to Sorong and Halmahera, thereby leaving Biak as another strongpoint to be defended 
to the last man.2
Admiral Ugaki, Commander, Battleship Division (BatDiv) 1, was one of the strongest advocates of the 
absolute necessity to defend Biak. On 25 May he argued that the enemy could build several airfields there 
that would make it very difficult for the Japanese to operate aircraft in the western end of New Guinea. 
Also, Palau would be within striking range of enemy aircraft based on Biak, which would make it impos-
sible for Japanese surface forces to operate east of Mindanao during the pending A-Go operation.3 
On 27 May, TF 77 (Rear Adm. William M. Fechteler) landed the Hurricane Attack Force, the U.S. Army’s 
41st Division, on Biak (Operation HORLICKS). The 41st Division, with most of its equipment, was embarked 
at Humboldt Bay on Z–2 day (25 May). The entire force sailed the same evening, to be joined the next 
morning by a covering force, the heavy and light cruisers and destroyers of TG 77.2 (Rear Adm. Victor A. 
C. Crutchley, RN) and TG 77.3 (Rear Adm. Russell S. Berkey). Speed was limited to the 8.5-knot maximum 
of the tank landing ships. There was no chance that the Allied force would avoid being sighted by search 
aircraft. Allied estimates of Japanese troops on Biak were universally optimistic. It was believed that no 
more than two thousand Japanese troops were on the island. But in fact as of 27 May some ten thousand 
battle-hardened soldiers were there. The core defense was the highly trained 222nd Infantry Regiment.4
On 27 May, the Japanese deployed seventy carrier-based fighter planes, four land-based reconnais-
sance planes, and sixteen carrier-based bombers to western New Guinea. At the same time, Japanese 
aircraft based in the Sorong area attacked the enemy forces on Biak.5 One day later, the Naval General Staff 
directed 23rd Air Flotilla to be reinforced by fifty aircraft from Japan via the Philippines, along with twenty 
fighters and twenty bombers from the Marianas.6 Within several days the strength of the 23rd Air Flotilla 
was increased from sixteen to two hundred aircraft.7 
On 29 May, the Southwest Area Fleet twice requested the Combined Fleet to counter the enemy land-
ing on Biak.8 Ugaki too had urged quick action, once it had become clear that invasion of Biak was im-
minent. Adm. Shirō Takasu, commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, recommended a counterlanding 
on Biak. Yet Ozawa wisely did not want to commit the entire First Mobile Fleet, because of expected high 
losses and the poor state of training of his pilots.9
On 29 May the Combined Fleet issued Order No. 102 directing subordinate forces to start preparations 
for a counterlanding on Biak. Combined Fleet’s plan was to transport part of the 2nd Sea Mobile Brigade at 
Zamboanga rapidly to Biak. The aim was to secure the island and seek an opportunity to induce the enemy 
to come out. The operation would be named KON (see map next page). On X-day (3 June) the invading 
force would penetrate into the Biak area. Forces would assemble at Davao on 31 May. CruDiv 16, under 
Rear Adm. Naomasu Sakonju, would be in command of the transport unit, composed of two CAs (Aoba 
 1 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 103–104.
 2 Ibid., p. 107.
 3 Ugaki, Fading Victory, p. 376.
  4 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 106–107.
  5 A-Go Operation, p. 21; A-Go Operations Log: Supplement, p. 4.
 6 Cited in Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 118.
 7 Ibid., p. 122.
 8 Ugaki, Fading Victory, p. 378.
 9 Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, pp. 555–56.
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KON Operation: Japanese Naval Movements, 30 May–11 June 1944
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and Kinu) and three DDs (Shikanami, Uranami, Itsukushima), a direct escort unit (CruDiv 5), and an indirect 
escort unit (Fusō and two DDs).10 The 23rd Air Flotilla would conduct preliminary strikes against enemy 
ships.11 However, on 30 May, Rear Admiral Itō had only eighteen aircraft available. He soon received the 
first of the planned 166 aircraft directed to be redeployed from the Marianas to Sorong, on the northwest-
ern coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula (Dutch New Guinea).12 
The Southwest Area Fleet would use barges for transporting troops from Sorong to Manokwari (the 
eastern part of the Vogelkop Peninsula) and then to Biak.13 The forces assigned to the A-Go operation 
would provide necessary support to KON while at the same time maintaining a high state of readiness for 
a decisive battle near the Marianas. Forces of direct screen and distant cover for the KON operation would 
return to their original units once the operation was completed.14
On 30 May, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) analysts learned from radio inter-
cepts that the chief of staff of Central Pacific Area Fleet had requested additional escort vessels to assist in 
transporting First Air Fleet personnel and material from Saipan to Palau, departing on 29 May. It was also 
learned from a Japanese army message sent on 5 May that the Japanese had deduced that Biak would be 
the target of the next enemy landing and urged speed in strengthening Biak and Manokwari. CruDiv 16 
(Aoba, Ōi, one DD) appeared to have completed successfully a transportation run to Sorong. The American 
analysts (erroneously) believed that the reinforcements of troops in western New Guinea by CruDiv 16 
were part of the A-Go operation.15 The COMINCH analysts also believed that enemy air units on Yap had 
been transferred to western New Guinea and would be replaced soon by other units. The Japanese reac-
tion to the Biak operation seemed to be largely limited to air reinforcements of western New Guinea, with 
Sorong and Babo most prominent in traffic.16
On 30 May, the daily COMINCH intercept summaries assessed that the enemy’s intention was to coun-
ter the Allied landing to the east of Mokmer on the next day. The Japanese air units based at Babo (on the 
southern shore of McCluer Gulf ), Wasile Bay (Halmahera), and Sorong had been requested to attack the 
assembly area of Allied destroyers. About forty-five Zero fighters flew from Peleliu to Wasile on 31 May. In 
addition, nineteen dive-bombers were scheduled to depart Peleliu for Babo on 1 June. A convoy of thirty 
ships escorted by one destroyer was scheduled to arrive to Sorong from Palau on 4 June.17 
On 31 May, IGHQ directed the transfer of twenty bombers, eight reconnaissance planes, and forty-
eight fighters from the Carolines to Sorong and Halmahera.18 In the morning the same day, eighteen twin- 
engine bombers flew from Guam for Palau, while forty-five fighter aircraft departed Palau for Wasile Bay, 
and nineteen scouting aircraft flew from Palau to Babo.19 These aircraft were assigned to the 23rd Air Flotilla.
In the first Japanese attempt to send reinforcements to Biak (31 May–4 June), three destroyers of the 
KON unit, escorted by Sakonju’s heavy cruiser Aoba, fueled at Tarakan, where they embarked 1,700 troops 
for Zamboanga on 31 May. The KON unit continued to Davao, where it was joined by two heavy cruisers 
(Myōkō, Haguro) and three more destroyers. This part of the force departed before midnight on 2 June. The 
other eight hundred troops of the amphibious brigade were embarked at Zamboanga in a detached force 
consisting of two minelayers, one transport, and one tank landing ship. Escort by submarine chasers was 
provided for the run to Biak. The battleship Fusō and two DDs took a more northerly and evasive route.20 
On 1 June, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) learned that the Japanese were evaluat-
ing favorable landing points on Biak Island for a landing by the 2nd Mobile Marine Brigade. The date of 
 10 A-Go Operation, p. 23.
 11 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 118; A-Go Operation, p. 23.
 12 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 119.
 13 Ibid., p. 118; A-Go Operation, p. 23.
 14 Ugaki, Fading Victory, p. 379.
 15 COMINCH Summaries of Radio Intelligence Japanese Naval Activities, 1 April 1944–30 June 1944, pp. 1635–36.
 16 Ibid., p. 1636.
 17 Ibid., p. 1638.
 18 Cited in Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 118.
 19 JICPOA-CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletins, 10 May–30 June 1944, p. 2.
 20 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 119–20.
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the landing was unknown but was believed to be “in the near future.”21 A message originated by Biak and 
addressed to CINC, Combined Fleet, CINC, Southwest Area Fleet, 4th Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and 
18th Guard Division (at Manokwari) indicated that the Korim Bay was considered a more suitable landing 
site than Wardo Village. The American analysts concluded that the Japanese reaction to the Biak operation 
was taking shape and that “present indications, while still somewhat vague, are that Japanese troops will 
be landed at Korim Bay and escorted by ships operating from Babo.” They also believed that one battleship 
(Fusō), three heavy cruisers (Haguro, Myōkō, and Aoba), one light cruiser (Ōi), and several DDs would take 
part in the operation.22
On 1 June, the Japanese selected Wardo Village as the primary landing and Korim Bay as the second-
ary site. The Combined Fleet sent a message: “In view of the dauntless reconnaissance, communications 
intelligence and the war situation at Biak, the major part of the enemy task force seems to be coming to 
western Carolines and there is a good possibility of the first decisive battles taking place in the area of 
western Carolines on 2, 4, 5, and 6 June.” The screening and escort forces of the KON force would maneuver 
in such a way as to lure the enemy to the Palau area. Afterward, the main body would quickly advance to 
the east of the Philippines. In Ugaki’s view, Combined Fleet was getting nervous and was exaggerating 
things, because of its focus on communications intelligence. Combined Fleet was firmly convinced that 
the enemy would come to Palau. In Ugaki’s view, the greater the resistance the Japanese offered on Biak, 
the more likely an enemy diversion elsewhere would be. Ugaki believed (erroneously) that the enemy fleet 
would be concentrated in the area of the Vogelkop Peninsula.23
On 1 June, Rear Adm. Keizō Komura, chief of the staff of the First Mobile Force, told Admiral Kusaka, “In 
view of the great probability of the enemy throwing his task force against western New Guinea and Halma-
hera as a diversion to break the stalemate at Biak, it is necessary to expect a decisive battle in connection 
with the operation KON, in the vicinity of Point A [180 miles southwest of Palau]. In order to prepare to meet 
this probability it is necessary to prepare to concentrate most of other Fifth Base Air Force groups at an 
appropriate time, to be able to cooperate with the task force operation.” However, Ugaki believed that the 
area of possible decisive battle should have been extended as far as Helen Reef, two hundred miles north 
of Vogelkop Peninsula, rather than Point A. On 1 June the Combined Fleet directed the Fifth Base Air Force 
to concentrate the 2nd Attack Air Group in the western New Guinea and Halmahera areas. Advanced bases 
would be prepared at Sorong and Babo, with nearby bases at Wasile and Kau.24 The next day, shortly after 
midnight, the KON transport unit departed for Biak.25
On 1 June, JICPOA informed all fleet and task force commanders that sightings by U.S. submarines on 30 
and 31 June indicated movement of battleships and heavy cruisers in the Davao and Tawi-Tawi areas. Only 
CruDiv 16 (Aoba), CruDiv 5 (Haguro, Myōkō), and the battleship Fusō appeared associated with the western 
New Guinea area. They might be used for troop transportation from the southern Philippines and Palau to 
western New Guinea–Halmahera. Nimitz also reported that Japanese intelligence believed that there were 
considerable Allied surface forces in the Admiralties on 29 May. The next day, the same Japanese analysts 
assessed that the U.S. force might move northwestward and advised alerting Japanese forces.26 
After the landing on Biak, Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid (1888–1972), Commander, Allied Forces, Southwest 
Pacific Area (SWPA), deployed two cruiser groups (under Admiral Crutchley and Admiral Berkey) to cover 
alternately the northeastern approaches to the island. On 2 June, Admiral Kinkaid and his staff were con-
vinced that the Japanese would approach Biak from the northeast. Accordingly, he recalled Crutchley’s 
cruiser group for refueling and replenishment to Humboldt Bay. He also put both cruiser groups under his 
own command and ordered this combined force to meet the Japanese.27 
On 2 June, eight Allied tank landing ships arrived from Hollandia to Bosnik. By 1630 four of them had 
completed discharging. When Japanese aircraft carried out their strikes, there was no Allied air opposition, 
 21 JICPOA-CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletins, 10 May–30 June 1944, p. 1.
 22 COMINCH Summaries of Radio Intelligence Japanese Naval Activities, 1 April 1944–30 June 1944, p. 1641.
 23 Ugaki, Fading Victory, p. 383.
 24 Ibid., pp. 384–85.
 25 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 119.
 26 JICPOA-CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletins, 10 May–30 June 1944, pp. 1–2.
 27 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 122.
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because the aircraft were grounded by bad weather at Wakde and Hollandia. The Japanese attack lasted 
for sixty-five minutes. The Allies suffered no losses except for a near miss of one landing ship. Out of fifty-
four aircraft, the Japanese lost twelve.28 
That same day, at 2345, Crutchley’s force—four cruisers (Australia, Phoenix, Boise, and Nashville) and 
fourteen DDs (including two Australian)—departed Hollandia and steamed toward the enemy’s initial 
position. Crutchley was directed to destroy the enemy force reinforcing Biak but to withdraw if it proved 
superior in strength. If the enemy were not intercepted on 4–5 June, Crutchley was to retire toward Hol-
landia the next day.29
The next day, JICPOA informed fleet and task force commanders that Babo and Sorong would be the 
main air bases from which the enemy intended to launch torpedo and dive-bombing attacks against Al-
lied forces on Biak.30 CruDiv 16 (Aoba and Kinu, plus two destroyers), it reported, would soon proceed to 
Biak, probably transporting the 2nd Mobile Marine Brigade. The landing would be made either between 
the Wardo River and a point 3.7 miles to the south or in the Korim Bay–Wardo Bay area. The time of the 
landing was estimated as between 2100 and 2300 on either 4 or 5 June.31
On 3 June, JICPOA decrypted messages revealing that the Japanese intelligence believed that a strong 
U.S. force would operate north of New Guinea. The intercepts also suggested that the Japanese believed 
that their forces had probably been discovered by the Allies. The American analysts believed that CruDiv 
16 was en route to Biak and that Fusō and CruDiv 5 were also in the area.32
Before noon on 3 June, B-24 Liberators from Wakde, operating on the basis of radio intercepts, sighted 
and shadowed the KON transport unit.33 The Japanese were surprised to be detected so early and so far 
from their ultimate destination; they had lost the element of surprise. The Japanese also had hoped to 
engage what they believed to be an enemy carrier force at Biak, plus other heavy forces, but that did not 
happen. All this led Toyoda to suspend the entire operation at 2035 on 3 June.34 Toyoda directed CruDiv 5 
and Fusō to return to their original units; the transport force would disembark troops at either Sorong or 
Manokwari and then withdraw to Ambon.35 Fusō, two heavy cruisers (Myōkō, Haguro), and two DDs would 
remain at Davao. At the entrance of Davao a U.S. submarine, Hake, sank one of the destroyers. Aoba, Kinu, 
and six DDs, with units detached from other forces, proceeded to Sorong, where they disembarked troops 
on the evening of 4 June.36 There they were harassed by the Allied bombers of the Fifth Air Force. 
On 3 June, a group of Allied ships (three DDs, eight tank landing craft, and four infantry landing craft—
three of them with rockets and one carrying demolition parties) were off Bosnik, on the southeast coast 
of Biak. They were subjected to a second air attack, by thirty-two Zeros and nine heavy bombers of the 
23rd Air Flotilla, plus ten aircraft of the Fourth Air Army at Samate (on Salawati Island, west of Vogelkop 
Peninsula).37 This attack caused only slight damage to the Allied vessels, but out of forty-one aircraft the 
Japanese lost eleven.38
About noon on 4 June a Japanese search plane sighted Crutchley, with TFs 74 and 75, some 120 miles 
east of Biak. Shortly afterward, Admiral Itō sent twenty-eight fighters and six bombers to attack them. 
The lack of carriers to provide CAP made Crutchley’s force very vulnerable. In the attack two light cruisers 
(Nashville, Phoenix) were slightly damaged by near misses.39 At 1900, Crutchley’s force reached its assigned 
position. Kinkaid advised Crutchley that if the Japanese tried to land, their landing site would be near 
Wardo.40
 28 Ibid., p. 119.
 29 Ibid., pp. 122–23.
 30 JICPOA-CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletins, 10 May–30 June 1944, p. 1.
 31 Ibid.; COMINCH Summaries of Radio Intelligence Japanese Naval Activities, 1 April 1944–30 June 1944, p. 1646.
 32 JICPOA-CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletins, 10 May–30 June 1944, p. 1.
 33 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 120; Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, p. 556.
 34 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 120.
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A study on 5 June by COMINCH analysts of enemy radio traffic pertaining to the Biak operation strong-
ly suggested that Fusō, CruDiv 5, and DesDiv 10 had been withdrawn as part, or in support, of CruDiv 16’s 
troop-transportation mission to New Guinea–Halmahera. These ships would be refueled and then would 
probably join the First Mobile Force, or sail to the east of Mindanao. Admiral Toyoda was in charge of the 
entire operation. The Japanese commander on Biak, COMINCH analysts reported, had requested that the 
3rd Air Attack Force strike a group of enemy ships composed of two heavy cruisers, ten destroyers, and 
eight transports, plus numerous small boats, in the vicinity of Bosnik, as well as the enemy positions on 
the Owi islands.41 
That same day, JICPOA analysts commented that there had been considerable activity in connection 
with the New Guinea Reinforcement Force. The transportation force—the cruisers Aoba and Kinu and two 
destroyers—had sortied late on 2 June. This group was accompanied by the Covering Force, consisting of 
Fusō, the heavy cruisers Haguro and Myōkō, six destroyers, the 1st Supply Force (Nichiei Maru, Kokyo Maru, 
and one other tanker), and two destroyers. The Japanese intent was believed to be to land troops on Biak 
probably on the night of 4 June. However, Japanese radio intelligence warned of a powerful enemy strik-
ing force near New Guinea. This was followed by a report of sighting an enemy force including carriers. 
Hence, the transportation force ran into Kabui Bay, Waigeo Island (off the northwest coast of New Guinea). 
The Covering Force sailed northward and arrived on 5 June at Davao, where it was refueled from the 1st 
Supply Force. However, the Japanese eventually discovered that the reports of enemy carriers were false. 
JICPOA believed that the KON operation had been either delayed or canceled (as in fact it had been, late 
on the 3rd) but that reinforcement forces would make a run to Biak at an early date.42 
On 5 June, Nimitz informed task force commanders, on the basis of radio intercepts, that CruDiv 16 had 
arrived at Warparim Bay on Waigeo Island at 1055 on 5 June. His intelligence analysts believed that DesDiv 
19 (two destroyers) would sail with CruDiv 16. Four enemy destroyers had left Sorong at 0600 on the 5th 
for an unknown anchorage in that area for refueling. CruDiv 16 would try to disembark troops on Biak but 
probably not before the night of 5–6 June. CruDiv 5, plus possibly Fusō, had returned to Davao early on the 
5th, for reasons that were unclear but probably involved either fear of attack by the U.S. force believed to 
be north of New Guinea or the completion of troop transport to the Halmahera area.43
On 6 June, Nimitz’s headquarters informed commanders that the 1st Supply Force of the First Mobile 
Force had completed fueling CruDiv 5 and Fusō at Davao around noon the day before. CruDiv 16 was at 
Kabui Bay the morning of 5 June. DesDiv 19 (part of CruDiv 16), plus DesDiv 27, had arrived at Ambon (on 
the Banda Sea) about 0400 on the 6th. It was estimated that CruDiv 16 would land troops at Biak, but not 
before 7 June.44 
On 7 June, COMINCH analysts learned that a newly formed KON force, based on CruDiv 16 units, was 
scheduled to take part in landings at Korim Bay on an unknown date. The analysts estimated this force 
at one heavy and one light cruiser, six to seven destroyers, and several smaller ships. The landing at Biak 
would start on 8 or 9 June. The 18th Guard Division at Manokwari, they reported, had informed Com-
mander, CruDiv 16 at 1820 on 6 June that it would not be able to assist in the supply of Biak, as practi-
cally all its boats had been put out of commission by bombing and strafing.45 Combined Fleet had added 
CruDiv 5 and destroyers to the KON force. The army wanted troops to be transported by cruisers as far 
as Manokwari and from here shuttled to Biak by destroyers; however, Manokwari and Babo were being 
frequently raided and their small installations and craft were greatly damaged. Korim, a landing site on the 
north coast of Biak, was also under enemy monitoring, so a counterlanding would not be an easy task.46
JICPOA and COMINCH correctly deduced that Toyoda was now planning a second attempt to reinforce 
Biak. He had directed three DDs to embark six hundred troops at Sorong. They were escorted by another 
three DDs, each towing a large landing barge. The entire force was covered by CruDiv 5 heavy cruisers 
(Aoba and Kinu). Their aim was to land the troops on Biak during the night of 8–9 June. On the morning of 
the 7th, the parts of the force joined north of Missol Island, west of the Vogelkop Peninsula. The cruisers 
 41 COMINCH Summaries of Radio Intelligence Japanese Naval Activities, 1 April 1944–30 June 1944, p. 1650.
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proceeded to Ambon and Salawati Island to replenish and then stand by. Sakonju’s force then steamed to 
Sorong to embark troops and at midnight departed for Biak. Daylight fighter cover was provided by the 
23rd Air Flotilla.47
Despite many setbacks, the Japanese had some successes. They carried out an air raid on the Allied 
airfield at Wakde on 8 June, inflicting significant damage on the runways and ground installations. Only a 
few Allied search aircraft were in the air at the time of the attack.48 
At about 1230 on 8 June, ten SWPA B-25s escorted by seven P-38 fighters from Lake Sentani (near Hol-
landia) attacked Sakonju’s force of six destroyers about thirty miles northwest of Manokwari. One enemy 
DD (Harusame) was sunk, and three others (Shiratsuyu, Shikinami, and Samidare) were slightly damaged.49 
The surviving destroyers continued toward Biak. At about 1900 Sakonju received a report from a Japanese 
bomber of an enemy force (Crutchley’s TF 74/75) some 120 miles east of Korim Bay. Crutchley’s force had 
no fighter cover, because of the shortage of the planes at Wakde. At 2340, one of Sakonju’s destroyers 
obtained contact with Crutchley’s force. Sakonju decided to withdraw, but that proved more complicated 
than he thought it would be.50
Shortly before, just after 2200, one PB4Y Privateer patrol bomber sighted an enemy force of five ships 
about sixty miles northwest by west of Crutchley and steaming at twelve knots in his direction. Crutchley 
issued a warning order for battle and set a course for intercept. His force detected the enemy at 2320—just 
before, as noted above, the enemy detected him and retired. During the two-hour stern chase that en-
sued, about 1,300 rounds were exchanged. Two enemy destroyers were hit, and one was slightly damaged 
by near misses; Crutchley’s force suffered no losses and prevented Sakonju from reinforcing Biak, except 
for a few troops landed from barges. Admiral Itō still had about 150 planes in the 23rd Air Flotilla, but these 
planes were recalled to help the First Mobile Force. Two of Sakonju’s destroyers (Shiratsuyu and Samidare) 
went to Batjan, where they joined two heavy cruisers, Myōkō and Haguro. The remaining three destroyers 
(Shikinami, Uranami, and Shigure) proceeded to Sorong and disembarked their troops, after which they 
joined two Aoba and Kinu and proceeded to Batjan, where they arrived on 10 June.
Notwithstanding the failure of this second attempt to reinforce Biak, Ozawa was now even more de-
termined to hold the island. On 9 June, he radioed Toyoda that Japan could not afford to lose Biak and its 
airfield. He argued that reinforcements might draw the American fleet into the anticipated zone of deci-
sive battle and thereby enable the A-Go operation. Toyoda agreed and on the 10th, concluding that there 
were no enemy carriers in the area, decided to detach BatDiv 1 from the First Mobile Force and attach it to 
KON. BatDiv 1, under Admiral Ugaki, departed Tawi-Tawi at 1600 that day and arrived at Batjan the next. 
Two more destroyers were added to Ugaki’s force. The new attack force was now composed of BatDiv 1, 
with the two superdreadnoughts, Yamato and Musashi; two heavy cruisers, Myōkō and Haguro; one light 
cruiser (Noshiro); three destroyers; Sakonju’s Transport Force 1, with CruDiv 16 (Aoba and Kinu, plus four 
destroyers); and Transport Unit 2, with two minelayers, one transport, several submarine chasers, and a 
number of freighters.
Toyoda’s Operation Order No. 127 of 10 June stated that the KON force’s missions were (in order of pri-
ority) to destroy the enemy task force and reinforcements in the Biak area; bombard enemy landing forces 
on Biak and Owi; and transport the 2nd Sea Mobile Brigade to Biak at an opportune moment. Ugaki was 
directed if he received the order “Stand by for Operation A,” he was to continue KON but act so as to lure 
the enemy task force to the hoped-for decisive battle.51 Accordingly, Ugaki selected the Bafgan anchorage 
on Halmahera as his assembly point, effective at 1600 on 10 June.52 
On 11 June, Nimitz’s headquarters told major subordinate commanders that BatDiv 1 had become 
associated in radio traffic with western New Guinea on the 10th, suggesting that its imminent departure 
for that area was possible. At about 1900, a U.S. submarine observed three battleships, four cruisers, and 
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readiness to cooperate with Ozawa. Other aircraft, including the Hachiman Group 
of forty-eight Mitsubishi G4M Type 1 (Betty) land-attack aircraft and forty-eight 
Jacks at Yokosuka, were in readiness to fly south if needed. These aircraft would 
attack TF 58 and TF 51.74 
In mid-June 1944, about 880 U.S. Marine, Navy, and Army aircraft were based 
in the Marshalls and Gilberts. This number included about 330 fighters (including 
forty-four night fighters), 132 heavy and 112 medium bombers, seventy-two dive-
bombers, forty-eight torpedo bombers, seventy-two patrol aircraft, and 128 miscel-
laneous aircraft (photographic, observation, transports).75 However, the Marianas, 
some 1,500 miles away, were far beyond the effective range of those fighters, dive-
bombers, and torpedo bombers. Heavy bombers had sufficient range but could not 
be effectively used against carriers or other surface combatants.
TF 58 also had more battleships (seven versus five), light cruisers (thirteen ver-
sus two), and destroyers (fifty-six versus twenty-eight) than the First Mobile Force. 
The Japanese had a larger number only of heavy cruisers (eleven to eight).76 The 
First Mobile Force included two 71,700-ton (full load) superdreadnoughts (Yamato 
and Musashi), but most of its other battleships were obsolete. The oldest battle-
ship, Kongō, had been built in 1913; only three battleships or cruisers had been 
commissioned after 1941.77 The number of destroyers was grossly inadequate. The 
Japanese had lost seven during the recent training and alert period.78 Finally, the 
U.S. carriers and large surface combatants possessed powerful antiair defenses, 
in the form of a large number of five-inch/38-caliber dual-purpose guns and 40 
mm and 20 mm guns. For example, an Essex-class carrier carried some eighty AA 
guns.79
The Japanese used twenty submarines in the A-Go operation, mainly in the 
vicinity of the Marianas. However, they did not have direct influence on the course 
destroyers en route southward from the Sibutu Passage and Tawi-Tawi. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPac) 
assessed that it was probably BatDiv 1 (Musashi, Nagato, and Yamato), accompanied by either CruDiv 4 or seven 
other units.53 Radio traffic on the 10th associated CruDiv 16 and CruDiv 5 with the Biak-Manokwari area (a message 
had been routed to Biak for CruDiv 5). A Japanese message of 1717 on 10 June indicated that three destroyers of 
DesDiv 27 were still afloat and had not been sunk by B-24s on the 8th, as previously reported. Japanese messages 
sent at about 2000 and 2300 indicated that Menado was probably the immediate destination of BatDiv 1.54
By the evening of 11 June, the KON force was assembled at Batjan. Ugaki intended to land troops at all costs, 
at the same time bombarding enemy positions on Biak and Owi. However, by that time Toyoda was much more 
concerned about the Marianas. Allied planes attacked Guam and Saipan on 11 June and again the next day. Hence, 
at 1830 on 12 June, Toyoda issued orders to execute the A-Go operation and to suspend KON temporarily. Ugaki 
reversed course, headed north, and joined Ozawa’s force. At the same time, Toyoda ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla to 
move all aircraft then in New Guinea to Palau.55
 53 JICPOA-CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletins, 10 May–30 June 1944, pp. 1–2.
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and outcome of the operation.80 In contrast, the American TF 17 deployed four 
boats in the Bonins area, three boats southeast and eastward of Formosa, five boats 
east and southeast of the Marianas, five in the Ulithi-Philippines area, and one off 
the Surigao Strait. The Seventh Fleet deployed three boats southeast of Mindanao, 
four off Tawi-Tawi, and two off Luzon.81
The U.S. Navy enjoyed one of its greatest advantages over the IJN in an excellent 
capability for refueling forces at sea. Service Squadron 10 of Service Force Pacific 
was directly responsible for refueling the fleet during FORAGER. Admiral Spruance 
emphasized the importance of adequate and timely replenishment, because the 
U.S. forces would be operating in enemy-controlled territory farther from Ameri-
can bases than ever before.82
Until 15 June, the United States routed commercial tankers to Majuro and then 
diverted them to final destinations. Afterward, tankers arriving at the Marshalls 
were routed to Eniwetok. Two Liberty-type tankers were available there, and three 
or more station tankers were to be there by 20 June. A fleet-oiler task unit, com-
posed of oilers and escorts, and an aircraft-replacement task unit, composed of 
an escort carrier plus escorts, was organized as TG 50.17. Its commander was re-
sponsible for coordinating the employment of all fleet oilers in the combat area. He 
sent fleet oilers back to Eniwetok for reloading when their black cargo oil had been 
reduced to twenty thousand barrels. He was also responsible for sending escort car-
rier units to Eniwetok for replacement aircraft. Eight task units (TU 16.7.1 through 
TU 16.7.8) were established for refueling at sea, each composed of three oilers with 
at least two destroyer escorts. Sometimes, one destroyer and two destroyer escorts 
were assigned. There were eleven rectangular refueling areas, each seventy-five by 
twenty-five miles, in the vicinity of the Marianas.83
The IJN made great efforts prior to the A-Go operation to ensure that there 
would be sufficient fuel, lubricants, ammunition, and other supplies for the First 
Mobile Force, Base Air Force, and other IJN units in the southern Philippines and 
the Central Pacific. In the IJN, all logistical responsibilities were concentrated at the 
Navy Ministry and NGS. 
The main reason for selecting Tawi-Tawi as a major naval anchorage was its 
proximity to Tarakan, Borneo, some 180 miles away; naval vessels could use crude 
oil from the Tarakan fields without refining. However, that oil was heavy in sulfur 
that could damage boilers. It was also highly volatile and posed a serious risk for a 
ship damaged in combat. Yet there was severe shortage of refined oil.84 For the A-Go 
operation, the Combined Fleet assigned three supply forces composed of seven to 
ten tankers and escorted with a few destroyers (see Japanese order of battle, above). 
The Allied Preparations, 2–9 June
All the U.S. forces taking part in FORAGER sortied from Hawaii the last week of 
May 1944 and headed directly for the main assembly area in the Marshalls, in the 
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lagoons of Majuro, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok. Admiral Spruance left Pearl Harbor 
on 26 May on board the heavy cruiser Indianapolis for the Marshalls.85 On 2 June 
Spruance’s flagship anchored at Majuro; two days later it arrived at Kwajalein and 
on 5 June at Roi. Spruance inspected installations on Roi and Namur.86 
TF 58 had then to transit some 1,580 nautical miles from Majuro to an area off 
Saipan. It sailed on 6 June and refueled in the afternoon on 8 June; it took almost 
ten hours to refuel the entire task force. TG 58.7, the Battle Line (Admiral Lee), 
was specially organized for surface action and operated separately, but on 8 June 
it was incorporated into TF 58’s task group structure.87 CTF 57 directed additional 
searches for 8–9 June between bearings of 317° and 342° and out to five hundred 
miles from Eniwetok to cover the fueling of TF 58.88 
On 7 June, Spruance arrived at Eniwetok and conferred on the final plan with 
his principal commanders, Turner (CTF 51 and CTF 52, the Northern Attack 
Force), Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC (Expeditionary Troops, CTF 56), Mitscher, 
Hoover (CTF 57), and Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly (CTF 53, Southern Attack 
Force).89 He received the plans of his task force commanders.90 He also inspected 
base development ashore.91 Spruance left Eniwetok in Indianapolis on 9 June and 
the next day joined TF 58. 
Spruance and his task force commanders continued to receive informa-
tion on the whereabouts of the Japanese commanders and their forces. On 5 
June JICPOA deduced that commanders of the First Mobile and Second Fleets 
were in the southern Philippines, while that of the Combined Fleet remained 
in home waters.92 It estimated that the Japanese had available for combat in the 
Philippines–NEI area six battleships, two large carriers, two auxiliary carriers, five 
light carriers, twelve heavy cruisers, three light carriers, and thirty destroyers.93 
It had been learned a week earlier that CINC, Central Pacific Area Fleet was Vice 
Adm. Chūichi Nagumo.94 Japanese reinforcements continued to flow into the 
Central Pacific, largely to the Palau–New Guinea area. One fighter and one dive- 
bomber squadron had been redeployed from Truk to New Guinea. Convoys con-
tinued to move troops and material from the Marianas to Yap and Palau; Saipan 
was an important transshipment point for the Carolines. JICPOA assessed that 
Japanese supplies of aviation gasoline and oil in the Marianas were dwindling.95 It 
also reported that the Japanese radio intelligence believed that a U.S. striking force 
might have sortied from Majuro during the night of 4–5 June.96
On 7 June, Nimitz’s staff estimated that Commander, First Striking Fleet (First 
Mobile Force) was at Tawi-Tawi with the main body of his fleet. CINC, Combined 
Fleet, it believed, was considerably concerned about west New Guinea and the Biak 
troop transport. The battleship Fusō, CruDiv 5, and DesDiv 10 were probably still 
at Davao, engaged in towing and fueling-at-sea exercises. There was good evidence 
that the tankers Ashizuri and Takasaki, or one of them, had been torpedoed and 
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sunk in the Sulu Sea en route from Tarakan to Yap via the Surigao Strait on the 
morning of 5 June. The 1st Supply Force consisted of three tankers (Nichiei Maru, 
Kokuyo Maru, and Seiyo Maru), and the 2nd Supply Force of two tankers, Genyo 
Maru and Azusa Maru. A force of one light cruiser (Natori) and two DDs, probably 
accompanied by one tanker (Hayasu), had sailed from home waters for Davao on 
6 June. JICPOA learned that the tanker in that force was carrying eighty five-inch 
hoses, ten 40 mm cables, and ten 48 mm cables five hundred feet long (all likely 
intended for fueling-at-sea rigs) for the First Striking Fleet. This tanker would sail 
from Davao to Balikpapan for refueling and then join the First Striking Fleet. From 
this single piece of evidence, the analysts concluded that the First Striking Fleet 
would sortie prior to 15 June.97
On 8 June, JICPOA deduced from Japanese radio traffic that the First Mobile 
Fleet might soon sortie from Tawi-Tawi. The Japanese were conducting an intensive 
antisubmarine search between Davao and Kau (Halmahera, North Maluku, Moluc-
cas).98 JICPOA learned about the general situation in the area of the Japanese South-
ern Army from a decrypted message of 2 June. Among other things, the Southern 
Army had concluded (correctly) that Saipan would be the enemy objective that 
summer. It also believed that the bases in New Guinea would be captured by the en-
emy as quickly as possible, giving the Japanese too little time to consolidate their line 
of defense. The enemy would make an all-out attempt to occupy the Philippines and 
exert pressure on Japanese positions there after June. In the Indian Ocean, the Japa-
nese believed, for the time being the enemy would conduct only harassing actions 
but would carry out a large-scale offensive after the end of the monsoon season, co-
ordinated with actions in the Pacific theater. The Americans, the Japanese analysts 
were reported to believe, would also carry out an air offensive against Japanese re-
inforcements from northern Burma and China. The American analysts commented 
that the Southern Army had control over all army operations in the southwestern 
Pacific and Southeast Asia. Its headquarters had recently moved from Singapore 
to Manila.99 On 10 June, JICPOA revealed the existence of the 3rd Supply Force of 
the First Striking Fleet, composed of two tankers, Kosen Maru and Sunosaki-Kosen 
Maru. They were scheduled to arrive at Balikpapan on 8 June for refueling.100
Japanese Preparations through 10 June
The entire plan for the A-Go operation was rehearsed in a series of tabletop maneu-
vers and war games. There were also a number of meetings between the planners 
of the NGS and Combined Fleet Headquarters. Vice Adm. Seichi Ito, deputy chief 
of the NGS, flew to Singapore to hold detailed discussions with the staffs of sub-
ordinate commanders. Ito helped the chief of the NGS, Adm. Shigetarō Shimada, 
incorporate the A-Go operation plan into an IGHQ directive.101 The First Mobile 
Force was directed to assemble eventually at Tawi-Tawi anchorage but for the time 
being its main elements were to remain at Singapore and the Lingayen anchorage.102
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On 27 April, tabletop maneuvers were conducted on board Ozawa’s flagship, 
the carrier Taihō. Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki, commander of BatDiv 1 (and former 
chief of the staff of the Combined Fleet), who attended the game, wondered why 
the Japanese side did not try to attack elements that could be easily destroyed in-
stead of seeking a decisive battle.103 He believed that the players, focused solely on 
fighting a decisive battle, seldom thought about an easy way to destroy elements of 
the enemy.104 On 2 May, war games and staff studies were held by the NGS aboard 
the Combined Fleet’s flagship cruiser Ōyodo, on board the carrier Taihō, and on a 
smaller scale on flagships of smaller units. Emperor Hirohito attended a critique of 
the NGS game on 2 May in Tokyo—the first time the emperor had participated in 
a preparatory planning session for a major naval operation.105 
Ozawa held another table maneuver on 6 May.106 Three days later, a table ma-
neuver was conducted by the Second Fleet. Ugaki was uncertain whether a decisive 
battle could be fought at all. At the same time, he suspected that the enemy might 
not be as good as the Japanese believed: everything “may turn out all right if and 
when we fight with them.”107
At about 0300 on 11 May, the First Mobile Force left Lingga for Tawi-Tawi. 
However, CarDiv 1, BatDivs 1 and 3, CruDivs 4, 5, and 7, and DesRons 2 and 10 re-
mained at Lingga.108 The next day, CarDiv 1 and two submarines left Lingga. On 14 
May, the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force arrived at Tawi-Tawi. The next day, CarDiv 
1 and the two submarines reached Tawi-Tawi, at 1100.109 On 16 May, the First Mo-
bile Force moved to a point west of the Inland Sea, where it joined the Third Fleet 
and Second Fleet.110 CarDiv 3 and the battleship Musashi arrived at Tawi-Tawi at 
about 1915 on 16 May.111
By May 1944 the Japanese had five army divisions and six independent regi-
ments, plus numerous smaller units, in the 31st Army area. The 29th Division was 
sent from Manchuria to Saipan in February 1944 and later to Guam. The 43rd Di-
vision was moved from Japan to Saipan in late May 1944.112 Out of some forty-five 
thousand troops in the Marianas, all but five thousand were on Saipan, Guam, and 
Tinian.113 
The IJN strengthened its forces in the Marianas too. Shortly after the fall of the 
Marshalls, the 55th and the 65th Naval Guard Forces were sent to Saipan and Tinian, 
respectively. The Japanese also increased their air strength, concurrently with the 
construction of the new airfields.114 In March 1944, the Combined Fleet and the Cen-
tral Pacific Area Fleet issued separate orders for accelerated construction of fourteen 
airfields and two seaplane bases in the Marianas–Truk and Palau–Yap areas. Spe-
cifically, Saipan would have three airfields and one seaplane base; Guam, four air-
fields and one seaplane base; Rota, one airfield; Pagan, two airfields; and Tinian, four 
airfields. Each airfield would accommodate forty-eight aircraft. The exception was 
the Marpi airfield on Saipan, which had only twenty-four. Charan-Kanoa on Saipan 
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would be used as an emergency strip. The network of bases would accommodate 
altogether some six hundred aircraft. Combined Fleet directed that these airfields be 
completed by April 1944; however, this proved overly optimistic. When U.S. forces 
invaded the Marianas in June 1944, most of these airfields were not ready: the Marpi 
field on Saipan was unfinished; Guam had only two operational airfields, with two 
under construction; Tinian had three usable airfields and one under construction; 
and Rota and Pagan each had one runway. Out of fourteen airfields planned, nine 
had been completed, capable of operating about four hundred planes.115 On 18 May, 
the Base Air Force was told that it would execute A-Go with the 1st Air Flotilla.116 
Deployment of the First Air Fleet was to be complete by 26 May. 
The next day, the commander of the First Mobile Force ordered, “Disregard 
damage. Part of the unit will be sacrificed for the overall success.”117 At 0930, Ozawa 
gave a speech to all subordinate commanders: “We do not consider our losses. If 
and when necessary for the sake of the main cause, an element will be sacrificed. In 
case communications and liaison go wrong, a commander must act as he sees fit.”118 
On 3 May, IGHQ issued Order No. 373, “The Immediate Operational Policy 
(A-Go Operation) to Be Adhered by the Combined Fleet.” The same day Admiral 
Shimada issued Order No. 209, “Operational Policies to Be Followed by the Com-
bined Fleet.”119 Among other things, he directed Toyoda to conduct “surprise” op-
erations until the enemy’s “spirit for attack” was broken.120 Shimada envisioned that 
preparations for decisive battle by the First Mobile Force and First Air Fleet would 
be completed in late May. The First Mobile Force would assemble in the south- 
central part of the Philippines. He directed Toyoda that after the First Air Fleet 
was deployed in the Central Pacific area, the Philippines, and north of Australia, 
“you will be in a state of readiness and taking advantage of a good opportunity, will 
employ your entire strength, . . . to engage and annihilate the enemy.” The decisive 
battle would be fought as close as possible to where Japanese forces were deployed. 
Should the enemy attack prior to the completion of preparations by the Combined 
Fleet, Japanese forces would secure “strategic points.” In that case, unless a favor-
able situation developed, the Combined Fleet would avoid a decisive surface en-
gagement with the enemy fleet. The enemy should be diverted and annihilated by 
the Base Air Force and local area-defense forces.121
In his Order No. 209, Shimada stated that preparations would encompass an 
area stretching from the Central Pacific to the Philippines and north of Australia. 
They should be sped up in the western Carolines, the south-central Philippines, the 
Halmahera area, and western New Guinea. Priority should be given to air opera-
tions. Maximum efforts should be made in the construction of bases, air bases in 
particular, and the securing of required quantities of fuel and ammunition.122 In 
close cooperation with the Base Air Force, the First Mobile Force would engage 
the enemy forces and annihilate them in a “single blow.” All battle preparations at 
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the anchorage in the southern Philippines would be completed by 20 May. A decoy 
force would advance to Ululsi or Palau and in cooperation with other Japanese 
forces induce the enemy to come out to where the decisive battle would be fought. 
The First Mobile Force would sortie and move east of the Philippines and at an op-
portune time absorb the decoy force.123 The Japanese forces should be also alert for 
an enemy attempt to attack from the flanks or to trap them.124 
Also on 3 May, Admiral Toyoda issued his Order No. 76, on the operational 
policy to be followed by the Combined Fleet. The major part of the Base Air Force 
and the First Mobile Force would concentrate to lure the enemy fleet. The decisive 
battle would be fought with the entire strength of the First Mobile Force, upon a 
favorable opportunity, around Palau and the western Carolines. The majority of en-
emy carrier striking forces would be attacked and annihilated in daylight.125 Should 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet appear off the Marianas, it would be attacked by land-based 
aircraft only and lured southward toward Woleai–Yap–Palau where a decisive bat-
tle would be fought during daylight. The Japanese were confident of winning such 
a battle. The enemy would be pursued and subjected to continuous air, surface, 
and submarine attacks, including by aircraft based south and west of the Woleai–
Yap–Palau line.126 If the enemy attacked the Marianas or both the Marianas and the 
western Carolines simultaneously, counterattacks would be conducted by the Base 
Air Force.127 
After the U.S. carriers attacked Marcus Island, the Japanese concluded that an 
assault on the Marianas was imminent. At midnight on 20 May, orders were issued 
to activate the A-Go operation.128 The First Mobile Force completed mobilization at 
Tawi-Tawi. The Base Air Force would start its deployment on 23 May and complete 
it three days later. By the end of May, the Japanese planned to move about 280 ad-
ditional aircraft to the Central Pacific.129
During their preparations for the A-Go operation in late May and until 13 June 
1944, the Japanese had rudimentary knowledge of the strength and composition 
of the enemy forces in the Central Pacific. Most of their information was obtained 
by land-based naval search planes. For example, on 27 May, Japanese intelligence 
estimated that as of 2 June enemy strength in the Central Pacific and Inner South 
Seas would consist of five “regular” (fleet) aircraft carriers and five “converted” 
(escort) carriers, three battleships, three cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, twenty-
nine transports, and nine small craft. In the Solomons, the enemy was believed 
to have one carrier, two converted carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, three 
destroyers, twenty-nine transports, and eighty small craft. In western New Guinea 
were one regular carrier, four battleships, seven cruisers, nineteen destroyers, sixty 
transports, and 120 small craft. The enemy’s total strength consisted of six regular 
carriers, seven converted carriers, eight battleships, twelve cruisers, forty-three de-
stroyers, 116 transports, and 209 small craft.130
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On 30 May, the aircraft of the 22nd Air Flotilla at Truk reconnoitered Majuro 
Island and Finschafen Bay (fifty miles east of Lae, on the Huon Peninsula of New 
Guinea). They observed five aircraft carriers—two of the Essex class, one of the En-
terprise class, and two of the Casablanca class—as well as one Iowa-class battleship. 
They also sighted three battleships, three cruisers, ten destroyers, two transports, and 
six tankers, or a total of twenty-nine ships at Majuro Atoll (two carriers, three battle 
cruisers, and eight destroyers were anchored outside the harbor).131 In Finschafen, 
the Japanese aircraft sighted nineteen ships (five large and six medium transports, 
five small transports, and three destroyers). At Kwajalein were observed eight de-
stroyers, nine small ships, one tender, eighteen transports, one tanker, and twenty 
other ships, plus several aircraft. In the Admiralties were sighted one Saratoga- 
class aircraft carrier, one battleship, one cruiser, forty small ships, and one trans-
port at anchor; 150 large and small aircraft were on the airfield.132 
On 31 May, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft observed at Kwajalein eight destroy-
ers, nine small ships, one small tender, eighteen transports, and a tanker, plus twenty 
other ships.133 On 2 June, aircraft based on Truk reported two cruisers, one destroy-
er, seventeen transports, one collier, twenty small aircraft, ten medium aircraft, and 
thirty large aircraft around Eniwetok, plus three large transports, ten small aircraft, 
and ten medium aircraft near Engebi (Enjebi today).134 On 4 June, Japanese recon-
naissance aircraft detected eight converted carriers, six battleships, eight cruisers, 
sixteen-plus destroyers, and ten oilers.135 The next day, the Japanese reconnoitered 
Majuro and sighted five regular carriers, either Essex or Enterprise class, eight con-
verted carriers (two of the Independence class), six battleships, eight cruisers, sixteen 
destroyers, and many others. In the Admiralties they observed one aircraft carrier, 
two battleships or battle cruisers, and five destroyers in Adora Harbor.136
At 0930 on 9 June, Japanese aircraft overflying Majuro reported that the enemy 
ships had departed; only ten transports and two destroyers remained.137 The same 
day, Japanese aircraft observed in the Admiralties the presence of one battleship, 
three cruisers, twenty transports, and about twenty destroyers, as well as 135 air-
craft. The Combined Fleet ordered reconnaissance of Brown Island (west of Kwa-
jalein) and of Kwajalein and strengthened patrols in the area.138 Reconnaissance of 
Majuro from Nauru on 9 June noted that the enemy had left for an unknown desti-
nation. One transport, two destroyers, and from ten to twenty large landing barges 
were sighted near the harbor entrance. Japanese submarines were also involved in 
the reconnaissance of Majuro Atoll.139 
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V Japanese A-Go Operation (Battle of the  
Philippine Sea), 13–22 June 1944 
Execution
As envisaged in the basic plan, the Fifth Fleet launched a series of strikes against the Japanese positions in the Marianas between D–4 (11 June) and D-day (15 June). Spruance and his subordinate commanders received 
a steady stream of messages on enemy movements and intentions from the Joint 
Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) and U.S. submarines. Until D-
day (15 June), the Fifth Fleet’s OPLAN 10-44 was executed as envisaged. The only 
exception was that on D–4 (11 June) the fast carrier task forces conducted a long-
range fighter sweep of Guam, Rota, Tinian, and Saipan instead of delaying their 
initial attack until daylight on D–3 (12 June). This change in the plan was made 
because of the discovery of larger than estimated strength of enemy aircraft in the 
Marianas, an opportunity for surprise, and the desirability of altering the pattern of 
attacks in previous carrier attacks against targets ashore.1
Allied Pre-invasion Strikes, 11–15 June
On 11 June, TF 58 launched a fighter sweep of 225 aircraft against the southern 
Marianas from a position about two hundred miles from Guam and 225 miles from 
Saipan and Tinian. There was no indication that TF 58 had been detected, yet the 
Japanese offered considerable opposition in the air. Some 150 enemy aircraft were 
reported destroyed, including about eighty in the air. Reportedly, these strikes re-
duced Japanese air strength by about a third. TF 58 lost only eleven fighters; the pi-
lots of five aircraft were rescued. Several Japanese vessels were destroyed at Saipan. 
The next day, TG 58.1 bombed Guam and Rota, while TG 58.4 struck targets on 
Saipan and Tinian. Mitscher steamed westward of the Marianas during the night.2 
Aircraft of TG 58.4 attacked a Japanese convoy heading from Tanapag Harbor, on 
Saipan, to Japan.3
On 13 June, all four carrier groups of TF 58 conducted repeated air strikes 
against the Marianas. That night TG 58.2 and TG 58.3 retired northeast of Saipan. 
The next morning both groups returned to a position southwest of Tinian to strike 
Saipan, Guam, and Rota. TG 58.1 and TG 58.4 were en route to Iwo Jima. Battle-
ships, cruisers, and destroyers of TF 51 bombarded Saipan. They encountered no 
air opposition and little antiaircraft fire.4 The U.S. aircraft sank an already-damaged 
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aircraft ferry and destroyed a convoy of five small cargo vessels. Battleships and 
destroyers of TG 58.7 conducted an almost-daylong bombardment of installations 
on Saipan and Tinian.5 
On 14 June, TG 52.17 (Fire Support Group 1) and TG 52.18 (Fire Support 
Group 2) shelled Japanese installations on Saipan and Tinian. Japanese shore bat-
teries damaged one old battleship, California, off Saipan and a destroyer off Tinian; 
one heavy cruiser (Indianapolis), one light cruiser (Birmingham), and a destroyer 
were damaged by near misses. Another battleship, Tennessee, was damaged by a 
shore battery northeast of Tinian.6
On 14 June, TG 58.1 and TG 58.4 refueled prior to planned strikes on Iwo Jima 
and Chichi Jima. Mitscher directed these two groups to limit their air strikes on 
Iwo Jima to 16 June only and to be ready the next day to engage the enemy fleet.7 
During the night of the 14th, however, TG 58.1 and TG 58.4 were released to start 
their strikes the afternoon of the 15th to get in two days’ worth of attacks. The U.S. 
planes were intercepted over Iwo Jima. They shot down ten Zero fighters and de-
stroyed seven other aircraft on the ground.8 After TF 58’s U.S. carriers struck Iwo 
Jima the Japanese decided to stop their planned reconnaissance eastward of the 
Marianas. They tried to obtain information on enemy forces west of Palau through 
radio intercepts but were unsuccessful.9 
In addition to TF 58’s and TF 51’s carrier strikes and bombardments, Allied 
long-range bombers based in the SWPA, SOPAC, and CENTPAC conducted, a 
week prior to the invasion of the Marianas, a series of intensive attacks against 
the Japanese strongholds in the Carolines. The aim was to isolate the Marianas 
from the rest of the Japanese-controlled positions in the Central Pacific. The heavy 
bombers of the Seventh and Fourteenth Air Forces struck Truk, Puluwat (Ender-
by), and Satawan Islands in the central Carolines.10 On 8 June, B-24 Liberators of 
the Seventh Air Force struck airfields on Truk.11 The next day the Thirteenth Air 
Force attacked airfields on Palau, Woleai, and Yap. B-24s from the Admiralty Is-
lands bombed Truk and Satawan. On the night of 9–10 June Seventh Air Force 
Liberators bombed Truk.12 On 10–11 June SWPA Liberators attacked Palau, while 
the Seventh Air Force Liberators again bombed Truk.13
Long-range heavy bombers of the Thirteenth Air Force attacked Truk during the 
night of 11 June, while B-24s from SOPAC attacked Palau airfields.14 The next day 
Truk was bombed by the Army Air Forces Liberators before dawn, and by SWPA 
Liberators at midday. Liberators from Wakde and Manus attacked the Palaus before 
dawn.15 On 13 June, Seventh Air Force Liberators made a predawn strike on Truk 
and Thirteenth Air Force bombers struck during daylight. SOPAC B-24s made a 
night attack on Palau. On the same day, Seventh Air Force Liberators made a day-
light attack on Truk, while B-24s from SWPA attacked Palau at night. On 14 June, 
SOPAC B-24s flew a night attack on the Yap airfields and a daylight attack on Truk.16
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Allied Information on the Enemy, 11–15 June
During the pre-invasion strikes on the Marianas, Admirals Spruance and Mitscher 
and other task force commanders were regularly kept informed by JICPOA on the 
locations, and in some cases the intentions, of enemy forces. On 12 June, JICPOA 
believed that the commander of the First Striking Fleet was still in the southern 
Philippines, probably at Tawi-Tawi, as was the commander of the Second Fleet. 
CINC, Combined Fleet was in Japan. Nimitz’s staff advised subordinate command-
ers that he believed it was too early to determine what course of action the First 
Striking Fleet would take in regard to the U.S. attack on the Marianas.17 Nimitz’s 
headquarters estimated that CruDiv 16 units had probably refueled from one tank-
er (Eiyo Maru) in the Sorong area on 11 or 12 June. CruDiv 5 was still associated 
with western New Guinea. In the morning on 11 June, an American submarine 
sighted a light cruiser (Natori), two destroyers, and an auxiliary carrier, with a 
deck load of aircraft, entering Davao Gulf; this group included one tanker, Hayasu, 
probably carrying fueling gear for the First Striking Fleet. A U.S. submarine sighted 
two Fusō-class battleships and about six cruisers, plus several destroyers, anchored 
at Tawi-Tawi on 11 June. The continued presence of the battleships in the Tawi-
Tawi area had been confirmed by sightings of BatDiv 1 apparently proceeding to 
Menado.18 
Nimitz’s assessment was that the connection of BatDiv 1 with Biak might mean 
that any fleet reaction to the Marianas operation had been postponed. No defini-
tive commitment had been made for fleet employment in the New Guinea area, 
and an operation would require time for refueling and preparation. The Japanese 
plan called for fleet defense of the Marianas. However, it was believed that the Japa-
nese would hesitate to risk their fleet without strong shore-based air support. By 
the time the fleet was ready, the possibility of shore-based air support might have 
disappeared. Nimitz’s intelligence staff saw no indication of a fleet movement into 
the Central Pacific. It estimated that the Japanese had available for combat in the 
Philippines–NEI area six battleships, two large carriers, two auxiliary carriers, five 
light carriers, twelve heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and twenty-six destroyers. 
It also noted recent reports indicating that a comparatively heavy toll had been 
taken of Japanese destroyers. The unconfirmed estimates were that the IJN had lost 
by June 1944 about seventy destroyers, plus six destroyers probably sunk.19 
Late during the night of 12 June, the U.S. submarine Bowfin reported an en-
emy force of four battleships, six cruisers, and destroyers entering the Sulu Sea 
near the northeastern tip of Borneo. However, Bowfin’s report was inconclusive. 
Hence, Spruance decided to proceed with the Saipan landings as scheduled and 
await further information about the enemy movements. He issued an alert to the 
Fifth Fleet and prepared contingency plans. There was a probability that the enemy 
might attack the Fifth Fleet on D+2 (17 June). However, an attack before that date 
 JAPANESE A-GO OPERATION (BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA): EXECUTION 247 246 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
was unlikely, because of the distances involved. Spruance had earlier scheduled an 
attack on Iwo Jima by carrier strike forces on 16–17 June.20 
On 13 June, Spruance received his first information on the existence of Ozawa’s 
force from the submarine Redfin, which reported four battleships, six carriers, eight 
cruisers, and six destroyers heading north through the Sibutu Passage (an eighteen-
mile-wide channel between Borneo and the Sulu Archipelago).21 At the same time 
other information indicated a movement of enemy battleships from the Halmahera 
area into the waters east of the Philippines. Evaluating Redfin’s report, Spruance 
calculated that it would take the enemy force at least until 17 June to reach the 
Marianas; he also considered these reports still not definitive enough to cause any 
major change in the Fifth Fleet’s plans or dispositions.22 Hence, Spruance decided 
to continue scheduled operations for the next four days, including the landing on 
Saipan and the carrier strikes on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima.23
Also on the 13th COMINCH analysts learned that at 2015 on 13 June a high-
priority order originated by Combined Fleet (but transmitted from Tawi-Tawi) to 
First Striking Force and all major commanders indicated that a major fleet opera-
tion was under way. They estimated that the mission of the First Mobile Force was 
to attack U.S. forces in the Marianas. The enemy sighted by Redfin would appar-
ently be joined by the forces that had sortied from the Batjan Islands (BatDiv 1). 
The First Striking Fleet would then be composed of six BBs, three carriers, two aux-
iliary carriers, four light carriers, eleven CAs, two light cruisers, and twenty-nine 
DDs. Another indication was a refueling for the First Striking Fleet arranged in a 
dispatch sent from Tawi-Tawi at 1614 on 13 June to the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces.24
JICPOA analysis in the afternoon and evening of 13 June of traffic between 
the Japanese naval high commands, plus messages sent by the commander of the 
First Striking Fleet to the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces, suggested that the enemy had 
reached a decision and that operation orders were being issued for surface action in 
the Marianas.25 JICPOA noted that sightings by submarines tended to confirm this 
conclusion. It further suggested that enemy forces would transit the Surigao Strait 
or the San Bernardino Strait. CarDiv 2 was in the Philippines area and would soon 
join the other carrier divisions. JICPOA also reported that BatDiv 1 and CruDiv 
5 (Haguro, Myoko), plus the light cruiser Noshiro and five DDs, had left the Batjan 
Islands at 2200 on 13 June, passed through position 01° 50ʹ north, 126° 50ʹ east at 
1400, and afterward proceeded to join the First Striking Fleet. Their rendezvous 
position was not known but was believed to be between Mindanao and the Mari-
anas. JICPOA (correctly) assessed that the movement of BatDiv 1 northward would 
seriously hamper previous enemy plans for reinforcing Biak and other points in the 
western New Guinea area.26
On 13 June, COMINCH analysts assessed (erroneously, as it turned out) on the 
basis of radio intercepts that there was little evidence that the Japanese considered 
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the Marianas operation to involve anything other than carrier strikes. Their ma-
jor reaction continued to be local. Also, there was no evidence of any concentra-
tion of surface forces for countermeasures, and little aircraft reinforcement to the 
Marianas had been noted.27 However, in what proved the first sign of the pending 
departure of major fleet units, CINC, Combined Fleet on 12 June ordered striking 
force units at Tawi-Tawi not to use radio except in an emergency. In the case of 
unavoidable necessity, messages should be carried by plane to Davao, Balikpapan, 
or elsewhere for transmission. There was, however, no evidence that CINC, First 
Mobile Fleet had departed Tawi-Tawi.28
The COMINCH daily summary of radio intercepts revealed that on the 13th 
Commander, Sixth Fleet had informed Toyoda that he had no submarines avail-
able for deployment eastward of Saipan. He had, however, directed two subma-
rines to get under way for the area northeast of Truk, without having completed 
overhauls, at reduced speed. He had lost contact with five submarines assigned to 
patrol the “NA line” since their departure in mid-May. It was suggested by analysts 
that the two submarines mentioned had been damaged by antisubmarine mea-
sures by the escort carrier USS Hoggett Bay and its group. The other five subma-
rines may have been sunk.29
On 13 June, Nimitz’s headquarters reported no indications of the locations of 
CarDivs 1, 2, and 3. They were estimated to be in the southern Philippines, how-
ever, with at least two divisions and Commander, First Striking Fleet probably 
at Tawi-Tawi. There was no satisfactory reason given for the previously reported 
movement of the 2nd Supply Force through the Surigao Strait on 6 June unless for 
fueling a task force of the First Striking Fleet. Recent sightings by U.S. submarines 
confirmed the general locations of all major units of the First Striking Fleet except 
CarDiv 1, which had been at Tawi-Tawi on 12 June. However, there was no evi-
dence regarding the whereabouts of CarDiv 2 or 3; it was possible that they were 
at anchor in the Surigao Strait. The commander of the Second Fleet was unlocated 
on 12 June but was probably at Tawi-Tawi. As of the evening of 12 June, there 
were no indications of movement of any major Japanese unit toward the Marianas. 
By the evening of 12 June, the Japanese believed that U.S. surface vessels would 
possibly bombard important points in the Marianas starting early on 13 June and 
their ground forces were directed to prepare for a battle. Nimitz considered also— 
erroneously—that the Japanese believed that the impending Allied actions against 
the Marianas would be another “hit and run attack.”30
TF 58’s estimate on the 13th of Japanese strength in the Halmaheras identified 
one division of new battleships and a division of cruisers, plus at least one squadron 
of destroyers. At Tawi-Tawi, it assessed, were three or four battleships; one division, 
possibly three divisions, of carriers; one division, possibly two divisions, of cruis-
ers; and about twenty destroyers and some auxiliary vessels. Operating northwest 
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of New Guinea against SWPA’s forces near Wewak were one or two divisions of 
cruisers, one battleship, and a destroyer. The Japanese had three replenishment 
groups, of which two were believed to be in the Philippines and one en route to the 
Philippines. One replenishment group operated in the Surigao area, awaiting ren-
dezvous orders. In home waters and to the north were three battleships, approxi-
mately seven cruisers (heavy and light), two to three escort carriers, destroyers, and 
a considerable number of submarines. In the Marianas and western Carolines were 
deployed many Japanese submarines. Of the three carrier divisions operating in the 
Philippines, two were not definitely located.31
On or about 13 June, Mitscher and his staff estimated the enemy’s possible 
courses of action. This assessment was made on the assumption that the Japanese 
had fairly accurate information on the number of U.S. carriers involved, because 
of TF 58’s strikes on D–4 and D–3. The enemy also probably suspected that am-
phibious landings were about to start. The prevailing opinion in the Fifth Fleet was 
that the Japanese navy would not fight for the Marianas—notwithstanding, it was 
acknowledged, the statements of prisoners, captured documents, and the Japanese 
press, which (combined with the “peculiar” psychological attitude of the Japanese) 
all pointed to the possibility of a strong defense of the Marianas. At the same time 
there was a possibility that the IJN would participate in defending the Marianas 
provided that it had sufficient oil and tankers. Although many tankers had been 
sunk by U.S. submarines, some had reached ports in the NEI and were available. 
However, it was believed that only a few had sufficient speed to operate with the 
fleet at sea. Taking all this together, Mitscher and his staff cautioned that the Fifth 
Fleet must be prepared for “an aggressive hard hitting battle” if the Japanese did in 
the event venture to the eastward.32 
Mitscher and his staff posited further that the attacks by TF 58 on Iwo Jima and 
Chichi Jima on D+1 and D+2 would probably destroy many planes on the ground, 
as well as air facilities. The Japanese would then require several days to ferry re-
placements to these airfields from the home islands. Further, strikes by General 
MacArthur’s B-24 Liberators against air bases on Palau and Yap would, even if not 
entirely successful, reduce the enemy’s air activity and prevent the enemy fleet from 
entering the area. Finally, enemy airpower in the Marianas had already been virtu-
ally destroyed by TF 58, but airfields remained operational, and the Japanese could 
bring more aircraft in.33
Mitscher, finally, assumed that the Japanese planes could operate as far as four 
hundred miles from land bases. The approaches to the Marianas could be searched 
with comparatively short hops from any of several bases. Guam and Rota were in 
effect additional “carriers”; they would allow Japanese aircraft to fly long-range at-
tacks and then refuel. (The fact that Rota, a new field, was not used indicates a lack 
of fuel at that base.)34
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From all these considerations, Mitscher and his staff inferred three possible 
courses of action for the Japanese fleet: a southwesterly approach, from the general 
direction of Davao, under air cover from the Philippines, Palau, and Yap; a north-
westerly approach, from the direction of northern Luzon; and a westerly approach 
from the central Philippines. The northwesterly approach was considered unlikely 
because of the longer transit time and higher fuel consumption it would require. 
An approach from the west was considered practicable. However, Mitscher and his 
staff (correctly) settled on the southwesterly approach as the most likely course of 
action for the Japanese fleet. It was shorter and thereby required less consumption 
of fuel. It was also favorable in that an equatorial weather front then moving east-
ward from the Philippines was heading in a northerly direction. Another advantage 
was that the enemy fleet approaching from the southwest would operate under 
cover of land-based aircraft during both its advance eastward and withdrawal. The 
greater number of enemy air bases in the southwest would also allow a more thor-
ough search by fewer aircraft than if the Japanese fleet approached the Marianas 
from the west or northwest.35
As for whether the enemy could surprise and outflank U.S. forces, Mitscher and 
his staff thought it possible if the main enemy force steamed directly to the Mari-
anas while a small, high-speed carrier unit ran close to Ulithi and attacked from 
the southern flank—or even from the rear, if the U.S. fleet went too far to the west. 
Allied land-based aircraft on Manus would search the southern area but could do 
so only during daylight hours. To ensure that U.S. forces would not be outflanked 
it would be necessary for the carriers themselves to conduct searches to their 
southwestward.36
In contrast to Spruance, Mitscher and his staff believed that even if part of the 
enemy fleet succeeded in approaching the landing area undetected, the threat 
would not be serious as long as the majority could be engaged west of the Marian-
as. In their view, the Fifth Fleet’s large force of old battleships, escort carriers, cruis-
ers, and destroyers could cope with any part of the enemy fleet other than its new 
battleships in a surface action. In an air action, the Japanese would be able to inflict 
casualties, but the fighters carried by the escort carriers would make the attempt 
very expensive. Moreover, such a small diversionary force, after it carried out an 
attack, would be detected and destroyed by the forces defending amphibious ship-
ping or the carrier groups. In Mitscher’s view, though there might be some losses 
on the American side to a diversionary Japanese carrier force, even if the Japanese 
chose to make such a suicidal attempt the Fifth Fleet could still attack the main en-
emy fleet approaching the Marianas from a westerly or southwesterly direction.37
Mitscher believed that Ozawa’s decision was in accordance with Toyoda’s desire 
to fight a decisive battle. In Mitscher’s view, there was nothing the Japanese could 
do with their fleet that could affect seriously the occupation of the Marianas, so 
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long as the U.S. fast carrier task force could engage the major part of that fleet. 
Damage to the amphibious forces could be avoided if TF 58 did not move more 
than three hundred miles from the Marianas without definite indications of the 
location of the main Japanese force. Mitscher and his staff also believed that the 
Fifth Fleet could attack a diversionary force as easily from three hundred miles west 
(downwind) of the Marianas as it could from the vicinity of Saipan.38
On 14 June, JICPOA estimated that CINC, Combined Fleet had determined 
that present U.S. activities in the Marianas represented an invasion and not a di-
versionary strike. JICPOA believed that the Z operation order of 8 March was in 
general effect, with slight modifications. CINC, First Mobile Force, with his strik-
ing force from Tawi-Tawi, would refuel near the entrance to the Surigao Strait, to 
be joined there by CarDiv 2.39 JICPOA believed it possible that the First Striking 
Fleet would proceed to a point about 350 miles west or northwest of Saipan where 
it could take advantage of shore-based air searches and patrols based at Iwo Jima, 
Yap, Palau, Woleai, and Truk. It could also use floatplanes based at Ulithi and on 
board cruisers and battleships for antisubmarine patrols. A day surface engage-
ment would probably require a decision by CINC, Combined Fleet, depending 
on the situation and effectiveness of the Japanese scouting and reconnaissance. 
JICPOA believed, however, that the First Mobile Force would have freedom to car-
ry out night torpedo hit-and-run attacks. It warned that the enemy might carry out 
a surprise attack from the flanks. JICPOA concluded, finally, that the inclusion of 
CINC, Central Pacific Area Fleet as an addressee in two Combined Fleet messages 
suggested movement of the First Striking Fleet toward the Marianas.40
Also on the 14th JICPOA estimated that the enemy carrier force would have 
sortied from Tawi-Tawi at 1000 on 13 June and steamed at eighteen knots, to arrive 
at the Surigao Strait about 1300 the next day. Allowing six hours for refueling, the 
carrier force could sortie from the Surigao Strait at about 1900 on 14 June. (In fact, 
however, Ozawa’s main body sailed for Guimaras, between the islands of Panay and 
Negros.) BatDiv 1, at twenty knots, could arrive at Davao for refueling by 0200 on 
15 June. After six hours it could sortie and join the main body at a position that 
was unknown but was estimated to be 16° north, 140° east.41 At twenty knots it 
could reach that position by 0930 on 17 June. The enemy force, composed of six 
battleships and nine carriers, with accompanying cruisers and destroyers, could 
reach a position 16° north, 140° east by dawn on D+2 (17 June) at the earliest. The 
analysts pointed out that their deductions were based on the sightings by U.S. sub-
marines and on traffic analysis, with only meager contributions by cryptanalysis. 
In estimating enemy capabilities, they cautioned, it would be well to consider the 
possibility that aircraft might be launched at extreme range, to land in the Marianas 
after attacking.42
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COMINCH analysts learned that at 0453 on 14 June the submarine Redfin had 
reported an enemy force of six carriers with planes on board, four battleships, eight 
cruisers, and about six destroyers in the northern Sibutu Passage at 1300 the day be-
fore on course 320°, speed eighteen knots. Nimitz estimated this force to comprise 
CarDivs 1 and 3; BatDiv 3 (Haruna, Kongō, Yamashiro, and Nagato); and CruDiv 7 
or 4, with Mogami and Yahagi, plus two other cruisers of either CruDiv 4 or CruDiv 
7. COMINCH analysts believed that CarDiv 2 was in the Zamboanga area. Redfin’s 
report of six carriers transiting the Sibutu Passage on 13 June pertained to CarDivs 
1 and 3; COMINCH suggested that CarDiv 2 might join them in the Sulu Sea.43
On 14 June, on the basis of Redfin’s report, Spruance advised all task forces of 
the Fifth Fleet that enemy forces might assemble and be within striking distance of 
the Marianas by 17 June. He directed TGs 58.1 and 58.4 to proceed to Iwo Jima and 
conduct planned air strikes. However, both carrier groups were advised that they 
might be recalled if the enemy fleet was approaching the Marianas.44 The refuel-
ing schedule was revised to allow the refueling of TGs 58.2 and 58.3 on 16 June.45 
Spruance also directed Admiral Hoover (CTF 57) to send a patrol-plane tender 
to Saipan and be prepared to send a patrol-plane squadron there.46 Spruance also 
informed his subordinate commanders that Admiral Nimitz would direct Admiral 
Lockwood (CTF 17) to adjust submarine stations so to allow for reconnaissance 
and attack on the enemy fleet. Nimitz also requested General MacArthur to extend 
his long-range searches northwest of the Admiralty Islands to the maximum prac-
ticable distance (1,200 miles) on 15, 16, and 17 June, to cover possible routes of the 
enemy fleet toward the Marianas.47 
On 14 June, Admiral Lockwood, as directed by Nimitz, adjusted the stations of 
submarine patrols.48 One day later he drew an imaginary sixty-mile square some 
five hundred miles west of Saipan and assigned four submarines (Albacore, Finback, 
Bang, and Stingray) to patrol thirty-mile radii around its corners.49 COMINCH 
analysts learned that radio intercepts on late 14 and early 15 June pertained to a 
rendezvous of tankers and escorts in the southern Philippine area. The addressees 
associated with the First Mobile Fleet included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Supply Forces 
(a total of ten tankers plus escorts). The analysts commented that several enemy 
tankers had passed through the Makassar Strait on 14 June and headed for the 
Davao area. A recent traffic association suggested that BatDiv 1 and accompanying 
vessels moving from Halmahera would refuel near Palau on 15 June. No informa-
tion was available concerning refueling plans for other parts of the First Mobile 
Fleet.50
Also on 14 June, Nimitz’s fleet intelligence officer, Lt. Cdr. (later Rear Adm.) 
Edwin T. Layton, reported that Toyoda now considered the American activity in 
the Marianas an invasion, not another carrier raid. His bulletin explicitly referred 
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to the Z plan and predicted that a modified form of that plan would be carried 
out. Layton’s estimate of enemy strength (nine carriers plus six battleships) was ac-
curate; he erred only in the date of the coming battle and the route Ozawa’s force 
would take. The intelligence forwarded to Spruance allowed him time to divert 
part of his force to bombard Iwo Jima. Daily radio intelligence summaries from 
COMINCH made it clear that the Japanese moves were neither unsuspected nor 
surprising in Washington, D.C. On 15 June, they noted that a Japanese plan to 
counter the invasion of the Marianas appeared to have been put into effect. Details 
of the enemy plan were not known, but the bulk of the Japanese fleet would be 
committed to the operation.51 
Toyoda’s Orders, 11–13 June
After the U.S. carriers struck the Marianas on 10 June, Admiral Toyoda, in command 
of the Combined Fleet, had a clearer picture about his enemy’s intentions.52 On 12 
June, Japanese air reconnaissance obtained the first detailed information about the 
force approaching the Marianas. The Japanese search aircraft reported that it consist-
ed of four groups: two “regular” carriers, one small carrier, and one battleship ninety 
nautical miles east of Saipan at 0550; two carriers ninety miles northeast of Saipan at 
0500; three carriers at unknown location at 0640; and two large carriers, two small 
carriers, and three battleships ninety miles southeast of Saipan at 1230.53 
The First Air Fleet sent a summary of the enemy situation on 12 June. By collating 
reports of several reconnaissance aircraft from 11 June and observation by a Saipan 
reconnaissance aircraft, it estimated that the enemy force consisted of eleven aircraft 
carriers, of which three groups, with nine carriers between them, were close to the 
Marianas and a fourth group, with two carriers, was between 120 and two hundred 
miles east of the others.54 The next day Japanese reconnaissance of the Admiralties 
noted two cruisers and two destroyers leaving the harbor, four large and four me-
dium carriers present, and ten battleships and eighty transports at anchor.55 
On 13 June, Toyoda was informed that three battleships and fifteen destroyers 
were in the Saipan area; that two carriers, three battleships, and five destroyers were 
east of Tinian and two battleships and five destroyers to the west; and that eight or 
nine battleships, five or six cruisers, and a large number of destroyers were east, west, 
and south of Saipan.56 It was reported to Toyoda that between a hundred and two 
hundred aircraft had attacked Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in waves from 0430 to 0500, 
as well as strafing attacks throughout the day. Three enemy carriers had bombed Ti-
nian and Guam.57 
At 1724 on 13 June, Toyoda issued an alert order (No. 146) for the A-Go opera-
tion. Another order (No. 147) temporarily suspended the Japanese effort to counter 
enemy landing on the island of Biak (KON operation) (for details of that operation 
see the sidebar “Allied Landing on Biak and Japanese Reaction, 27 May–11 June 
1944,” in chapter 4). BatDiv 1 (less Nagato), CruDiv 5, DesRon 2 (three destroyers), 
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and DesDiv 10 (two destroyers) were ordered back to their original formations.58 At 
the same time the 2nd and 3rd Attack Forces of the Base Air Force, then in the midst 
of reinforcing Halmahera, were directed west of the Carolines and to be ready for a 
decisive battle. The remainder of the 23rd Air Flotilla was to continue operations in 
western New Guinea.59 As of 13 June, Toyoda’s plan was that the First Mobile Force 
would attack the enemy regular carriers during the day, in cooperation with the Base 
Air Force; he tentatively set 19 June as the day to start. That date was uncertain be-
cause of a delay in the deployment of the Yawata Unit (part of the Yokosuka Air 
Group) to Iwo Jima.60 The Base Air Force would use airfields on Iwo Jima, Truk, 
Mereyon, Yap, and Palau. The Base Air Force would attack the enemy first and then 
await the arrival of the First Mobile Force. At the opportune time, the 7th Air Attack 
Force (less elements dispersed on Hokkaidō and in the Kuril Islands, and the Yoko-
suka Air Group) would employ its maximum strength in cooperation with the First 
Mobile Force and attack the invading enemy air force.61
First Mobile Force’s Initial Moves, 13–15 June
Ozawa’s First Mobile Force sortied from Tawi-Tawi at 1000 on 13 June. BatDiv 1, 
under Admiral Ugaki, departed the Batjan anchorage, Halmahera, that morning.62 
At about 1615 Toyoda directed the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces to be alternately on 
thirty-minute alert. At 1704, the 2nd Supply Force was ordered to advance to a pre-
viously designated “Point A” and there to be on alert. At about 1745, the 3rd Supply 
Force was directed to reach Point J, there to stay on alert. Toyoda directed the First 
Mobile Force to sortie from Tawi-Tawi for Guimaras. The First Mobile Force sailed 
out at about 1800 on 14 June. The Japanese were aware that the enemy would learn 
about their movements; however, in their view, Guimaras was a better place to obtain 
supplies than Tawi-Tawi. From 1700 on 14 June to 0700 on the 15th the First Mobile 
Force took on board some 10,800 tons of supplies.63 
At 1230 on 14 June, the First Air Fleet informed Ozawa of the presence of nine 
enemy battleships, five heavy cruisers, and more than thirty destroyers. This force, 
divided into four groups, bombarded Japanese positions ashore. At 1745 the Com-
bined Fleet informed Ozawa that the force that had been raiding the Marianas since 
the 11th comprised almost the entire U.S. Navy’s strength in regular carriers. More 
than half had been involved in attacks on 11 and 12 June, and some had probably 
refueled in the rear on 13 and 14 June. The Japanese considered the invasion of the 
Marianas imminent.64
In the early morning of 15 June, Ozawa learned that some thirty enemy transports 
had appeared off the west coast of Saipan and started landing troops. A large enemy 
task force was attacking the Bonins and Iwo Jima.65 At 0717 on 15 June, Toyoda issued 
Order No. 154 for the execution of the A-Go operation: the “enemy commenced its 
landings in Saipan, Tinian areas with its powerful forces. The Combined Fleet will 
destroy the enemy task force which has come to the Marianas area, then annihilate 
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its invasion force in a decisive battle.”66 His message ended with a call for sacrifice: 
“The destiny of our Empire lies in the outcome of this battle. Each member will 
fight to the end.”67 At 0900 the main body of the First Mobile Force, less those ships 
involved in the KON operation (see the sidebar, chapter 4) sortied from Guimaras. 
At 1730 the same day, the First Mobile Fleet passed through the San Bernardino 
Strait and took an approximately easterly course toward the Marianas (see map 
13).68 
On 15 June, Toyoda combined the 7th Base Air Force (centered on the 3rd Air 
Fleet) with the Yokosuka Air Group. He also directed the concentration of twenty 
submarines in the Marianas area.69 Because of the massive attacks by enemy fast 
carrier forces, the Base Air Forces had suffered such heavy losses that they were 
unable even to conduct reconnaissance in support of First Mobile Force. Hence, 
Ozawa had to rely on his own reconnaissance aircraft to detect the enemy fleet.70
The Approach Phase, 15–17 June
After exiting the San Bernardino Strait, Ozawa’s main body sailed on southeasterly 
until 1530 on 16 June. BatDiv 1—with CruDiv 5, DesDiv 2 (three DDs), DesDiv 
10, and DesDiv 4 (less one DD)—was joined by the 1st Supply Force at 1000 at 
11° north, 130° east. At about 1530, after being refueled, BatDiv 1 joined Ozawa’s 
force.71 All the ships of Ozawa’s main body and the destroyers of Force C started 
refueling on 16 June.72 The refueling was completed at 1000 on 17 June. The First 
Mobile Force was then at 12° 15ʹ north, 132° 45ʹ east. All six oilers then proceeded 
to 14° 40ʹ north, 134° 20ʹ east and stood by (see map 13).73 
During the approach phase Ozawa was regularly informed by the Combined 
Fleet headquarters about the actions of enemy forces in the Marianas. For their 
part, Nimitz and his subordinate commanders received many reports based on in-
tercepts of messages Toyoda sent to the First Mobile Force or Central Pacific Area 
Fleet. However, because of the radio silence observed by Ozawa’s force, JICPOA 
was unable to obtain information on its movement toward the Marianas. The most 
important and reliable sources of information on the movements of the First Mo-
bile Fleet were reports by U.S. submarines.
On 15 June, Nimitz informed subordinates that Toyoda had transmitted sev-
eral urgent messages in the morning on 15 June to Force A about the landings on 
Saipan. There was no definite information regarding Japanese plans. However, all 
indications pointed toward a movement to the east or northeast of Mindanao by 
the First Striking Force. That both the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces were associated 
in radio traffic with BatDiv 1 and the Davao–Palau area suggested that BatDiv 1 
would be refueled in that area. The commander of CruDiv 16 and Fusō was indi-
cated as having been around Davao late on the 13th; this group was associated with 
the 1st Supply Force. A U.S. submarine found the Tawi-Tawi anchorage empty of 
enemy ships at 0700 on 14 June.74 
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Definitive information that the First Mobile Force had left the Philippine waters 
came at 1835 on 15 June, when the submarine Flying Fish reported that enemy 
battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait 
at twenty knots on course 080°.75 At 2038 the Japanese learned by their own radio 
interceptions that an enemy submarine had discovered their position.76At 1945, the 
submarine Seahorse sighted an enemy force at 10° 11ʹ north, 129° 03ʹ east (about 
two hundred miles east-southeast of the Surigao Strait) on course 045°, speed 16.5 
knots. The composition of the enemy force was unclear, but on the basis of radar 
echoes it was thought likely to be BatDiv 1, on the way to join the force sighted by 
Flying Fish.77 However, Seahorse was unable to transmit its sightings until 0400 on 
16 June.78 
On 15 June, JICPOA learned from radio intercepts that all Japanese shipping 
west of the Marianas and south of 20° north had been directed to clear the area. The 
ships at Yap and Palau had been ordered to take refuge in the Philippines. Hence, it 
was estimated, the Seahorse sightings were possibly one of the three replenishment 
forces for the First Striking Force. Filipino coast watchers reported three carriers 
and seventeen warships at 11° 20ʹ north, 123° 23ʹ east at 1010 on 15 June, on a 
northerly course. Another coast watcher sighted nine carriers, three battleships, ten 
cruisers, and eleven destroyers at 1730 on 15 June at 12° 34ʹ north, 124° 09ʹ east, en 
route eastward. JICPOA estimated that the carriers belonged to CarDivs 1, 2, and 
3, the battleships to BatDiv 3 (plus Nagato), the cruisers to CruDiv 4 and CruDiv 7 
(plus Mogami and Yahagi), and the destroyers probably to DesRon 10.79
On 15 June, JICPOA reported that CINC, Combined Fleet had announced on 
14 June that a phase of the A-Go operation was in effect as of 1727 on the 13th and 
that the operation would be “decisive.” Nimitz believed that the pending Japanese 
operation would be similar to the Z operation.80 JICPOA also reported that the en-
emy search aircraft from Mindanao bases had been directed to fly antisubmarine 
patrols for the main body of the First Striking Fleet on 16 and possibly 17 June. 
Radio traffic analysis suggested that aircraft based on Yap and Palau were prob-
ably patrolling for the First Striking Fleet. CruDiv 16 was estimated to be in the 
Halmahera–Sorong area on 15 June.81 
Ozawa received information that at 1215 on 15 June the enemy had appeared 
170 miles east of Guam and that at 1330 the same day it had started air attacks on 
Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam. Air strikes had continued on the 16th. The Japa-
nese estimated the enemy force as containing from ten to fifteen carriers.82 
During the evening of 15 June, Ozawa and his staff issued an estimate of the situ-
ation. Ozawa believed that the enemy fleet was divided into five groups, containing 
altogether fifteen carriers, seven of the regular type and eight converted from cruis-
ers. A group of supply ships, his estimate noted, was some four hundred nautical 
miles east of the Marianas. A group of tank landing ships had been observed in the 
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vicinity of the archipelago. The Japanese believed that the arrival of a large invasion 
fleet was imminent. Only a part of the enemy’s force of escort carriers had been 
detected, but it was believed that more would arrive in the vicinity of the Marianas. 
Japanese fighter aircraft had also reported (erroneously) the presence of eight car-
riers and other ships, including battleships and transports, in the Admiralties.
On 15 June, the Japanese high command and Combined Fleet agreed that the 
U.S. objectives were to invade and occupy “strategic” bases in the Marianas and 
invade “strategic” areas in the western Carolines and thereby draw out the First 
Mobile Force for a decisive battle. They believed that it was quite possible that the 
enemy had knowledge of the Japanese plans. Having intercepted radio messages 
from U.S. submarines, the Japanese assumed that the Americans knew about the 
sortie of the First Mobile Force from Tawi-Tawi on 13 June and its departure from 
Guimaras on 15 June. The Japanese also assumed that the enemy was aware of First 
Mobile Force’s plan to attack in the vicinity of the Marianas between 18 and 19 June.
On 15 June, Ozawa and his staff assumed that about two-thirds, or ten, of the 
enemy carriers would be deployed west of the Marianas and at a distance of not 
greater than three hundred nautical miles. The remaining carriers would support 
fighting ashore and act as a reserve. Ozawa thought that because of the combat 
situation ashore, there was very little possibility that all the enemy naval forces 
would leave the invasion zone and deploy temporarily east of the archipelago. In-
terestingly, Ozawa and his staff also considered it “very improbable” that the enemy 
would send part of his carrier force far to the west of the Marianas to carry out a 
flank attack against the First Mobile Force or to make a surprise attack, because it 
would then be operating in an area patrolled by Japanese land-based aircraft.
Ozawa correctly assumed that because the Japanese air bases were mostly in the 
southwestern Marianas, the Americans would probably attack the southern islands 
first and try to cut off air and other supply lines to the southwestern islands. At 
the same time the enemy would detach an element to attack in the north. Ozawa 
believed it very likely that the enemy would employ numerous escort carriers in 
the archipelago to reinforce the battle on land. For Ozawa, it was not possible to 
delay a decisive engagement beyond 19 June. He needed, he believed, to bring one 
about even sooner, and in fact Ozawa and his staff believed that, given the enemy’s 
deployments, the day of the decisive battle would be 18 June. 
Ozawa’s battle plan envisaged intensive scouting east of the enemy’s positions. 
He planned to arrive at a point some three hundred miles west of the Marianas so 
the First Mobile Force could attack enemy regular carriers to the east. He intended 
to use Battle Plan No. 1 (which envisaged a longitudinal array of forces) and Battle 
Plan No. 2 for daylight aerial battle. Ozawa planned to hold the 2nd Air Flotilla and 
reinforcements in reserve to guard against the surprise attack. At the same time, he 
intended to carry out “strict” (comprehensive) air patrols to the north. 
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Ozawa decided to intensify reconnaissance by adding land-based aircraft one 
day prior to and on the first day after the decisive battle. He stressed the need to 
differentiate between the regular and escort carriers. Ozawa laid down as the main 
tactical objective an attack on the enemy task force in the vicinity of the Marianas. 
Afterward, the objective would be to annihilate the enemy. In the south, scouting 
would be left to land-based aircraft. After success in the initial clash with the enemy, 
the entire force would pursue and annihilate the remainder. In case of lack of suc-
cess, the First Mobile Force would retreat, reorganize, and then resume its attack. 
Ozawa also warned that the First Mobile Force should be on guard against attack 
after 16 June.
On 15 June, by a directive from IGHQ, the major part of the Yokosuka Air Group 
was placed under Toyoda. The Yawata unit was directed to proceed to Iwo Jima 
and report to the 5th Base Air Force. Prior to the decisive battle, about half the 5th 
Base Air Force was redeployed for the KON operation, greatly weakening its overall 
strength. Other problems were that many air bases were still under construction, 
personnel were unfamiliar with new aircraft, and the health of aircrews was poor. 
In the meantime, Spruance, on the night of 15 June, on the recommendation of 
Admiral Turner, designated 18 June as W-day (the initial landing on Guam), de-
pending on the progress of fighting on Saipan.83 Nimitz designated the area west-
ward of the existing “Class C submarine area” (reserved exclusively for operations of 
surface vessels and aircraft) bounded by longitude 134° east, between latitudes 10° 
and 19° north, as a “Class D submarine area” (in which surface, air, and subsurface 
craft operate simultaneously), effective at 1200 (in the minus-ten time zone) on 16 
June.84
At 2253 on 15 June, Nimitz relayed his views, based on sightings and radio in-
tercepts, that the enemy forces sighted by Flying Fish and Seahorse could, if they 
continued on their reported courses and speeds, effect a junction at approximately 
14° 50ʹ north, 134° 25ʹ east at about 2300 on 16 June. Steaming from the junction 
point at twenty knots they would reach the assumed position 16° north, 140° east 
at about 1430 on 17 June, from where they might be able to conduct carrier strikes 
against U.S. forces near Saipan. Most likely, however, the Japanese would be unable 
to initiate a surface attack on the night of 17 June.85 
At 0354 on 16 June, Nimitz informed major subordinate commanders that 
Flying Fish had reported sighting a large task force at 1800 on the 15th. That force 
consisted of at least three battleships (one was Nagato), three carriers, several cruis-
ers, and destroyers. It had exited the San Bernardino Strait on a course of 080° and 
at a speed of twenty knots. It was probably part of the First Striking Fleet, which had 
been sighted on the 13th transiting the Sibutu Passage.86 Flying Fish’s report lacked 
specific data on the number of carriers present, but it was believed that the force 
included all the carriers of CarDivs 1, 2, and 3, a total of nine.87 
 JAPANESE A-GO OPERATION (BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA): EXECUTION 259 258 MAJOR FLEET-VERSUS-FLEET OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–1945
Spruance was now certain that the Japanese were seeking battle and that they 
would risk everything in a determined attack. Hence, in his view, the landing on 
Guam was clearly not feasible.88 Hence, he canceled 18 June as W-day.89 The Saipan 
invasion could not be canceled, because it had been under way for a day. Spruance 
boarded Admiral Turner’s flagship, USS Rocky Mount (AGC 3) to discuss with 
Turner and Gen. Holland Smith changes in the plan because of the probable fleet 
action.90 Also discussed were measures to be taken for the support of shore op-
erations and the security of TF 51 in case the enemy tried to interfere with opera-
tions on Saipan.91 Spruance, much concerned about the safety of the transports, 
asked Turner whether they could be moved to a safer position to the east. Turner 
responded that battle ashore was going badly and that he was reluctant to move 
the transports; the troops ashore needed the food and ammunition still on board. 
Spruance told Turner to move everything he did not need eastward; TF 58 would 
try to keep the Japanese “off his neck.”92
Turner agreed to detach temporarily five heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and 
twenty-one destroyers on 17 June to reinforce TF 58 for a surface action. The ships 
were sent west of Saipan as a blocking force.93 This left only seven battleships, three 
cruisers, and five destroyers for fire support ashore and local defense, and seven 
escort carriers for air support. The transports of the southern attack forces carry-
ing Guam invasion troops were directed to remain at sea about two hundred miles 
east of the Marianas. All ships of the northern attack force not actually needed at 
Saipan would move eastward until called back. Holland Smith had already landed 
his Saipan reserve and enough supplies ashore to give the troops a reasonable ex-
pectation of being able to carry on until the immediate threat of the Japanese fleet 
could be taken care of. Six radar-equipped aircraft from Eniwetok were ordered to 
start night searches out to six hundred miles.94 
Spruance ultimately made the decision to continue unloading at Saipan on 17 
June. As many transports as possible would be withdrawn at night, and only those 
urgently required would return on 18 June. The old battleships, the cruisers, and 
the destroyers of the bombardment group would cover Saipan from westward. At 
the same time, the southern attack force would be withdrawn eastward.95
On the morning of 16 June, Mitscher informed his task force commanders of 
his view that the Japanese would approach the Marianas from a southerly direction 
under shore-based air cover and close to Yap and Ulithi. They would attempt to op-
erate in the vicinity of Guam. He also believed, however, that the enemy fleet might 
approach instead from the west—“Our searches must cover both possibilities.”96 
In the afternoon on 16 June, TGs 58.1 and 58.4 conducted fighter sweeps over 
Chichi Jima and Haha Jima.97 As mentioned above, about ten Zeros were shot 
down, and seven enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The U.S. side lost 
two planes over Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. The U.S. aircraft set on fire three small 
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freighters and destroyed twenty-one seaplanes.98 Spruance ordered two carrier 
groups to make fighter sweeps over Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima on 16 June—a mis-
take, because that made them unavailable to conduct searches jointly with the other 
two carrier groups.
Spruance directed Mitscher to assemble his task groups so as to be ready to fight 
the next day (17 June). Mitscher would conduct minimum air operations on that 
day.99 TG 58.2 and TG 58.3, with reinforcing units of TF 51, would join at 1600 on 
17 June.100 TGs 58.1 and 58.4 would start searches north and west of the Marianas. 
The movements of a refueling group would be adjusted to allow early fueling of 
TGs 58.1 and 58.4. In addition to the planned searches, TG 58.1 would conduct 
strikes against targets on Guam and Rota, while TG 58.4 struck Pagan. However, air 
support for U.S. forces on Saipan would stop. At the same time, Spruance directed 
CTF 57 to send six patrol planes of Patrol Squadron 16 to Saipan on 17 June and 
prepare to make night radar searches out to six hundred miles west of Saipan.101 
On the Japanese side, at 1850 on 16 June Admiral Kusaka, chief of staff of 
the Combined Fleet, informed Ozawa about the enemy activity in the Marianas. 
Ozawa now learned that the enemy had landed a large force on Saipan near Charan-
ca at 1000 on 15 June and established a beachhead there. Because of a massive 
bombardment, the Japanese forces had been unable to repulse the landing. Kusaka 
also informed Ozawa that an enemy submarine near Mindanao had sent two ur-
gent messages to the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet reporting the detection 
of his (Ozawa’s) force. Kusaka estimated (correctly) that the decisive battle would 
take place west of the Marianas on or about 19 June. The Base Air Force would in-
tensify reconnaissance after 18 June. Japanese forces other than the Combined Fleet 
would conduct reconnaissance out to six hundred miles between bearings 90° and 
190° from Koroku, on Okinawa; out to seven hundred miles between bearings 90° 
and 120° from Toko, on Formosa; and out to six hundred miles between bearings 
90° and 140° from Toizaki, on Kyūshū. Kusaka also pointed out the difficulty of 
distinguishing from the air between the enemy regular and converted (escort) car-
riers; however, he thought, those operating near the amphibious forces were most 
likely of the converted type. The best time to attack them would be while they were 
refueling. Most of the enemy battleships observed around Saipan and Tinian were 
of older types. Admiral Kusaka, finally, informed Ozawa that the enemy carriers had 
sustained considerable aircraft losses since 11 June but that they had replaced those 
losses from the escort carriers. (Kusaka had been misinformed by Admiral Kakuta, 
commander of the First Air Fleet, about the losses inflicted on the enemy carriers.)102
In Washington, COMINCH analysts observed that enemy radio traffic on 16 
June was almost entirely concerned with operational reports from the Marianas, 
with the Guam station apparently covering for Saipan. Almost all reports were 
being directed to “Force A” (Ozawa). The exchange of messages between high 
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commands practically stopped; none had been noted between Ozawa and Toyoda. 
Throughout the day, Toyoda was actively directing Central Pacific Area Fleet forces. 
He also ordered air searches from the bases on Palau and Truk.103
Nonetheless, on 16 June Ozawa received a message from the Central Pacific 
Area Fleet that east of the Marianas had been sighted nine enemy carriers (in-
cluding two escort carriers), four battleships, fourteen cruisers, and about fifteen 
destroyers. The enemy force west of the Marianas consisted of three carriers, five 
battleships, twelve cruisers, thirty-eight destroyers, and eighty-seven transports. 
North of Truk were two enemy carriers, one battleship, three cruisers, and other 
ships, heading west. Some 350 miles south of Truk had been observed two enemy 
carriers and over a dozen other ships, steaming south. Within 150 miles southeast 
of Iwo Jima there were reported to be three enemy carriers. The Japanese estimated 
that the enemy forces consisted in all of seventeen carriers, eight battleships, more 
than thirty cruisers, over fifty-five destroyers, and eighty transports.104 
At 2220 on 16 June, Kusaka transmitted an estimate of the situation in the Mari-
anas. Among other things, he stated that the enemy invasion force consisted of a 
force centering on regular carriers; a supporting force of converted carriers, battle-
ships, cruisers, and destroyers; and an invasion (landing) force. Most of the enemy’s 
regular carriers seemed to be involved in the operation. The force consisted of four 
carrier groups, each composed of two large carriers, three cruisers, and two battle-
ships. Three carrier groups had taken part in the attacks on Saipan, Tinian, and 
Guam on 11, 12, and 13 June, while another group protected a landing force some 
two hundred miles east of Saipan and was refueled. After 14 June, only one carrier 
group had been left in the vicinity of Saipan and Guam. The air raids on Iwo Jima 
and Chichi Jima had been conducted by one or two groups on 15 and 16 June, while 
at least one other carrier group had probably refueled and prepared to engage the 
First Mobile Force. The enemy’s supporting force had appeared near Saipan on 14 
June and bombarded Saipan and Tinian every day, as well as Guam on 16 June. 
That force consisted of a number of converted carriers that seemed to have taken 
part in the amphibious landing. It was also probable that some of the battleships 
that had been with the task force until 12 June were part of the force. Kusaka esti-
mated that a division of troops had landed on Saipan and that more seemed likely 
to follow from the Marshalls. It was unlikely that troops would come from the Ad-
miralties. He estimated that the enemy would try to land on Guam about 17 June. 
In his view, there was a possibility that the enemy suspected the movement of the 
First Mobile Force and would be “massed” to meet it. The enemy might also try to 
neutralize Yap and Palau around 18 June.105
On 16 June, Toyoda replied to a message he had received from the emperor: 
“Your humble subject is filled with awe upon receiving word from Your Majesty 
through Your Majesty’s Chief of Staff. All members of the fleet and Army units 
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under my command, in obedience to Your Majesty’s Command, will fight and 
achieve victory by Grace of God. Our garrison in the Saipan area intends to an-
nihilate the enemy, and the task forces intend to annihilate the enemy task forces at 
an opportune time when the enemy is occupied with the landings on Saipan. Thus, 
the wishes of Your Imperial Majesty shall be fulfilled.”106
That same day, COMINCH daily radio intercepts summaries showed contin-
ued and increasing association of CINC, First Mobile Fleet with the Marianas– 
Bonins. The analysts concluded that the Striking Forces were “at present destined 
for action in the central Pacific.” CINC, Combined Fleet was embarked on the light 
cruiser Oyodo, believed to be in home waters. Radio traffic on 15 June concern-
ing the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Supply Forces suggested that final dispositions, escort, 
and composition of these forces were incomplete. All three were in vicinity of the 
southern Philippines but not necessarily joined.107 
Shortly after midnight on 16–17 June, TGs 58.2 and 58.3 completed refueling 
off Saipan. In the process they had moved far to the east; Mitscher directed them to 
steam at twenty-three knots to join the other two carrier groups. Mitscher’s intent 
was to get as far westward as possible to close the distance to Ozawa’s force, because 
of the need to use easterly courses for launching and recovering aircraft.108 The two 
groups sent night searches out to 270–350 miles at about 0200. The planes returned 
about 0700; all their searches were negative.109
At about 0510 on 17 June, the submarine Cavalla, on the way to relieve Flying 
Fish off the San Bernardino Strait, reported a group of two large oilers and three 
destroyers at 13° 29ʹ north, 130° 45ʹ east on course 120° at 15 knots (see map 13). 
This was in fact the 2nd Supply Force, which had followed Ozawa’s force from Gui-
maras.110 Cavalla was directed by Admiral Lockwood to maintain contact but was 
unable to do so because of inadequate speed.111 
Shortly after 0700, TGs 58.2 and 58.3 conducted 325-mile searches between 
bearings 215° and 285°. None of them detected the enemy force.112 TGs 58.1 and 
58.4 were directed to search between 215° and 285 out to 325 miles (between 15° 
and 20° north). Both groups were later directed by Mitscher to keep under surveil-
lance the area between 138° east and south of 20° north until they joined the rest 
of TF 58.113
At 0845 on 17 June, Rear Adm. Keizō Komura, chief of staff of the First Mobile 
Force, sent to the Combined Fleet, the 5th Base Air Force, and the Central Pacific 
Area Fleet a message informing them that the refueling had been completed and 
the entire force would advance to a general location west of Saipan via Point C (15° 
0ʹ north, 136° 0ʹ east), arriving by dawn on 19 June. The intent was to guard against 
enemy movements to the west and from the north. The primary objective was to 
attack the enemy regular carriers and then, using all available strength, to destroy 
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remaining enemy forces and the invasion force. For security reasons, this message 
was initially sent by plane to Palau, where it was transmitted to the recipients.114 
Also on 17 June Ozawa received information that around Saipan and Tinian the 
U.S. Navy had concentrated four or five converted carriers, four or five battleships, 
four to six cruisers, thirty destroyers, and sixty transports. North of Rota were six 
carriers, eight battleships, and eighteen cruisers and destroyers.115 Ozawa requested 
the Base Air Force to maintain continuous reconnaissance of the enemy regular 
carriers in the Marianas beginning on the evening of the day prior to a decisive 
battle. Ozawa also asked for intensified reconnaissance west of the Marianas by 
each air base on the day preceding the decisive battle. He stated that special impor-
tance should be attached to the southern and southwesterly sectors (between 160° 
and 210°) from Iwo Jima. If the Yawata Air Unit had not deployed as planned, the 
decisive battle should be delayed by one day.116
During the afternoon of 17 June, Mitscher radioed to Spruance the disposition 
of his carrier groups and options for their employment once Ozawa’s force was de-
tected.117 If the battle with the enemy fleet started before TGs 58.1 and 58.4 arrived, 
TG 58.2’s carriers would be designated as the “battle line.” If the battle were fought 
after TG 58.1 and TG 58.4 arrived, TG 58.4’s carriers would become the “battle 
line.” After the first air battles had been fought and TF 58 had obtained control 
of the air, CruDivs 10, 13, and 12 and DesDivs 11, 1, and 90 would be released to 
join TG 58.7. After the initial air battle—or before, if it became feasible—TG 58.1 
would take a station about fifty miles north-northwest of TG 58.3 to strike from the 
northern flank and cut off the enemy from escape to the north.118 
At 1800 Mitscher recommended to Spruance that TF 58 change course to 310° 
until reaching 16° north, then turn to 270° until after the daylight launch of search 
aircraft. He hoped that “this would allow us to flank the enemy, keep outside of 400 
miles range of the enemy fleet and far from the land-based aircraft based on Rota 
and Guam and still be in a position to hit the enemy carriers groups downwind 
from TF 58.”119 Mitscher’s intent was to move a good distance to the west during the 
night to be able to operate aircraft on an easterly heading the following day and to 
rendezvous with TGs 58.1 and 58.4 on the 18th. He explained that the same general 
plan would be followed on each successive day, so that if the winds were light and 
the launches long, TF 58 could still keep to the west and intercept an attack beyond 
the range at which the enemy could strike Saipan.120 
Spruance initially approved Mitscher’s plan. Mitscher replied with a “proposed 
plan for strike on enemy surface force. Make deck load launch from CVs [fleet 
carriers] consisting of sixteen VF [fighters], twelve VB [dive-bombers], and nine 
VT [torpedo bombers]. Second deck load sixteen VF and available VN [training 
aircraft] and VT. Second deck loads prepared for launch as second wave unless 
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situation indicated delay advisable. Augment VT from light carriers as practical. 
Arming VT half torpedoes, VB half GP [general-purpose bombs], half SAP [semi-
armor-piercing]. Later strikes include AP [armor-piercing] as targets indicate.”121
At 1415 on 17 June, Spruance issued his battle plan to CTF 58 and Commander, 
Task Group 58.7:
Our air will first knock out enemy carriers, then will attack enemy battleships and cruisers 
to slow or disable them. Battle Line will destroy enemy fleet either by fleet action if enemy 
elects to fight or by sinking slowed or crippled ships if enemy retreats. Action against the 
retreating enemy must be pushed vigorously by all hands to ensure complete destruction  
of his fleet. Destroyers running short of fuel may be returned to Saipan if necessary for  
refueling.122 
For some reason, Spruance’s plan did not refer, directly or indirectly, to the possibil-
ity of an enemy “end run.”
That afternoon Nimitz sent Spruance a message: “On the eve of possible fleet 
action . . . you and the officers and men under your command have the confidence 
of the naval service and the country. We count on you to make the victory deci-
sive.”123 Nimitz clearly expected a victory over the enemy fleet.
In the late afternoon, Mitscher requested permission from Spruance for sig-
nificant changes in the composition of TF 58. He wanted to save time and avoid 
possible confusion in case of a sudden need to fight a surface engagement with 
Ozawa’s forces, by re-creating the battle line (TG 58.7) under Admiral Lee. At 
1730, Mitscher directed seven fast battleships (Washington, North Carolina, Iowa, 
New Jersey, South Dakota, Alabama, and Indiana), with two cruiser divisions (four 
CAs) and four destroyer squadrons (thirteen DDs), to leave their respective car-
rier groups and form TG 58.7.124 Afterward, Spruance approved the addition of 
CruDivs 6 and 12, DesRon 45, and DesDivs 1, 12, and 106 to that force.125 It was re-
alized that this decision would reduce shipboard AA defenses of the carrier groups. 
However, it was believed that one cruiser division and destroyer division would be 
sufficient.126 
Replying to a query from Mitscher on movements during the night, Spruance 
told Mitscher, with a copy to Lee, “Desire you proceed at your discretion selecting 
dispositions and movement’s best calculated to meet the enemy under most advan-
tageous conditions. I shall issue general directive when necessary and leave details 
to you and Admiral Lee.”127 
In the evening on 17 June, Spruance believed that the enemy fleet approaching 
the Marianas consisted probably of five battleships, nine carriers, eight heavy cruis-
ers, and a number of destroyers. Spruance estimated that the enemy would prob-
ably conduct strikes by carrier-based aircraft, supported and followed by heavy 
fleet units.128 The enemy fleet might be divided in two parts, one of them, with 
carriers, coming around one of the American flanks. In Spruance’s view, if TF 58 
were moved too far from Saipan before the enemy’s location was definitely known, 
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such a flank attack might inflict heavy damage on the amphibious force there. The 
enemy flanking force would be able to escape to the northward or southward. The 
airfields on Guam and Rota would be available to the enemy unless U.S. carrier-
based aircraft were able to keep them neutralized.129
Spruance and his chief of staff, Rear Adm. Charles J. “Carl” Moore, reevaluated the 
enemy movements and increased air activity. It seemed to them that the enemy knew 
the location of TF 58 and was shadowing it, deliberately staying beyond the range 
of U.S. search aircraft. It looked as if the Japanese intended to attack Turner’s forces 
while avoiding TF 58, perhaps by luring Spruance westward. Submarine reports in-
dicated that part of the enemy force might be creeping up from the south for an end 
run. Spruance concluded that he had been misinterpreting the enemy’s intentions. 
He had first believed that the enemy would not oppose the invasion; then, on the 
basis of reported movements in the Philippines, he had changed his mind and begun 
to assume they would seek a fleet action. Now for a second time it seemed that he was 
wrong, and so informed Nimitz. In his view, the Japanese attitude toward striking the 
U.S. fleet had not changed but the method had—the enemy had started to use carri-
ers for a fleet action. Spruance now believed that the Japanese intended to exploit any 
advantage that their carriers might gain: they did not intend to throw “everything at 
us by coming in to Saipan at high speed to fight it out.”130 
Ozawa did indeed receive fairly accurate information on the composition and dis-
position of enemy forces near the Marianas.131 He also knew that enemy carriers had 
attacked Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima on the 15th and 16th and that the U.S. amphibi-
ous forces were supported by escort carriers. This meant that fast carriers would be 
freed of providing close support.132 Ozawa assumed that Spruance had learned of 
the Japanese concentration in the Philippine Sea. He also believed (as it turned out, 
correctly) that Spruance was a cautious commander and that his carriers would most 
likely remain within a few hundred miles of Saipan’s beaches.133 In other words, Spru-
ance would remain on the defensive, covering Saipan instead of seeking a battle with 
the enemy carriers. However, Ozawa expected enemy forces to be diverted to attack 
Yap and Palau on 18 June. He received information from Tokyo that an enemy carrier 
group was off Guam, while the positions of other carrier groups were unknown. He 
believed that the enemy might engage the First Mobile Force as early as 18 June.134 
Ozawa also received grossly inaccurate reports of successes by Japanese land-
based aircraft against the invading forces. These reports claimed that one night 
fighter and five attack aircraft based on Truk had attacked a convoy of twenty 
ships four hundred miles from Truk and had sunk thirteen transports, leaving 
one destroyer listing heavily. A force of thirty-one fighters and nineteen bombers 
from Yap, he was similarly told, had attacked a force some thirty miles off Ti-
nian and destroyed two or three carriers and left one destroyer or one transport 
burning.135 
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At 2125, Admiral Nagumo sent a message that the enemy had conducted attacks 
every night since the landing but so far had been unsuccessful. The focus of the 
enemy attacks was Saipan’s Airfield No. 1. The enemy had landed three divisions 
on 17 June. Nagumo (correctly) estimated that the enemy would not land on Tini-
an and Guam for the time being but would focus on the initial phase of the Saipan 
landing. Probably, most of the enemy carriers had left the area. Nagumo advised 
not delaying the decisive encounter; otherwise the Japanese not only would miss 
an opportunity to inflict losses on the enemy fleet but would find it more difficult 
to resist the attack on Saipan.136
Between 13 and 17 June Spruance had had only a single report about Ozawa’s 
forces, and it had been obtained by a submarine. The submarine Cavalla had sight-
ed at 2115 (some sources say 2245) on 17 June a large group of enemy ships at 
12° 23ʹ north, 132° 26ʹ east (some seven hundred miles west of Guam) zigzagging 
between courses 060° and 100°, with an estimated speed over the base course of 
nineteen knots (see map 14).137 The enemy force was composed of at least fifteen 
ships of combatant type. The formation was led by a carrier on the starboard flank, 
with two units of three vessels each—believed to be battleships or heavy cruisers—
in column on the port flank, plus more units.138 This was Ozawa’s force; Cavalla lost 
contact at dawn.139 Because of the darkness, Cavalla had been unable to observe all 
of Ozawa’s ships; also, Ozawa’s true position was some sixty miles northeast of the 
one reported.140 Nimitz believed that Cavalla’s report pertained to the main body 
of the First Striking Fleet; all traffic analysis indicated that this force was approach-
ing the Marianas from the direction of the Philippines. There were indications that 
enemy land-based aircraft had flown searches from Palau, Yap, Mindanao, For-
mosa, Okinawa, southern Japan, Iwo Jima, Marcus, Truk, and possibly Woleai and 
Ulithi.141
Searching for the Enemy Forces, 18–19 June
During the night of 17–18 June, four Martin PBM seaplanes from Saipan searched 
for the Japanese fleet to a distance of six hundred miles but made no contact.142 
Spruance was informed by Admiral Moore of Cavalla’s report in the early morning 
of the 18th. Spruance and Moore reassessed the situation in the light of this report. 
It seemed that the enemy fleet was rapidly converging on Saipan.143
Not until 0345 did Mitscher receive Cavalla’s report, sent at 2115 on the previ-
ous evening. He calculated that at nineteen knots the force should be about 660 
miles from Saipan at dawn and about five hundred miles from TF 58’s position 
at 0530. Hence, there would be little chance to detect it on 18 June. However, if 
TF 58 steamed directly toward the projected enemy position at 1500 it would be 
possible to detect it during the afternoon searches. Perhaps, Mitscher thought, if 
he maintained course and speed it would be possible to deliver a strike in late af-
ternoon.144 At that time TGs 58.2 and 58.3 were too far east of Mitscher’s flagship 
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(Lexington); he planned a rendezvous for all four groups at 1200 on 18 June. 
Obviously, it would have been much better if they had assembled much earlier. 
However, this rendezvous could not be effected if TG 58.2 and TG 58.3 steamed 
southwest toward the oncoming enemy fleet. Because of the longer range of Japa-
nese carrier aircraft, Ozawa would be able to strike these two groups before they 
could attack him. Mitscher’s option was to steam southwest and thereby extend 
TF 58’s afternoon searches to cover a larger area of possible enemy movements. 
This would perhaps bring the two carrier groups within striking range and would 
at least afford an opportunity of shadowing the enemy by night in preparation 
for operations the next day. Steaming southwest for a rendezvous would effect a 
concentration of forces and allow an afternoon search that would pick up the en-
emy if he continued at approximately his present speed. The decision was made 
to rendezvous to the southwest; the advantage was that it would place in striking 
position the concentrated air strength of TF 58 if the enemy launched a long-
range attack.145
Mitscher believed that Cavalla’s contact was the enemy’s main body. He pre-
ferred that TF 58 steam at high speed toward the enemy, launch searches that 
afternoon to locate the enemy force, and then seek a surface engagement that 
night.146 This was the reason Mitscher asked Lee, “Do you desire night engage-
ment? It may be we can make air contact late this afternoon and attack tonight. 
Otherwise we should retire to the eastward tonight. I am requesting task groups 
58.1 and 58.4 to join today.” Lee’s answer was firmly negative: “Do not repeat not 
believe we would seek night engagement. Possible advantages of radar more than 
offset with difficulties of communications and lack of training in fleet tactics at 
night. Would press pursuit of damaged or fleeing enemy, however, at any time.”147 
Lee’s response reflected the reality that TG 58.7 could operate effectively as a co-
hesive force only in daylight. His task group had been formed from the ships of 
four other groups. Lee also believed that U.S. battleships were neither designed 
nor armed for close-range night actions against light forces. As he was to observe, 
“a few minutes intense fire . . . from secondary battery guns can, and did, render 
one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent through destruction 
of radar, radio, and fire control circuits.”148
The fact was that neither Spruance nor Lee wanted the night engagement that 
Mitscher proposed. Mitscher’s numerical superiority made him stronger during 
daylight, while the danger of night melees favored the numerically weaker Japa-
nese, who were better trained for them.149 
At 0535, TGs 58.2 and 58.3 launched westward searches (between bearings 205° 
and 285°) to a distance of 325 miles.150 At 0600 Japanese search aircraft detected six 
carriers sailing on a northeasterly course.151 U.S. carrier aircraft shot down one of 
them, a Jake seaplane launched by a cruiser. The episode indicated that the Japanese 
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were searching for the U.S. forces.152 At 0730, Cavalla sent another report, of a ma-
jor part of the enemy fleet on course 080° at nineteen knots. It was then some 
seven hundred miles west of Saipan and closing.153 The track based on this report 
corresponded closely with that estimated earlier in the day. If Ozawa’s force contin-
ued on that course, U.S. air searches might detect it at some three hundred miles 
around 1530. That meant that if TF 58 decreased the range during the afternoon 
and night, and the enemy wanted to close and fight, a night surface action was 
quite possible.154 Back at Pearl Harbor, Vice Adm. John Towers, Commander, Air 
Force, Pacific Fleet, was concerned that Ozawa would enjoy a great advantage if he 
succeeded in positioning his force within six hundred miles of Guam, with TF 58 
in between. Ozawa would be then able to land his aircraft on Guam, to refuel and 
reattack. He urged Nimitz to direct Spruance farther west to seek out the enemy 
fleet. Nimitz rejected his advice, convinced that Spruance as the senior command-
er on the scene would know how best to employ the forces under his command. 
Nevertheless, he directed his chief of staff, Rear Adm. Charles McMorris, to warn 
Spruance about the possibility of shuttle bombing.155
Admiral Lockwood, after receiving Cavalla’s report, shifted four of his boats 
(Finback, Bang, Stingray, and Albacore, from what he called the “Pentathlon 
Group”), then patrolling northwest of Saipan, some 250 miles southward.156 Lock-
wood advised his commanding officers not to “miss any opportunity to get in a 
shot at the enemy.” Operating within a square, these four submarines would be 
athwart the track of the First Mobile Force.157 This proved to be an excellent deci-
sion and led to several critical sightings of Ozawa’s force. Lockwood also radioed 
to his submarines, “Now that contact with enemy forces has been made, shoot first 
and report later. Due to presence own surface forces, identify targets as enemy be-
fore firing.”158
In the morning on 18 June, however, Spruance was still largely in the dark re-
garding the exact location and composition of Ozawa’s force. He was relying largely 
on reports of submarines and search aircraft based in the Marshalls and Saipan. 
JICPOA’s radio intercepts were useful in reading messages transmitted by the Com-
bined Fleet and other shore commands but not for obtaining precise information 
on the movement of the First Mobile Force, which had maintained strict radio 
silence since sortieing from Guimaras.
At 1200, TGs 58.1 and 58.4 joined TF 58; all four of Mitscher’s groups were now 
together. Thereafter until approximately 2000, TF 58 steamed on the course 245° 
at fourteen knots. The need to turn to the east for all flight operations prevented 
a faster advance to the westward.159 At 1330, TGs 58.1, 58.2, and 58.3 launched 
searches out to 325 miles between 185° and 315°. The results of all the searches 
were negative. This meant that neither of the two enemy forces sighted by Cavalla 
was yet within five hundred miles of Saipan.160 
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For Spruance, Cavalla’s report about fifteen enemy ships reinforced his belief 
that Ozawa might try to outflank him. He knew from intelligence that Ozawa’s 
force consisted of at least forty surface combatants.161 There was no information on 
the whereabouts of the remaining ships. Also, Spruance disagreed with Mitscher’s 
assumption that the enemy would come from the southwest. He intended to stay 
near Saipan, searching westward by day and retiring eastward toward Saipan each 
night to prevent the Japanese from slipping past in the dark.162 Spruance sent an 
important message to Mitscher: 
TF 58 must cover Saipan and our forces engaged in that operation. I still feel that main ene-
my attack will come from westward but it might be diverted to come in from southwestward; 
diversionary attacks may come in from either flank or reinforcements might come from Em-
pire [i.e., the home islands]. Consider that we can best cover Saipan by advancing westward 
during daylight and retiring eastward at night so as to reduce possibility of enemy passing 
us during darkness. Distance which you can make to westward during day will naturally 
be restricted by your air operations and by necessity to conserve fuel. We should however 
remain in air supporting position off Saipan until information on the enemy requires other 
action. Consider seeking night action undesirable initially in view of our superior strength 
of all types, but earliest possible strikes on enemy carriers is necessary.163
Spruance’s closing sentence was contradictory, in that Mitscher was unable to close 
the range with Ozawa’s force and at the same time stay close to Saipan. Also, on the 
morning of the 18th the wind was from the east. This was unfavorable to the U.S. 
carriers, because to steam into the wind for flight operations they had to turn away 
from the incoming enemy force, thereby opening, not closing, the range.164
Mitscher submitted an estimate that the enemy could be at 14° 00ʹ north, 142° 
30ʹ east at 0400 on 19 June for an attack on the U.S. forces at Saipan. He proposed 
to proceed during the day to the westward conducting air searches to the maxi-
mum possible distance. He would reverse course toward Saipan at nightfall and 
stay within striking range of the enemy’s northern flank. If search reports were fa-
vorable, he would conduct a night-fighter and torpedo attack. Mitscher’s proposal 
was approved by Spruance.165
Ozawa, in the meantime, continued with his efforts to locate the enemy carriers. 
Between 1425 and 1540 one of his search planes detected three groups of carriers, 
one group of two regular carriers and ten to fifteen destroyers, the second group 
of two apparently regular carriers and other vessels, and the third with two regular 
carriers and ten other vessels.166 Ozawa did not want to attack so late in the day, be-
cause his pilots were inexperienced in the night flying.167 Nonetheless, he directed 
the 23rd Air Flotilla to attack and then land on Guam; however, its mission was 
subsequently aborted.168 
Ozawa estimated that three enemy carrier groups were westward of the Mari-
anas. There were no indications of the feared flank attack from the north. The range 
of U.S. scouting and attack aircraft, Ozawa knew, was about three hundred nauti-
cal miles; he (correctly) believed that because of the situation on Saipan the enemy 
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carrier force would most likely not move farther than that from the archipelago. 
Ozawa’s decision was to use all available aircraft on the day of decisive battle, 19 June. 
His intent was to “annihilate enemy regular carriers groups” advancing westward of 
the Marianas. The attack would be conducted from the south. The distance between 
the Japanese and enemy carriers would be about three hundred nautical miles, or 
480 if an attack were conducted on the enemy ships in the vicinity of the Marianas.169 
Ozawa started to receive a stream of reports from his search aircraft. At 1514, 
search aircraft No. 15 reported, “Enemy task force, including carriers at 14° 50ʹ 
north, 142° 15ʹ east.” This was TF 58. At 1600, plane No. 13 also sighted enemy car-
riers. However, the most important sighting was by plane No. 17, searching south 
of No. 15, which sent reports shortly after 1600 of enemy carriers and other ships. 
At 1640, Ozawa had a more complete picture of the situation; the estimated posi-
tion of the enemy carrier force was 14° 12ʹ north, 141° 55ʹ east. Plane No. 17 also 
reported that the enemy was on a westerly course and that the cloud cover was 
seven-tenths. The cloud layers were between 29,500 and 3,300 feet. The wind was 
easterly at eleven knots.170 
At 1530, Ozawa received a report from plane No. 15 that led him to a decision to 
prepare for battle.171 Ten minutes later he ordered his force to change course from 
060° (east-northeast) to 200° (south-southwest). He wished to maintain a distance 
of no less than four hundred miles between his force and the enemy carriers, to re-
tain the freedom of action offered by the longer range of his aircraft. At 1610, after 
receiving a report from No. 17 on an “unknown number of carriers, ten plus other 
ships” at 14° 12ʹ north, 141° 55ʹ east, Ozawa issued his Operation Order No. 16: 
“(1) At about 1500 enemy task force believed to be, one, 350 miles bearing about 
220° from Iwo Jima, and the other, 160 miles west of Saipan; (2) First Mobile Fleet 
will retire temporarily, after which it will proceed north and tomorrow morning 
contact and destroy the enemy to the north, after which it will attack and destroy 
the enemy to the northeast.” Unfortunately for the Japanese, however, neither of 
the reports on the location of TF 58 was accurate; at the time of No. 17’s contact (at 
1610), the center of TF 58 was actually about two hundred miles west of Saipan.172 
Rear Adm. Sueo Obayashi, commander of CarDiv 3, prepared his three carriers 
to launch some sixty-seven aircraft at 1637. Three Jills, fifteen Zeros armed with 
bombs, and four Zero fighters had been launched when he received Order No. 16 
from Ozawa. At 1710, No. 17 search plane sent another and more detailed report: 
the enemy force consisted of two small groups, one composed of two Saratoga-class 
carriers and ten to fifteen destroyers, and a second comprising two regular carriers 
and ten or more other ships. The enemy ships were on an easterly course. Within 
the next hour Ozawa received from Tokyo a warning that the report that the enemy 
force was “350 miles, bearing 220° from Iwo Jima” was false. Hence at 1817, Ozawa 
issued Operation Order No. 19, stating that the enemy force west of the Marianas 
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(as reported by search plane No. 17) would be the main target of attack on the 
19th.173 This led Obayashi to recall his aircraft. Junior commanders were not happy 
with Ozawa’s decision not to attack immediately. They believed that a strike even so 
late in the day would be successful, because it would have a good chance of achiev-
ing surprise. Also, the attacking planes would be able to land on Guam.174 
While CarDiv 3 recovered its planes, the main body steamed on course 200°. At 
1900 it changed course to 140° and slowed to sixteen knots. At 2020 Ozawa broke 
radio silence for the first time; he had to tell Kakuta where TF 58 could be found 
and arrange for coordinated attacks on the next day. A U.S. naval DF station picked 
up that message, though it lasted only a few minutes, and identified it as having 
been sent by Ozawa. The station estimated Ozawa’s position as 13° north, 136° east 
(its actual position at that time was only some forty miles away). TF 58 was some 
three hundred miles from that point. The DF station reported by message.175
By 18 June, Japanese land-based aircraft in the Marianas had been decimated by 
TF 58’s strikes. Admiral Kakuta, who was on Tinian, ordered all nineteen remain-
ing aircraft (including fifteen Zero fighters) on Truk to move to Guam by the early 
morning of the 19th. They did so just in time to escape a fifty-six-aircraft strike 
by U.S. Army Air Forces Liberators based on Los Negros and Kwajalein. These 
last-minute reinforcements brought the number of planes of all types on Saipan to 
about fifty, compared with the five hundred envisaged in the original A-Go opera-
tion plan.176 
Spruance’s Decision
In the meantime, at 2000 on 18 June, TF 58 changed course to the eastward.177 Dur-
ing the evening Spruance’s staff continued to discuss the possible courses of action. 
Some members agreed with Spruance, while others supported Mitscher’s desire to 
continue westward.178 Spruance felt that until he knew about all the elements of the 
enemy fleet he could not leave Saipan unprotected either to attack or to search for 
the enemy.179 He reportedly said, “I believe that making a war is a game that requires 
cold and careful calculation.” In his view, “it might be a very serious thing if we 
turned the wrong way, just once.”180 At 2130, Spruance decided to stay near Saipan 
and let the enemy come to him. TF 58 would then sink the enemy carriers before 
they could sink transports.181 
It was at 2200 that Spruance received from Nimitz the information that a radio 
transmission apparently from CINC, First Mobile Fleet had been “DF’ed” within a 
hundred miles of 13° north, 136° east at 2023. This position was some 585 miles 
and 257° from Saipan.182 Nimitz’s information meant that the enemy force was be-
tween 11° 30ʹ north and 15° 30ʹ north and not farther east than 138° (see map 
14). At 2346, a message from Admiral Lockwood (not addressed to Spruance but 
monitored on the fleet broadcast) stated that he was unable to read a message from 
the submarine Stingray because of jamming. Stingray’s position was then 12° 20ʹ 
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Spruance’s Decision at 0038, 19 June 
Spruance made a tough decision in the early morning of 19 June to adhere to his original mission by not 
risking movement too far westward from Saipan. In his war diary Spruance gave the following six reasons 
not to turn west at 0038 on the 19th: 
 • The DF fix given for the Japanese force was not definite, being somewhere within a hundred-mile 
radius. 
 • The originator of the transmission was not definitely known. 
 • The size and composition of the enemy force was not known. 
 • It was important to guard against a flanking movement.
 • The transmission could be from a decoy. 
 • A transmission from the submarine Stingray had been jammed at 2346, indicating that it might be in 
contact 175 miles east-southeast of the DF fix.1 
Spruance’s primary mission was to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. The amphibious landing on 
Saipan was at that time at the critical stage. The troops ashore had only part of their supplies; the remain-
der was on board a large number of ships in the vicinity of Saipan. The Japanese had usually divided their 
forces and approached from different directions; they had done that in the battles of the Coral Sea and 
Midway, and at Guadalcanal. The Japanese Z operation plan indicated that this was still their doctrine. The 
sightings so far received showed Spruance that two separate forces were definitely approaching. He did 
not know whether they had joined. Spruance was eager for an all-out battle but was determined not to 
take his carrier striking force beyond supporting distance of the beaches unless he was sure that no end 
run around his flank was planned. He would not be lured away from what he conceived to be his main job 
of protecting the landing force.2
After the war, Spruance revealed his reasoning. In 1952, he would write in a letter that “as a matter of 
tactics—I think that going after the Japanese and knocking their carriers out would have been much bet-
ter and more satisfactory than waiting for them to attack us; but we were at the start of very important 
and large amphibious operation and we could not afford to gamble and place it in jeopardy. The way Togo 
waited at Tsushima has always been in my mind. We had somewhat the same basic situation, only it was 
modified by the long range striking power of the carriers.”3
Spruance in the postwar years asked himself what he would have done had he been a Japanese com-
mander. He felt that he had known in 1944 the Japanese way of thinking, after his years of study and his 
friendships with Japanese naval officers. By this logic he was convinced by mid-evening of 18 June that the 
Japanese were capable of a flanking movement to hit the transports and that in fact they would do exactly 
that. Apparently, Spruance did not seriously believe that the Japanese might be going after Mitscher’s 
carriers rather than Admiral Turner’s transports. If the Japanese admiral had not divided his forces but 
sought the carriers rather than the transports, Spruance’s revised battle plan would have been potentially 
disastrous. It would have exposed U.S. carriers to a long-range attack, and they would have been unable, 
with their shorter-range aircraft, to retaliate.4 
Nimitz stoutly defended Spruance’s decision and actions in the battle of the Philippine Sea:
It may be argued that the Japanese never had any intention of evading Task Force 58 with part or all of their forces, 
and aiming their major air attack against our shipping at Saipan. From this premise it could be proved that our main 
body of carriers and gunnery ships could have pushed them to westward without concern for expeditionary forces, 
and that had it done so, a decisive fleet air action could have been fought, the Jap fleet destroyed, and the ending 
of the war hastened. There is no restriction in surmising how a hand might have been played and how much could 
have been won had the cards fallen differently from the way they did.5
 1. Forrestel, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, p. 137.
 2.  Ibid., p. 138.
 3. Potter, Nimitz, p. 302; Taylor, Magnificent Mitscher, p. 239.
 4. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 293.
 5. Taylor, Magnificent Mitscher, pp. 239–40.
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Nevertheless some complaints from Nimitz’s staff aviators crept into his summary for June 1944: “There 
may be disappointment to some. In fact, that in addition to the successful accomplishment of our 
purpose—the occupation of the southern Marianas—there was not also a decisive ‘fleet action’ in which 
we would naturally hope to have been victorious and to have thereby shortened the war materially.”6 
Admiral King, upon arriving at Saipan for a meeting about 12 July 1944, told Spruance that he had 
done exactly the correct thing with the Fifth Fleet in the Philippine Sea, whatever others might say, be-
cause the Japanese had had another fleet, in the Inland Sea, ready to fall on the many U.S. transports that 
had not discharged their cargoes at Saipan.7 King elsewhere defended Spruance’s decision by arguing, “As 
the primary mission of the American forces in the area was to capture the Marianas . . . the Saipan amphibi-
ous operation had to be protected from enemy interference at all costs. In his plans for what developed 
into the battle of the Philippine Sea, Spruance was rightly guided by this basic obligation.”8
Spruance’s decision nonetheless remained highly controversial. It was not well received at the time 
by Mitscher’s staff, especially his chief of staff, Commodore Arleigh Burke (1901–96, later an admiral and 
CNO). Burke and his operations officer, Cdr. John “Jimmie” S. Thach, drafted one scorching message after 
another, in what amounted almost to mutiny. Yet eventually they too accepted that it was Spruance’s call 
and gave up hope of changing the decision and letting TF 58 move westward.9 There remained among 
the naval aviators, however, little doubt that Spruance had missed the opportunity of the century. A com-
mon complaint was that this is what could be expected when a nonaviator was put in charge of carriers.10 
For example, Adm. Frederick C. Sherman (1888–1957), a highly regarded aviator and carrier group com-
mander, was a particular critic of Spruance’s handling of TF 58. He would assert that Spruance’s order that 
TF 58 was to head east during the night conflicted with his “Beware of an end run.” Spruance, he believed, 
“was still thinking in terms of surface action. He did not grasp the tremendous power of our air weapons 
or their ability to strike in any direction to the limit of their fuel. There were no end runs in aerial warfare.”11
Some claimed that if Spruance had changed his mission from covering Saipan to seeking out and de-
stroying the enemy fleet, the gain might have been worth the increased risk. If successful, he would have 
eliminated a major threat to future U.S. operations and possibly have shortened the war, as against the 
risk of losing a few transports and a concomitant delay in seizing Saipan. Nimitz’s explicit message the day 
before urging a decisive victory in the possible fleet action was, in this view, more than enough justifica-
tion for Spruance to modify his original mission of covering Saipan regardless of the tactical situation.12
Spruance could in fact have alleviated the risk of uncovering Saipan. Turner had seven old battleships 
and eleven escort carriers, with which he could have fought a delaying action against an end run while TF 
58 engaged the enemy carriers to the westward. Immediately after that engagement, TF 58 could have re-
turned to Saipan at high speed—into the wind, conducting air operations as it steamed—quickly closing 
the range to Saipan, ideally before the enemy could inflict unacceptable damage there. However, this op-
tion had several drawbacks. The escort carriers were slow and could be easily outmaneuvered by the fast, 
heavy Japanese surface ships. The U.S. old battleships were armed primarily by high-explosive projectiles 
meant for shore bombardment. They carried only a limited supply of armor-piercing projectiles, which 
were best suited for surface engagement. The escort carriers carried few if any torpedoes, and their bombs 
were of the high-explosive type, for support of troops ashore.13 There was also a possibility that the enemy 
did not plan an end run and would refuse battle. Reportedly, all these courses of action were discussed 
and examined by Spruance and his staff throughout the day and early evening of 18 June.14
In the end, Spruance stuck to his mission but in so doing risked extensive losses to his carrier forces. He 
did not allow TF 58 to attack the Japanese carriers on 19 June but instead opted to absorb the full impact 
of the enemy’s air attack. On the night of 18–19 June he denied the carriers of TF 58 the sea room they 
 6. Potter, Nimitz, p. 303.
 7. Y’Blood, Red Sun Setting, p. 206, cited in Taylor, Magnificent Mitscher, p. 238.
 8. Potter, Nimitz, p. 303.
 9. Tillman, Clash of the Carriers, p. 101.
 10. Potter, Nimitz, p. 303.
 11. Taylor, Magnificent Mitscher, p. 239.
 12. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 294.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid., p. 295.
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needed for prolonged flight operations. The carriers had to steam toward Guam throughout the day while 
launching and recovering; more than one carrier had to delay flight operations to dodge islands. Such a 
tactical handicap earlier in the war would have been fatal. The Japanese pilots of 1944, however, were 
no match for the superb fighter pilots the U.S. Navy had by then produced; Spruance was very lucky that 
Mitscher’s pilots were able to overcome these deliberately accepted constraints.15 
Spruance had made a similar decision during the invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943 (Opera-
tion GALVANIC). His inherent caution then led him to restrict carrier activities to an area around the islands. 
This lack of mobility unnecessarily exposed carrier groups to air and submarine attacks, in which they 
suffered unwarranted damage. The carrier Independence was torpedoed and put out of action for several 
months. The carriers would have been more effective if they had been allowed to attack the enemy posi-
tions in the Marshalls.16 
Spruance returned to Saipan on 18–19 June because he believed that transports would be needed 
there the next day. But they were not needed.17 The transports were, in fact, about two hundred miles east 
of Saipan, and completely out of danger. Unbeknownst to Spruance, Gen. Holland M. Smith did not think 
he would need the transports for the two days the fleet battle would take.18 General Smith felt that his po-
sition ashore was not bad. All his artillery had been landed, and this partially compensated for the lack of 
naval gunfire. Spruance, then, could have ordered the transports to safe haven in the east without unduly 
endangering operations ashore. The fleet action would have been decided within a day; the U.S. troops 
on Saipan could have held their own for that long, even if they had been forced to delay their advance.19 
But the question here is what was known to Spruance at that time. In deliberating whether to close the 
enemy fleet on the night of 18–19 June he would have been prudent to reconsider his assumptions made 
two and a half days earlier. The relevant question that night, in retrospect, was whether all the transports 
could be moved eastward for from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to allow TF 58 time for a decisive action. 
Yet Spruance never suggested such a course of action to Turner. Nor did Turner volunteer to clear to the 
east so as to free Spruance to advance toward the enemy. The universal assumption was that Turner had 
to return some transports to Saipan on 19 June.20
The most ironic aspect of the situation was that Spruance thought that he could “read” the enemy side 
and make decisions on that basis. Yet time and again he analyzed his counterpart’s intentions wrongly. In 
contrast, Ozawa correctly predicted both Spruance’s state of mind and his intentions.21 Spruance assumed 
Ozawa would split his forces and attack Turner’s transports, but Ozawa did just the opposite. Ozawa as-
sumed that Spruance would cautiously remain near Saipan, allowing him, Ozawa, to launch long-range 
strikes without risk to his carriers. Ozawa, who had only nine carriers versus the fifteen of TF 58, could 
count on help from land-based aircraft at Guam, Rota, and Yap. However, his plan was fatally undercut by 
the poor state of training of his pilots; in any case, the majority of the Japanese land-based aircraft were 
destroyed before Ozawa’s force arrived within striking range of the Marianas.22
Clearly, Spruance was unduly concerned with the possibility of attack from the flank. He had read the 
Z plan and was convinced that the Japanese would go after Turner’s transports. Yet his confidence in his 
ability to divine his opponent’s intentions was misplaced; Ozawa was much more skillful in guessing what 
Spruance would do and in planning accordingly. The Japanese were in fact still seeking a decisive battle 
with the U.S. Pacific Fleet; the transports were secondary.23
Another problem was that Spruance’s staff was almost entirely composed of surface officers, like Spru-
ance himself. Admiral Burke believed that this reflected a fundamental weakness in Spruance as a com-
mander. In Burke’s view, a little healthy disagreement from people with different outlooks might have 
 15. Ibid., pp. 300–301.
 16. Y’Blood, Red Sun Setting, p. 204.
 17. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 301.
 18. Cited in Y’Blood, Red Sun Setting, p. 206.
 19. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 301.
 20. Ibid., p. 302.
 21. Ibid.
 22. Ibid., p. 303.
 23. Y’Blood, Red Sun Setting, p. 206.
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north, 139° 00ʹ east, about 435 miles and west of Saipan.183 The jammed transmis-
sion indicated that the enemy force might be at approximately 12° 20ʹ north, 139° 
00ʹ east, at around 2300.184 Nimitz’s and Stingray’s messages together indicated to 
Spruance a probable movement of the enemy force to the eastward, but neither 
was conclusive about its position.185 From Spruance’s perspective, “it was not clear 
whether the enemy force was concentrated, or in two or more groups, whether the 
enemy was advancing directly toward Saipan, delaying his movement eastward or 
moving his forces to within striking distance of Saipan by the northern flank, the 
southern flank, or both.”186
About thirty minutes before midnight, Mitscher called Spruance on the TBS 
(talk between ships) circuit and proposed to change course to 270° at 0130 to be 
able to launch an attack at 0500. Did Spruance agree?187 Spruance studied and 
discussed the situation with his staff for about an hour and at 0038 on the 19th 
rejected the proposal, sending the following message to Mitscher: “Change pro-
posed does not appear advisable. Believe indications given to Stingray more ac-
curate than that determined by direction finder. If that is so continuation as at 
present seems preferable. End run by other carrier groups remains possibility and 
must not be overlooked.”188 (For details of Spruance’s decision and the views of 
critics, see the sidebar “Spruance’s Decision at 0038, 19 June.”)
Clash of the Carrier Forces, 19–20 June
By the midnight of 18–19 June, Ozawa had fairly complete knowledge of the 
location and movements of Spruance’s Fifth Fleet. He called heavily on land-
based search planes for information, yet all that he received was from aircraft of 
his carriers and floatplanes from his cruisers. On 18 June Ozawa learned from 
them about the carriers at TF 58’s northern and southern edges, about forty miles 
apart. This information gave Ozawa a good fix on TF 58.189 At 0008 on the 19th he 
sent a message to his fleet: “I humbly relay the message which has been received 
from the Emperor through the chief of staff, the IGHQ’s Naval Section. ‘This 
operation has immense bearing on the fate of the Empire. It is hoped that the 
force will exert their utmost and achieve as magnificent results as in the battle of 
Tsushima.’”190
 24. Ibid., p. 205.
 25. David M. Abshire, “The Inimitable Admiral Arleigh ‘31 Knots’ Burke: Lessons for Leadership and Strategy Today” 
(Abshire Lecture in Honor of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 
29 January 2010), p. 10, available at www.thepresidency.org/; Taylor, Magnificent Mitscher, p. 237.
been beneficial.24 Burke believed too that Spruance did not, after the exchange of carrier strikes, aggres-
sively pursue the Japanese fleet but instead opted to play it safe and protect the invasion fleet. Burke’s 
draft after-action report criticized Spruance on this point. Mitscher disagreed, and Burke rewrote the re-
port, but it remained critical of Spruance’s decision. Mitscher’s own after-action report included the follow-
ing: “The enemy has escaped. He had been badly hurt by one aggressive carrier air strike, at the one time 
when he was within range. His fleet was not sunk.”25
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At midnight TF 58 was at a position 14° 27ʹ north, 142° 05ʹ east, on course 009° 
and at a speed of seventeen knots. Spruance’s intent was to proceed on that course 
until 0620 so as to be close to Saipan. He wanted to be within supporting distance 
of the troops ashore in case the enemy force came within striking distance from 
either north or south.191
At 0115, a long-range PBM from Saipan obtained a radar fix on forty enemy 
ships in two groups about seventy-five miles northeast of Nimitz’s DF fix of the 
preceding evening (see map 15). This critical piece of information did not reach 
Spruance for eight hours. Otherwise, perhaps it would have influenced him to turn 
westward to reduce the gap of three hundred miles before morning.192 
At 0150 Spruance received a report from the submarine Finback that it had 
sighted searchlights at 14° 25ʹ north, 135° 45ʹ east at 2010 on 18 June (see map 14). 
That position was about a hundred miles northeast of the DF fix sent by Nimitz.193 
Finback also reported seeing numerous unidentified aircraft during the day of the 
18th. This report only further reinforced Spruance’s resolution to continue east-
ward. He was now convinced that the enemy had been generally aware of the loca-
tion of TF 58 on 18 June.194 
At 0300, Ozawa’s force changed its course to 050° and increased speed to twenty 
knots.195 Between 0300 and 0400 Ozawa reorganized his battle formation into three 
groups: Force A (Ozawa, CarDiv 1); Force B (Rear Adm. Takaji Joshima, CarDiv 
2), and Force C (Rear Adm. Takeo Kurita, CarDiv 3). Forces A and B constituted 
the main body, five fast carriers and one light carrier. They were arranged about 
nine miles from each other (see figure 1). Force C, or the van, consisted of three 
circular groups sailing in a line abreast about six miles from each other. The most 
powerful surface combatants were in Force C; each of its groups included battle-
ships and heavy cruisers and was centered on a light carrier. Force C was about a 
hundred miles ahead of the main body. Ozawa’s aim in devising such an unusual 
cruising formation was to inflict heavy losses on incoming enemy aircraft. They 
would be forced to fly through the intensive AA defenses of Force C, fly another 
hundred miles to the main body and then a hundred miles back, and again pass 
over strong AA defenses returning to their carriers. In his view, the Americans 
would suffer catastrophic losses in such attacks. If the U.S. carrier forces advanced 
westward to bring their aircraft within range of the First Mobile Force, they might 
sink some Japanese carriers, but Ozawa would have a better chance of sinking more 
of the enemy’s.196 This battle disposition was very different from the one practiced 
by the U.S. Navy. Among other things, it allowed the optimum use of cruiser and 
battleship floatplanes for search. It also placed the three smaller, converted carri-
ers within powerful AA defenses so that they could absorb any enemy attack and 
protect the six larger carriers.197 A great disadvantage was that Ozawa’s carriers were 
poorly protected from attack by submarines.198 
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Figure 1
First Mobile Force: Battle 
Disposition #1 (MOD),  
19 June 1944
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In the early morning, Ozawa made a determined effort to locate the enemy car-
rier groups precisely. At 0330 he launched a first wave of search planes (sixteen 
Kate seaplanes); at 0415 a second wave (thirteen Kates from CarDiv 3 and one Jake 
seaplane from Chikuma) was launched.199 (This wave sighted only destroyers, and 
seven of its planes were shot down by TF 58’s dawn search aircraft.)200 At 0530, a 
third wave of search planes (eleven Judys from Shōkaku and two seaplanes from 
Mogami) was launched from 12° 20ʹ north, 136° 35ʹ east.201 They were to search out 
to 560 miles.202 By 0600 Ozawa had more than sixty aircraft searching for the enemy 
carriers; other planes were being readied for attack. Hence, only a few aircraft were 
available for CAP. Also, antisubmarine patrols were called off—this proved a costly 
mistake.203
At 0634, Ozawa’s No. 7 search plane from the first wave reported sighting, about 
160 miles west of Saipan, two regular carriers, four battleships, ten cruisers, and 
some old vessels—tracked collectively as “objective [i.e., contact] 7 I”—heading 
west. Shortly afterward, Ozawa received a report of four other enemy regular 
carriers.204 By 0700 the planes of Ozawa’s first wave had reached the limits of 
their searches and started their return. One plane on its return leg sighted about 
0730 parts of the enemy carrier striking force (actually TG 58.4 and TG 58.7, or 
“objective 7 I”).205 
TF 58’s own searches at 0200 and 0530 were as fruitless as were those of the 
preceding day.206 At 0200 the carrier Enterprise launched a search-and-attack group 
of fourteen torpedo planes to cover the sector between 240° and 270° out to three 
hundred miles. At 0530, TF 58 launched another search between 185° and 345° and 
to a distance of 325 miles from 14° 40ʹ north, 143° 40ʹ east. This search had nega-
tive results. However, its aircraft shot down one Japanese aircraft thirty-seven miles 
from the task force at 0554.207
Until about 0530, TF 58 continued on a northeasterly course, but then it turned 
to the southwest, directly into the wind. The centers of the carrier groups were 
twelve to fifteen miles apart. The ships of each group were deployed in four-mile-
diameter circles (see figure 2).208 The weather was clear and warm. There were only 
a few clouds. The wind was from the east-northeast to east-southeast at between 
nine and twelve knots. Ceiling and visibility were unlimited. From the bridge of a 
carrier it was possible to see up to forty miles.209
At 0620, Spruance directed TF 58 to change course to the west-southwest, 250°, 
at fifteen knots to close the distance with the still-undetected enemy force. By then 
TF 58 had reached 14° 37ʹ north, 143° 58ʹ east.210 However, TF 58 could not steam 
on that westerly course for long, because of the need to turn into the wind to oper-
ate aircraft. As it happened, the carriers had to change course four times (at 0706, 
0741, 0800, and 0830). By 1023 they were only a few miles farther westward than 
they had been at daybreak.211 
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Figure 2
TF 58’s battle formation,  
19 June 1944
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Spruance told Mitscher that if the morning searches failed to find enemy ships, 
neutralization strikes on Guam and Rota would be necessary. Mitscher’s response 
was that this would not do any good, because of the lack of proper bombs, but that 
he would keep Guam under fighter surveillance.212 At 0715, Mitscher was informed 
that fighter aircraft from the carrier Belleau Wood (in TG 58.1) had observed many 
enemy aircraft taking off from Guam and had shot down ten of the fifteen fighters. 
This was why Mitscher ordered a sweep over Guam by fighters of the three carrier 
groups.213 
In the meantime, Ozawa had directed that a series of massive air attacks on TF 
58 start at 0730 (see map 16). CarDiv 1 launched its first attack wave of 129 aircraft 
(fifty-four bombers, twenty-seven carrier attack planes, and forty-eight land-based 
attack planes) against “objective 7 I,” some 380 miles away. At about 0830, CarDiv 
3, of Force C, launched sixty-nine planes (sixteen Zero fighters, forty-five Zero 
fighters armed with bombs, and eight Jill torpedo bombers) against the same ob-
jective.214 Mitscher’s flagship, the carrier Lexington, was then about 110 miles away 
and southwest of Saipan.215
At 0820 a search plane from CarDiv 3 detected a large enemy force including 
battleships. At 0845 search plane No. 15 of the third search wave detected three large 
enemy carriers, five battleships, and ten other smaller ships (collectively designated 
“objective 15 Ri”) about seventy nautical miles southwest of Guam on course 240°. 
At 0900 forty-nine aircraft of CarDiv 2’s first attack wave (twenty-six land-based 
fighters, sixteen fighters, and seven attack aircraft), heading to attack “objective 7 I,” 
were directed to change their course at 0930 and attack “objective 3 Ri.”216 
The Japanese suffered a major blow at about 0910 when the submarine Albacore 
torpedoed Ozawa’s flagship, the 37,870-ton carrier Taihō, in Force A, at 12° 24ʹ 
north, 137° 20ʹ east.217 All but one of Albacore’s six (by some accounts four) tor-
pedoes missed, because of a faulty torpedo-fire director. The one hit struck Taihō 
just after it launched forty-two aircraft as part of Ozawa’s second attack wave, led 
by CarDiv 1.
At about 1000, TF 58 radars detected many enemy planes to the westward at 
about 150 miles.218 (Other sources say 130 miles.)219 At 1005, the first of a series of 
large “bogies” (enemy aircraft or groups of them) was picked up bearing 265°, dis-
tant about 125 miles, at an altitude of twenty-four thousand feet. Mitscher recalled 
all his fighters that were bound for Guam. A search-and-attack group was sent to 
the westward, but it failed to detect the enemy ships.220 At 1010 Mitscher ordered 
TF 58 to prepare to launch every available fighter plane. About ten minutes later 
he gave the order, “Execute.” At 1023 the enemy planes were only about 110 miles 
from Lexington. The entirety of Task Force 58 changed course to the east and into 
the wind.221 All the U.S. fighters were launched between 1023 and 1038. The carri-
ers’ decks were cleared of bombers so as to keep fighters in the air contin uously.222 
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The climax, 0300–1500,  
19 June 1944
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Because the wind, as noted, was only nine to twelve knots, the carriers had to 
steam at twenty knots to attain the thirty-knot wind over the flight deck needed for 
launching and recovering aircraft.223 They also had to conduct zigzagging maneu-
vers. Hence, as before, they gained little ground to the westward to close the range 
with the enemy carriers.224
Japanese aircraft were intercepted thirty-five or forty miles west of TG 58.7. 
These were the sixteen Zero fighters, forty-five Zeros carrying bombs, and eight Jill 
torpedo bombers of the first attack wave launched from Force B.225 Some seventy 
Hellcats intercepted them.226 Meanwhile, Ozawa decided that after the end of the 
first attack, if enemy losses had been heavy, the First Mobile Force would advance 
to the Marianas at dawn on 20 June and resume the air battle; a diversionary force 
would annihilate the enemy. In the event that the losses inflicted by the first attack 
wave were inconsiderable, the First Mobile Force would temporarily retreat west-
ward, reorganize and refuel, and then try to force a decisive battle.227
Ozawa’s second attack wave was launched at 0856, consisting of 138 aircraft 
(fifty-three Judy bombers, twenty-seven Jill torpedo bombers, and fifty-eight Zero 
fighters). These planes encountered difficulties on the way to their intended tar-
gets. Because of engine troubles, eight had to return to their carriers shortly af-
ter being launched. The remaining 130 planes flew by mistake over Force C; two 
planes were shot down and eight were damaged by the AA fire of Kurita’s ships.228 
At 1107 TF 58’s radar detected these planes at about 115 miles out; U.S. fighters 
intercepted them when they had approached TF 58 to about sixty miles.229 At 1145, 
about twenty planes of this group broke through; TG 58.2 was subjected to two 
large attacks and TG 58.3 to one.230 The Japanese aircraft attacked also the battle-
ships South Dakota, Alabama, Indiana, and Iowa of TG 58.7 and the carriers Wasp 
and Bunker Hill of TG 58.2. Other Japanese bombers attacked Enterprise (at 1157) 
and Princeton (at 1202) of TG 58.3. Only thirty-one Japanese aircraft returned to 
their carriers.231 During the attack on TG 58.7 the new battleship South Dakota 
sustained a direct hit, and the heavy cruiser Minneapolis suffered a near miss. An 
enemy plane crashed into the side of the battleship Indiana. The carriers Bunker 
Hill and Wasp had near misses.232 
During the air battle, a few aircraft from Lexington patrolled the Guam area. 
At about 1040, the carrier Hornet sent seventeen Helldivers and seven Avengers, 
escorted by twelve Hellcats, to bomb the Orote field on Guam. They encountered 
no opposition in the air.233
At about 1000, the third attack wave of sixty-four aircraft (twenty-six fighters, 
thirty-six carrier bombers, and two carrier bombers) was launched from CarDiv 2, 
Force B.234 (One historian claims that the third attack wave, launched between 1000 
and 1015, involved forty-seven aircraft—fifteen Zeros, twenty-five Zeros armed 
with bombs, and seven Jill torpedo bombers.)235 These Japanese planes approached 
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TF 58 from the north. The Japanese planes were detected at a distance of about a 
hundred miles by radars of TG 58.1, and some forty Hellcats were sent to intercept 
them. Seven attackers were shot down; the rest of the third attack wave returned 
safely to their carriers.236
In the aftermath of Ozawa’s third attack wave, there was a brief respite in the 
aerial battle. At 1300 Mitscher ordered a search for the enemy carriers between 
185° and 315° and out to 350 miles. Except for contact with enemy aircraft, the 
results were negative.237
Ozawa suffered another major setback with the sinking of yet another large car-
rier. At 1120 Cavalla fired a spread of six torpedoes at the 25,675-ton Shōkaku. 
The carrier received three hits and was badly damaged. At 1215, Cavalla reported 
having scored three torpedo hits on Shōkaku, which had been accompanied by two 
heavy cruisers and three destroyers, at 11° 50ʹ north, 137° 52ʹ east. Subsequently 
Cavalla was heavily depth-charged.238 At 1501 Shōkaku sank, about 410 miles from 
Guam, at 12° north, 137° 46ʹ east.239 
Between 1100 and 1130, Ozawa launched the fourth and the last attack wave of 
the day, comprising eighty-two planes (thirty Zeros, nine Judys, twenty-seven Vals, 
ten Zero fighter-bombers, and six Jills) from four carriers (Junyō, Hiyō, Ryuho, and 
Zuikaku).240 The pilots were ordered to attack “objective 15 Ri” but failed to find it 
because of the incorrect position given by the search planes. The largest group in 
this attack was from CarDiv 2, with forty-nine planes (twenty Zeros, twenty-seven 
Vals, and two Jills); it was directed to land on Guam. At about 1450, as the aircraft 
approached the island and prepared to jettison their bombs, they were picked up 
by the radars of TF 58. They were intercepted by the last CAP of the day, twelve 
Hellcats from the light carrier Cowpens (CVL 25, in TG 58.4). They were joined 
by seven Hellcats from the fleet carrier Essex (CV 9, in TG 58.4) and eight more 
Hellcats from Hornet (TG 58.1). Thirty out of forty-nine Japanese aircraft were shot 
down as they tried to land. The remaining nineteen managed to land at Orote but 
were damaged beyond repair.241
At about 1335, Ozawa received a report from the First Air Fleet on the sight-
ing of five enemy carrier groups totaling ten regular carriers, thirteen converted 
carriers, nine battleships, and nineteen cruisers. The first group, bearing 322° and 
150 miles from the Marianas, was composed of three regular carriers, two special 
[converted] carriers, and one battleship; a second group, bearing 282° and dis-
tant ninety-five miles, comprised four regular carriers and four battleships; a third 
group, at bearing 226° and eighty miles, consisted of three regular carriers, four 
battleships, and nine cruisers. The fourth group, bearing 320° and forty-seven 
miles away, consisted of eight carriers (probably converted carriers) and ten heavy 
cruisers. Finally, the fifth group, bearing 300° and a hundred miles away, comprised 
three converted carriers.242
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The air battle continued at varying intensity until 1500. By then, TF 58’s carri-
ers were steaming eastward and approaching the lee (downwind) side of Guam.243 
Mitscher remarked that he was in the unfortunate position of fighting a defensive 
battle close to the lee side of the enemy land bases to which carrier planes could be 
shuttled, and at the same time on the windward side of enemy carriers.244
Most of the Japanese air attacks were intercepted by U.S. fighters fifty to sixty 
miles from the center of TF 58. The Japanese attacked repeatedly from the west-
ward in groups, some of only a few aircraft, others up to seventy. Their attacks were 
poorly coordinated. Mitscher enjoyed a great advantage of having all 467 of his 
aircraft available for defense alone. Only about forty enemy aircraft penetrated the 
fighter defenses in the course of the day.245 
Because enemy carrier aircraft were trying to land on the airfields of Guam and 
Rota, Mitscher gave orders to his bombers and torpedo aircraft in the air to bomb 
these fields. Spruance directed TG 58.4 to coordinate its actions with the escort car-
riers of TF 51.246 The U.S. fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo bombers repeatedly 
attacked Guam during the day. The airfields at Orote and Agana on Guam were 
cratered, and damage was inflicted on the airstrip on Rota.247
In the meantime, the carrier Taihō suffered a large internal explosion at 1432 
and sank at about 1532.248 The ship went down with 1,650 officers and men out of 
its complement of 2,150. Ozawa shifted his flag to the heavy cruiser Haguro at 1606. 
The next day at 1200 he transferred to the carrier Zuikaku.249 
Ozawa learned that the first attack wave from CarDiv 2 had failed to find its 
assigned target only after transferring to Haguro. Moreover, the launch of the sec-
ond attack wave from CarDiv 3 was canceled because of the need to accommodate 
aircraft from other carriers.250 If the aircraft from CarDiv 1 had to be used again 
they would have to land at night, because the aircraft that took part in the second 
attack wave would start to recover at about 1500. Preparations were also made to at-
tack “objective 15 Ri,” but because of the loss of Taihō these preparations were can-
celed. Most of the aircraft of the second attack wave from Taihō were transferred to 
Zuikaku.251 
After his transfer to Haguro, Ozawa assessed the actions of his forces during the 
day. He concluded that the Japanese air attacks had fallen short of his expectations. 
Hence, he decided to carry out another attack.252 However, he had only about 102 
planes left out of the 430 he had brought from Guimaras.253 He could attack the 
enemy only after reorganizing the First Mobile Force and obtaining support from 
land-based aircraft.254 Moreover, unbeknownst to Ozawa at that time, the reports he 
had received from his fliers and from Admiral Kakuta on enemy carriers sunk were 
erroneous. He also received a false report from Kakuta that a substantial number 
of carrier planes were now safe on Guam. Accordingly, Ozawa believed that Kakuta 
still had more than five hundred planes available to attack the enemy carriers.255 In 
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fact, however, American aircraft had already destroyed the majority of these planes 
in repeated attacks on Saipan, Guam, Tinian, and Rota. Ozawa never understood 
this, misled by deliberately false claims of success from Kakuta.256
Ozawa’s force began to refuel on the afternoon on 19 June. However, receiving 
a report that his forces had been sighted by enemy carrier aircraft, Ozawa immedi-
ately stopped refueling, increased speed to twenty-four knots, and headed north-
west.257 At 1800, he ordered his forces to concentrate and reach a designated posi-
tion at 0700 on 20 June. Force A would sail on a course 90° at sixteen knots. Two 
hours later he also issued an order to the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces to proceed to 
the assigned point for refueling.258 The last Japanese attack of the day took place at 
1823 and carried on to Guam. U.S. aircraft followed them and shot them down as 
they were landing.259
In the meantime, at 1545, TF 58’s afternoon carrier search reported the Japanese 
fleet at 15° 00ʹ north, 135° 25ʹ east, on course 270° and speed twenty knots. Addi-
tional reports received within the next hour indicated that it was composed of bat-
tleships, carriers, cruisers, oilers, and destroyers. It was divided into three groups: 
a northern group (one carrier, four BBs, six CAs, several DDs), a southern group 
(two light carriers, two oilers, several DDs), and a western group (many ships, 
types uncertain).260 At least one group was on a northerly course at ten knots.261 The 
northern group was about ten miles north of the southern group, and the third, 
larger group was some twenty-five miles westward.262
By midafternoon Spruance no longer feared an enemy end run.263 At 1630 he 
sent Mitscher a message: “Desire to attack enemy tomorrow if we know his position 
with sufficient accuracy. If our patrol planes give us required information tonight 
no carrier searches should be necessary. If not, we must continue searches tomor-
row to ensure adequate protection for Saipan. Point OPTION should be advanced 
to westward as much as air operations permit. Damaged ships tomorrow proceed 
Saipan anchorage.”264 
At 1634, Spruance received a delayed report from an SWPA B-24 Liberator 
search plane of two enemy carriers, two heavy cruisers, and many destroyers at 
12° north, 137° 30ʹ east on course 170° and at twenty-five knots. The sighting had 
occurred at 1120.265 
At dusk, Spruance sent a report to Nimitz about the events of 19 June: 
Task Force 58 made 325-mile search from 185 degrees, launching at 0530 in latitude 14° 
35ʹ north, longitude 143° 40ʹ east. Air attack on Task Force 58 commenced at 1045 coming 
initially from westward and continued for several hours. Some enemy planes landed on 
Guam and Rota but these fields were hit by Task Force 58 planes several times to prevent 
their use. Over three hundred enemy planes are reported destroyed by our planes and AA 
fires. Own aircraft losses not yet reported. Only known damage to our ships: 1 hit on South 
Dakota which does not affect her fighting efficiency. Believe enemy has made long strikes 
depending on Rota and Guam fields for reservicing. If so, his plane losses may be greater 
than expected.266
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This message caused mixed feelings on the part of Nimitz’s staff. TF 58 had suf-
fered little damage, but more importantly, Spruance had failed to inflict any damage 
on the enemy carriers. Spruance’s position at the time of the first search on 19 June 
had been only about ninety miles northwest of Guam and Rota and 125 miles south-
west of Saipan. It was obvious to Nimitz’s staffers that Spruance had kept TF 58’s car-
riers too close to the beachhead. Reportedly, Admiral Towers demanded that Nimitz 
fire Spruance for mishandling the carriers and recommended himself as a replace-
ment.267 Nimitz wisely refused to criticize Spruance’s action without full knowledge 
of the situation. Spruance’s mission was to “capture, occupy and defend Saipan, 
Tinian and Guam.” There had been no mention about going on the offensive against 
an enemy fleet. In Nimitz’s view, staying close to the Marianas and making the en-
emy airfields on Guam and Rota unusable may have been the safest way to prevent 
shuttle bombing or attacks by aircraft coming down from Japan via the Bonins.268
At 1930, Spruance detached TG 58.4 to proceed to a refueling position. This 
carrier group had been striking Guam and Rota.269 At 1957, Lockwood informed 
Spruance that a series of DF fixes had located major units of the enemy fleet within 
a hundred miles of 10° 30ʹ north, 136° 30ʹ east at 1800. The last U.S. plane was re-
covered at 1945. Afterward, TF 58 changed its course to 270° and increased speed 
to eighteen knots. The intention was to reach a position by daylight on 20 June 
to attack the enemy fleet or to attack a reportedly damaged Shōkaku-class carrier 
(in fact, Shōkaku itself);270 Spruance had received a reliable report that a U.S. sub-
marine had torpedoed a carrier about 375 miles west of TF 58. He believed that 
enemy forces were in full retreat. Spruance estimated that the Japanese had lost 383 
aircraft, TF 58 only twenty-five. Aircraft had inflicted no damage on carriers; one 
battleship had been slightly damaged.271
At 2245, Ozawa directed his force to sail immediately to the northwest and ma-
neuver as necessary to refuel on 21 June. Toyoda had directed Ozawa to fight a 
“running” battle after reorganizing the First Mobile Force and to refuel on the 21st. 
Damaged ships would proceed to their bases in Japan. Some of the aircraft carri-
ers would proceed for training in the Lingga Archipelago. Ozawa was to attack the 
enemy task forces in cooperation with land-based aircraft on 22 June. Afterward, 
he would deploy his air units to land bases, where they would come under control 
of the Commander, 5th Base Air Force. The aircraft carriers would proceed to their 
respective training bases. After 22 June, Ozawa was to use the remaining forces 
under his command for “mopping up” operations around Saipan.272 For his part, 
Mitscher, in his initial report for the actions on 19 June, claimed that 358 enemy 
aircraft had been shot down, while his own losses were only twenty-five aircraft.273 
The Japanese official report admitted losses of 450 aircraft but estimated that 160 
enemy aircraft had been shot down. 
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The real figures are different. The actual American losses on 19 June were 
twenty-six aircraft, and twenty-four pilots and crews.274 Some three hundred U.S. 
carrier aircraft (all but five of them Hellcats) had engaged enemy aircraft. About 
thirteen had been shot down, and six had been lost to operational causes. The per-
sonnel losses, after rescue operations, were ten pilots and seven air crewmen killed. 
In addition, four officers and twenty-seven enlisted men had been killed on three 
ships damaged or suffering near misses.275 The Japanese had employed 373 carrier 
aircraft for searches and strikes; only 130 returned. They also lost fifty Guam-based 
aircraft.276 U.S. submarines sank two large carriers, Taihō and Shōkaku. Many other 
planes had been lost ditching into the sea, crashing on carrier decks, or going down 
with the two sunken carriers. The total Japanese losses for 19 June had been about 
315 aircraft.277 
The main reason for the Japanese losses was lack of coordination between vari-
ous carrier groups and between carrier and land-based aircraft.278 Ozawa went into 
battle with half the aircraft the enemy had. His pilots were inexperienced. Ozawa 
was misled on the third and fourth attacks about the location of TF 58. He was also 
led to believe that Guam was a sanctuary when in fact it was a graveyard. Ozawa fully 
expected to have five hundred aircraft available from land bases but he never did.279
JICPOA assessed on 19 June that the enemy aircraft destroyed by TF 58 rep-
resented some 70 percent of the enemy’s nine air groups. The remaining aircraft 
would be adequate for two air groups for carriers of the Shōkaku class. The Japanese 
would require at least three months to reconstitute nine air groups—much longer, 
in fact, to form air groups with training equivalent to that with which CarDiv 1 had 
begun the battle (six months), or CarDiv 2 (three and a half months), or CarDiv 
3 (four and a half months). This delay would be caused more by a lack of trained 
aviators than a shortage of planes. JICPOA pointed out that this assessment was 
based on information that had proved excellent in the past and was considered 
reliable.280
At midnight on 19–20 June, TF 58 (minus TG 58.4) was west of Saipan on course 
260° at twenty-three knots.281 The Fifth Fleet’s night searches were extended out to 
550 miles between the bearings of 260° and 270°, and to seven hundred miles be-
tween bearings 270° and 300°. However, none of the searches detected the enemy 
fleet. At 0530 on the 20th, TF 58, by then at 13° 33ʹ north, 141° 03ʹ east, launched 
searches covering the bearings from 205° to 325°. The presence of enemy heavy 
cruisers was assumed, because of contact with Jake seaplanes. Spruance had had 
no report on any Japanese force since 1215 the previous day, when he had received 
Cavalla’s report of having torpedoed Shōkaku. He advised Mitscher that Zuikaku 
(which had been damaged by a bomb that day) might still be afloat and if so would 
most likely head northward. He stated, “Desire to push out searches today as far 
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westward as possible. If no contacts with the enemy fleet consider it indication fleet 
is withdrawing and farther pursuit after today will be unprofitable. If you concur, 
retire tonight toward Saipan. Will order our tankers with TG 58.4 and direct TG 
58.4 remain in vicinity of Saipan. The carrier Zuikaku must be sunk if we can reach 
her.”282 
By midmorning, Spruance still had no information on the location of Ozawa’s 
force. He directed Mitscher to continue searches, indicating that if no enemy 
ships were found, TF 58 would stop its pursuit.283 At noon Mitscher sent a spe-
cial fighter search/strike group armed with five-hundred-pound bombs. The 
fighters flew 450 miles but failed to establish contact; they flew slightly too far 
north.284 At 1330, TF 58’s carriers launched afternoon searches from 13° 25ʹ 
north, 139° 20ʹ east between 235° and 355° out to 325 miles.285
Finally, after so many fruitless searches, aircraft in two separate sectors in 
TF 58’s regular afternoon 250-mile search sighted Ozawa’s forces.286 At 1545, 
TF 58 was at 13° 53ʹ north, 139° 05ʹ east when a report was received from 
one of its search planes indicating an enemy force at 15° 00ʹ north, 135° 25ʹ 
east, on course 270° and speed twenty knots. Within the next hour, Mitscher 
received a second report that the enemy force was disposed in three groups 
and included carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and oilers. No air-
craft had been observed on the decks of the enemy carriers.287 Ozawa’s force 
was steaming in three groups. One was composed of one carrier (Zuikaku), 
two CAs (Haguro and Myoko), and several destroyers. Some twenty miles 
southwest was a second group, two converted carriers (Junyō and Hiyō), one 
light carrier (Ryuho), one battleship (Nagato), and one heavy cruiser (Moga-
mi), plus a destroyer screen. About ten miles due south was the third group, 
three light carriers (Chitose, Chiyoda, and Zuihō), four battleships (Musashi, 
Yamato, Kongō, and Haruna), seven CAs (Takao, Maya, Atago, Kumano, Suzuya, 
Tone, and Chikuma), and a destroyer screen. In addition, there were also six oil-
ers, with a few destroyers.288
At the time of the initial contact, Ozawa’s force bore 289° 290 miles from TF 
58, at the extreme range of U.S. attack aircraft.289 Another major problem was 
that darkness was only a few hours away. Spruance had a difficult decision to 
make. If the aircraft were launched so late in the afternoon, the pilots would at-
tack in dusk and land at night, with gas tanks nearly empty. They could inflict 
some damage, but a follow-up attack the next morning would be nearly impos-
sible, because of the confusion and delay in nighttime recovery of the planes. 
Nonetheless, Mitscher urged Spruance to attack immediately, and Spruance 
agreed.290 
At 1520 Ozawa ordered both the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces to head imme-
diately westward. At 1610 his search planes detected enemy carrier aircraft two 
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hundred nautical miles east of Zuikaku. Five minutes later, these planes sighted 
two carriers and battleships, plus other units, heading west. Ozawa decided to 
strike with torpedo bombers at dusk; the planes would land in the Marianas.291 
At almost the same moment, 1620, Spruance decided to attack Ozawa’s force. 
Mitscher immediately turned his force eastward, into the wind. At 1638 the first of 
216 aircraft (eighty-five fighters, seventy-seven dive-bombers, and fifty-four tor-
pedo bombers) from TF 58’s six heavy and five light carriers were launched.292 All 
were airborne within nine minutes. In the process, the U.S. carriers had moved 
away from the enemy, increasing the distance to about 340 miles by the time of the 
first attack by American aircraft.293 
At 1700 Ozawa ordered a battle disposition for night combat. Twenty minutes 
later, he launched ten torpedo bombers, having decided to attack during the night. 
This decision was based on several factors, among them Ozawa’s expectations that 
the torpedo bombers would be successful and that land-based search planes would 
provide support the next morning. Also, no other enemy forces had been sighted 
in the vicinity of those detected earlier.294
Ozawa could launch only eighty aircraft before 216 aircraft from TF 58 attacked 
his force between 1840 and 1900. The Japanese observed about 130 to 150 enemy 
aircraft attack CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force at 1840 
and for the next hour. They later estimated that CarDiv 1 was attacked by fifty 
aircraft, CarDiv 2 by forty, and the Diversionary Attack Force by about thirty-five. 
The Japanese would claim that more than forty were shot down during the air bat-
tle and seventy by AA fire.295
Mitscher’s report would state that his aircraft had sunk one large carrier of the 
Hitaka class (Hiyō) and had badly damaged, and probably sunk, another ship of 
that class (Junyō). He further reported that the carrier Shōkaku had received three 
or four thousand-pound-bomb hits, and one Kongō-class battleship and one heavy 
cruiser had been hit. Finally, he reported, one destroyer was believed sunk and two 
others damaged, and three tankers sunk and two others burning. Also, fifteen to 
twenty enemy aircraft had been shot down.296
At 1912, Spruance had rejected a suggestion from Mitscher to release Lee’s TG 
58.7 immediately to catch the enemy fleet. It was a mathematical impossibility that 
even these fast ships could overtake Ozawa. Even if some had been able to steam 
at a sustained speed of thirty knots (which was doubtful), they would have closed 
only 120 miles in twelve hours, slightly more than a third of the distance between 
Mitscher’s and Ozawa’s forces. In any case, at Mitscher’s recommendation TF 58 
had remained at sixteen knots to rescue as many pilots as possible. This meant that 
TF 58 was about four knots slower than Ozawa’s force.297
At 1945, Toyoda directed Ozawa to break away from the enemy at an oppor-
tune moment. Five minutes later, Ozawa received a message from Admiral Kusaka, 
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Combined Fleet chief of staff, that the intention was to attempt a renewed attack. At 
2015 Ozawa directed the 1st and 2nd Supply Forces to steam immediately toward 
the west and then head for Nakagusuku Wan, a bay on the east coast of Okinawa.298
For Spruance and Mitscher, meanwhile, the most difficult task was to ensure 
that as many pilots as possible safely reached their carriers. However, because the 
attack had been carried out at extreme range, many inevitably would have to ditch. 
At 2042, TF 58 was at 14° 57ʹ north, 138° 28ʹ east. All task groups turned eastward 
and started recovery of aircraft. All destroyers were directed to recover pilots from 
the water.299 
At 2045, the first aircraft returned. The entire force had to sail about an hour 
and a half on an easterly course to complete their recovery.300 Despite the threat 
of submarines, Mitscher ordered the carriers to illuminate their decks by shining 
searchlights directly up. Picket destroyers fired star shells to help pilots find their 
carriers.301 All red truck lights were turned on.302 
In the aftermath of the attack there was great confusion among TF 58’s carrier 
groups. Many pilots of TGs 58.1 and 58.3 landed on board carriers of TG 58.2.303 
Many aircraft ran out of gas and made forced landings in the water. TF 58 lost in all 
about ninety-five aircraft. Some had been shot down, but the majority were lost by 
crashing on flight decks or ditching into the sea.304 
Because of the difficulty of recovering the pilots, it was not possible to continue 
pursuit of Ozawa’s force. Also, as Mitscher reported, many destroyers were low on 
fuel and needed to be refueled the next day. Hence, Spruance sent a message to 
Nimitz at 2217: “Enemy main body in four groups. 2045 position is latitude 15° 
30ʹ N, longitude 133° 05ʹ E. Approximate course west. After completion recovery 
intend to come to course 315°, speed 16. Many carriers and enemy vessels damaged 
and in confusion. Intend to steam at 16 knots in order to recover many downed 
pilots as possible.”305 
In the meantime, at 2046, Ozawa received the order from Toyoda to retire with 
his six remaining carriers, five battleships, thirteen cruisers, and twenty-eight de-
stroyers.306 At 2100 he canceled his previous order for a night engagement, giving 
as the reasons that his torpedo bombers had been unable to detect the enemy force. 
In addition the enemy air attack on his main body and supply groups at 1530 had 
resulted in the loss of most of his carrier aircraft. He issued a new order that “in the 
event that there is little opportunity for a battle at night immediately retreat to the 
northwest.”307 
Americans claimed that on 20 June at least forty enemy planes had been shot 
down in the air and approximately seventy planes destroyed by AA fire.308 At the 
end of the day the Japanese had only twenty-five aircraft left on their carriers.309 
TF 58’s aircraft had not been as successful in attacking carriers and heavy sur-
face ships as might have been expected. They had sunk only a single carrier—the 
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twenty-eight-thousand-ton Hitaka—and inflicted damage on four other carriers. 
The carrier Hayataka (Junyō) had suffered two direct hits and six near misses, 
while Zuikaku and Chiyoda had received one bomb hit each.310 The carrier Ryuho 
had suffered minor damage. The battleship Haruna had been damaged by a direct 
bomb hit. Also damaged was heavy cruiser Maya, while one destroyer (Hayanami) 
had suffered minor damage. Two oilers (Genyo Maru and Seiyo Maru) had suffered 
heavy damage and had been abandoned; another oiler had been heavily damaged.311 
The Japanese later greatly exaggerated their successes on 20 June, claiming to have 
shot down more than forty planes in the air battle and destroyed seventy by AA.312
The Pursuit, 21–22 June
After the major aerial battles on 19–20 June, Spruance decided to pursue Ozawa’s 
retreating force. The only hope of closing the distance, however, was lost when 
Spruance rejected Mitscher’s suggestion to release Lee’s TG 58.7.313 TF 58’s carrier 
groups were unable to close the range, because they had to turn away to launch and re-
cover their aircraft. Another problem was that TF 58’s air searches were not successful.
During the night of 20–21 June, long-range PBMs based on Saipan searched 
westward out to seven hundred miles. At 2305, one made contact with Ozawa’s 
force at 16° 15ʹ north, 133° 35ʹ east, reporting its course as 330°, its speed as fifteen. 
Spruance considered the prospects of overhauling the enemy fleet discouraging. 
However, he believed that there was a possibility of finding damaged enemy ships, 
so he decided to continue the pursuit. To that end, Spruance directed TG 58.4 and 
a fleet-oiler group to steam westward at best speed and latitude 15° 30ʹ north.314
Spruance did not know at that time that the carriers Hiyō and Shōkaku were still 
afloat. Nor did anyone on his staff know that a single torpedo hit had sunk Taihō.315 
At midnight on 20–21 June, TF 58 was on course 280° at a speed of sixteen knots, 
four knots less than Ozawa’s force was making.316 At 0100, Mitscher canceled a 
previous order for night strikes, because the enemy was probably not within range. 
About half an hour later, another PBM from Saipan reported twenty-five enemy 
ships at 16° 30ʹ north, 132° 48ʹ east, on course 330°, speed fifteen, and trailing oil.317 
The distance between the opposing fleets was then about 327 miles; Ozawa’s force 
bore west by north (285°) from Spruance’s.318
At 0200, only a few hours after completing recovery, TF 58 started a new search 
for the enemy. Several long-range night-flying Avengers were launched from En-
terprise and Bunker Hill between then and 0300.319 When dawn came, however, TF 
58 was in disarray. Its ships were scattered over the ocean. Its carriers were sorting 
out their aircraft, many having landed the night before on the first available flight 
deck. Spruance and Mitscher reorganized the force and continued their pursuit 
and search westward but could find only cripples.320 TF 58 was still steaming at low 
speed to facilitate rescue of pilots, and it became evident that it had no chance to 
overtake Ozawa’s force.321
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At 0600, nevertheless, each task group of TF 58 launched a deck-load strike of 
Hellcats carrying 450-pound bombs in the hope of sinking the cripples. The pilots 
were directed to return if they found no targets after flying about three hundred 
miles. None of them found any enemy ship.322 However, at 0743 an Avenger from 
Bunker Hill sighted the enemy force at 17° 30ʹ north, 131° 40ʹ east, on course 300° 
at twenty knots.323 That was about 360 miles away, well beyond the effective range of 
the U.S. carrier bombers.324 Mitscher reported to Spruance that his scouting planes, 
fitted with a special fuel tank, could search out to 360 miles but that strikes were 
limited to 250.325 The new information on the location of the enemy confirmed 
Spruance’s belief that Ozawa was trying to reach his home bases and was moving 
faster than TF 58. Hence, there was no chance to close the range and attack. For this 
reason Spruance directed Mitscher to carry on the search for cripples and to seize 
every opportunity to strike.326 Spruance also ordered Mitscher to detach TG 58.2 
(less carriers Cabot and Monterey) to join TG 58.7 as the battle-line carrier group, 
which was to attack the enemy force and “inflict maximum damage.”327
In the meantime, Ozawa directed CarDiv 3 to search between 90° and 180° and 
out to 350 nautical miles. These searches were negative. At 0715, Force A and Force 
B were directed to proceed to Nakagusuku Wan and the 2nd Diversionary Attack 
Force to Guimaras.328 At 1030, Ozawa concluded that his force had successfully 
evaded pursuit by the enemy fleet. All units of the main force were directed to reach 
Nakagusuku Wan by the morning of the 22nd. The 2nd Diversionary Attack Force 
would be in a state of readiness in the central and southern parts of the Philippines. 
The battleship Fusō and 1st and 2nd Supply Forces were assigned to the 2nd Di-
versionary Attack Force. However, because of the enemy action and the difficulties 
of refueling at sea, Ozawa decided that the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force would 
temporarily anchor at Nakagusuku Wan, refuel, and then set out for Guimaras.329 
The Second Fleet was sent to the Singapore area, and the 3rd Fleet was ordered to 
train and equip in home waters and to achieve readiness for future operations.330
Spruance’s pursuit of Ozawa’s force had been complicated, as noted, not only by 
the need to sail on easterly courses to launch aircraft but also by low fuel states on 
board the destroyers. All task groups had to slow down. For example, Lee’s TG 58.7 
steamed at only eleven knots, on course 280°, from 1200 to 1516. After refueling it 
increased its speed to fifteen knots.331 At 1050 on 21 June Spruance directed Admi-
ral Lee, now reinforced by Wasp and Bunker Hill (which had been sent to him, as 
noted above, for air cover), to press ahead at best speed. At 1126 Spruance himself 
boarded Indianapolis to join the battle line. The carriers followed, making good 
about fifteen knots. However, some of the group’s destroyers were dangerously low 
on fuel and had to be refueled. This led to a further delay, while from 1205 until 
1454 battleships fueled destroyers, steaming between eleven and fourteen knots. 
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At 1516, TF 58 increased to fifteen knots, and on 280°.332 During the first twelve 
hours on 21 June, TF 58 made good only 150 miles. It was actually falling behind 
the enemy.333
At about 1500, TF 58 launched another search group. Spruance allowed it four 
hours to make contact.334 At 1920, shortly after the sun went down, when no enemy 
ships had been sighted, Spruance directed Mitscher to retire on course 90°, along 
parallel 15° 30ʹ north.335 At 2000, Spruance abandoned the pursuit. TF 58 was then 
at position 16° 02ʹ north, 133° 54ʹ east, or some seven hundred miles from Saipan. 
TF 58 then turned to an easterly course toward Saipan. The last contact with the 
enemy fleet had been at 0743, when it was moving northwestward and at twenty 
knots.336 The battle of the Philippine Sea was over.
When Spruance turned away, Ozawa’s force was about three hundred miles 
from Okinawa. The same evening, Ozawa dictated a message to Toyoda offering 
to resign. He expressed his deepest regret that he had lost this opportunity to lead 
the Japanese on the glorious path of victory. Toyoda, after consulting with the navy 
minister, refused to accept Ozawa’s resignation.337
During the entire day on 21 June, efforts to rescue TF 58’s pilots continued by 
destroyers, scouting aircraft of TF 58, and planes based on Saipan. Lockwood also 
redeployed his submarines to assist.338 Many pilots were rescued and brought to 
safety; total losses were twenty-two pilots and twenty-seven other airmen.339 Lock-
wood also directed submarines to cover the enemy withdrawal, whether to home 
waters or Luzon.340
During the night of 21–22 June, six PBMs from Saipan searched bearings from 
240° to 300° and out to seven hundred miles. However, results were negative.341 
At about noon on 22 June, TF 58 made a prearranged rendezvous with fleet oilers 
some 220 miles east of the point where the retirement had commenced. Refueling 
continued until nightfall and was completed the next day.342
On 22 June, Ozawa’s main body and the majority of the 2nd Diversionary Attack 
Force entered Nakagusuku Wan at 1300 and 1500, respectively. The transfer of per-
sonnel from the sunken ships to other ships in the force then started.343 Four of the 
six surviving carriers, together with the battleship Haruna and the heavy cruiser 
Maya, had to proceed to Japan either for repairs or for long-delayed upkeep. The 
fleet brought back only thirty-five serviceable planes.344 Toyoda directed Ozawa 
that the entire force (less battleship Fusō and light cruiser Natori) was to proceed to 
the western part of the Inland Sea.345
In this decisive encounter between opposing carrier forces, out of nine Japanese 
carriers, six survived. However, their fighting strength was emasculated, because so 
many pilots were lost.346 The United States claimed that the Japanese lost 476 planes 
and 445 aviators.347 Between leaving Tawi-Tawi at 1000 on 13 June and launching 
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the first air attack at 0730 on 19 June, the First Mobile Force transited some 1,550 
miles at average speed of thirteen knots after allowing twenty-four hours for refuel-
ing en route.348
The Japanese after-action report concluded that the battle should have been 
fought in the Iwo Jima area. Its authors blamed inadequate intelligence and air 
search for the ultimate failure of the A-Go operation. Further, the report’s draft-
ers argued, Japanese search planes having detected the U.S. fleet, on 18 June at a 
distance of 380 miles, the enemy carriers should have been attacked that afternoon. 
Finally, they held, had the A-Go operation started on 12, not 15, June, the enemy 
carriers could have been attacked on the 15th, and a decisive battle could have been 
fought even earlier.349 However, the main reason for the Japanese failure was the 
incomplete state of training of the pilots and their lack of flying experience. 
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VI Japanese A-Go Operation (Battle of the  
Philippine Sea), 13–22 June 1944
Conclusions and Operational Lessons Learned
The Combined Fleet and the U.S. Fifth Fleet operated over an ocean area stretching from the southern Philippines in the west to the Marshalls in the east. Prior to the beginning of the A-Go operation, Japanese naval forces 
and aircraft had available to them a large number of bases and airfields in the Cen-
tral Pacific and southern Philippines. The Fifth Fleet had only the advance bases in 
the newly captured Marshalls and Gilberts. Their main bases at Pearl Harbor were 
thousands of miles from the pending operating area off the southern Marianas. 
Initially, the Fifth Fleet had to transit some 1,580 miles from its advance bas-
es in the Marshalls to the Marianas; the deployment distance for the First Mobile 
Force was more than 1,900 miles. Prior to their deployments, both fleets operated 
from exterior positions. This situation had changed once the Fifth Fleet arrived in 
the proximity of the southern Marianas. Then its Task Force 58 operated from an 
operationally central position with regard to the approaching First Mobile Force. 
Japanese naval land-based aircraft in the Marianas occupied tactically a central po-
sition throughout the entire operation, while those aircraft based in the Palaus and 
on Yap and Truk operated from an exterior position. The American advance bases 
in the Marshalls and the Gilberts represented exterior positions in the invasion of 
the Marianas. The geographic positions and distances between them always play criti-
cal roles in a war at sea. Their importance is especially critical in the initial deploy-
ment of naval forces and aviation. The military characteristics of a maritime theater 
must be properly evaluated; yet the importance of geography and distances should not 
be overemphasized. Ultimately what counts most for the success in war is the factor of 
force, its human element in particular.
The Allies established a sound command structure in the Pacific theater. Admi-
ral Nimitz had full control over all naval, ground, and air forces in the Pacific Ocean 
Areas (POA). The only exception was the Twentieth Air Force, which was controlled 
by General Arnold. Nimitz’s staff was composed of representatives of all services. 
Nonetheless, Nimitz had too many responsibilities. He was not only a theater- 
strategic commander (as CINCPOA) but also an area fleet commander (as 
CINCPac). This sometimes created problems, because he was subordinate at the 
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same time to both the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Admiral King. Spruance, as 
commander of the Fifth Fleet, exercised full authority and responsibility over all 
subordinate forces. He was de facto an operational commander, because he had au-
thority over all forces deployed in the Central Pacific. Admiral Lockwood had con-
trol only over the submarines of the Pacific Fleet; however, he did not control the 
deployment and employment of submarines in the SWPA’s Task Force 71, which 
operated in the southwestern Pacific, including Philippine waters. A sound theater 
command organization should be simple and flexible. The chain of command should 
be straightforward, with clear lines of responsibilities for all commanders. All forces 
operating within the boundaries of a given maritime theater should be controlled by 
a single commander; otherwise no effective planning, preparations, and execution 
of military actions can be accomplished. This is especially critical in high-intensity 
conventional warfare. A theater commander should not overly centralize command 
and control by collecting too many responsibilities but should establish intermediate 
levels of command. 
In contrast to the Allies, the Japanese had a highly fragmented command struc-
ture. They never established a theater-strategic level of command in the Pacific the-
ater as the Allies did. They also lacked a truly joint command in the Central Pacific. 
Relations between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army at the highest levels were 
generally bad; this was less of a problem at the middle and lower command levels. 
The striking power of the Combined Fleet was concentrated in the First Mobile 
Force (often called the “First Striking Force” in JICPOA/COMINCH intelligence 
assessments), created on 25 February 1944 from the (disbanded) First Fleet and the 
Second Fleet. The First Mobile Force included the First Mobile Fleet (all the carri-
ers), all the battleships of the former First Fleet, and the heavy cruisers and destroy-
ers of the Second Fleet. The First Mobile Force continued to be directly subordinate 
to the Combined Fleet. On 10 March the Combined Fleet also established a new 
intermediate and geographically based command, the Central Pacific Area Fleet. 
The new command, under Admiral Nagumo, was intended to strengthen defenses 
in the Japanese mandated islands. In theory, Nagumo commanded all Japanese na-
val and ground forces in the Central Pacific. However, that was not the case in 
practice; his army counterpart retained full administrative and tactical control of 
all army units in the Central Pacific. The consequence of this lack of unity of com-
mand was that no unified plan was ever prepared for the defense of the Marianas. 
In the modern era, success in combat at the operational-tactical level and higher 
requires the closest cooperation of forces among two or more services—what the Unit-
ed States calls “jointness.” No single combat arm or service can reach its full potential 
today unless it is employed in combination with other combat arms, branches, or 
services. Shortcomings of one service can be balanced by capabilities of others. A joint 
force commander has more options than a single-service component commander in 
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employing forces, because sea, land, air, and special-operations elements collectively 
offer a wider range of possibilities. At the same time, the enemy is put at a great dis-
advantage against a multidimensional threat for which he might not have an effective 
counter. Multiservice forces allow creative operational commanders to combine their 
diverse but complementary capabilities in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways 
and to generate an impact greater than the sum of those of the individual parts.
By the beginning of 1944, the Allied strength in the air was overwhelming. In 
the first six months of 1944, as preliminaries to the invasion of the Marshalls, the 
isolation of Truk, and the landings in the Marianas, TF 58 and the Army and Navy 
land-based aircraft in SWPA, SOPAC, and CENTPAC conducted massive strikes 
and raids against Japanese strongpoints, bases, and shipping. These strikes were 
complemented by attacks by submarines against military and commercial shipping. 
Cumulatively, air strikes and submarines attacks wore down considerably Japanese 
air strength in the Central Pacific. A large number of naval vessels, mostly trans-
ports, were sunk or damaged; regular reinforcement and supply of Japanese forces 
in the Central Pacific were thereby made much more difficult. The mobility of TF 
58 allowed rapid shifting of strikes from one part of the theater to another. Allied 
air strikes also forced the Japanese to redeploy their forces to areas less exposed. On 
a few occasions the Japanese high command was misled regarding whether carrier 
strikes were raids or preludes to imminent invasion. Modern warfare at sea is a 
combination of decisive operation and weakening of the enemy by numerous tactical 
actions and over time—that is, “attrition.” A proper balance must be found between 
these two methods of combat employment of forces. Properly applied, the tenets of 
operational art should prevent attrition from, by design or default, predominating.
By 30 May 1944 Nimitz, Spruance, and all task force commanders were well 
informed about all major movements of the enemy naval forces and land-based 
aircraft in the entire Pacific theater, and specifically in the Central Pacific, the NEI, 
the Philippines, and western New Guinea. They had fairly accurate and reliable 
information on major organizational changes in the IJN and the location of fleet 
commanders. They also had good intelligence on Japanese plans and intentions. 
Most of this information was obtained through the radio intercept and radio traffic 
analysis and direction finding. Some was acquired from search aircraft and sub-
marines. The biggest single success came in early July when, through an accident, 
American-led Filipino guerrillas retrieved a copy of the Combined Fleet’s plan for 
the Z operation. Also, Allied intelligence was occasionally able to get information 
on Japanese assessments of the situation and perceptions of possible future Allied 
actions. Intelligence plays an important, often critical, role in the decisions of opera-
tional commanders. Sources of intelligence should be diverse, and different methods 
of collecting, processing, and analyzing information should be used whenever possible. 
One should be very cautious in relying on decrypted messages; if the enemy becomes 
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aware that his messages are being read, he can use them to feed false information and 
achieve surprise.
Admiral Nimitz and his staff were the key architects of the campaign plan for 
the seizure of the archipelagoes of the Central Pacific (Operation GRANITE II). Fi-
nal decisions on the sequencing of major operations in the POA and SWPA were 
made by the JCS, although Nimitz and MacArthur, respectively, were consulted. 
Nimitz’s plan for the invasion of the Marianas (FORAGER), OPLAN 3-44, was clear 
and succinct. The ultimate objective of seizing control of the southern Marianas 
was to establish advance bases for attacks on the enemy maritime traffic, for the 
strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands, and for the iso-
lation and neutralization of the Carolines. Surprisingly, however, Nimitz’s plan 
mentioned nothing about how the Combined Fleet might interfere. By early May 
1944 American naval intelligence had reliable and accurate information on the re-
deployment of enemy carriers, large surface combatants, and destroyers from the 
Lingga Archipelago and the home islands to Tawi-Tawi, Davao, and other bases in 
the southern Philippines. Nimitz, Spruance, and their subordinate commanders 
received copies of the captured plan for the Z operation. Yet for some reason Nimitz 
and his staff did not change their assumptions about possible enemy reactions, or, 
accordingly, OPLAN 3-44. 
Spruance’s OPLAN 10-44 of 12 May was based on several realistic assumptions, 
primarily that the southern Marianas were strongly defended. It also assumed that 
Japanese long-range aircraft based in the Carolines and on Iwo Jima and Chichi 
Jima would attack U.S. forces in the southern Marianas. It further postulated that 
the Allied aircraft based in the Marshalls and in the SWPA would prevent enemy 
aircraft in the Carolines from interfering. In contrast to Nimitz’s plan, Spruance’s 
OPLAN 10-44 assumed the “possibility” that enemy naval forces and carrier-based 
aircraft would try to prevent the capture of the southern Marianas or to interfere 
with the unloading of material and personnel should the United States accom-
plish its objectives there. That assumption was the basis for the missions issued to 
Admiral Mitscher. However, Spruance clearly believed that enemy surface forces 
would interfere with the U.S. amphibious force after, not prior to, the landings on 
Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Characteristically, Spruance delegated to Mitscher au-
thority to modify the basic plan on the basis of changes in the situation. Operation 
plans should be short and clear. They should contain only information unavailable 
to subordinate commanders but necessary for sound decisions. A higher commander 
should take care not to omit assumptions critical for planning by subordinates. An 
operational commander should not base planning assumptions on the expected suc-
cess of his forces. Planning assumptions should be few in number. They should deal 
with uncertainties in the operational situation that could have major impacts on the 
development and execution of plans.
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The Combined Fleet’s planning for defense of the Mandates was very thor-
ough and methodical. Its initial plans were drafted in mid-August 1943, during 
the struggle for the control of the Solomons. The draft envisaged the destruction of 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a “single blow” should the Allies advance into the Central 
Pacific and the Philippines. That operation was anticipated for mid-1944. Formally, 
the IJN shifted after March 1944 to the strategic defensive, as directed by IGHQ. 
The weight of main effort shifted to the southeast area. This meant that the major-
ity of the IJN’s surface forces was redeployed to the Inner South Seas Area. Admiral 
Koga drafted the Z operation plan, which called for the employment of the entire 
Combined Fleet against the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The Z plan was ambitious, encompassing the entire area within the Japanese 
defense perimeter in the spring of 1944. It was also based on a rather inflexible view 
of the situation. Various operational districts and interception zones were drawn 
well in advance and divided into a number of “operational” districts. Excessive re-
liance on scripted scenarios and actions/reactions was typical of Japanese naval 
operational planning. It showed great lack of creativity on the part of senior naval 
commanders and their planners. Similarly, the basic Z plan consisted of four subor-
dinate plans, based on whether certain scenarios happened or not. Each envisaged 
an attack from the flank; this might have been one of the reasons for Spruance’s 
concern that the enemy carriers might attempt to attack in the rear of TF 58. The 
greatest problems for the Japanese were lack of adequate training of the carrier 
air groups and uncertainty of fuel supplies. Operational planners should not rely 
on scripted scenarios, because they lead to overly detailed and inflexible plans and 
orders. An operation plan drawn well in advance should be regularly updated and, 
in case of drastic changes in the strategic or operational situation, modified or even 
abandoned. It should pose multiple threats to the enemy. It should avoid past pat-
terns of employment of forces. It should be novel and creative and should surprise the 
enemy. A sound operation plan should include deception; the success of the basic plan 
should not depend on successful deception.
Admiral Toyoda only slightly modified the plan for the Z operation, renaming it 
“A-Go.” Like the previous plan, the A-Go plan envisaged employment of the entire 
carrier force, four air flotillas of the base air forces, and submarines in a decisive 
battle. Yet Toyoda did not provide timelines in his modified plan. The employ-
ment of the Base Air Force was predicated on the destruction of about a third of 
the enemy carrier forces prior to the beginning of a decisive battle. This seems 
unrealistic, because such a weakening of the enemy’s principal strength could not 
have been achieved prior to a decisive clash between carrier forces. Operation plans 
should be neither too detailed nor too broad. The basic plan for a major operation 
or campaign should provide some tentative timing and sequencing of the objectives 
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to be accomplished; otherwise operational sequencing/synchronization and logistical 
support/sustainment cannot be properly planned.
The U.S. Fifth Fleet was numerically and qualitatively greatly superior to the 
First Mobile Force and the base air forces that took part in the A-Go operation. 
TF 58’s single greatest superiority was in combat experience and skill of its pilots, 
the reason for that being the U.S. Navy had a much more effective way of training 
its pilots than the IJN did. The American ships also had much more advanced and 
reliable radars and radios. However, the range of U.S. carrier aircraft was consider-
ably shorter than that of their Japanese counterparts. That gave a potentially great 
advantage to Ozawa, who would be able to detect the U.S. carriers before they could 
detect his own. Ozawa was able to count as well on the support of naval land-based 
aircraft based in the Marianas and Carolines for search and attack; however, their ef-
fectiveness steadily decreased in the months preceding the A-Go operation. Ozawa’s 
carrier aircraft were potentially able to refuel at land bases and then reattack; they 
were also able to use land bases as sanctuaries in case of some damage. The United 
States had a large number of aircraft in the Gilberts and Marshalls, but they had 
inadequate range to attack Ozawa’s force. Another great disadvantage for Spruance 
was that because of the prevailing easterly trade winds, TF 58 had to steam away 
from Ozawa’s force to launch or recover aircraft.
The Japanese had a potentially significant advantage in their better doctrine 
for, and proven skills in conducting, night surface actions. This was the result of 
their doctrinal development and training in the interwar years. In contrast, the 
U.S. Navy had paid little attention to that important aspect of surface warfare in 
the 1920s and 1930s. In 1942–43, during the long struggle for the Solomons, it 
gradually improved its capabilities in night fighting. However, they were still inad-
equate. In peacetime, one should develop a sound and comprehensive doctrine for the 
combat employment of naval forces and aircraft; no aspect of naval warfare should 
be neglected or, worse, ignored; otherwise, it will not be possible to train and prepare 
properly for combat with a strong opponent. Errors made in peacetime are difficult, if 
not impossible, to correct once hostilities at sea begin. Faulty tactical doctrine has an 
invariably negative effect on the employment of naval forces and aviation in a major 
naval/joint operation or campaign. 
By June 1944, the U.S. Navy had an overwhelming superiority over the IJN in 
the logistical support and sustainment of its forces, which were deployed many 
thousands of miles from the nearest bases. Its underway-replenishment capabilities 
were unmatched.
TF 58 used advance bases in the Marshalls for rest and preparation for the in-
vasion of the southern Marianas. Its carrier pilots were battle-hardened veterans 
of almost continuous combat in the spring of 1944. In contrast, the First Mobile 
Force required much training prior to the activation of the A-Go operation. After 
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mid-May the opportunities for training pilots were much reduced, because the 
First Mobile Force moved from Lingga to Tawi-Tawi, where there were no airfields. 
At Tawi-Tawi, however, its commanders and staffs were involved in a number of 
table maneuvers and war games in which all details of the A-Go operation plans 
were rehearsed. There were also numerous staff meetings. These preparations were 
much more thorough than those for the Midway-Aleutians operation in 1942. 
Orders issued by IGHQ and NGS on 3 May 1944 were the first documents 
specifying the operating areas of the Combined Fleet and setting a deadline for 
completion of preparations for a decisive battle. The First Mobile Force would be 
assembled in the south-central part of the Philippines, while the First Air Fleet 
would be deployed in the Central Pacific area, the Philippines, and north of Austra-
lia. A location for decisive battle would be selected as close as possible to the forces’ 
deployment areas. Should the U.S. Pacific Fleet attack prior to the completion of 
Japanese preparations, the Combined Fleet would avoid a decisive battle. Instead, 
enemy forces would be attacked by the Base Air Force and local area-defense forces.
Toyoda, in his order issued the same day, laid down that a decisive battle would 
be fought with the entire strength of the First Mobile Force and a major part of 
the Base Air Force. Toyoda selected the Palaus and western Carolines as the site of 
the battle. The Japanese plan for the A-Go operation was elaborate and envisaged 
almost every possible scenario, yet it was based on several false assumptions. For 
example, the Japanese were overconfident in decisive victory over the skillful and 
much stronger enemy fleet. They also seemed to underestimate the enemy’s abil-
ity to discern the movements and probable intentions of the Japanese forces. Yet at 
the same time, the Japanese commanders had fairly accurate information on the 
strength of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Most of the data were obtained by land-based search 
aircraft and direction finding. Also, despite perennially poor intelligence support, 
the Japanese high command was able to deduce enemy intentions properly, on the 
basis of analysis of the enemy’s past actions but also of reliance on plain common 
sense and logical thinking.
The Fifth Fleet executed pre-invasion strikes by TF 58’s carriers and prelimi-
nary bombardments by heavy surface ships against the defenses, naval vessels, mer-
chant shipping, and airfields in the southern Marianas as envisaged in Admiral 
Spruance’s basic plan. The air strikes encountered little opposition in the air. In 
addition, long-range heavy bombers based in SWPA, SOPAC, and CENTPAC con-
ducted what are now called “operational fires” designed to isolate the Marianas 
from other Japanese-controlled areas and to prevent the arrival of air reinforce-
ments. In planning a major amphibious landing on a defended shore it is necessary to 
conduct naval surface fire support and close air support shortly before and during the 
landing and during the battle ashore. Optimally, the amphibious objective area should 
be isolated from the rest of the enemy-controlled area by means of operational fires. 
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They can be also used to deceive the enemy about the true objectives of the amphibi-
ous forces and the timing of their landing.
During the pre-invasion strikes Spruance and his subordinate task force com-
manders received numerous alerts from JICPOA on the locations and movements 
of Japanese naval forces and aircraft in the southern Philippines. However, the 
most valuable reports were from TF 17’s submarines in the area. Bowfin’s report 
of 12 June on the presence of the enemy forces in the Sulu Sea, however, was in 
Spruance’s view inconclusive. He decided therefore to proceed with the planned 
landing on Saipan but at the same time alerted his fleet about the possibility of an 
engagement on 17 June. More important was the report the next day from the sub-
marine Redfin of a large number of ships, including carriers, in the Sibutu Passage. 
For some reason Spruance considered that report too as inconclusive and so con-
tinued with the planned operations for the next four days. JICPOA and COMINCH 
daily radio-intelligence summaries on 13 June concluded that a major operation by 
the First Mobile Force was under way. Spruance should have taken these reports as 
conclusive enough to prepare his fleet for a battle, delay the landing on Saipan, and 
cancel strikes by two task groups on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. 
Mitscher’s estimate of the situation on 13 June described fairly realistically the 
operational situation facing his task force. In contrast to the view then prevalent in 
the Fifth Fleet, Mitscher and his staff warned that the Japanese might actually risk 
their fleet in defense of the Marianas and that the Fifth Fleet should be fully pre-
pared for such an eventuality. Mitscher and his staff accepted the possibility of an 
end run by the enemy if TF 58 steamed too far westward without proper searches 
on its southern flank. Yet they apparently minimized the threat to U.S. shipping 
off Saipan. However, there is no way of knowing how much damage would have 
been inflicted on amphibious shipping or whether the enemy would have been 
destroyed in the process.
On 14 June, or one day prior to the landing on Saipan, Nimitz and his staff 
received quite accurate information about the composition of Ozawa’s force. They 
were now convinced that the Japanese intended to execute a modified Z operation. 
Likewise, King and his staff in Washington were not surprised by the movements 
of the enemy forces in the southern Philippines. 
After U.S. carrier strikes on the southern Marianas began, Toyoda received de-
tails of the composition of the enemy forces and their activities. He became quickly 
convinced that an invasion of the Marianas was imminent. He issued an alert order 
for the Combined Fleet in the late afternoon on 13 June and temporarily aban-
doned the effort to counter a landing on Biak. Toyoda decided that a decisive battle 
would be conducted on 19 June. His plan was that the First Mobile Force and the 
Base Air Force would attack the enemy “regular” (i.e., fleet) carriers—that is, the 
enemy’s operational center of gravity—during daylight hours. The initial attacks 
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would be conducted by the base air forces. Yet perhaps a better plan would have 
been to conduct simultaneous strikes from several directions by both carrier and 
land-based naval aircraft. 
Ozawa’s force maintained strict radio silence upon leaving Guimaras on 15 June 
and until the evening of the 18th. During the approach phase, Ozawa was regularly 
informed by Toyoda about the situation and enemy activities around the Marianas. 
This information, though it lacked detail, was sufficiently accurate to allow Ozawa 
to make sound assessments and decisions. He correctly concluded that the enemy 
carriers would not move more than three hundred miles west of Saipan and so he 
was in no danger of a flanking attack. Ozawa also was correct that the enemy would 
attack the southern islands in the archipelago first. 
For his part, Spruance’s main source of information between 15 and 18 June were 
reports from submarines. The most critical were sent by Flying Fish and Seahorse 
on 15 June. Although JICPOA provided a steady stream of reports, none of them 
pertained to the location and movements of Ozawa’s force. However, Spruance and 
his task force commanders received many decrypted Combined Fleet messages to 
subordinate major commanders. Among other things, Nimitz and Spruance knew 
that Toyoda considered the operation then under way to be “decisive” and that the 
Japanese assumed that the United States knew that the First Mobile Force intended 
to fight on 18 or 19 June. They also had good knowledge of current and planned 
activity by Japanese naval aircraft in the Marianas and Carolines and on Mindanao. 
Yet neither Nimitz nor Spruance suggested, in the light of the change in the situ-
ation, delaying the landing on Saipan until the approaching enemy force was de-
feated and full local sea control obtained. Operational commanders should conduct 
running estimates of the operational situation once operations are under way. They 
should make new decisions in case of drastic changes in the operational situation, ap-
propriately altering or even abandoning the operational plan.
By 16 June, submarine reports and information received from Nimitz had con-
vinced Spruance that the Japanese had decided to risk everything and seek a deci-
sive battle. Hence, he made a correct decision to delay the landing on Guam. On 
Admiral Turner’s recommendation, however, he did not move all the transports 
eastward from Saipan. Spruance had to pay attention to the views of his most senior 
subordinate commander, but when he made this decision, he was unaware that 
the situation on Saipan was not as grave as Turner told him. Spruance should have 
consulted not only Turner but also Gen. Holland Smith, who was the senior com-
mander on the ground.
Spruance’s battle plan, issued in the afternoon of 17 June to Mitscher and Ad-
miral Lee (CTG 58.7) was short but contradictory. Among other things, Spruance 
clearly stated that the objective of the pending operation was the “complete destruc-
tion” (emphasis added) of the enemy fleet. Yet that would have required giving TF 
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58 full freedom of action, even to move out of supporting distance of the U.S. troops 
on Saipan and the invasion forces in the southern Marianas. Also, Spruance’s plan 
did not mention the possibility that the enemy might attempt a flanking attack. 
This was clearly an omission, because all his major decisions during the operation 
were almost exclusively influenced by that concern. The operational plan should de-
scribe the missions issued to their subordinate tactical commanders succinctly and yet 
clearly. They should not use language that contradicts previous decisions or expressed 
intentions. The words matter.
The decision to re-create TG 58.7 in the late afternoon of 17 June was perhaps 
unnecessary, since neither Spruance nor Lee was ready, and for good reason, to 
fight a night surface action. The major disadvantage of pulling battleships and ac-
companying cruisers and destroyers out of the carrier groups was a considerable 
weakening of their shipboard air and antisubmarine defenses. This seems to have 
been too high a risk to take, because there was no way of knowing prior to the 
actual engagement between the carriers how effective the Japanese pilots would 
be. Normally, the operational commanders should not direct changes in task organi-
zation. If such changes are made, it is necessary to find a balance between offensive 
capabilities and the absolute necessity to defend and protect the friendly operational 
center of gravity adequately.
Spruance’s assumption that the enemy would first use carriers and then heavy 
surface ships was not plausible unless the initial carrier engagement ended in a 
Japanese victory. Only then would Ozawa be able to finish off the remnants of TF 
58 with battleships and other surface combatants. 
Spruance’s message to Mitscher and Lee in the late afternoon of 17 June gave 
them significant freedom in the dispositions and movements of their respective 
forces. Yet in the course of the operation Spruance made many tactical decisions 
that were clearly the responsibilities of Mitscher and Lee. The problem was perhaps 
that Spruance’s flagship at that point, the cruiser Indianapolis, was in TG 58.3, of 
which Mitscher’s flagship, the carrier Lexington, was also a part. The result was 
contrary to Spruance’s usual style of delegating authority to tactical command-
ers. Operational commanders should generally avoid making tactical decisions and 
thereby usurping the authority and responsibility of subordinate commanders. The 
only exception is if decisions of a subordinate could endanger the entire operation or 
that of an adjacent commander. In such a case, the operational commanders are duty 
bound to reverse the decision. Normally, area or numbered-fleet commanders should 
have headquarters ashore, with much better opportunities to evaluate the operational 
situation and less temptation to make tactical decisions.
Spruance’s most important, and also the most controversial, decision was not 
to let TF 58 steam too far westward during the night hours and thereby, Spruance 
feared, possibly allow part of the enemy fleet to get around behind and attack the 
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amphibious shipping off Saipan. Yet Spruance repeatedly misinterpreted the en-
emy’s intentions. Initially, Spruance and many of his subordinate task force com-
manders (but not Mitscher) believed that the Japanese would not commit their 
fleet to oppose a U.S. invasion of the Marianas, probably because they had not 
committed their fleet in defense of the Gilberts or Marshalls. Spruance’s second 
misinterpretation was his firm belief that part of Ozawa’s force would try to make 
an end run. Spruance was clearly influenced in that respect by his study of the 
captured plan for the Z operation; also, several messages from JICPOA and Nimitz 
referred to the possibility. He also believed that, having talked to some Japanese of-
ficers prior to hostilities, he knew the Japanese navy’s way of war. Even reports by 
submarines on the location of Ozawa’s fleet were not enough to change his decision 
on 18–19 June. In contrast, Ozawa correctly analyzed the situation and concluded 
that Spruance, as a cautious commander, would not venture far to the westward 
beyond Saipan’s beaches. In making their decisions, operational commanders should 
assess the enemy’s possible options on the basis of capabilities, not intentions. The only 
exception is when an operational commander has positive knowledge of the enemy’s 
plans. 
Spruance had many admirable qualities as a naval operational commander. 
However, he was cautious (as Ozawa correctly noted) and averse to high risk. He 
also probably interpreted too narrowly the mission of his fleet. An admiral with 
Nelson’s boldness and energy would have undoubtedly acted differently than 
Spruance did. But at the same time, such an admiral would have taken very high 
risks—and also the responsibility, had he failed.
Spruance’s decision brought severe criticism shortly after it was made. He was 
criticized especially by the aviators on Nimitz’s staff. They believed that Spruance 
had essentially tied the carriers to the beaches and thereby prevented them from 
achieving a much larger victory. From a purely tactical perspective, such criticism 
is not without merit. However, Spruance was an operational commander, and his 
overall responsibilities were much greater. The United States was conducting a ma-
jor amphibious landing, and TF 58 was there to provide distant (or operational) 
cover and support. This meant that TF 58 had to operate within a supporting dis-
tance of the amphibious forces on and near Saipan; to do otherwise would incur 
too much risk. 
Normally, a major opposed amphibious landing would require the attacker to 
obtain at least local control of the surface and associated airspace. However, the 
situation in Operation FORAGER did not fit such a scenario. The U.S. force transited 
over an “uncommanded” sea and then landed on Saipan without any opposition 
by the enemy fleet. Toyoda activated the A-Go operation only on 13 June, after 
becoming convinced that the U.S. carrier strikes were not a raid but a prelude to an 
invasion of the southern Marianas; at that time his fleet was some 1,900 miles away. 
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Only after it sortied was it possible for Spruance to prepare for a decisive engage-
ment. Inherent in such a situation was that the stronger fleet would be operation-
ally on the defensive, while the weaker fleet would be on the offensive. The Fifth 
Fleet already possessed de facto local sea control of the surface and the air on 19–20 
June. Its mission was to deny that control to the enemy and thereby protect U.S. 
forces on the beaches and off Saipan. Nimitz and Spruance should have delayed 
the landings on Saipan for a few days after learning from radio intercepts on 13–14 
June that Toyoda had activated the A-Go operation; then there would have been 
no limitations on TF 58’s movements and actions. Also, the Fifth Fleet would have 
been in a position to go over to the offensive.
The A-Go operation, or the battle of the Philippine Sea, is yet another of the numer-
ous historical examples that show the importance of a proper balance between the 
material and human elements of the factor of force in achieving victory in combat 
and in a war as a whole. While superiority in materiel, numerical and qualitative, is 
often a critical factor, it is much more important to possess superiority in elements 
that are hard or impossible to quantify—that is, the education, training, and skill of 
leaders and subordinates, will to fight, morale, discipline, and unit cohesion. The 
human element in war is of inestimable and timeless value and importance, but it is 
often underestimated or even ignored in our information age. Yet experience con-
clusively shows that wars are fought and won by humans, not machines, no matter 
how advanced they are. 
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